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INTRODUCTION 
B Y PROFESSOR W . J . A S H L E Y 
FRIEDRICH NAUMANN is probably the most widely read 
political writer in Germany. " He has his readers "—wrote 
a competent and not too sympathetic reviewer before the 
w a r — " in the workman's cottage and the undergraduate's 
sitting-room, in the boudoir of the millionaire's wife and 
in the offices of high officials." And the war gave him an 
opportunity he was quick to seize. His work on Mittel-
europa, here translated, is far and away the most important 
book that has appeared in Germany since the world-conflict 
began. It expresses, with a contagious enthusiasm, aspira-
tions already deeply rooted in many German minds: it 
makes out of them a systematic scheme, commended by 
eloquence and buttressed by historical and economic learning. 
If, as I believe to be the case, the idea of an organised and 
close-knit Central Europe as one of the world-Powers of the 
future has by this time come to be the dominating thought 
in German politics, Naumann's book has undoubtedly done 
much for its diffusion. 
Some light is thrown upon it by its author's career. 
Naumann began life as a Lutheran pastor ; and his first 
enterprise, as soon as he had found out his gifts of writing 
and speaking, was an attempt to convert the association 
for evangelistic work among the masses, known as the 
Innere Mission, into an instrument for practical social 
v 
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reform. This failing, he gave up clerical work, and set 
himself to create, by means of his journal Die Hilfe, a 
National-Social party in the country and in the Reichstag. 
This was to combine all the practicable objects of Social 
Democracy with the contemporary enthusiasm in middle-
class circles for naval and colonial expansion ; and for this 
movement he wrote in 1900 his first considerable political 
book : Demokratie und Kaisertum (" Democracy and the 
Functions of the Emperor "). The purpose of this book was 
to induce Social Democracy to come to terms with the 
existing political system. Henceforth Naumann was a 
convinced monarchist—though his conception of the 
monarch's functions has gone through more than one phase. 
The book is called on its title-page " a handbook for domestic 
politics," and one need only look at the synopsis of contents 
to discover that gift for symmetrically plotting out the field 
of inquiry, that ability to compel even the most recalcitrant 
material to fit into a prearranged scheme, which has charac-
terised his subsequent writings. The National-Social party 
secured a few thousand adherents but never succeeded in 
capturing a seat in the Reichstag. Unable to make headway 
on the working-class side, Naumann's political pilgrimage 
took a new direction. He turned towards the middle classes, 
and came in touch with the bourgeois Radicalism of South 
Germany, organised as the Volkspartei. About this time 
Naumann was very much under the influence of Professor 
Brentano of Munich, who enjoyed the distinction of being 
one of the very few free-trade economists then left in 
Germany, and at the same time an ardent advocate of trade 
unionism of the English type. The Volkspartei had been 
Radical, in the continental sense : that is, it had impartially 
opposed all forms of State action. It now became Naumann's 
programme to secure influence in this party by his vigorous 
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advocacy of Free Trade, and to use the influence thus gained 
to convert it to social legislation. He was successful in 
getting into the Reichstag, and did something towards 
bringing about the amalgamation of various radical groups 
into a " fraction " rather less negligible from a parliamentary 
point of view. To this period belongs (1906) his second 
political book, Neudeutsche Wirtschaftspolitik (" Modern 
German Economic Pol icy") ; which pictures a glorious 
future for Germany and the realisation of all its ideals, 
imperial and social, on the basis of free trade and vastly 
expanded foreign markets. 
Nine years later—as the reader of the present work will 
at once discern—the economic philosophy of his earlier 
books was rapidly thrown overboard. Rapidly and almost 
silently : for the few pages in which Naumann here explains 
how it comes about that he can now be in favour of customs 
duties when formerly he was one of their most strenuous 
opponents, can hardly be regarded as an adequate explana-
tion of what is in fact a pretty complete change in mental 
attitude. Naumann is one of those men who are peculiarly 
sensitive to the movement of contemporary feeling, and 
easily convinced of the wisdom of every cause they advocate, 
without being restrained by any very strong craving for 
intellectual consistency. But this makes his book all the 
more worthy of serious attention in this country ; because 
it is so largely the formulation of current German thought, 
and so little, in essence, original. 
The first question which English readers will ask as to 
Naumann's present political vision is its chances of realiza-
tion. That vision may be described as a loosely federal 
combination for purposes of offence and defence, military 
and economic, consisting primarily of the German Empire 
and the Dual Monarchy, but also including the Balkan States 
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and Turkey, together with all the neutral States—Roumania, 
Greece, the Scandinavian kingdoms, and Holland—that can 
be drawn within its embrace. He rightly feels that the 
one thing essential from his point of view is to bring about 
the permanent association of Austria-Hungary and Germany, 
and to that issue he devotes all his argumentative power. It 
is seldom that he lets himself go, so far as to remark that the 
Central Europe of his vision " obviously " needs, in order 
to make it self-contained, *' an extension of its northern and 
southern sea-coast—if possible," or, in another place, to 
reckon in the future population of the Central European 
Power " the oversea possessions of neighbouring States " — 
Holland is meant—" which have not yet joined us." As a 
rule he follows his own frankly expressed caution : not to 
say much at the present stage about neutral countries. One 
sometimes wonders, be it remarked in passing, whether 
German writers, even Naumann, do not sometimes forget 
that a good many people outside Germany can read German. 
In dealing with the primary problem, association with 
Austria-Hungary, Naumann exhausts all the resources of a 
large and adroit vocabulary, full of special coinages almost 
impossible to turn into English, in order to spare the sus-
ceptibilities of the weaker partner. Sovereign rights, he 
declares, must be scrupulously safeguarded; the fresh 
governmental machinery which will have to be set up 
is to consist simply of Joint Commissions, which shall 
merely prepare the business for, and carry out the instruc-
tions of, the several Governments. In spite of all his care, 
however, he constantly uses expressions such as " Super-
State " and " Economic State " ; and he frequently falls 
back on the analogy of the Zollverein in a way that shows 
that it is something like a federal State he really has in mind. 
And this State he conceives of as, in fact, under German 
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guidance and permeated by German influence—of course 
for its own good. As it happens, in an earlier stage of his 
career Naumann had been quite unsympathetic towards the 
project of commercial union with Austria-Hungary, on the 
ground that German progress would be hampered by 
association with a backward partner. Such association, 
he thought, would so strengthen the agrarian element in 
Germany—which he then feared and even now does not 
love—that it would involve in German economic develop-
ment a retrogression of twenty years. Now, on the con-
trary, his argument is that German business method is to 
tone up Austrian administration, and German capital and 
cartels are to give new life to Austrian manufactures and 
agriculture. National languages are to be tenderly pre-
served as quaint and sentimental survivals ; but, naturally 
German—it is casually remarked—will be the working 
language of the Joint Commissions. 
The shrewder heads among German politicians are well 
aware that, however attractive such a vision may be to 
German eyes, it may not be quite so pleasant to non-
Germans. Accordingly there is a pretty general consensus, 
apparently, in political circles as to the desirability, for the 
present at any rate, of concentrating attention upon the 
one question of a customs union. And here one must remove 
a misapprehension not uncommon in England. The creation 
of " Central Europe " is often treated in this country as 
involving free trade between the partners. No doubt that 
is the ultimate ideal of many of its advocates. But as soon 
as they have come to close quarters with existing trade 
conditions they have all realized—and Naumann is very 
explicitly among them—that any large measure of internal 
free trade is for the present, and for an indefinite time to 
come, quite outside practical politics : all that is feasible 
xiv INTRODUCTION 
is a system of mutual preferences, specially devised to protect 
the interests of the industrially weaker countries, with, 
maybe, a free list for certain non-competing products, 
chiefly of the nature of raw materials. But it is believed 
that the preference may be so considerable and so perma-
nent, and may be combined with so complete and constant 
an alliance in the work of commercial negotiation with 
other countries as to make of " Central Europe " a largely 
self-sufficing and an effectively united economic area. 
It is sometimes said in this country that we need not 
greatly concern ourselves with our possible relations to 
" Central Europe," since Hungary can be relied upon to 
prevent its coming into existence. The party of Magyar 
ascendancy in the Hungarian State is possessed by a fierce 
spirit of national independence; they have always been 
restive within the present union with Austria; they will 
naturally be loth to allow the Dual Monarchy to enter into 
relations with Germany which will inevitably still further 
lessen their freedom of action. The Hungarian manufac-
turing interests, which before the war were already demand-
ing protection against Austrian products, may be expected 
vigorously to oppose a policy which may have the effect of 
exposing them to the more dangerous competition of German 
goods. All this, however, is perfectly well known to German 
economists and politicians, including Naumann. They reply 
that, after all, Hungary is still mainly an agricultural 
country, and that Germany has it in its power to grant such 
tariff favours to—or impose such tariff restraints on—Hun-
gary's agricultural interests as to overcome the resistance of 
the manufacturers. Among possible terms, it will be seen 
that Naumann proposes for Hungary a large share in the 
provisioning of those State granaries for Central Europe 
which he regards as the necessary outcome of the war. 
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Others propose to carry further, if necessary by the use, 
no doubt, of German credit, that policy of assistance to 
Hungarian industry by means of loans or of exemption from 
taxation which has already been successful in staving off a 
protective tariff against Austria. But what they really 
rely upon is the pressure of the political situation. Magyar 
Hungary dislikes German influence, but it still more dislikes 
the idea of losing its present political predominance over the 
Slav races within its borders ; and rather than run the risk 
of losing this privileged position, it may be counted upon to 
accept, though with a wry face, the terms Germany will 
propose. 
Anyhow, the making of a tariff union is going to be 
seriously attempted from the German side. Of the state 
of feeling in influential quarters evidence may be found in 
the series of recent articles by Professor von Schmoller in 
the Neue Freie Presse. Schmoller, whose opinion carries 
more weight with the official classes in Germany than that 
of any other academic teacher, has long lost the fiery impetu-
osity of his youth. He has the reputation of that statesman-
like caution which waits to bless a movement till it is well 
under way. He has certainly never, until very recently, 
been an active supporter of Central European propaganda. 
And this is what the wise old veteran now says : " I have 
given a large part of my scientific life to the history of the 
Zollverein, and I have now read and thought over all the 
recent literature. My conclusion is that this is the time for 
making an energetic attempt to secure a close tariff arrange-
ment with Austria-Hungary, and that in all human and 
historical probability it will have a great and salutary 
success. The leading men of almost all classes and parties 
are more and more coming together under this flag." 
So far as the German working classes are concerned 
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and are politically articulate, they would seem to have been 
completely won over. Six months ago the Central Europe 
policy was formally approved by a Conference representing 
the Socialist section in the Reichstag, the Councils of the 
German and Austrian Socialist parties, and the Executives 
of the German and Austrian trade unions. And the com-
mercial diplomatists have not to go out of their way to 
set negotiations on foot. Both the commercial treaty 
between Austria and Hungary and that between the Dual 
Monarchy and Germany expire at the end of next year. All 
the economic problems involved in the relations between the 
two Central Empires will have to be faced, in any case : 
we may be quite sure they are already being examined with 
German thoroughness. 
The question now naturally presents itself : what effect 
will mutual preference between the States of Central Europe 
have upon the external trade of the federated group, and 
especially upon the trade of Germany, after the war, with 
what are at present enemy countries. That trade has been 
built up largely by means of the Most-Favoured-Nation clause 
in the treaty which it extorted from France at the conclusion 
of the last war, and similar clauses in treaties with the 
United Kingdom and other lands. Does Germany hope to 
retain the advantages of that clause for its own exports 
to foreign countries, while withdrawing, by the operation of 
Central European Preference, a large part of the reciprocal 
advantages from the exports of other countries ? The answer, 
surprising as it may seem, is that that is precisely what 
Germany is now planning to do. These plans are not in the 
least secret. More than a year ago, long before an Economic 
Conference at Paris was contemplated, some of the best 
brains among the economists of Germany were at work 
devising the formula which should keep alive the Most-
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Favoured-Nation clause for Germany's benefit, while getting 
rid of it wherever it stood in the way of an allied Central 
Europe. And the situation is not without humour when we 
find Professor Jastrow actually appealing to free-traders in 
Germany not to oppose the Central European preferential 
policy but to console themselves with the recognition of their 
principles by the retention of what he euphemistically calls 
a " modified Most-Favoured-Nation system." 
But, as the months go on, the prospect of German success 
so complete as to lay the foundations of Central Europe and 
at the same time compel the Entente Powers to accept one-
sided commercial terms is evidently not so rosy as it once 
appeared. And the great shipping and exporting interests-
all that side of German life represented by Hamburg—are 
beginning to ask how they are going to be affected if Central 
Europe is realised but the Most-Favoured-Nation facilities 
all lost. This is the meaning of the book by Professor 
Harms on " Germany's Share in the World's Trade " which 
has recently appeared. Professor Harms fills a chair of 
economics at Kiel, and he is the director of an Institute for 
World Economics which is financed by the great business 
interests. The whole purpose of his book is to emphasise 
the importance of recovering and extending German foreign 
trade. He argues forcibly that no gains to German trade 
due to Preference within Central Europe can make up for 
losses in other European countries. But while all this is 
significant, it is equally significant that he concludes his 
book by declaring twice, and in the most emphatic way, that 
" the whole problem is primarily political, and economic 
considerations are only of secondary importance " and that 
this is bound to be the case " for a long time." 
I should not like to prophesy : but certainly, at present, 
it looks very much as if Germany will try to do both—regain 
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its previous foreign trade and create a Central Europe with 
internal preference ; but that, if it has to make a choice, 
it will choose Central Europe, and hope to regain its foreign 
trade at some later and more propitious season. 
Whatever may be the outcome of Naumann's advocacy 
of Central Europe, there is a great deal of information and 
suggestion in his book that make it well worth reading. Take, 
for instance, his laudation of the German gift for organisa-
tion. Organisation has been so dinned into German ears as 
the supreme merit of the nation that, after all these months 
of food control, even they must be getting a little tired of it. 
And Naumann happens to be extravagantly unfortunate in 
the example he starts with, to illustrate the difference between 
the old English and the new German types of Capitalism. 
He reports a visit to London and his surprising discovery 
that " the London docks are all separate concerns, without 
any sort of organic connection." His informants apparently 
told him nothing of the great amalgamation of 1888, and 
we must charitably suppose that his visit took place before 
the establishment of the London Port Authority in 1909. 
Clever as he is, he has fallen a victim to the common danger 
of knowing one's own country up to date and assuming 
that other countries have stood still since last we visited 
them. The history of the London Docks, accurately known, 
tells, of course, in precisely the opposite direction. It shows 
that even in England, handicapped, as all old concerns are 
likely to be, by the possession of antiquated plant, the need 
for new departures and for large measures of reorganisation 
do make themselves felt and responded to, after a time. 
When organisation is at last taken in hand, England may 
even improve upon foreign examples—as, for instance, when 
England imitated the German system of compulsory 
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insurance and had the courage to extend it to a new and 
vast field, that of unemployment, which the German 
bureaucracy, with all its organising skill, has not ventured 
to enter. A purely objective study would perhaps show 
that though the German is indeed more methodical, the 
greater prevalence in Germany of organisation, in the 
sense of combination, of business interests has been due 
at least as much to special conditions of history and 
geography as to any peculiar natural gift. When all 
is said, however, the fact remains that Germany at present 
is better organized than England for competition in the 
markets of the world; and that an effective policy of 
assistance to British industry on the part of government 
demands a degree of active co-operation among the members 
of the several trades that has hitherto in many cases been 
notoriously absent. However, the war is weakening the 
spirit of jealous individualism in industry as in much else, 
as well as hastening the consolidation of commercial forces 
in many directions. And in the task of organisation which 
is being forced upon us, I am convinced that this people, in 
spite of all its labour difficulties, enjoys one enormous advan-
tage over Germany, the absence of that alienation between 
social classes which is Germany's great and conspicuous 
defect. 
June 27, 1916. 
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C e n t r a l E u r o p e 
C H A P T E R I 
P A R T N E R S H I P IN T H E W A R AND ITS RESULTS 
As I write this fighting is going on in the East and in the 
West. I write of set purpose in the midst of it all, for it is 
only in war time that our mood enables us to entertain 
broadly transforming thoughts of reconstruction. Once the 
war is over our everyday spirit will quickly take possession 
of us, and in the everyday spirit Mid-Europe can never be 
fashioned. Bismarck founded the German Empire during 
and not after the war of 1870, and our statesmen must lay 
the foundations of this new structure during this war, in the 
midst of bloodshed and the upheaval of the nations. Later 
it might, and it would, be too late. 
The subject I wish to discuss is the growing unity of 
those nations which belong neither to the Anglo-French 
western alliance nor to the Russian Empire. But more 
particularly my subject is the welding together of the 
German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, 
for all further schemes for a union of the Central European 
nations depend on whether or no, in the first instance, the 
binding together of the two Central Powers themselves is 
successful. 
When war broke out many of us, myself included, thought 
that an understanding with France might still come about, 
since there is no enmity towards France either on the 
German or the Austrian and Hungarian side. Whenever the 
French are willing we shall be able to offer them the hand 
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of friendship, but of course each additional month of war 
makes any mutual approach more difficult. France has 
chosen to link her fate with that of England and from 
henceforth will be made use of by England. She will no 
longer be willing to conclude an independent peace for 
herself, and will, unfortunately, for the immediate future, 
become a larger and more important Portugal at England's 
side. Hence, in what follows, we leave the French outside 
the discussion, whilst always hoping that in a more distant 
future they will rank themselves with Central Europe. 
Nor can we speak of Italy except with reserve and 
caution. Italy, disregarding her old union by treaty, has, 
it is true, gone over into the camp of the enemy, yet she 
can hardly by this act have determined her political and 
economic alliances for all time. National humours and 
economic interests are indeed frequently inharmonious in 
Italy. Economically she belongs to Central Europe, but 
we recognise that her Latin nationality and the Adriatic-
Alpine boundary problem have turned Italian thought into 
another direction. Now the armies on the Isonzo have the 
first word, and hence we shall discuss Mid-Europe without 
reference to Italy. 
Of the Northern Powers, the Roumanians, Bulgarians, 
Serbians and Greeks, and also of Holland and Switzerland, 
we shall have something to say later on in our book. We 
shall not say very much however, for it would be a mistake 
to include these smaller Central European States in our 
scheme from the outset as fixed quantities, whilst actually 
they still have a breathing space before making their 
decision. They wish to see and they ought to see for 
themselves first whether the nucleus of Mid-Europe will 
form itself, whether the German Empire and Austria-
Hungary will crystallise. 
During the war we Germans, the Austrians and the 
Hungarians stand in friendly alliance with the Turks. In 
this alliance the Turks are fighting in their own interests. 
They are engaged in a brave fight for life for the remnant 
of a once powerful State, and for the political existence of 
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the faith and being of Islam. A strange turn of history 
has brought us and the Turks together in that their enemies 
were our enemies. Their only hope of holding their own was 
an alliance with us, and hence also with the Austrians and 
Hungarians. We hail them, and hope that in the future 
too our paths may lie together, but Turkey is not in the first 
instance concerned in the formation of the Mid-European 
nucleus. It is not in direct contact with us geographically, 
and is a country of a very different type both nationally 
and economically; it is southern, oriental, antiquated and 
sparsely populated. In this case too the nucleus of crystal-
lisation must first be in existence before the conditions of 
accession to the union can profitably be discussed. 
Thus our attention must first be directed towards that 
portion of Central Europe which extends from the North 
and Baltic Seas to the Alps, the Adriatic Sea and the 
southern edge of the Danubian plain. Take a map and 
see what lies between the Vistula and the Vosges Mountains, 
and what extends from Galicia to Lake Constance ! You 
must think of these stretches of country as a unity, as a 
brotherhood of many members, as a defensive alliance, as a 
single economic district ! All the traditional separatism of 
these lands must be so effaced in the stress of the Great War 
as to make the idea of union tolerable. This is the demand 
of the hour, the task of these months. History speaks to 
us of it in the thunder of the guns, but it rests with us 
whether or no we listen. 
* * * * * * 
It may be questioned whether our partnership in this war 
is due to chance or to necessity. We maintain the latter. In 
old days indeed it was chance when, or if ever, Austria and 
Prussia combined. They united when they had some 
common task to complete such as the division of Poland or 
the conquest of Napoleon, but they fell apart again as soon 
as they had settled their own frontiers, or were attracted in 
diverse directions by other Powers. In the long years of 
the past there was much more fighting than harmony in 
Central Europe. Each section went its own way, and 
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there were as yet no constraining reasons for a lasting 
unity. The States were merely territorial divisions, disput-
ing sovereignties, and in no sense historically determinate 
political groups. They grew and fell apart like clouds. 
Even the partnership in the old German Empire involved 
no solidarity, for hardly ever, if at all, during the later 
centuries did this ancient Empire emerge as a complete 
political entity. It was broken in the Thirty Years War, 
it crumbled in pieces in the Seven Years War, it split in 
Napoleonic times and it was divided in the Civil War of 
1866. We shall discuss the earlier history more in detail 
later on. For the present this statement is sufficient: there 
is more unity to-day than ever before in the old German 
Empire ! To-day all the ancient States, large and small, 
in the stretch of country described above, have become a 
single united fighting entity, and victory and defeat are a 
like experience for all, from Heligoland to Orsova. This is 
no mere political intrigue, no patched-up defensive alliance. 
The war has come as a creator of the Mid-European soul, 
which is now coming into existence in advance of the ex-
ternal forms appropriate to it. It is this soul that we shall 
discuss, and its external embodiment that we shall examine. 
All the allies in the Great War feel without argument that 
neither now nor in the future can small or even moderate-
sized Powers play any large part in the world. Our concep-
tions of size have entirely changed. Only very big States 
have any significance on their own account, all the smaller 
ones must live by utilising the quarrels of the great, or must 
obtain leave if they wish to do anything unusual. Sove-
reignty, that is freedom to make decisions of wide historical 
importance, is now concentrated at a very few places on the 
globe. The day is still distant when there shall be " one 
fold and one shepherd," but the days are past when shep-
herds without number, lesser or greater, drove their flocks 
unrestrained over the pastures of Europe. The spirit of 
large-scale industry and of super-national organisation has 
seized politics. People think, as Cecil Rhodes once expressed 
it, " in Continents." The country which desires to be small 
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and isolated will, in spite of this, become of its own accord 
dependent on the varying fortunes of the Great Powers. This 
is in conformity with an age of intercommunication and 
with centralised military technique. The country without 
alliances is isolated, and the isolated country is endangered. 
In this age of extending State federations and Great Powers, 
Prussia is too small, and Germany too small, and Austria 
too small, and Hungary too small. No single States of this 
kind can survive a world war. Suppose that we of the 
German Empire were fighting alone, or that Austria-
Hungary had to offer a solitary defence. Such things are 
no longer possible. Their day is past. Hence to-day the 
Central European union is no chance but a necessity. 
People who do not feel enthusiastic about it must yet 
desire it, since the alternatives are even worse. The 
intelligent man is he who does of his own free will what he 
recognises as necessary. 
* * * * * * 
Nevertheless it will be very difficult to found Mid-Europe, 
and no one act or decision can be at all adequate to the 
task. It will occupy at least a generation. But for the 
moment it is for the Governments and the peoples to deter-
mine and say whether or no they desire Mid-Europe at all 
or not. For the representatives of the German Empire, 
equally with those of Austria and Hungary, will enter 
upon the coming peace negotiations in an entirely different 
spirit according to whether or no they mean to remain 
united in the future. 
We have no intention of saying anything about the 
actual terms of peace, partly because at present publicity 
is still forbidden, partly because we ourselves think it a 
useless and doubtful policy to discuss something which is 
as yet subject to military successes or failures. But whether 
or no the frontiers of the two Central Empires of Mid-Europe 
be shifted somewhat more to the east or west as the result 
of military victories, this question will arise : Will the 
ambassadors from Berlin, Vienna and Budapest enter the 
hall of the International Peace Congress as declared and 
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honest friends, or as secret opponents ? We want them to 
return to their countrymen with the watchword : United 
for ever ! Then they will indeed bring back something real 
for every one, a new creative work, a great hope, the 
beginning of a fresh epoch. Thus only shall we Central 
European nations appear finally justified for having shed 
our blood for one another. What was Serajewo to us 
Germans of the Empire ? What were we seeking in the 
Carpathian passes? Why did the Hungarians or the 
Southern Slavs trouble themselves about Zeebriigge ? Why 
should German Bohemians or Tzechs have defended the 
ridge of the Vosges ? The entire history of the war with 
all its sufferings and heroic deeds becomes purposeless, 
meaningless, if the war ends with a misunderstanding 
between those who, throughout it, have been allied. But 
this misunderstanding is not so far off as many think, for 
even now the spirit of a unified Mid-Europe is no mere 
matter of course, and the approaching peace negotiations 
will supply to the full opportunities both small and great 
for friction and trouble. All coalition wars have, from of 
old, had difficult peace negotiations, for they end in 
gains and losses which must be equalised amongst the 
allies. But each allied Power can, and will, allow and 
make over advantages to its allies with a better grace, 
if it knows that they are certainly going to remain its 
allies. Both Powers will obtain much more from the 
Peace Congress if they negotiate throughout in common 
and do not enter into special settlements. These con-
siderations ought to suffice, and will indeed be amply 
sufficient for those who remember the depressing history of 
the Vienna Congress in 1815. Then exactly that happened 
which now we must avoid. Temptations to break faith 
will creep in on both sides, since the future is assured to 
our opponents if they can succeed in dividing us. This 
weighs with them more than any other gain from the war. 
But for what then have we sacrificed our sons, and for 
what are we Germans, Austrians and Hungarians mutilated. 
* * * * * * 
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It is occasionally said that the war will lead to a general 
slackening of the bonds between the Great Powers, and 
that every country must wish to emerge free and without 
obligations from this great tragedy of political alliances. 
There may be some truth in this in so far as the constraint 
of the State syndicates has been generally felt as such, but 
all the same, the outcome will be much what it is in the 
case of industrial syndicates : new ones are continually 
growing up when once the idea of combination has taken 
root. It is contrary to history to believe that in these days 
five or eight Great Powers will leave the precincts of the 
Peace Congress without having some fresh treaties in their 
pockets. What is called " freedom " is nothing but the 
already conceived desire to change one's alliance in the 
future. 
It is not to be supposed that at the conclusion of the war 
the long jubilee years of an everlasting peace will begin ! 
It is true, doubtless, that there will be a widespread inclina-
tion towards peace, for war sacrifices and war taxes speak 
an insistent language. Moreover, we shall be more careful 
than hitherto to suppress frivolous pretexts for war and to 
strive for understanding between nations. But, on the 
other hand, the war will leave behind it an immense number 
of unsolved problems, both new and old, and will lead to 
disillusionments which will express themselves in extensive 
armaments. All the War Ministers, General Staffs and 
Admiralties will ponder over the lessons of the past war, 
technical skill will contrive yet newer weapons, frontier 
fortifications will be made still wider and, above all, longer. 
Is it really credible that in such an atmosphere the isolated 
State can remain any longer in isolation ? 
As far as Germany and Austria-Hungary are concerned, 
they must either intrench their respective frontiers on the 
ridges of the Erzgebirge, the Riesengebirge and the Bohmer-
wald, or they must regard this line as, in essentials, only an 
inner administrative boundary in a territory looked upon 
by foreigners as one. This reasoning is as valid for Vienna 
as for Berlin. After the experiences of the present war no 
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isolated country can remain unintrenched. For the primary 
and most important military inference from the war is that 
m future we shall fight only in long lines, and that the 
trench will become the essential form of defence for a 
country. The policy of trenches means that every country 
must consider what frontiers can and what cannot be 
defended by trenches. The argument is somewhat as 
follows : if France before 1914 had not applied its expendi-
ture on defences to the erection of heavy fortresses, but 
instead had protected its whole frontier from Belfort to 
Dunkirk with trenches, probably the German thrust into 
Northern France across Belgium would not have been 
possible. The same thing applies to our frontiers in East 
Prussia and to those in Austrian Galicia. After the war 
frontier trenches will be made everywhere where there is 
any possibility of fighting. There will be a fresh system of 
Roman and Chinese walls made out of earth and barbed 
In consequence of this trench-making policy a country 
wiH be constrained to make certain, at the moment of 
planning out these military defences, with whom it proposes 
under all circumstances to live at peace. Europe will have 
two long ditches from north to south, one anyhow stretching 
from the Lower Rhine to the Alps, the other from Courland 
to either the right or left of Roumania. This will constitute 
the mam and unavoidable triple division of the Continent 
The problem for Central Europe to decide is whether or no 
another intermediate ditch, dividing Germany and Austria-
Hungary, will be needed in between the two great north 
to south ditches. It will be needed if no unity of future 
policy can be guaranteed, but if it does become necessary 
it will be harmful and fateful in the highest degree to both 
parties. 
The future trench-making policy will make it exceptionally 
difficult for small States to maintain their independence for 
under this system military expenses will decrease as ' the 
size of the country to be defended increases in relation to 
its frontiers. A State like Roumania could hardly afford 
PARTNERSHIP IN WAR AND ITS RESULTS 9 
to maintain its own trench system on all sides. This means 
that it must choose from the outset which frontiers it will 
leave open. Higgling over neutrality will be rendered 
much more difficult by this coming trench policy. Possibly 
trench-making will be the most effective instrument of 
Providence in making war into a delusion by means of its 
own technique. But in the first instance the long trenches 
must be made and paid for and manned. And when this 
is done Mid-Europe will either be established, or she will be 
debarred from unity in any future that can be foreseen. 
It is on these grounds that a decision must be based. 
* * * * * * 
During the war the responsible leaders of the combatant 
States are so pressed by their daily duties that in the midst 
of strenuous work they can hardly find time for historical 
reflections. They are not in the fortunate position of 
Bismarck in the winter of 1870-71, who knew from the 
outset approximately what he wanted, for this unprece-
dentedly serious war appeared, in the summer of 1914, 
undesired and diplomatically unprepared for. We purposely 
avoid entering into complicated discussions over the causes 
of the war, the time for this will come later, when all the 
documents have come to light. This much may, however, 
be stated with certainty : the two Central European Powers 
had no defined military aim because they were only prepared 
for defence. The war was not undertaken in order to 
secure this or that object. Hence it lacks any intrinsic 
unity of purpose, and the royal and ministerial proclamations 
calling the nations to arms lack a definite programme. There 
is no single watchword for all the combatants from Apenrade 
to Fiume. The war began purely as a war of defence, and 
hence from the point of view of Mid-Europe its ideals are 
essentially somewhat vague. This, in our opinion, is felt 
even more strongly in Austria and Hungary than in the 
German Empire. In the German Empire two ideas were 
always present in the minds of Government and people : 
that some time or other a break would occur with the 
Tsar, and that some time there must be a fight with England 
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over the control of the sea. The only regret was that both 
things came about together with an overwhelming rush ; 
the war with France, the war in the East and the naval 
war. Austria and Hungary, however, had no interest in 
either the French war or the Anglo-German naval war, but 
instead they had serious tension in the Balkans, among the 
Southern Slavs and in Italy. Thus at the outset they were 
evidently more concerned" about their southern frontiers 
than about the risks in Galicia. It was only during the war 
itself that the nations in the Danube kingdom became fully 
conscious of and impressed by the Russian danger. The 
military objective shifted from Belgrade to Przemysl and 
the Carpathians, and then swung back again to Trieste and 
extended into Polish territory. A situation arose in which 
the two parties had a joint campaign in the east, whilst, in 
addition, the German Empire had its special international 
campaigns and the Austrians and Hungarians their special 
southern campaign. Obviously we were mutually helping 
one another in this way, but nevertheless the war was 
regarded, and is still regarded, rather differently in Vienna 
and Budapest than in Berlin. There was no controlling 
idea of joint statesmanship and like responsibility in all 
directions. This controlling idea, however, appeared during 
the war in peoples and Governments, in spite of many 
individual differences of opinion. Then for the first time 
the belief took root in the hearts of those concerned that 
this war is not merely a German war, and not merely a 
Danube war, but is the historical test of Mid-Europe. But 
this inspiring thought has not yet risen to general conscious-
ness. It is yet far from certain that all utterances about 
the war are tuned to this note. It is our task to strengthen 
this consciousness, until even leading men in their official 
statements speak of the rapidly growing unity of Mid-
Europe as a self-evident fact. The Germans of the Empire 
in their utterances concerning the war have not always 
kept in mind the effect that an insistence upon purely 
German aims must have on their Magyar and Slav allies. 
To talk, for instance, of a decisive struggle between German 
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and Slav is a misconception, very natural indeed, but a 
serious departure from ideas proper to the alliance. Phrases 
of this sort necessarily sound very differently in the ears of 
Tzechs, or Poles or Slovenians than in ours. If we expect 
a hundred thousand Poles and other Slavs to join with us 
in driving out the Russian armies, we must never let these 
allies of ours slip out of our memories. This involves a 
certain sacrifice for us Germans of our accustomed national 
mode of thought, but we are faced ultimately by a definite 
alternative. Either this is a German war, in which case we 
have no right to complain if it is so regarded in Prague and 
Agram, or it is a Central European war, in which case we 
ought to, and must, speak of it as such and act accordingly. 
The same thing applies to the preaching of " the German 
idea in the world." My friend Rohrbach has done us all 
a great service by becoming the prophet of this idea in his 
admirable and widely read book, and no patriotically 
minded Hungarian or Tzech will think evil of us patriotic 
Germans if we sing and dream and study and work for 
Deutschland, Deutschland uber alies. We need this. It is 
our life's blood. Only, in doing so, we must not fail to 
remember that our non-German partners too have a life's 
blood, and want to realise for what they are prepared to 
die. In exalting our nationality we ought at the same 
time to exalt theirs. 
Come what may we must not be petty. It is obvious 
that in a Germany at war all our old heroic traditions must 
be revived, and we must see around us the Prussian King 
Friedrich II., and Blücher, Moltke and Bismarck. We fight 
as Germans, but we fight with millions of non-Germans, 
who are prepared to go with us to battle and to death, so 
long as they have our respect and can believe that our 
victory will also be their victory. 
On the Austrian and Hungarian side too a like mode of 
thought must be acquired more definitely than hitherto. 
The feelings of dislike and irritability often aroused now by 
any strong expression of German national feeling must 
vanish and be overcome in a common appreciation of the 
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many-sided strength of our great and noble union. There 
are still m the Empire of the Danube some easily explicable 
remnants of the old temper of l 866, which are but i l L u k e d 
to the new Mid-Europe; anti-Prussian feelings which, 
when they are expressed, are just as unpalatable to thé 
Northerners as the North German particularism, referred to 
above is to the differently constituted South. Occasionally 
something appears which seems like envy, a grudging of the 
strength which yet is indispensable J u s "all a's a" body 
To speak quite frankly : it sometimes happens that people 
accept help, and at the same time scold those who help 
them. The finer spirits in the Danubian Empire have always 
been sensible that this was unsuitable, but there, as here 
there are people who have not such fine feelings. To such 
people on both sides the conception of comradeship in the 
joint war must be more openly preached than hitherto, and 
the leading men in both States must speak to their country-
men more frankly and decisively of the accomplished fact : • 
that the past is forgotten, that we cancel all our earlier 
debits and credits, and from henceforward press onwards 
hand m hand like good and honest friends. The war 
unites. 
* * * * * * 
In the later sections of this book we shall have to discuss 
more m detail the difficulties in the way of the union, and 
even here we must briefly point out how different the two 
Empires are, so that we may face the whole complicated 
problem from the outset. 
Austria-Hungary is a unit of long standing with strong 
disintegrating tendencies ; the German Empire is a newly 
formed unit with ever-increasing centralisation. Over there 
exists a growing spirit of particularism or of provincialism 
a constant effort to snatch something from the hands of thé 
central authority and to make Maria Theresa's monarchy 
a mere legend. With us, on the contrary, the creative 
energy lies more in the Imperial than in the State Govern-
ments. To use an old phrase, Germany develops daily 
from a confederation of States into a federal State 
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whilst Austria and Hungary are growing out of a single 
State into a confederation of States, or rather, into a union of 
two States, one of which is almost a confederation of States, 
whilst the other is an attempt at a national State, but of 
a most difficult composition. With us political talents 
and aspirations are Imperialist, over there they are 
frequently provincial, separatist, or nationalist, but not 
centralising. 
The German Empire is founded on the German national 
ideal, and finds its justification therein. The foreign-speak-
ing portions, and especially Prussian Poles, are indeed a 
difficult problem for statesmanship, but they are neither 
so numerous nor so powerful as to come into consideration 
as partners in the Government. Austria-Hungary, on the 
other hand, has dreaded for the last hundred years the 
national spirit of its peoples as a decentralising power. 
Hence its political thought is more colourless. In the place 
of a central nationalism there is what the French term 
¿tatisme, the mere machinery of government : monarchy, 
bureaucracy, army. 
Austria-Hungary is older; it had long been rich in land 
and honours when Prussia had still to seek recognition of 
its royal dignity; it was one of the European Great Powers 
before the North had any serious word to s a y ; it was not 
so broken as the North either in the Thirty Years War or 
in Napoleon's t ime; it has followed a prudent course 
through the centuries, and has many more traditions to 
uphold. The German Empire, on the contrary, is the most 
recently founded of the European great States, an intruder 
in the royal company, less inherited than fought for, a 
child of the nineteenth century. It is like mixing the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to think of working 
up Austria and Prussia into a single historical entity. 
The German Empire is more northerly, colder, more uni-
form, more technical. Austria-Hungary is more southerly, 
more brightly coloured, more a natural growth, more 
romantic. The difference noticeable within the German 
Empire between North and South Germany is in a yet 
IO 
CENTRAL EUROPE 
higher degree the difference between Germany and Austria-
Hungary. 
The German Empire is more western, Austria more 
eastern. The same differences which we know as marking 
the districts east and west of the Elbe occur in more defined 
form m Central Europe, so soon as the country between 
the Theiss and the Carpathians joins the countries, distant 
to them, on the Mosel and Lower Rhine. 
The greater part of Germany is Protestant, most of 
Austria-Hungary is Catholic. 
Germany is much more capitalist, and consequently much 
more socialist, than Austria-Hungary. For us Germans of 
the Empire a union means a reopening of the already half-
settled disputes of the preceding generation ; for Austria-
Hungary it means a rapid transition to conditions and prob-
lems which are there only slowly and gently approaching 
The rhythm of life is different. We work more methodi-
cally. We think more in terms of money, are more punctual, 
more businesslike, hence also poorer in homelv comfort and 
the art of simple living. This is carried so "far that each 
country secretly regards the other with something of pity 
and forbearance, because each lacks just what the other 
regards as essential to civilisation. 
Austria-Hungary possesses more past because it is the 
older organisation, and more future because it has more 
undeveloped land and labour power. It has less present, 
because it has held itself back with long hesitation from thé 
technical skill advancing from the West, and is not so rich 
in sea-coast, coal, iron, and organising energy. 
Germany is a country of large towns, and daily grows 
more so ; Austria, and still more Hungary, will for a long 
time yet be a country of forest, arable land, and pasture. 
With us the factory takes precedence of the estate and the 
workman's quarter of the country village ; there the rela-
tion is reversed, as it was with us a good forty years ago. 
Berlin and Vienna, two different temperatures, more 
different even than Vienna and Budapest ! 
* * * * * * 
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The amount of sentimental resistance and the number 
of opposing practical interests are considerable, hence it 
is not surprising that the question of Mid-Europe is ap-
proached with much criticism from both sides. Here, 
truly, is no case of love at first sight. Rather is there 
evasion and refusal, a shrinking with instinctive fear from 
new and boundless complications. Known evils are better 
than unknown. Hence it is necessary to go more closely 
into the reasons for the foundation of Mid-Europe, and to 
refute opponents by showing that there is no other possi-
bility for either Empire. We shall begin this inquiry from 
the standpoint of the German Empire, and undertake to 
discuss without reserve all unfavourable arguments, since 
only thus can they be met. 
Bismarck's policy in its first stage separated the Prusso-
German Empire from Austria-Hungary ; in its second stage 
it established between the two Empires the treaty connec-
tion which still holds. Taking Bismarck's standpoint, then, 
a development and intensification of the treaty connection 
may be equally well desired or rejected according to whether 
we side more with the younger or with the elder Bismarck. 
The younger Bismarck, up to 1866, agreed with the " Lesser 
Germany " * party and successfully maintained the " Lesser 
Germany " ideal policy in opposition to Austria. This was 
the starting-point of all his subsequent immense successes, 
successes which were beneficial both to us and to Europe. Is 
it surprising, then, that there are still many of the " Lesser 
Germany " party amongst us, and especially in Prussia ? 
So far as I can see, there are two principal forms of 
" Lesser German " opinion : an Old-Prussian and a Liberal 
capitalist. The conservative, despotic Old-Prussian at the 
bottom of his heart regards even the German Empire as 
a watering down of his Friedrich's State, and secretly 
distrusts the South Germans, whilst liking and esteeming 
them in other respects, as not quite capable of creating a 
* Kleindeuisch, Grossdeutsch, terms applied in German politics, 1848-66, 
to those w h o wished (a) to leave out, (b) to include, Austr ia in the recon-
struction of the Empire.—TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. 
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State. He wants clearly defined terms of authority, and this 
for their own sake, although he sees quite well what material 
and military advantages the extension of the Imperial 
German markets and authority has brought. He might, 
and indeed does, also recognise advantages, of which we shall 
speak later, in a closer union with Austria-Hungary. But 
primarily his traditions and political class lead him to feel 
any kind of joint government with Austria and Hungary 
as an infringement of his personal importance, and this in 
spite of the doubled area of territory to be jointly governed 
The Prussian noble and his adherents are strongest in the 
Prussian Landtag, less strong in the Reichstag, and would 
probably have even less influence in any future Mid-European 
representative assembly, should such an assembly arise out 
of the present beginnings. Since he has witnessed the 
development of the German Empire he has grown prudent 
and inclined to take to heart the phrase, principiis obsta! 
To call these principles of his merely selfish is inapt, since 
for him political ideals and his personal interests are so 
intermingled that it is unjust on historical grounds to deny 
his ideal aims. Devotion to his country makes him instinc-
tively suspicious of ah extensions that change the character 
of the State. 
His political opponent, the Liberal capitalist, is of quite 
a different character. For him everything centres round 
the undisturbed development of industry and commerce, 
because he regards these as the means to national prosperity 
and a financially powerful State. The economic union with 
Austria-Hungary appears to him as a drag on progress, a 
leaden weight on the foot. Partnership with Austria-
Hungary will probably mean that the German Empire 
must live through again the last thirty years of its domestic 
policy, and there is no security that the second experience 
will be as fortunate as the first. It might be that we should 
remain involved in an agrarian economic policy against 
which hitherto we have fought with good reason. Economic 
union with Austria-Hungary signifies prolongation of the 
policy of protection, strengthening of middle-class efforts, 
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difficulties in the way of joining in English international 
commerce, and a drag on modern enterprise. The Liberal 
capitalist, of course, knows well that the Mid-European union 
will, on the other hand, bring advantages to him also, since 
it will widen the market protected by tariff and will increase 
considerably the possible openings for his capital. As a 
Liberal he fears that an undemocratic spirit may be intro-
duced by Austria, and more especially by Hungary, for 
Austria-Hungary has, it is true, many Parliaments, but all 
the same there is little effective Parliamentary spirit in 
Austria, and in Hungary, with a rigorously worked out 
Parliamentary system, there is little of universal democracy. 
With these two " Lesser Germany " types is associated a 
third, " Greater Germany," * party, which for national 
reasons seeks the closest sympathy and union with the 
Germans in Austria and Hungary, but wishes to admit no 
foreign-speaking section into the German State, since it 
already finds our Poles, Danes and French a heavy burden. 
Certain members of this group, for reasons based on the 
principle of German nationality, are indeed counting even to-
day on the approaching break-up of the Danubian Monarchy, 
and would gladly bring about a purely German State 
extending from the North Sea to Trieste, " the German 
port." This, at least up to the outbreak of war, represented 
the opinion of many Pan-Germans, whilst others among 
them always accepted the Danubian State as a given existing 
whole, and reckoned with it as such. 
Obviously in actual fife very varied combinations and 
gradations of these three modes of thought are met with. 
Any one who regards Mid-Europe as something to aim at, 
must come to an understanding with them. So far as this 
understanding is economic, or concerns domestic politics, we 
shall defer it to later sections, but here we shall speak of 
what is common to all three, of the desire to maintain 
German power. We believe that they will all recognise at 
bottom that this power is in itself more important than 
either the maintenance intact of the Old-Prussian despotism, 
* See Translator's Note on page 15. 
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or the rapid development of industrial capitalism, or the 
setting up of the purely national State. By them and by 
us all it is accepted that the Fatherland is worth more than 
any individual interests however well founded. The ques-
tion is then, whether the German Empire can face the future 
confidently without an alliance with Austria-Hungary, 
whether it is perhaps even true that we are stronger without 
Austria-Hungary than with it ? It is this that we deny. 
We have already said elsewhere that the German Empire 
is too small by itself to defy permanently future general 
attacks. This statement is an undeniable inference from this 
war up to the present, and needs no further support, for if 
we suppose that Austria-Hungary were merely neutral, then 
we should have to face all the Russian army corps alone ; 
but if we picture Austria-Hungary as one of the crowd of 
our enemies, then the position of Germany becomes a 
military impossibility. Hence the German Empire, for its 
part, can only give up the idea of a strong and binding 
alliance with Austria-Hungary if another equally safe and 
equally natural alliance can take its place. This is, however, 
difficult to imagine after ah that has happened in the war.' 
An alliance with France, as we have already said, would 
be very advantageous both to us and to the French, but 
what French Government could conclude it now ? An 
alliance with England is still theoretically conceivable, not-
withstanding the mutual " songs of hate," but who would 
vouch for its permanence ? And how much would even a 
friendly England help us in the face of a second Seven Years 
War on the Continent ? An alliance with Russia offers less 
security for the Empire, and is less in accordance with 
national sentiment than union with Austria-Hungary, and 
its permanence could only be attained at the expense of 
a joint partition of Austria-Hungary. It must not be for-
gotten that according to Bismarck's Gedanken und Erinner-
ungen the traditional understanding between Russia and 
Prussia was broken off from 1876 onwards, because Bismarck, 
with the approval of the whole of Germany, was prepared 
to offer our lives to protect the position of Austria-Hungary 
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as a Great Power ! This was the decision upon which the 
present war depends; this was the policy, at the height of 
his creative work, of that master whom we ought all to 
endeavour to follow. The die was cast then in favour of 
Mid-Europe. 
Think for a moment, please, whether it would be endurable 
if our Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs returned from 
the Peace Congress with the news that we were again in the 
same position as before 1876 ; that is, faced by the choice 
between Russia and Austria ! We should all know what 
that must signify : the future sacrifice of the Danubian 
Monarchy ! This is where the " Lesser Germany " ideal leads 
us if it is logically carried out. Of course this final result 
would not be openly spoken of at the outset, but in Austria 
and Hungary a slackening of our friendship would at once 
be understood in this sense, and another alliance would 
instantly be sought at whatever cost. The international 
situation is such that no half security mil serve Austria-
Hungary. There a firm footing is essential. Moreover, the 
Germany which deserts its comrade after such a stupendous 
war would later on be betrayed in its turn by its fresh 
partner ! This is of all things the most certain. We shall 
discuss later on the economic aspects of association with 
Russia or England. 
* * * * * * 
Strong opposition to Mid-Europe is also to be expected 
on the part of Austria and Hungary, and so far as I can see 
in the following five typical forms : 
The Imperial privy councillor, well proved in the service 
of the Crown, has contributed largely to the maintenance of 
government in that country of complicated race problems 
without always meeting with the recognition he deserved. 
But he has grown up in such intimacy with the idea of the 
ancient Austrian dignity, and so full of dislike for Prussian 
forms and informalities, that he will admit Prussia as little as 
possible into his sphere of activity. That North German 
embodiment of unrest would do more harm than good in 
ancient Austria, where delicate handling is required ; and 
IO 
CENTRAL EUROPE 
he simply does not believe that the Prussians would ever 
allow him to have any say in the matter. He regards the 
Prussian system as a strange machine, whose efficiency is 
not to be denied, but whose noise and mechanical accuracy 
make him shudder. He himself prefers to go on with good 
hand-work in the old style ; even if it wastes time it is at 
any rate more human. 
The Austrian, and also the Hungarian Slavs (Tzechs, 
Poles, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Slovenians, Dalmatians), as well 
as the Hungarian Roumanians, do not as a matter of course 
expect very much benefit from any fraternisation with 
the German Empire. For the most part they keep up a 
continual quarrel with the Germans living in their com-
munal and provincial districts; consequently they look 
on them as their domestic enemies and are accustomed to 
judge the whole of Germany by them. Fortunately they 
like the Russians even less, as a rule, than the Germans, 
and they are glad to remain Austrian, only they deplore 
that arrangement of the universe which compels them to 
live between two great bodies of people who are so alien 
to them. They will endeavour in various ways to take the 
opportunity of the foundation of Mid-Europe in order to 
secure special national advantages for themselves, since, as 
born particularists, they are only interested in a minor degree 
in its formation; their first thought is for their special 
nationality. 
The Magyar Hungarians are in a very different position. 
Their authority depends on the defeat and restraint of the 
Russians, for it is evident that one of the first principles of 
a conquering Russia would be to humiliate the Magyars 
for the benefit of the Hungarian Slavs, and perhaps even 
of the Roumanians. The Magyar State can only continue 
to exist, in its present form, as an independent political factor, 
in alliance with one of the non-Slav Great Powers. This 
is what binds the Magyars of almost every shade of opinion 
so firmly to the German Empire. They are well aware that 
Austria alone cannot protect them from the Russians. So 
far then as a German-Hungarian friendship is concerned we 
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and the Magyars agree perfectly, but when it is a question 
of the Mid-European constitution, which will sooner or 
later become necessary, it appears that the existing relations 
between Hungary and Austria are far too vague to admit 
of a new Mid-European adjustment being based without 
difficulty on the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich. And since 
the Magyar is by nature and tradition a stickler for " State 
rights," and often more of a theorist than an opportunist, 
he may, even with the best intentions, prove a serious 
obstacle at some given later time. Since we must discuss 
these matters more in detail in another place, it will suffice 
here to direct attention to them. 
The Austrian German, perhaps also the German in Hun-
gary, and more particularly the German in Siebenbürgen, is 
naturally eager to obtain any sort of political unity with the 
German Empire. But in many cases he asks for something 
rather different from what we Germans of the Empire could 
grant him. Hundreds of times the Germans of the Ostmark, 
left outside Bismarck's Empire, have called to us : " Come 
over and help us ! " Equally often they have been answered : 
" It will not do, you owe your political allegiance to Austria 
or to Hungary and we must not interfere ! " With us in 
the German Empire, thanks to Bismarck's training, State 
policy comes before the policy of any nationality, hence we 
do and have done nothing which could seem like incitement 
to a German Irredenta. Italians, Serbs, Roumanians, or 
Russians from one side of the frontier are continually calling 
to and tempting their race-fellows on the other. But we, 
respecting the connection made by the alliance, have often 
been obliged to let our brothers call in vain. This has 
produced a definite feeling of annoyance ; to what purpose 
is my Fatherland so powerful, if it cannot stretch out a 
helping hand to me across the border ? The Germans in 
Austria have, in a difficult situation, done much for the 
German race and for the Austrian State, for which they 
receive no tangible reward from either side. Even now, 
in the Great War, they supply comparatively the largest 
number of soldiers in Austria ; suffer, as they tell us, the 
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most severe losses; subscribe relatively the most to the 
Austrian war loans; and yet are not certain for a single 
day that, after the war, when the Parliamentary majority 
becomes effective again, they will not be excluded from a 
share in the government and, in spite of this, have to bear 
the greater part of the cost of restoring Galicia. In this 
state of abandonment they once more stretch out their 
hands to the German Empire to demand that no fresh treaty 
be made with Austria which does not afford them guarantees 
against political exclusion and oppression. From their 
point of view they are not unjustified, but it is by no means 
certain whether the German Empire is in a position to delay 
its new Central European treaty of alliance until the very 
necessary regulations for the nationalities within Austria 
and Hungary are completed. And if they are completed, 
the question will still be a domestic affair for Austria and 
Hungary. The German Empire might indeed discuss it in 
a friendly manner, but certainly must not come forward 
from outside like a dictator, lest the whole movement for 
unity, so essential for all, be endangered from the outset. 
I know that one section of our German brothers in Austria 
were in such a position before the war that they would then 
rather have given up Austria for lost and have preferred 
to be included in the German Empire. But I believe that 
during the war insight into the coherence and responsi-
bility demanded by all the evidence of history has so 
developed among these very Germans that they will now 
realise in future, better than before, that it is a national 
necessity for Germany to continue Bismarck's policy of 
1876 and 1879 °f maintaining the integrity of Austria. 
Moreover, in many cases the racial impulse towards the 
German Fatherland is oddly counteracted by the Austrian 
interests of the German industrials. Of course there are 
a great many non-German industrials, but nevertheless the 
Germans form such an important and outstanding group 
among the rest that they must be counted here as a separate 
type. As a rule the German producer, as a man and a 
German, desires the closest possible union with his great 
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and beloved home country, but as a man of business he 
occasionally remarks : " God protect me from my friends ! " 
This feeling is very different in different branches of industry. 
Often the competition of the German Empire constitutes 
the greatest danger for Austro-German industry, or is at 
least so regarded. We shall go into details later, here 
we only wish not to overlook the tendency altogether. 
Non-German industrials, too, may be possessed by a like 
anxiety. 
Of the relation of the Crown and of the supreme command 
of the Army to the Mid-European scheme we shall purposely 
avoid speaking here, because this is beyond the range of 
our knowledge, and discussion might perhaps do more harm 
than good. 
Of such a mixed, if not more mixed, nature is the recep-
tion given to the concept of a Central European union in 
Austria and Hungary. But here, too, the ultimately decisive 
consideration will not be what advantage or disadvantage 
this or that group hopes or fears, but whether or no it is 
desired to maintain the Dual Monarchy as a State. Whoever 
desires this must also desire the Central European alliance, 
because an Austria-Hungary without allies would be even 
more wholly lost than a German Empire without allies ; 
and because no other alliance in the world can give the 
Dual Monarchy the necessary support. 
We have before mentioned it as theoretically possible 
that, in the case of a weakening of Bismarck's alliance, 
which Graf Andrassy concluded for Austria-Hungary in 1879 
with the assent of his Imperial master, the Danube Empire, 
remembering the Seven Years War, might some time range 
itself with Russia and France. In fact, we admit that there 
are individuals in Vienna, or in the Slav districts, who do 
occasionally think something of this sort. This is the only 
effective threat which Austrian statesmen have available 
for us, for a bare alliance between Austria-Hungary and 
England would be just as platonic as a war waged by the 
Dual Monarchy alone against England. It is conceivable 
that a Franco-Austro-Russian union against the German 
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Empire might be a serious danger, and, in fact, almost 
must be so. It is questionable, indeed, whether the Austro-
Hungarian Crown could rely on either its people or its 
troops for a new Seven Years War of this kind, but we are 
willing to admit this, with some important reservations, 
for the sake of theoretical accuracy. What would Austria-
Hungary gain thereby in the end ? Even in case of victory 
she would be reduced to the level of a crumbling Balkan 
State dependent on Russia's goodwill, crumbling because 
the Slavs would be pulling with all their might towards 
Russia, and the Germans towards Germany. An Austria 
which adopted this course would have lost its eastern 
frontier, its future in the south, and its task in the world's 
history, and therewith its inner unifying force. Such a 
policy might be contemplated in case of need for psycho-
logical reasons, but not from political considerations. ~ And 
since the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy possesses a wealth 
of political feeling such as exists practically nowhere else 
in the world, we may safely reckon that if a choice has to 
be made it will be founded not on temporary humours, but 
on more fundamental laws of development, which means 
that the Central European alliance will be, in fact, supported 
and maintained notwithstanding all the politico-legal and 
other difficulties connected with it. 
Many readers may think it scarcely fitting for us to discuss 
at all such grievous and dismal possibilities. But in a 
political discussion of this kind all imaginable cases ought 
to be reckoned with, because it must always be presumed 
that each such case is being taken into account somewhere 
or other. Such investigations do not make cheerful read-
ing, but it is not our business to make an inspiring appeal, 
but rather to discuss in a manner intelligible to doubters 
and opponents. Before two Empires bind themselves for 
better or for worse they must have a thorough preliminary 
stock-taking. Austria-Hungary is as independent as the 
German Empire, has absolute freedom of action, and has 
the moral right to make any use of this freedom which 
offers permanence and prosperity to the Danubian Empire, 
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even if it is displeasing to the North German Empire. 
Austria is concerned with Austrian policy, and Hungary 
with Hungarian policy. We do not dispute the formal 
right to adopt the position of opponent, we only assert that 
a dissolution of the permanent alliance by Austria-Hungary 
would and must be a kind of suicide. From the Austro-
Hungarian standpoint the alliance with Germany is less 
a sentimental obligation than a pressing necessity for self-
preservation. 
* * * * * * 
But we have not yet got to the bottom of the matter. 
One final and most difficult question still remains to be 
examined : Whether the Danubian Monarchy can be kept 
in existence at all with or without an alliance ? This ques-
tion is actually discussed both within and without the black 
and yellow boundaries, and we must not overlook it, because 
there are serious German politicians who will hear nothing 
of the Central European union, for no reason but that they 
consider a split in the hitherto federated Dual Monarchy 
to be historically unavoidable, and because there were or 
are serious German-Austrians, and also members of other 
nations in Austria and Hungary, who agree with them. 
We, for our part, do not share this opinion. If we did 
we should not write about the future of Mid-Europe. We 
are optimists. But since pessimists exist, their opinions 
also must be examined. 
Pessimists are no new phenomena in or out of Austria. 
When Maria Theresa, a queen unsurpassed by the ablest 
men, and founder of effective home government, ascended 
the throne, the doubters said that it was beyond human 
power to breathe life into the State. And from that time 
onwards the whisperings and mutterings about a fatal 
illness have never ceased, but the sick man has gone on 
living passably well all the same. There have been almost 
always symptoms of disintegration, but always new signs 
of life too. And the course of the present war speaks much 
for the possibilities of life in the Hapsburg State federation. 
If we Germans of the Empire find here and there less concord 
IO 
CENTRAL EUROPE 
than we should wish, yet experienced and reliable Austrians 
tell us that the mobilisation, the conduct of the war, and the 
administration have gone on much better than they would 
have thought possible. Strife ceased, pettiness disappeared, 
slackness vanished, a sense of duty showed itself, the will 
developed, the State was at hand. 
This is not the place to go into all kinds of details about 
unfortunate experiences during the war of which we hear in 
private, if for no other reason than that these assertions 
cannot now be checked. At the end of the war Austria will 
have the depressing but unavoidable duty of conducting an 
inquiry into loyalty and disloyalty to the State. Granted 
that as a rule, after the first mobilisation, it was harder to 
keep the army up to strength in the non-German and non-
Magyar districts than with us, yet we must remember all 
that has already been said about the position of the Slav in 
Austria. If we take the past into account in regard to 
those matters, we shall say in spite of everything : the 
unity of the State has proved beyond all expectation ! 
What notions England and Russia had about the progress 
of the war ! They imagined whole nations coming from 
the Danube to join them. There has never been the slightest 
sign of this. 
The most severe trial of the Dual Monarchy is, of course, 
connected, both now and in the future after the war, with 
the ideals of nationality. Without entering here upon an 
investigation of the nationality question we can yet assert 
that the highest tension in the disputes concerning it is 
now relaxed, and that the war is proving a stern master and 
educator in moderating the demands of the nationalist 
particularists. The impossibility of sovereign small States 
with mixed populations is obvious. This does not mean 
that the different nationalities will forget all their quarrels, 
but they will regard their disputes as a matter of home and 
not of foreign politics. They will recognise that a Tzech 
army, or a Croat General Staff or a purely Magyar Foreign 
Office, or a Slovenian economic policy or a Galician State 
Bank must be counted as impracticable. Centralised 
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Management will emerge from the Carpathian campaign 
heavily burdened yet greatly strengthened. Even the 
Hungarians, who during the war have occupied prominent 
positions in this Central Management, will be obliged to 
recognise this. They do not contemplate abandoning any-
thing of the principle of Dualism, but they are sufficiently 
keen-sighted to see that centralisation is technically unavoid-
able for reasons of political necessity. If the Government 
makes use of its present favourable opportunity it will 
re-create and extend what Maria Theresa brought into being, 
political consciousness ! Nothing will help more towards 
this than joint work at the new and important task of 
fashioning Mid-Europe : begin a fresh epoch ! 
So long as the Austro-Hungarian Central Government or 
the responsible representative of the dynasty has nothing 
else in view but to maintain the existing state of things 
with the help of small reforms, there will be little to grip 
the imagination of the youth of all the nationalities owing 
allegiance to it. But when once it raises the banner of a 
new epoch its gates will be thronged by able men. Austria-
Hungary undoubtedly possesses amongst all its peoples 
proportionately numerous talents and noble and effective 
gifts. But hitherto political employment has offered too 
few tasks demanding a broad outlook, to attract ability. 
This may and shall be different now. A new State-creating 
enthusiasm will be wrung out by force and necessity. It 
rests with the Crown to awaken all spirits by the watch-
word, Mid-Europe, and to let the fight for trivialities appear 
indeed trivial. It rests with the Crown whether there shall 
be Spring or Autumn after the war. It is optimistic to 
believe that it will unhesitatingly choose Spring, but there 
is surely no cause to give up hope. 
An old State can endure much provided its foreign 
defences are assured. Turkey offers a remarkable instance 
of this. That Turkey lost one piece of territory after another 
was due to her old-fashioned army and the doubtful status 
of the advisers and instructors from the rival countries. 
Now that the Young Turk movement is beginning to 
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revive in virtue of the Prussian reorganisation of the 
army, matters are rapidly beginning to look more favour-
able. But Austria-Hungary was always more stable than 
Turkey, and has never become so weak from a military 
standpoint. Hence usually the area of the. State has 
been maintained, even in the most difficult times, and 
hence, too, there is no reason now to regard the further 
salvation of the Danubian Monarchy as improbable. There 
is no natural law asserting that a complete cure will be 
attained, but it may be attained, and we desire to attain it. 
We Germans of the Empire must desire it. 
The Austrians, however, must not take it in bad part 
when I remark that it is largely their own fault if pessimistic 
opinions about their country are too widely prevalent in the 
world. There is a special sort of political criticism in Vienna 
which thinks itself interesting and important when it paints 
gloomy pictures. This, in Vienna, is done with no very 
serious intention, but is rather like the daily grumblings of 
an old lady who would not feel it quite the thing to acknow-
ledge that she had eaten and slept well. This artificial 
melancholy is, in fact, purely aesthetic, and has very little 
to do with politics, but foreigners attach a political meaning 
to such expressions of weariness. If, for instance, it had 
been rumoured in Paris before the war that the Bavarians 
were on the point of separating from the German Empire, 
we should have raised our glasses and cried, " Good 
luck ! " But if the news appeared one evening in the 
Corriere della Sera or in some other foreign paper that the 
Tzechs were threatening the Austrian State and had ready 
ears for foreign whispers of intrigue, the Vienna cafés 
would have sighed out, " Just what we expected of those 
Tzechs ! " No doubt there is occasionally reason to sigh, 
but it need not be done so openly or with such satisfaction. 
If Austria herself will recognise her attacks of pessimism for 
what they really are, that is for aesthetic politics, then 
foreigners too will begin to respect her as more healthy. 
We have confidence in you, have confidence in yourselves ! 
* * * * * * 
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The outcome of our inquiry, so far, has been to show the 
necessity for a close union of both Empires. Meanwhile 
we have assumed in various places without further argument 
that the new alliance must be richer in content than the 
present one, but we have not yet been able to explain why 
the existing mutual alliance will not suffice longer. 
The present Dual Alliance, called for a time the Triple 
Alliance, and then again the Dual Affiance, which dates 
from October 16, 1879, was a defensive alliance in the 
event of one of the two Central European Powers being 
attacked by a third party. How and when exactly such a 
case would arise cannot be gathered from the text of the 
treaty. Indeed, so far as I can understand it, the event 
referred to in the treaty has never, in the strict sense of the 
text, actually occurred, indeed hardly can occur, for by the 
time the fact of being attacked is, so to speak, juridically 
evident, any readiness to help would be too late. The 
really effective content of the Dual Affiance was conse-
quently in part more and in part less than a treaty. More 
in so far as mutual goodwill was genuinely ready for any 
sort of complication that might arise. But less in that any 
compulsion to recognise the event referred to in the alliance 
was lacking. We have seen in the case of Italy, the treaty 
with which in any case differed somewhat from the German-
Austrian-Hungarian treaty, how pliable a carefully drafted 
text becomes in this respect if an ill will undertakes its 
interpretation. Since each new case is different in form it 
must, as a matter of course, be discussed as new by the two 
Cabinets. This is in the nature of things so long as there 
are two Foreign Offices with different aims, methods and 
leaders. But the two Foreign Offices must be retained, as 
we shall explain more carefully later. The consequence is 
that political treaties concerning defensive affiances cannot 
be regarded as in themselves binding on a nation. 
When, for example, in 1911, in connection with the 
Agadir demonstration, we were in danger of a Franco-
Russian war about Morocco, without its being possible for 
us to assert an actual attack by the French, it remained, so 
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far as we knew, an open question whether the Austro-
Hungarian army would help us at all, since it was not 
bound to do so by the text of the treaty. 
When in the summer of 1914 the heir to the Austrian 
throne and his wife were murdered by boyish criminals at 
Serajewo, the German Empire was not obliged by the 
clauses in the treaty to trouble itself at all about the matter. 
That the Emperor Wilhelm and his advisers did take action 
was in excess of the treaty obligation. Germany offered 
her life-blood to Austria-Hungary, and the latter thereupon 
accepted the enemies of Germany as her own. The Great 
War is thus much more than a treaty war, it is a partnership 
of sentiment, as though we had already grown into unison. 
Suppose now that the two Empires simply return to the 
old relation at the end of the Great W a r ; "that would be 
something less than what now exists during the war. Less 
just because this brotherhood of blood was not legally 
demanded of us, and we all know this well enough. But 
how ought the future relation to be put into words ? We 
have forebodings both in North and South that the future 
will bring us face to face with yet more difficult matters, 
that the world will remain for us full of dark and strange 
dangers. How then can we mutually safeguard ourselves, 
lest one day, for whatever human reason, the partnership 
should prove non-existent ? 
The safeguard certainly does not consist in mere political 
treaties. No treaty can be formulated between two 
sovereign States which has not its loopholes and omissions. 
The safeguard lies in a community of life in its many aspects, 
political, economic and personal; in the voluntary, syste-
matic interchange between the two countries, in the com-
munity of ideas, of history, of culture, of work, of legal 
concepts, of a thousand and one things large and small. 
Nothing less than the attainment of this common existence 
will bind us really securely. But even the will to attain it 
is of immense value. And this is the spirit in which we 
proclaim Mid-Europe as the goal of our development. 
* * * * * * 
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In trivial matters, and those of minor importance, it is 
possible to draw up and determine upon complete plans or 
estimates, but for a scheme of the magnitude and difficulty 
of this in regard to Mid-Europe, such a proceeding would be 
most unprofitable. Nothing is easier for the expert than to 
enumerate ten or twelve points in a programme. Something 
as follows : 
The same recruiting laws. 
Mutual military inspection. 
Joint committee for foreign affairs. 
Joint boards for railways, the control of rivers, etc. 
The same coinage and measures. 
The same laws for banks and commerce. 
The same assessment for military expenses. 
Mutual liability for national debts. 
Equality of customs tariffs. 
Joint collector of taxes. 
The same factory laws. 
The same laws for companies, syndicates, etc. 
This sort of thing might be continued for quite a long 
time, but it is meaningless. In real life problems come up 
in succession, and no one can tell beforehand in what order 
or in what selection. Even for political parties the fist of 
demands in their programme is more often a source of 
weakness than of strength. On the one hand people are 
deterred by the list because they cannot tolerate one of the 
points enumerated, whilst they keenly deplore the absence 
of another. On the other hand the party leaders them-
selves tie their hands unnecessarily, and often are quite 
unable to accomplish what they have pledged themselves 
to. They desire and ought to be judged by their deeds in 
each case as it occurs, and they ought to realise, step by 
step according to their best judgment, the common ideals 
and aims of the party. This practical conception, resulting 
from party experience, applies to a yet greater extent to 
the State. It is true that an able Minister President may 
be able to make one or two promises which can be redeemed 
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in a comparatively near future, but he will never lavishly 
make all the promises that he would carry out were he a 
Zeus. If, then, a new and important political structure 
comes into the sphere of practical politics, a kind of super-
State over other States, an Empire of Empires, it would be 
a direct sin against the ideal of this new creation to try to 
stuff it to overflowing from the outset with tasks that 
would occupy ten or twenty years. Each item on the 
programme given above will require years of work to 
accomplish. Many will be attempted in vain. Others, to 
which to-day we give no thought, will become urgent 
to-morrow. Politics are a work of real life done for the 
sake of that life. 
It would be better to attempt to indicate from the outset 
those departments with which the super-State must not 
interfere, but we know from the history of the German 
Imperial Constitution how elastic the boundary-line between 
Empire and individual State has remained after more than 
forty years. We shall refer in the chapter on constitutional 
problems to some of the principles of division which are 
relevant in this connection. The essential thing now is not 
an academic general authorisation lasting through one or 
two lifetimes, but the establishment of an effective starting-
point for the new institution itself. We shall investigate 
further, later on, how this may be done. 
Nor must it be thought that Mid-Europe can be called 
into being merely by laws, regulations and penalties. It is 
at least equally important that the boundary between the 
federated States shall be non-existent for all important 
groups of intellectual and material interests, as is partly 
the case already: community in banks, syndicates, trade 
unions, craftsmen's guilds, agricultural conferences, meetings 
of economists, historians, lawyers, doctors and many others. 
Hitherto such super-State groups have generally only ex-
tended from us to the German-Austrians, but it is necessary 
that a common atmosphere should prevail throughout Mid-
Europe. All this must not be hindered secretly or openly 
by the Government, but must be definitely promoted, so 
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that a community of life may develop from above down-
wards as a result of comradeship in the alliance. 
* * * * * * 
The cry comes to us from the midst of the war : " We 
must be a single nation of brothers, inseparable in adversity 
or danger ! " This sublime call from) living and dying is 
the key-note for the coming epoch. Not, indeed, that there 
has been no friction in the conduct of the w a r ! Such 
friction has occurred, and does still occur, and often seems 
so disturbing to those most closely affected that they have 
no great desire to let their neighbours become too intimate. 
Officers and soldiers of the German Empire|who have come 
back from the joint fighting-lines often speak bitterly 
against the Austrians and Hungarians, condemning them 
for want of punctuality, lack of marching efficiency, and 
inaccuracy. In these matters the difficulties of the polyglot 
army are often much too little considered. People forget, 
too, that the Austro-Hungarian army missed the schooling 
of 1870. These Imperial German military critics do not 
realise that the new portions of the German army in 1870 
were of varying values, and needed first of all amalgamation 
with the efficient Prussian army. Moreover there are 
mutual complaints occasionally in the German army itself. 
This does not mean that any doubt is felt of the indomitable 
courage of every section of the Central European Army. 
Even the severest critics praise the genuine and unreserved 
devotion of the Austrian and Hungarian troops in the face 
of danger, and their good and faithful comradeship. On 
the other hand, both Austrians and Hungarians complain oi 
the German, and especially of the Prussian, want of con-
sideration and overbearing manners, and so on. On both 
sides there has been some stupidity, and disagreement in 
details has often gone deep. But all this only signifies a 
succession of incidental events. Comradeship in fighting 
and death is a much greater thing than these unpleasant 
matters, to which we only refer because they are more 
harmful if unexpressed. There is no progress without 
friction. And indeed such half and secondary tones are 
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never absent from human endeavour. Even in the army of 
a single individual State not a single day of the war passes 
without collisions between transport wagons, without 
conflicting orders, without omissions and wrong judgments. 
Can it be expected that two armies that have not fought 
side by side for a hundred years should at once act like 
Siamese twins ? When at last the guns are silent and those 
who return home are at work once again in house and shop, 
then these transitory happenings will sink into confused 
impressions and ideas, but the vital will endure : so many 
nationalities faced by one death in one struggle ! After the 
war only our common victory will illumine us. 
And if once again, which God forbid, the storm-bell 
should ring for Central Europe, this war will form a memo-
rable background ; fathers will tell their sons how they 
were carried from the firing-line by trusty comrades with 
whom they could hardly speak. We do not yet know how 
different all we Central Europeans shall have become after 
the war. We have experienced the full weight and harsh-
ness of international politics, we have lost more brothers 
and children than any one generation before, but we have 
also received more help from God and man than ever did 
heroes of an earlier time. We are losing much of our 
social harshness in the war, the class war for individual 
interests is relaxing, former enemies find themselves loyally 
united heroes, nations who formerly only looked askance 
at one another are mutually friendly. It is our high fate 
to experience what to later generations will seem like a 
sacred legend. With this war behind us we could remove 
mountains. Now or never the lasting unity between East 
and West will develop, and Mid-Europe will stand between 
Russia and the Western Powers. 
C H A P T E R II 
OF T H E PREVIOUS H I S T O R Y OF C E N T R A L 
E U R O P E 
IF an historical entity is to be made of Mid-Europe, a 
fresh historical consciousness must grow up, for economic 
considerations, however serious they may be, will not of 
themselves suffice to arouse the necessary enthusiasm. Of 
course a scheme of this nature cannot be carried out without 
numerous calculations as to material advantages and dis-
advantages, but it is a false rendering of history to believe 
or wish to believe that great political transformations can 
be accomplished by the spirit of calculation alone. Each 
new social creation has its birthplace in the human soul, 
and this soul is never merely economic ; from time imme-
morial and still to-day, it is compounded of impulses and 
desires, material and ideal, definite and vague, variously 
mingled but yet pressing forwards. 
A revolution in thought is needed comparable to the 
change of soul which preceded or followed the. founding of 
the Empire by Bismarck; a re-estimation, not indeed of 
all, but of many accepted values. If we go nowadays into 
our German Reichstag we notice that it is only for certain 
minor affairs that Prussians, Bavarians, Saxons, Wurttem-
bergers, Hessians, Hanoverians or Mecklenburgers sit 
together. Our political parties have throughout lost their 
provincial character in relation to general questions of 
State: they think Imperially! During the war this 
Imperial consciousness has shown itself with especially 
remarkable power. There may indeed still be daily conflicts 
of interests among us Germans, but there is no spirit of 
separatism. Things are naturally somewhat different in 
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the case of our foreign-speaking fellow-citizens, but they too 
hold their own in the war with courage and endurance, for 
the unity of the Empire. This complete agreement in 
principle is the greatest triumph of Bismarck's work as 
founder; for when the German Empire was " constructed," 
as people used to say in those days, the Prusso-German 
spirit of unity existed only in desire, not in fact. In those 
days the individual States still had their own history, their 
own pride and their own sensitiveness. Many centuries of 
quarrelsome and turbulent individual history lay behind 
them. Often the trivialities of their mutual relationships 
are hardly to be called history. The Germans were a non-
politically minded race of good fellows and servants, 
intellectually active, but with little mind for the interests 
of the State. They went each his own way, like sheep 
without a shepherd. But in the interval, out of all this 
rusticity and confusion a Prusso-German tradition has 
developed, that is, we have each saved out of our very 
chequered pasts something that we as Germans can carry 
on with us as our joint inheritance, whilst we have let 
much sink into oblivion of the old quarrels and envy and 
injustice. Some wounds, indeed, are not yet quite healed, 
as we see in the case of the Guelphs. But who still deplores 
nowadays that Prussia deprived the Saxon royal house of 
its most fertile territories ? Who nowadays gives a thought 
to the fact that nearly all the federated States took the 
field against Prussia in early days and again in 1866 ? Who 
now objects to the fact that Frankfurt-on-Main was annexed 
in those days ? The whole nation is conscious, without 
putting it much into words, that no progress can be made 
as an historical entity without a cancelling of old bonds. 
The past is past ! Let the dead bury their dead. They 
have served their age as we wish to serve ours. Honour to 
their name and to their ashes ! 
The political spirit of Mid-Europe, if it is to be of much 
value, must now take possession of us to the extinction of 
numerous old disagreements, for there have been many 
harsh, acute and cruel wars between Austria and Prussia, 
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and between Austria and Bavaria. Here, too, the rubbish 
of centuries needs to be cleared away before the new building 
can be put up. Silesia, Bohemia and the Tyrol have 
witnessed amazing struggles. We are not at present con-
cerned with the fights with and about the Tzechs, the 
Hungarians, the Poles and the Serbs, but are considering in 
the first instance the battles waged between the old German 
Austria and the equally German Powers, Prussia and 
Bavaria. Our ancient banners have all been carried in 
opposition to one another throughout the old German 
Imperial territory. We will leave them hanging peacefully 
on the walls, for no stalwart regiment is ashamed of its 
earlier bravery. But we may well allow some dust to 
gather on these symbols of bygone strife, for new banners 
are now coming to the front, honourable insignia of our 
indescribably great common war. Let us act on the 
principle : to understand all is to forgive all. We, for our 
part, can understand how the golden kingdom of Austria 
had to resist the rise of Prussia with all its might. You can 
understand that the energy existing in the North German 
States had to work out its course. We can both understand 
that the politics of the eighteenth century were the politics 
of conquering princes, and that under the conditions of the 
time it could not be otherwise. You went to Upper Italy 
as conquerors just as King Friedrich II. went to Silesia. A 
hundred wars, little and big, were fought out within the 
boundaries of what is now Austria so that it might become 
Austria ; a hundred fights were necessary so that Prussian-
Germany might come into existence. This was and is the 
way of the world. To-day we can hardly realise how at 
one time neighbouring towns and princedoms could con-
template feuds with each other. Formerly they laid siege 
to one another, now they talk and eat together. Now, too, 
the honoured successor of the Empress Maria Theresa can 
receive the descendant of King Friedrich II. : we are 
partners in victory ; your enemy is our enemy ! 
We must extinguish between North and South the feud 
that existed before Napoleon's time, that showed itself 
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during that time in bitter misunderstandings, and has 
since embittered the common life. Looking back we shall 
see both Friedrich II. and Maria Theresa as two splendid 
warrior types of the same period, souls in the same Valhalla, 
sovereigns inspired by a like spirit of uncompromising 
foresight. We shall even accept Metternich and Baron von 
Stein as part of the same picture, far apart though they 
were in real life : the one a scientific statesman full of a 
facile, industrious elegance, the other a prophet inspired by a 
difficult national morality. We of the German Empire will 
purposely forget the suppression of the joyous youth of our 
national movement in the Conferences of Aachen, Karlsbad 
and Vienna, we shall know no more about Olmiitz, or about 
the pressure on the Frankfurt Federal Diet ; we shall be 
patient when we think of the negotiations against Prussia 
which Beust in Vienna carried on with France, for all this 
is past and has an adequate explanation in history. In like 
manner, too, Austria will forget that at the Vienna Congress 
Prussia was ready to take the field with France against her, 
that the Customs Union was directed and carried on by 
Prussia against Austria, that in 1859 Prussia did not help 
Austria against France and Italy. Both sides must shelve 
the irritations roused by the Crimean War. Our common 
frontiers, formerly so often overstepped, are from henceforth 
to be permanent boundaries, no longer frontiers dividing 
two foreign Powers, but inland boundaries between federated 
countries. And the Emperor Wilhelm I., dead a quarter of 
a century ago, will figure in the history of our Central 
European union as a brother of the Austro-Hungarian 
Emperor and King Franz Joseph I., who, by a miracle, still 
dwells among us, to pronounce the blessing of a revered and 
beloved old age upon the new epoch, after so many ancient 
quarrels, an Attinghaus of the newborn and saving peace of 
nations. 
Were Bismarck, hero and centre of many combats, to 
appear amongst us again for the peace negotiations after 
the Great War, not only would he be hailed with infinite 
confidence from all sides and by every party in the German 
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Empire, but all the peoples in Austria and Hungary would 
meet him enthusiastically. Notwithstanding his fight at 
Koniggrátz, he would appear to all of us, from the North Sea 
to the Bosnian frontier, as the creator of Mid-Europe, the 
man who dispensed mighty power and justice throughout 
the centre of the European continent. Would that he 
were here ! 
* * * * * * 
Forgetfulness is not, however, enough in itself to awaken 
the new sentiment for Mid-Europe, it will merely be a 
preparation for further spiritual progress. We must learn 
to discover the germs and tendencies, the prophecies and 
strivings of the future in the past. New tasks demand new 
eyes. This is a very important chapter and merits all the 
care and devotion of young historians, for historians are 
ultimately the educators of the people. Their responsibility 
increases with the democratic interest taken by the people 
in the State. Cabinet policy in the old style could be 
fashioned in case of need without historical ideas, by bribery, 
calculation, political technique and intrigue. But since the 
masses have become influential in determining the fate of 
the world, they need to have ideas and aims and meanings 
with regard to future happenings. It is true that not 
every one can read the writings of a Treitschke or a Friedjung, 
but the stream of their knowledge flows through a hundred 
channels of speech, school and newspaper, to the cottages of 
the citizen and voter. Hence it may be allowable to insert 
here some special discussion in outline of the people and of 
the nature of its history. 
In speaking in such a connection of the historian as a 
political educator, I see on his right hand the philosopher 
and on his left the poet. I regard him not merely as a 
seeker into the memorable events of the past, but as an 
exponent of the discoveries made by himself and his fellow-
workers. In the first instance, indeed, the historian is 
concerned entirely with facts; he determines what has 
happened. That is the absolutely indispensable basis of his 
art, as necessary as the daily renewed inspiration of nature 
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is to the painter. He who loses the discipline of reality is 
worthless as an artist. But when he has stored up material 
round him like the stones for a mosaic, he has then to show 
whether he is more than a collector, whether he has the 
power to reanimate, to command his material to take form 
and live. He must breathe something of hims'elf into his 
material. This even applies to a certain extent to descrip-
tions of ancient and long-past peoples and periods. When 
Mommsen wrote his Roman History, it was a German 
history of the Romans, a Roman history expressed in 
German, a breathing upon the stones so that they cried out. 
This he was able to do because through his experience of 
the rise of the young German State he could live out the 
times of the first ancient Empire of the West. But the 
historian who portrays our own ancestors, so that we can 
inherit and carry on their traditions, must have even more 
sympathetic insight than he who describes far distant 
times. Out of the thousand things which he might relate 
he selects those which seem to him to promote or obstruct, 
from the standpoint of his ideal of life. The painter Max 
Liebermann once said to me, " Art is omission." B y this 
phrase he distinguished mechanical copying which indeed 
leaves out much, but only such things as chance not to 
come on to the paper, from artistic inspiration which can 
recognise the essential matters and their accessories, which 
deliberately omits non-essentials, and emphasises what it 
is imperative to take into account. In the pursuit of 
truth this can never happen from petty and sophistical 
motives, but must spring of itself from a rare " world-
philosophy." 
Bismarck himself read much history, and that history or 
historical poetry of the finest type. Living in what he read 
he finally proved in his Gedanken und Erinnemngen an 
unrivalled exponent of statesmanlike ideals. The last and 
best thing he bequeathed us was his account of himself : 
very intimate and not without omissions, mistakes and 
partialities, but teeming with the penetration of wisdom. 
He sang the swan song of his own epoch of empire-making, 
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and uttered notes in so doing which will only be properly 
heard when the next new epoch dawns. He wrote for us 
and for our times. 
However, I shall not speak at present of his wonderful 
testament, but of the historians who were his predecessors 
and escort. There was a school of historians of the 
foundation of the Empire in the stricter sense of the word : 
Arndt, Raumer, Dahlmann, Gervinus, Häuser, Baumgarten, 
Droysen, Sybel, Treitschke. 
The men differed among themselves, but they were 
essentially of the same family. They helped themselves 
and many others to an understanding of the coming National 
State. They, with their wave of German national Liberalism, 
reached further than the Old Master Ranke, who in his 
survey of the whole of Europe embodied the older inter-
nationalism of the pre-Napoleonic Christian and aristocratic 
culture. Many of them have not survived their own period 
because they belonged to it all too completely. But in the 
golden days of the Prusso-German State such thinkers and 
poets were needed, their task was accomplished then. 
Mid-Europe will need such people now. It will need more 
than statesmen to think it out aright. The statesman is 
essential in his own place in the forefront of the political 
scheme. But in the background there must be a whispering 
and rushing from the far distant past; visions of ancient 
knights, of a passionate people, of battles lost and won, of 
a common emergence from bog and forest. The evolutionary 
basis of history needs to be discovered, the Will which 
controls matter, before and above any description by 
Reason. 
The historians of the period of the foundation of the 
German Empire can be divided into two principal groups, 
the Medieval-Imperial and the Protestant-Prussian. It is 
true that I have tried in vain, with the help of an experienced 
friend, to classify every separate case under these heads. 
There are noticeable intermediate types : yet at bottom the 
distinction holds, Mediaeval-Imperial or Prussian ! The con-
tribution of the first group has just now, at the beginning 
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of the Mid-European epoch, a renewed freshness of effect, 
for our mediaeval period is common to all types of Germans', 
whether in North or South or East. But the second group,' 
the Prussian historians, have imbued us Imperial Germans 
with something which cannot equally be regarded as a 
unifying possession for the Germans of the Danube. For 
this second theme owes its origin to the fight of separation 
between North and South. Hence, if now during the Great 
War we turn our steps towards Mid-Europe, we are in 
perpetual conflict on the way with these teachers of our 
own youth, especially with von Treitschke, Sybel, and their 
colleagues. For if they are absolutely and permanently 
right, then Bismarck was wrong in 1878. But they were 
only absolutely right for a time. They remained reliable 
in much for a longer period, but the game grew more exten-
sive, the complete vision out-distanced their revelation, and, 
as we recognise their limitations, a new spiritual country 
opens out before us. We must here enter into this point 
rather more at length, because without some definite study 
of this portion of history, the Mid-European ideal will seem 
merely like an old guide-book showing a few new railway 
connections. There is also much food for thought in the 
fact that the historians of the last decades are all more or 
less removed from the Empire-making history. They are 
occupied either, like H. Delbrück, with purely organising 
and military statesmanship as such, or like Helmolt and 
Schäfer, with overseas international politics, or like Gumplo-
wicz and Lamprecht, with the history of social and psycho-
logical culture, or above all with the calm critical estimation 
of past struggles, like Friedjung in Austria. 
* * * * * it-
All earlier history is primarily a history of princes. The 
most determined republican is powerless to alter this, for 
in those days political feeling was as yet non-existent 
amongst the governed. It will prove a vain task to attempt 
to write a history of the civilisation of the nations without 
princes or popes. Such a history is constitutionally defec-
tive, since every servant's coat has first been worn by a 
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gentleman, and all household furniture has first had its 
place in the rooms of a princess. And even nowadays 
the rulers remaining to us out of the multitude of early 
sovereigns still serve as our models in many things in life, 
and are supreme over our great armies in war and peace. 
Theories to the contrary notwithstanding, this is the fact ! 
Thus we must look upon the German mediaeval period as 
a history of the Emperors in the first place, before we can 
pass from them to the people. 
The early German Emperors are Central European figures 
in the fullest sense of the word, and the type is thus only 
now becoming recognisable again. The " Lesser Germany " 
party are'indeed unable to understand the greatest of 
the early Emperors. Since 1870, it is true, people have 
sung much in praise of Barbarossa and Wilhelm I., but the 
real inner connection between the two characters was lack-
ing. To-day, during this war that extends from the Alps 
to Anatolia, to-day Barbarossa rises up out of the River 
Selef in distant Turkey. 
Our people only know particulars about the most import-
ant of the early German Emperors : Karl the Great, Hein-
rich I., Otto I., Heinrich III., Heinrich IV. (Canossa !), 
Friedrich Barbarossa, Friedrich II., Rudolf von Hapsburg, 
Maximilian I., Karl V. But throughout Central Europe, 
and wherever the German language prevails, a notion is 
rooted firmly in the hearts of the people that already in 
those days there was a Mid-European World Power. Even 
if the coherence of the Empire was often feeble in those 
days of overgrown forests and poor communications, even 
if at times the elective imperial dignity seemed hardly more 
powerful than the old elective monarchy in Poland or 
Hungary, yet, throughout the Middle Ages there existed in 
essence a desire for a united Power ruling from Jutland to 
the Adriatic Sea, and even to Sicily. Even apart from 
Karl V.'s Burgundian and Spanish inheritance, the western 
boundary of Central Europe ran about where the Germans 
and French are now entrenched. It began at Bruges and 
Ghent, extended southwards almost as far as St. Quentin, 
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included Verdun and Toul, and in the most vigorous times 
took in Besançon, Lyon, Vienne, and even Avignon. The 
eastern boundary certainly varied very much according to 
whether Pomerania, Bohemia, Hungary and Croatia were 
joined to the Empire or not. North and south of the Alps 
however, a supreme authority was exercised with but few 
intervals from the time of Karl the Great to that of Karl V 
This authority was indeed in the characteristic mediaeval 
way not always obeyed, but it was recognised as existing in 
principle. It will from henceforth be easier than before to 
regard as our forerunner this ancient Empire, extensive and 
on the whole, powerful as it was. Neither Imperial Austria 
nor Royal Prussia, when separated from each other, were 
quite in a position to carry on the Imperial tradition, because 
each only possessed a part of the original whole. For 
centuries the Empire of the Carolingians, the Ottos and the 
Hohenstaufen, has been non-existent and will be so until 
it is born again out of the union between the Hapsburgs 
and the Hohenzollerns, between the Frisians and the Illy-
rians, between the Prussians and the Tyrolese. In the more 
distant past vague feelings of community have already 
subsisted between them. There was even a time when 
Warsaw and Cracow were counted as belonging to the Hansa 
League. People from all parts of Central Europe travelled 
and rode to the Reichstag. Knights from every department 
of what is now the German Empire and of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy journeyed with Friedrich Barbarossa 
to the Holy Sepulchre. There was, in fact, in mediœval 
Central Europe a peculiar community of life and culture 
which differed somewhat from anything in the still confusedly 
intermingled kingdoms of England and France, and had no 
analogy whatever among the Byzantines, Tartars or 
Varangians. The Germans occupied the centre of Central 
Europe, but they drew in the neighbouring peoples on all 
their borders : the Holy Roman Empire of the German 
nation. Now, during the Great War, this ancient Empire 
is striving and pushing under the earth, longing to return 
after its long sleep. Every aspiration after unity during 
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the many confused centuries that have intervened has been 
an after-glimmer of its light. And when, a hundred years 
ago, the wars of liberation against Napoleon united all the 
German races for a short time, the prophets, with poetic 
reminiscence, sang, as of old, of Emperor and Empire : 
Germany shall be one ! Are you not conscious, in this super-
human war, of the spirits of our ancestors ? Do our sons 
go side by side to their death merely because of a written 
treaty, or is there something behind ? Did not the clouds 
mass themselves in the sky over the Carpathians and over 
Antwerp as though in an attempted greeting of knights and 
war-horses of old ? All this was once one Empire ! Now 
it is only the dream of an Empire. What will it become ? * * * * * * 
Of all the mediaeval Empires, Central Europe remained 
longest in its amorphous and unorganised condition. Whilst 
France and England on the one hand, and Russia on the 
other, grew comparatively quickly and easily into single 
coherent political entities, the centre of the Continent from 
Sweden to the Neapolitan kingdom remained a territory 
of innumerable small States. One important reason for 
this appears, as we have already noticed, to lie in the fact 
that the Emperor was elected. In all States where the 
monarch is elected, it is a matter of experience that the 
electing portions develop to excess at the expense of the 
whole, for each election multiplies their particularist claims. 
Besides this the physical character of Central Europe has 
from the outset encouraged numerous subdivisions, and 
there was no mediaeval capital. The Eternal City of Rome 
was always looked upon as the Imperial City of the Western 
World and the earlier Emperors generally had itinerant 
Courts. Hence north of the Alps no resident Government 
was established or encouraged. Central Europe produced 
nothing north of the Alps that could be compared with 
Rome, Constantinople, Moscow, Paris or London, for all 
our medieval towns lacked the crystallising power of a 
ruler. Neither Cologne, nor Mainz, nor Frankfurt, Augs-
burg, Nürnberg, nor Hildesheim, Lübeck, Leipzig, nor 
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Prague, Graz, Vienna, was a European metropolis. It was 
only with the rise of the Northern and Southern Ostmarks 
in the later Middle Ages that the older Vienna, and in still 
more recent times the more modern Berlin, grew up : two 
centres neither of which was in itself the recognised capital 
of Central Europe. Perhaps the reader has seen in scientific 
books an illustration on a large scale of the process of cell-
division : one cell acquires two nuclei, and loses its form 
more and more as these two nuclei recede from one another. 
It was something the same with Central Europe after the 
time of Karl V. Or to put it otherwise : the controlling 
authority moved from west to east and split into two 
halves, which fought each other. But at the same time 
there remained an undoubted connection, which could be 
stretched, and at times also broken, between almost all the 
sections which had once been united under the Ottos or 
the Hohenstaufen. The result is a withering up of the 
Imperial idea on the left bank of the Rhine, and as com-
pensation a forward pressure of Germanism into Poland, 
Lithuania, Bohemia, Moravia, and even into the Southern 
Slav provinces under Turkish rule. 
It is indeed not quite verbally accurate, if we express it 
so briefly as we have just done, to say that both the new 
centres of authority became the means of spreading the 
energy of Germanism into the East. Berlin has done little 
more than concentrate the effects of work done earlier in 
East Prussia, Pomerania, and Mecklenburg. And Vienna 
has generally been more occupied with extending its authority 
towards the East than with spreading German influence. 
After all, the main point is this : the two leading Powers 
that were advancing eastwards were hampered by a form-
less structure: the German Empire, a country full of 
splendid cities and cathedrals, with golden crops and precious 
vineyards, but without military strength of its own and 
without political feeling. Whilst both struggled forward 
to the East they quarrelled on their van about Polish terri-
tory, on their flank about Silesia and Saxony, and on their 
rear about all the absurd trivialities of spiritual and worldly 
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princes, about the continual lawsuits over the inheritances 
of the nobility, about the regulation of the boundaries of 
the pigmy domains, and about the war subsidies of the 
French and English. This was the pitiable condition of 
German affairs when, finally, Napoleon I. burst upon them 
with threats and disturbance. Nowhere else could he have 
founded the Confederation of the Rhine. But the Confedera-
tion of the Rhine was the end, the final complete end of the 
history of the ancient German Empire. The old Crown was 
laid aside. Finis Germanics! When and how shall it 
come again ? In what intermediary form and by what 
stages ? 
* * * * * * 
With the Napoleonic period the second stage in the history 
of Central Europe begins, the stage in which we are still 
living. The old Imperial drama had been played through 
to the end. Central Europe was full of historical rubbish, 
and was pressed backwards and forwards between West 
and East. The effective power at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century was in the hands of Napoleon and 
Alexander I. of Russia, behind whom were the English. 
This is not the place to discuss the personal characteristics 
of the Tsar Alexander, but for the purposes of this sketch 
he may be regarded as the embodiment of the Russian 
power and as the predecessor of Nicholas I. 
There are two principal advances in the Napoleonic War : 
one from Paris to Moscow, and one from Moscow to Paris. 
In both cases Central Europe was pushed, first eastwards 
by Napoleon, and then westwards by the Tsar Alexander. 
The advance from Paris to Moscow (1805-1812) might 
have been held up on the Rhine if " the Empire " had had 
any real significance ; the advancing army would have been 
pent up before the Bohmerwald if the two leading Powers 
had fought in partnership instead of letting themselves be 
defeated separately, but there was no community of feeling. 
It was in Napoleon's " great army " that the Austrians and 
Prussians first learnt to march side by side. In June 
200,000 French, 45,000 Italians, 79,000 Bavarians, Saxons, 
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Hessians, Wiirttembergers, etc., 34,000 Anstrians and Hun-
garians, 32,000 Prussians, 50,000 Poles, advanced on to 
Moscow. This was the first occasion on which Central 
Europe acted in concert. 
The advance from Moscow to Paris (1812-1815) presents 
the reverse picture. In August 1813, 160,000 Russians 
130,000 Austrians and Hungarians, 180,000 Prussians 
20,000 Swedes marched from East to West. The further 
the allied army pressed onwards towards the west after 
the Battle of Leipzig, the more it attracted Central European 
troops to itself, so that finally all Germany crossed the 
Rhine. This was the second occasion on which Central 
Europe acted in concert! 
It is important to picture to ourselves thus briefly the 
events of the Napoleonic period, in order not to be left 
buried in the history of individual States. In the schools 
of the German Empire we foster a presentation of history 
which lays all the emphasis on the Prussian struggle for 
national freedom, and we know that in Austria much more 
weight is put on the clever diplomacy of the Court which 
under difficult circumstances saved what there was to save. 
The first important common experience of the two States 
is not thought of as " common " in history, because people 
on both sides are afraid to admit unreservedly that a hundred 
years ago Napoleonic France could not be repulsed without 
Russia. When the three rulers of Russia, Austria-Hungary 
and Prussia stood on the King's Hill at Leipzig, the Russian 
was the strongest of them because he had already freed his 
own country. When Alexander advanced on Paris in 
triumph, and the Central Europeans accompanied him and 
did what he wanted, they still went on quarrelling amongst 
themselves, and begging the great man from the East to 
be their friend and arbitrator. Baron von Stein accom-
plished his work for his passionately loved German Father-
land more by the help of the Russian Tsar than by that 
of the Prussian King. The events of the Vienna Congress 
require this background to explain them. 
The Vienna Congress re-established Central Europe under 
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Russian protection. We will not absolutely condemn the 
German Constitution as then drawn up. In spite of its 
obvious weaknesses and faults it was yet the first attempt 
at the task with which we are now occupied afresh. This 
task demands a much more careful study, before the new 
Peace Congress which is ahead of us, than it has received 
for fifty years. With it will begin the struggle about the 
future form to be adopted by these provinces and peoples, 
who now defend themselves independently and successfully 
against East and West, against France and Russia, and 
faced by the opposition of England. Formerly Central 
Europe was a mass of rubble, now we see it hardening into 
stone before our eyes. The difference is immense. A 
century has wrought wonders. We now hold the centre 
by our own strength against Russia, France, and England, 
and a few others besides. If only Baron von Stein could 
see i t ! 
* * * * * * 
The Napoleonic period has a special significance for the 
soul of Central Europe, because it planted a political and 
democratic spirit in the people. Napoleon appeared as the 
personification of the French Revolution, and as a personal 
dictator made great reforms both directly and indirectly. 
The completion of the liberation of the serfs, so far as it 
could be accomplished in face of the opposition of the old 
landed proprietors, was the result of Napoleon's subversive 
influence on all conditions of life. What Maria Theresa, 
Joseph II., and Friedrich II. liked to confer as a favour to 
the people from above, now, amid the gleam of weapons, 
took the form of a popular demand. The temporary re-
establishment of Poland had a nationalising effect on its 
neighbours. The rise of Prussia displayed a king urged 
forward to victory by the popular will. Universal con-
scription in Prussia made subjects into supporters of the 
State. The fragile nature of kingdoms, both great and 
small, was obvious. Everywhere there was fermentation 
and effervescence. A new epoch was striving to emerge, 
a national epoch. But the new still lacked form and was 
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without tradition and without technical skill in Parliamen-
tary politics, so that at first, in the lassitude following on 
the unspeakable labours of the war, it remained weaker 
than the practised skill of the old Governments. The 
Governments made many promises to the developing peoples, 
without carrying them out, partly because they were un-
willing, partly because they could not. The best of the 
soldiers, like Bliicher, hung their swords upon the wall 
discontentedly, because this peace and this congress did not 
repay their efforts. Mid-Europe had desired to come into 
existence, but had not done so. Nevertheless the new seed 
remained in the ground. There was now a period of secret 
growth from 1815 till 1848. The ideal of a free German 
Empire in its ancient strength and splendour developed, 
and, too, the nationalist demands of the frontier peoples 
developed, hopes, difficulties and possibilities developed. 
All this happened whilst officially the two Central European 
Powers were allowing themselves to be led and checked 
by Russia. Indirectly, first Alexander I. and then Nicolas I. 
was the Regent of Central Europe. The German provinces 
lay at the Tsar's feet like superior Balkan States, which 
had obtained their freedom from Russia. The East had 
conquered in the struggle between West and East, and made 
use of her victory. 
Things went on in this way until in 1848 a fresh wave 
of democratic feeling surged out of France in the West up 
to the frontiers of the Russian Empire. The Paris Revolu-
tion concerned all Europe. It affected Central Europe as 
far as Warsaw and Budapest, almost like Napoleonism 
without Napoleon. The soul of the West swelled up against 
the authority of the East. This authority was more severely 
shaken in Vienna than in Berlin, because Vienna had offered 
less scope to the spirit of the wars of liberation than Berlin, 
and because the national principle in Hungary risked its 
great and vigorous passage of arms on this occasion. The 
middle classes and the townsfolk in Germany and Austria 
now wanted to put in their word, the educated class demanded 
a share in general politics, the tax-payers claimed to be 
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consulted about their money. Every little street and square 
resounded once again with German problems, citizens' rights 
and constitutional demands. But once again the new spirit 
lacked the energy of definiteness, for it was non-military. 
Wrangel in Berlin, and Windischgratz in Vienna, proved 
stronger than all the popular riots. In Hungary alone did 
the revolution appear on the scene with its own army; 
Austria was too much undermined to suppress the Hun-
garians, and, therefore, summoned the Russians across the 
Carpathians, the same Russians who are now pent up in 
these same passes, and resigned to the Tsar Nicolas I. the 
task of protecting its tottering authority. Nothing is so 
characteristic of the condition of Central Europe at that 
time as this proceeding. 
But although the revolution had, and could have, on the 
whole, no triumphant result, yet it led to essential progress 
as compared with 1815, to wit the beginning of Parliamentary 
life in the representative assemblies, such as they were, and 
the renewed attempt to work out the Central European 
problem of the Vienna Congress with fresh energies in St. 
Paul's Church at Frankfurt-on-Main. The constitutional 
content for the new structure of Central Europe which was 
thus attained was indeed of small importance in political 
law, but it was in itself a great matter that, in 1848 and 
1849, a Parliament existed in which Central Europe, in so 
far as it spoke German, was represented. Wise things were 
said in St. Paul's Church about all the Central European 
problems, ranging from Italy to Denmark, from the French 
frontier to Poland and Hungary. The spirit was stirred, 
the political atmosphere was favourable to the debate, 
nothing was lacking but what we now have in the war, the 
pressure of foreign events and the strength of the army. 
What was said was by way of prelude, a mere testing of 
the instruments. But then everything Central European 
was submerged again, and the Bundestag held once more in 
the Eschersheimer Gasse in Frankfurt, those meetings which 
we know so well from Bismarck's letters and reports. 
* * * * * * 
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In the course of the Frankfurt discussions there was a 
painful and grievous divergence between the " Greater 
Germany " and the " Lesser Germany" views. At the 
voting for the election of King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. of 
Prussia to be German Emperor, 290 members voted for the 
Prussian hereditary Emperor, and 240 members refrained 
from voting. The German-Austrians had in part withdrawn, 
the Tzechs had not got beyond considering the possibility 
of attending, the other sections of the Central European 
peoples were absent, because it was a question of establishing 
not Mid-Europe but the German Empire. Thus in this 
combination there existed a strong minority who did not 
wish to adhere to the views of the Prussian " Lesser 
Germany " party, and who still believed in a joint federal 
State since they hoped for a " rejuvenated Austria." The 
majority tendered the Crown to the King of Prussia, but 
he refused it. In this way the whole political problem of 
Germany and Central Europe was disposed of, and no one 
knows how and with what results it might have been 
reopened had not Bismarck, acting on other assumptions, 
adopted the " Lesser Germany " view and carried it through. 
The Frankfurt majority started with a fixed desire for 
German unity, and for its sake had come to terms more or 
less willingly with the idea of the Prussian King as Emperor. 
Bismarck, on the other hand, took Prussian power as his 
starting-point and adopted the German view in order to 
advance this power. He was in no sort of sense a German 
revolutionary, but, on the contrary, a decided opponent of 
the popular movement; nevertheless in order to carry out 
his royalist policy he was obliged to take up the nationalist 
demands of the time. 
It is essential for our purpose to grasp Bismarck's attitude 
as well and as comprehensively as possible, because it is a 
point of critical importance for the Mid-European scheme 
whether it be carried through with or in opposition to the 
spirit of Bismarck. In the latter case it would be con-
demned to futility. We must, therefore, inquire more 
closely what induced Bismarck to enter upon the war of 
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1866 and to bring into being a " Lesser German " State 
on a monarchical basis. 
Even before his days of triumph he lived more in an 
atmosphere of foreign than of home politics, and as a 
young man was unusually familiar with the contemporary 
fluctuations in ihe balance of power in Europe. Moreover 
he had an absolute genius for things military. Hence it 
came about that he had no confidence in any German 
unity which was indefinite from the military point of view, 
nor consequently in the Frankfurt Constitution. How 
could an effective military unity be established if small 
States, incompetent in the military sense, had an important 
voice in the Federal Assembly ? We must not forget that 
the Prussia of 1850 possessed much less territory in Germany 
than the Prussia of 1867 as enlarged by Bismarck ! The 
corresponding chapters of the Gedanken und Ennnerungen, 
like the earlier notes made by Bismarck in the fifties, are 
interspersed throughout by military considerations. After 
the humiliation at Olmiitz when, owing to anxiety about 
the Austrian army in Bohemia, Prussia had to give up her 
claims to Kurhessen and Schleswig-Holstein at the demand 
of Schwarzenberg, the Austrian Minister-President, it would 
have been impossible for her to carry on a Greater 
Germany " policy if, simultaneously, she wished in the first 
instance to attain military importance as a North German, 
non-Austrian Power. Then, in addition, came the influ-
ence of the Crimean War, of which in general we in the 
German Empire knew very little, but which Bismarck lived 
through with his full powers of sympathetic interest. The 
Crimean War freed Austria from Russian guardianship, and 
secured its inclusion in the existing group of Western 
Powers. It is possible now, after the event, to think that 
it might have been better in fact for Central Europe if as a 
whole it had joined with the West to attack Russia in the 
Crimean War, had freed Poland and had driven back the 
Russians. We are much inclined just now to form a retro-
spective wish of this kind, but at that time Prussia still 
retained in its blood too much of the fear of the unmeasured 
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force of the French Revolution ; for 1870 had yet to be lived 
through, and the Prussian king was used to Russian super-
vision. He remained a trembling neutral like the present 
King of Roumania. Under these circumstances Bismarck 
learnt the helplessness of the German Confederation. Was 
there, then, any other aim for his unusual, overpowering 
and abounding energy than to establish his Prussia and to 
secure for it by military means the control of the German 
Federation ? Only so could there be any foreign policy for 
him, which really deserved the name of policy. The strong 
man must first make for himself a theatre or arena, he must 
build up a position for his sovereign so that there might be 
place for purposive action. And the course of events up 
to 1866 showed that he was right. He created what the 
majority in St. Paul's Church, with their military unpre-
paredness, had merely put forward as a pious wish. He 
created it differently from anything imagined by these 
learned men, but still he created it. It was he, together 
with his sovereign and with Moltke, who completed the 
work of Friedrich II. of Prussia, and who, at the same 
time, carried out the popular demands of the "Lesser 
Germany " party in St. Paul's Church. 
But as soon as the revolution in the condition of the 
German army was completed, and after the victory of 
Konigsgrátz, he began at once and without reserve to 
consider the preservation of Austrian inviolability, and 
extorted it from the Prussian king and his generals. Thus 
it appears that he and he alone at bottom thinks in terms of 
Central Europe, taking that as his environment whole. His 
own account of the Bohemian deliberations is a most 
weighty document in connection with our train of thought. 
He does not want a German Empire with Hungary, Galicia, 
etc., excluded, nor a purely German national State with no 
counterpart in historical experience. But he does want 
to retain permanently the possibility of a union of the 
two Great Powers lying between East and West. He 
never forgot that France and Russia might conceivably 
attempt to crush a centre that was not indivisible. All his 
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later policy was implied in his dispute with King Wilhelm 
at Nikolsburg over the "shameful peace." In case of 
doubt he was always more Austrian than Russian. His 
considerations read as follows : 
" If Austria were seriously injured, she would become a 
confederate of France and of all opponents; she would 
sacrifice her anti-Russian interests for the sake of revenge 
against Prussia. On the other hand, I can imagine no 
future acceptable to us for the countries which constitute 
the Austrian kingdom, supposing that the latter were 
destroyed by Hungarian or Slavonic rebellions or were 
reduced to a state of permanent dependence. What could 
take that position in Europe which the Austrian State has 
hitherto occupied from the Tyrol to the Bukowma ? Any 
fresh States formed in this area could only be of a persistently 
revolutionary character. We could make no use of German-
Austria either in whole or in part, we could not secure a 
strengthening of the Prussian State by the inheritance of pro-
vinces such as Austrian Silesia or parts of Bohemia, no union 
between German-Austria and Prussia could be successful. 
Vienna could not be governed as a suburb of Berlin." 
Thus in his old age, Bismarck subsequently described m 
writing'his position in 1866, and thus does he wish to be 
regarded by posterity. On no account does he wish to be 
registered in the memories of later generations as the 
destroyer of ancient German unity and of the Central 
European affiance. And in fact he succeeded in making 
his policy understood by Austria and Hungary in the course 
of a few years and during his own lifetime. In 1866 there 
was an alteration of the centre of gravity, but no destruction 
of the germs of that Mid-Europe which is now at last coming 
The Franco-German War of 1870-71 meant the final 
liberation of Central Europe from France. The present 
generation hardly knows what an extensive influence France 
exercised before the war in Southern and Central Germany, 
and how much inclined Austria was to wrest from Prussia, 
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with the aid of France, what had been gained in 1866. 
Hence nowadays people pass lightly over those passages in 
Bismarck's Erinnerungen where he speaks of the danger of a 
new Confederation of the Rhine. To us to-day the Rhine 
Confederation is a distant and barely conceivable tradition, 
but then it was still in the region of practical politics! 
Central Europe stood between East and West, and as yet 
on no independent footing. I remember a trivial experience 
of my boyhood : the leading townsfolk in our little town in 
the Saxon Erzgebirge were talking together in July 1870 : 
" W e Saxons are all right; now we keep in with Prussia 
because we must, but the French if they come will know 
that we did not want to do it ! " This, or something like it, 
was what a good many people were thinking. The French 
magic spell had first of all to be completely severed, and was 
in fact splendidly destroyed. In this way Bismarck fully 
reaped the advantage of 1866 : Southern Germany joined 
the North German Confederation, and the German Empire 
came into existence. Now there was a North German 
Emperor. Without any fresh injury to Austria the lesser 
German Empire arose, a triumphant victory for those who 
as early as 1848 had looked forward to this and this only ; 
as yet, however, the prophecies of Untersberg and Kyffhauser 
were not completely fulfilled. 
Those were wonderful days when North and South 
Germany conquered France together. That was a victory 
without Russia's aid, though with her acquiescence ; that 
was the victory over all forms of protectorship in the West, 
the chance to be free after a hundred years of a complicated 
dependence ! Even Austria, in spite of all despondency, 
felt that she too would gain her freedom by this war. The 
Wacht am Rhein was sung even on the neutral Danube. The 
Battle of Leipzig was repeated in France in 1870 without the 
help of the Tsar. B y the blessing of God, what a change! 
In attempting to formulate the results of the Franco-
German War from the Austro-Hungarian point of view 
we must reckon it a loss for Austria that " the Empire," 
and in particular the South German States, came under 
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North German leadership for all time as far as could be 
foreseen, so that the ancient Hapsburg period of Empire 
was now for the first time completely at an end for the rest 
of Germany. Austria-Hungary had now no longer an 
indefinite background in the west, she possessed her own 
borders and nothing more. But at the same time she 
gained a strong and victorious friend who could strengthen 
her strength and compensate for her weakness. Intelligent 
people in Vienna and Budapest understood this at once, 
and under the leadership of Graf Andrassy and with the 
consent of the Emperor Franz Joseph they acted accordingly. 
It is most instructive for Germans of the Empire to read 
the history of the year 1870 in Wertheimer's book : Graf 
Julius Andrassy, sein Leben und sein Zeit (Stuttgart, 1910). 
There we learn to look from an outside point of view at 
events which as Germans we have experienced from the 
inside. A t the beginning of the war Andrassy was in 
favour of neutrality, because he cherished a hope that 
France and Prussia would weaken themselves in a mutual 
war, and that hence the critical part of arbitrator might fall 
to Austria-Hungary at the conclusion of peace. Beust, the 
Austrian Minister-President, wished to join in against 
Prussia, but the far-sighted Hungarian insisted on neutrality, 
and the unexpected Prusso-German victory justified him. 
He may be called the saviour of Mid-Europe, for if at that 
time Austria had attempted to settle her accounts with 
Prussia again, then whatever the immediate outcome, no 
common future would have been possible. Thus Andrassy, 
in 1870, showed himself to be the same man with whom 
later Bismarck was to conclude the treaty of 1879. If we 
ever succeed in giving a political shape to Mid-Europe 
the portraits of Bismarck and Andrassy ought together to 
be wreathed with laurels of gratitude and honour. 
* * * * * * 
The western limits of Central Europe were thus fixed in 
1871, a settlement of boundaries on the Russian side had 
to follow. In the autumn of 1876 Bismarck received a 
telegram in code from Livadia, which demanded on behalf 
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of the Tsar a statement as to whether or no the German 
Empire would remain neutral if Russia went to war with 
Austria. Never was there a more fateful question. After 
attempts at delay had failed, Bismarck answered that we 
could tolerate it if our friends merely lost and Won battles 
against each other, but not if one of them was so severely 
injured as to endanger her independent position as one of 
the influential Great European Powers. In virtue of this 
answer Russia came to an amicable understanding with 
Austria about Bosnia and Herzegovina and entered upon a 
Russo-Turkish instead of a Russo-Austrian War. 
The outcome of these events was the Berlin Congress 
of 1878 and the Dual Alliance of 1879, and with these 
events the traditional alliance between Russia and Prussia 
was practically at an end. The impression produced by 
the King's Hill at Leipzig had faded. Bismarck did indeed 
preserve a certain connection with Russia in the shape of 
the counter-insurance treaty, but the partnership between 
Russia and Prussia was dissolved. The die was cast. Dual 
Alliance was formed in opposition to Dual Alliance : Mid-
Europe between East and West. It may be said that the 
present war had its beginnings in 1876. The Russians for 
their part, it is true, proposed a Russo-German Alliance even 
after 1876, but the German Empire was bound, it was 
married to Austria-Hungary for life and for death. And 
thus both the Empires have passed through the last three 
decades together, thus to-day they are fighting shoulder to 
shoulder and thus will they continue. 
This alliance agreed to by Graf Andrassy and Bismarck 
in 1879, a n d which constituted Andrassy's last important 
act, is in no sense to be looked upon as the temporary 
outcome of a fluctuating political situation. After the 
Franco-German War Bismarck indeed originally wanted to 
re-establish a triple alliance, in accordance with old custom, 
between Russia, Germany and Austria ; the triple imperial 
alliance of the monarchical system in opposition to all 
western disorganisation. With this object in view he 
arranged various meetings between the three Emperors 
from 1872 onwards. But these grand visiting days did not 
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prevent the fateful question of 1876. The statesman of 
Central Europe was obliged to renounce the dream of the 
King's Hill, and to say definitely, very definitely, whether 
or no he wished to uphold Austria-Hungary at all costs and 
in every danger. Any one who now wants to dissolve the 
German-Austrian-Hungarian alliance throws us back politi-
cally, as we have already said, to before 1876, and obliges 
us to consider over again all the pros and cons of the Russian 
question of that date. This reconsideration will do no 
harm, for it must inevitably lead back to Bismarck's decision, 
which was certainly not adopted lightly or without the 
most exact knowledge of all contingencies. 
When dealing with the formation of the Dual Alliance, 
Bismarck mentions the following reasons for hesitation : 
changeableness of Hungarian opinion, uncertainty as to the 
behaviour of the Germans in Austria, danger of Catholic 
ascendancy over Protestantism, anxiety about Polish desire 
for dominance on the Austrian basis. A treaty of alliance 
would be of little avail against all this. All the same he 
concluded the treaty with Andrassy and stated his reasons 
in a letter which he wrote in September 1879 to the then 
King of Bavaria : 
" Should no agreement (connection by alliance) be arrived 
at, Austria could not be blamed if, under the pressure of 
Russian threats and in uncertainty about Germany, she 
finally sought a closer understanding with France or even 
with Russia herself. Should the latter occur, Germany, 
owing to its relations with France, would be left in complete 
isolation on the Continent. But should Austria draw 
closer to France and England as in 1854, Germany would 
be thrown entirely upon Prussia, and, if she did not desire 
isolation, would be involved in the, as I fear, mistaken and 
dangerous methods of Russian home and foreign politics." 
These words are still true in essentials to-day. He who 
will not think in terms of Mid-Europe, because the doubts 
existing in 1876 and 1879 have grown greater instead of 
less, ought to consider somewhat with which country an 
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alliance can be entered upon if we finally abandon 
Bismarck's policy. 
* * * * * * 
Whilst working this out we have spoken frequently, very 
frequently indeed, of Bismarck himself, but for nearly 
thirty years politics for us meant Bismarck. As long as he 
lived people might fight for him or against him, but it was 
he who had the last word. All Germany's political negotia-
tions up to the Great War are either a perpetuation of his 
potent influence or weak attempts to break away from it. 
He was a Hercules. The Austrians have had no such man, 
but he is theirs and ours too. I think that I have made it 
clear that he laid the foundation of Mid-Europe. It rests 
with us to carry on the work. All the cares which perplexed 
him have been amply justified by the Great War ! Shall 
not his hopes also bear fruit ? 
It is true that after Bismarck's retirement all possible 
efforts were made to change the policy of the German 
Empire. The Emperor Wilhelm II. took, on occasion, 
every conceivable pains to secure better and more per-
manent connections with France and England. But never-
theless when the universal tempest broke, Austria-Hungary 
alone stood at our side, though subsequently Turkey too 
threw in her lot with us both. What Prince Bulow, as 
Imperial Chancellor, did by the " faith of the Nibelungs " was 
an important prophecy for Mid-Europe. The century's 
history has first driven us apart and then thrown us 
together again. The probation time of our interconnection 
is over. It now remains to build up our common future. 
What else in the world could we do in virtue of our 
whole history ? 
If the German Empire enters into alliance with Russia it 
means a return to the position of Prussia under Friedrich 
Wilhelm IV. From the economic point of view, as we shall 
show later, this may have certain advantages, but politically 
it will be the death of our independence. And the German 
people will not endure this permanently, for it would imply 
joint responsibility for everything Russian, as we have 
already pointed out in an earlier paragraph. 
PREVIOUS HISTORY OF CENTRAL EUROPE 61 
If the German Empire allies itself with England, which, 
after this war, is hardly conceivable, but which before it 
appeared to be possible, it will become the military partner 
of the first Sea Power, and must fight Britain's battles on 
the Continent. Such a position may have much in its 
favour commercially, but as a national policy would bring 
to an end our individual share in the world's history. We 
have already mentioned other grounds for hesitation. 
In both cases the period from 1870 to 1914 would become 
a mere interlude in German history, an episode full of 
splendour and self-respect, a brief golden age such as 
that of Holland. An individual course is only possible to us 
in union with Austria-Hungary. 
And how do matters stand on the Austro-Hungarian side ? 
Any serious attempt to enter into the traditional feeling 
in the Danubian monarchy will enable us to realise at once 
that a binding connection with the Prusso-German Empire 
will be regarded there as a very serious step. For without 
doubt it involves, in spite of all the consideration which 
must be shown to Austria's right to determine its own 
action, a bond which may, under the circumstances, be 
hard to tolerate. To speak quite frankly : Austria will 
be assenting finally to that shifting of the weight of gravity 
which took place in 1866. She will renounce all future 
claim to be the chief ruling Power in Central Europe, 
as she was in her ancient days of splendour. There is no 
formal dependence involved, no curtailing of sovereignty, 
no giving up of inherited power, but all the same there will 
be an actual acknowledgment of the existing position of 
forces. We shall speak elsewhere of the most complicated 
legal-constitutional questions, here it need only be stated, as 
the result of previous history, that a situation has arisen, 
owing to the founding of the Empire by Bismarck and its 
justification of itself in the Great War, in which the German 
Empire has become the first of the two leading States in 
population, military efficiency and unity. This situation 
exists now, and is already far from new, but all the same it 
will require resolution on the part of Austria to acknowledge 
the fact in a political arrangement. 
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It is obvious that Austria-Hungary, too, will examine 
all other possibilities before the permanent Mid-European 
union is decided upon. We have already said something 
about this, but it seems necessary to reassert, in connection 
with our survey of past history, that Austria cannot stand 
by herself in the world, because she is no match for a 
simultaneous attack on her various frontiers, and that she 
has no other natural partner in alliance except the German 
Empire. A Russian guarantee that the Austrian State 
shall retain all its present territories is absolutely impossible 
so long as the pan-Slavonic revolutionary movement is 
predominant, and an English guarantee would be ineffective. 
Even more certain than the statement that the German 
Empire needs the union, is the converse statement that 
Austria-Hungary is bound to the German Empire for better 
and for worse. This is a fact ! If this alliance is dissolved 
the Balkan provinces will turn towards the north ! If it is 
dissolved the German-Austrians will lose their footing in 
the Dual Monarchy ! Austria-Hungary may and indeed 
ought to stipulate for every necessary condition and safe-
guard for herself in the union, but she cannot prevent that 
union even should she wish to do so. Thus speaks past 
history, for Mid-Europe arose in the first instance out of the 
Prussian victories, and especially that of 1870. 
History of the past, wonderful chaos, crowd of forms, we 
pray thee lend us thine aid ! If thou willst thou canst 
destroy everything ! If thou willst, thou canst make every-
thing easy ! Come hither, ye learned counsel of our historical 
Muse, ye interpreters of the developing fate of nations, open 
your minds to the search, so frequently obscured, into the 
genesis, of Mid-Europe ! Hide nothing, and veil nothing of 
the past, but make prominent those things that are seen for 
the first time by those alone who begin to muse on and seek 
for Mid-Europe ! To-day all ears are open to your words ! 
The nations in the midst of the Continent, all the peoples 
between East and West, desire to know their future. Speak 
and we will hearken ! 
C H A P T E R III 
CREEDS A N D N A T I O N A L I T I E S 
C E N T R A L Europe is at the present time a geographical 
expression which has so far acquired no political or con-
stitutional character. But Austria, too, was once merely a 
geographical expression, and Prussia was a provincial term 
denoting only the most easterly portion of the kingdom. It 
is not so very long since it was said that Germany was only 
a geographical concept, and what a content this word has 
acquired in the interval! The word " Mid-Europe," which 
has not hitherto been used in history, has, at any rate, this 
great advantage, that it carries with it no associations of 
creed or nationality, and consequently does not from the 
outset awaken feelings of opposition. We shall have quite 
enough and more than enough to do with such feelings of 
opposition, for if ever any territory on the inhabited earth 
contained within itself a superfluity of passionate discords 
and frictions, it is this Central European country of ours ! 
It may, indeed, be said that the more recently colonised 
countries, and especially the United States of America, 
have to deal with intermixtures of opinions and races of an 
even more marked and violent nature. But the inhabitants 
of such countries have essentially less traditional obstinacy. 
The ocean lies between them and their old home, and during 
the long voyage across they have made up their minds to 
accommodate themselves to new conditions. This ocean 
voyage is lacking for us in old Europe ! Here it is not our 
ambition to be or to become the most modern country in 
the world, but on the contrary we are fervently defending 
old rights, old customs and old boundaries, whether they 
are good or bad. The very radicals with us are in this 
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respect often the most conservative of all. But it would 
be an excellent thing if people could be inspired on their 
entrance to Mid-Europe, with some such joyous and impres-
sionable voyager's humour, the cheerful courage of those 
who, after superhuman battles, believe more in the future 
than in the past. Ill-humoured ancestor worship will never 
bring us to our goal. We stretch the hand of fellowship from 
the North to the South to all who will march with us forward. 
But, of course, all objections and special demands must 
receive attention. Mid-Europe can only come into being 
through millions of discussions about the interests of every 
component group and tendency. It is of no use for any one 
to think out a theoretical scheme of union between the 
countries concerned, and in doing so purposely to ignore all 
religious and national difficulties. Let us agree at the 
outset, that if any one be so " enlightened " as to have lost 
all his own natural colour, he still cannot deny or mistake 
the force of innate and inherited traits of character without 
making himself ridiculous. Churches may mean nothing to 
him, yet all the same they are realities. He may be a mere 
railway traveller without country, but nevertheless those 
who cultivate the soil from north-west to south-east, those 
who dwell in towns, large and small, those who tend vine-
yards, those who work in mines, have all their own insuper-
able mass of peculiarities. Our Central European wealth 
and vigour, as also our daily political and social difficulties, 
consist in an incredible and disquieting abundance of 
characteristic forms. 
I have visited most parts of the Central European country, 
and am familiar with people from every district. Shall I 
picture them all to myself ? Then in thought I am in a 
peasant's cottage in Lower Germany, in a country house in 
Upper Germany, in an Alpine inn, in a little town in Bohemia, 
in the industrial region in Upper Silesia, in a shop in Posen, 
in an hotel in Tatra, with friends in Budapest, at the port 
at Triest, at home in Berlin, in the splendid old cathedral of 
St. Stephen in Vienna, in the silence of the Bohmerwald, 
on the shore at Riigen ; and so on continually forms arise 
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of men, women and children, and I hear every German 
accent, from the broad Frisian Plattdeutsch to the Tyrolean 
Mountain German, from the softness of the Lower Rhine to 
the sharpness of East Prussia, from the Mecklenburg calm 
to the Viennese liveliness, and in addition there is the 
sound of Danish in the North, French in the West, Italian 
and Croatian in the South, Tzechish in Bohemia, Magyar, 
Roumanian and Polish in the South-East and East. The 
whole is alive like a mighty forest with tall trees and under-
growth, with evergreens and fir-copses and a thousand 
small bushes and flowers. It is like a sea in which all kinds 
of fish disport themselves. And nowhere are limits or 
divisions sharply fixed. All is in flux, pushing and pressing 
in confusion, whispering and shouting, pleading and scold-
ing, praying and calculating. Unless all these people are 
willing, the Archangel Michael himself cannot mould them 
into his heavenly legion. To reduce this crowd to political 
efficiency, to produce from it an army and to make it a 
vigorous, united, organic State—this is something almost 
superhuman and at the same time splendid, a task for the 
ablest of statesmen, who possess the soul of the nations, 
and whose thoughts are guided by the spirit of history. He 
who takes up this work must have nothing petty about 
him, and must excel in will, in power, in goodness and in 
patience. For this work we want to summon our best men 
and women from all parts of Central Europe, or rather we 
want to express the summons to them in the words which 
Providence addresses to all of us in this war : Become a 
united people ! Remain united after such terrible slaughter ! 
* * * * * * 
In government there is a conservative type of forbearance 
and a liberal type of forbearance, and the two must co-
operate in the genesis of Mid-Europe. The conservative 
forbearance has sympathy with what has been. The liberal 
forbearance pleads for freedom of movement for what is 
striving to be. We must learn better than before to separate 
off that coercion and law which are State necessities, from 
those things in which free play may be allowed to individual 
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tendencies. As the maxim puts it : in necessariis unitas, in 
dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas — in the requirements of 
State, coercion and equality; in personal matters, freedom ; 
in both, comradeship! The powers of the State confedera-
tion, of the States, of the subordinate States, of the Circles, of 
the Communes, of the geographical districts, of the national 
communities, of the religious associations, of the economic 
organisations, workmen's societies, trade unions, learned 
societies, parties, must be flexibly graduated, so that Mid-
Europe, with perfected organisation, may be the spacious 
home of free movement. All abilities now employed in the 
leadership of State and commune in North Germany, South 
Germany, Austria and Hungary must be combined together, 
so that a tradition may be formed, which will perpetuate 
itself with ever fresh vitality, and will carry on amongst 
our children and grandchildren the work that we are 
beginning with hesitation and effort. 
Central Europe can be treated neither as barracks nor 
cloister, neither as public meeting nor as factory, neither 
as farmhouse nor as suburb, neither as bank nor as work-
shop, but all must have a place therein : discipline and 
independence, threats and rewards. We need to ponder 
over this, for it will not come about of itself. We must 
raise the character of the peoples by our directing reason. 
And what is the object of it ? 
The history of the evolution of nations shows us a develop-
ment of human types which is the result of many centuries. 
We know what is meant by an Italian, a Frenchman, an 
Englishman, a Russian, an American. We know also what 
is meant by a German, a Magyar, a Pole, a Tzech. But 
our Mid-European type is not yet fully developed, he is still 
in process of formation. Frenchmen and Englishmen are 
complete after their kind, but we Germans and the smaller 
nations surrounding us have not at present acquired 
that degree of assurance in the conduct of life and in tact, 
nor that political training and aesthetic habit, which would 
suffice of themselves to guide us in matters great and small. 
In comparison with the two western nations we are still 
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young. When the French had already lived through the 
most splendid period of their monarchy we were just 
beginning to imitate Romance culture. Our forefathers 
learnt French and went to Paris in order to find out there 
how to behave and how to dress and what constituted good 
tone. From the English we borrowed sport, habits of 
travelling, town-planning and many other such things. We 
are still not quite out of our schooldays. To confess this 
calmly is no shame, even in war time. We possess, it is 
true, old and honourable traditions and primitive elements 
of temper and character, and in addition many an efficient 
and long-used method, and many a new invention. But 
old and new, primitive, medieval and modern, are still 
unbalanced. We are, if I may so express it, historically a 
half-finished product, and we are still awaiting the day of 
completion. This gives us a touch of the primitive and of 
something still capable of improvement. I should not 
choose to be occupied with any other human situation than 
this one, because it involves such wonderful problems. We 
have much background and many good qualities, we have 
also ability to work our way through, but now our high 
school period ought to begin. Round and about the German 
spirit will grow up a Mid-European culture ; there will 
develop a human type which will be intermediate between 
Frenchmen, Italians, Turks, Russians, Scandinavians and 
Englishmen. Let us search out these Mid-Europeans! 
But indeed it is difficult for us just because we are in Mid-
Europe : in the land of passage for all the migrations of the 
peoples, in the battlefield of all the great intellectual 
struggles, in the region of religious wars, of fights about 
nationality, of an endless succession of economic periods, in 
a region which neither affords nor can possess inward ease 
because it is too full for mere classification. Taking the 
region as a whole we are too much occupied with futile 
efforts, and frequently even full of despair about things in 
particular, but nevertheless we have plenty of optimism 
about things in general. We are familiar with the despair 
of those who do not gain their victory, and with the optimism 
68 CENTRAL EUROPE 
of those who take up the old problems afresh. Let us, in 
this mood, speak in the first place of the old and still 
influential religious struggles of Central Europe, of the many 
attempts, doubts, broodings, advances, falls, of suffering and 
death, and the song of the holy angels. 
* * * * * * 
From ancient times onwards, Central Europe was an 
object of dispute between the two portions of the old Roman 
Empire. To express it otherwise: the greater part of 
Central Europe, since it was Christianised and civilised, was 
fundamentally dependent upon ancient Rome, the immortal 
Italian capital of the material and spiritual world. But in 
the Carpathian districts and on the Lower Danube there 
was always an ebb and flow of Byzantine influence. The 
pre-Turkish orthodox Rome of the East attempted as 
occasion offered to gain a footing amongst the Magyars and 
Bohemians as well as amongst the Poles. But Constanti-
nople made its furthest thrusts to the north-west when it 
was Turkish and Mohammedan. The Turks were twice 
before Vienna, they had possession of Graz and Istria and 
advanced on the other side as far as Galicia, they conquered 
Lemberg and Przemysl and galloped over the Carpathian 
passes which now again have been the scene of our battles. 
They imposed upon the conquered peoples an often oppres-
sive system of political and military suzerainty and of 
taxation, but did not enjoin their conversion to Moham-
medanism. Hence, even under Turkish rule, the earlier 
spiritual connections with the Eastern and the Western 
Rome continued within approximately the same geographical 
limits. In course of time, by material and spiritual means, 
Western Rome pressed its eastern boundary far forward up 
to the Vistula. Eastern Rome receded towards the east 
and south. To-day Mohammedan districts are found only 
in Bosnia and Herzegowina; there are Eastern Orthodox 
Christians in Serbia and on the borders of Dalmatia, Croatia, 
Slavonia, and especially in the Roumanian districts at the 
junction of the Theiss and the Danube, round Siebenbürgen 
and in the Bukowina. A section of the Roumanians and 
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almost all the Austrian and Hungarian Ruthenians on both 
sides of the Carpathians are Greek-Catholics, that is, their 
religion is Byzantine in origin but Roman and papal in 
organisation. But all the rest has been a part of the per-
manent whole adhering to Western Rome since mediaeval 
times, and hence it experiences all the powerful inner 
convulsions of this great spiritual community. 
* * * * * * 
The separatist movement away from Western Rome, 
which began with the Cathari, the Waldensians, the 
Wicklifites and the Hussites, and reached its climax in the 
German and Swiss Reformation, was lived through in the 
German-Slav-Hungarian districts of Central Europe with 
terrible force and counter-force. The violent and injurious 
struggle raged on from 1517 until the Peace of Westphalia, 
and disturbed the organisation and well-being of the mediaeval 
State almost to the point of destruction. On and around 
German soil a volcanic spiritual experience was consum-
mated, the results of which were felt universally wherever 
there were children of distant Rome ; but those who were the 
earliest forerunners of the movement often thereby sacrificed 
themselves and their country. People's hearts were in a 
state of ferment. Nearly all the territories which now 
belong to Germany, Austria, Hungary and to what was 
once the Kingdom of Poland, were first gripped by the new 
teaching, then again reconquered, and often changed their 
ruler and their faith many times over, until at last, after 
much bloodshed, the spirit and the ability to resist were 
exhausted and creeds were regulated according to authority 
and normal conditions. All these immense struggles in 
nearly every town, borough, county, diocese and electorate 
have become of necessity almost incomprehensible to our 
present generation of men. In the interval we have gained 
something which four hundred years ago, at the close of an 
epoch in the world's history, the most enlightened intellects 
hardly dared to think out. And this something is the 
personal freedom of the individual from the enforced 
bondage of religious opinion. This freedom of the individual 
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appears as a result of the Reformation, but at first both 
the German and the Swiss Reformation were, according to 
their own intention, only a transition from the old universal 
community of church life and affairs to a new and special 
territorial one. Even Luther and Calvin desired coercion, 
and insisted on the axiom : cuius regio, eius religio : the 
ruler determines the faith ! The age of constraint required 
fixed forms and discipline of the inmost soul. This had not 
been so in the later days of the old Roman Empire, but as 
soon as the Romish faith became in the North a missionary 
religion and a religion of the masses, and especially after it 
penetrated to the German Franks, it became a constituent 
part of public life. Out of that wonderfully free, lawless, 
spiritual and personal Sermon on the Mount there developed 
a sort of spiritual militarism, without which no social or civic 
order seemed possible. Thus Luther and Zwingli did not 
wish to infringe upon discipline as such, but to mould their 
spirit again more closely to the Biblical model and to 
advance personal piety and individual experience in religion. 
This constituted their sacred task, which seemed like pre 
sumption, insubordination and a misleading of the people 
to the representatives of the ancient and long-since syste-
matised community of souls. 
This account of the Reformation movement in the Church 
may seem superfluous here, but I am anxious that we in 
Central Europe should get a grasp of history in which 
Catholic and Protestant are conceived of as constituent 
parts of a joint past without surrender of their spiritual 
value and reputation. For it cannot be denied that the 
union of North and South may be attended by a passionate 
outburst of feeling in this very sphere of religion. In its 
religious evolution North Germany has, as a rule, conducted 
itself differently from Austria; and Austria, Bohemia and 
Poland have again behaved differently from Hungary; 
consequently everywhere remnants of bitterness have per-
sisted which may be reawakened at the slightest provoca-
tion. Almost the whole of North and some important 
parts of South Germany have gone over to the Protestant 
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established Church, whilst the counter-Reformation, the 
forcible suppression of the new form of faith, was most 
violent in the Hapsburg territories. There, under King 
Ferdinand I., the Jesuit Canisius, called by some the 
*' Hammer of heretics," and by others the " second Apostle 
of Germany," carried on his work. From thence at various 
times Protestants migrated from house and home, and 
numbers of these were taken in by the Prussian rulers. The 
result of this is that the Protestants of the German Empire 
often still have a conception of the violence of the Austrian 
Catholics, whilst the pious Austrian Catholics have a horror 
of Prussian godlessness and denial of everything sacred. 
Any one who travels in the Tyrol and goes to church on 
Sundays will hear something of this. This division in 
opinion gives a sharper character to the struggles for political 
power between North and South, and thoughtful people 
are apt to ask themselves what spiritual and religious 
consequences a closer union may have for both parties. * * * * * * 
This type of question is not new. In the middle of last 
century, when the "Greater Germany" party separated 
from the "Lesser Germany" party, the factor of creed, 
whether expressed or unexpressed, had its share in the 
matter. And von Treitschke, Bismarck's historian of the 
new German Empire, traced an almost direct connection 
between Wittenberg and Berlin, between Luther and 
Bismarck, when he wrote his account of the previous 
history of the founding of the Empire. Luther intro-
duced German Christianity and this led by way of the 
great Elector Friedrich II., Kant and Hegel, to the German 
Empire. To us, who have grown up with this point of 
view, it seems so evident that we find it difficult to realise 
how'strange it must appear to the Catholics even in the 
German Empire. No doubt there is in fact much truth in 
it, for the devotion to the State which characterised the 
Prussians was of no Catholic growth ; but this way of putting 
it is inadequate as a complete explanation of the German 
Empire. The Empire is by no means merely the outcome 
72 CENTRAL EUROPE 
of the Königsberg influence of Kant, and moreover it is 
only in a strictly limited sense that King Friedrich II. 
can be regarded as a Protestant Christian. But, above all, 
this purely Protestant presentation of history, whether it be 
true or not, cannot be persisted in as a primary Imperial 
tradition since ah parties have given up the Kulturkampf 
and it must not and will not be reawakened. When 
Bismarck's Empire made its peace with the Pope and the 
Party of the Centre, the Protestant character of the Hohen-
zollern Emperors became an unofficial private affair of those 
who, as wearers of the crown, were above creeds. From 
that time onwards the German Empire, as such, has had no 
special creed, and it can have none after the union. 
Thus whilst at one time the Prussia of Friedrich the Great 
was honoured as the " leading Protestant Power," Austria 
was regarded as the political embodiment of the Papacy and 
the Jesuit Order. In contrast to the freethinker Friedrich II., 
his great opponent Maria Theresa, splendid in her austere 
and harsh devotion to the Church, appears as the founder of a 
State. Church system which has not yet entirely disappeared, 
and under which the Protestant minority in Austria, whether 
German or Slav, has much to endure. But this point of 
view too, however correct as a whole, certainly admits of 
exaggeration, for this same Maria Theresa sent Protestant 
colonists, both Lutherans and Calvinists, to Galicia and 
elsewhere, and was more gracious to them than many later 
sovereigns. 
But the essential thing is that in a partnership between 
Germany and Austria-Hungary the German, and with them 
the Hungarian, Protestants would be in the minority. This 
weighs heavily upon the minds of some Protestants, however 
well they appreciate the historical and political necessity for 
the union. They argue somewhat in this way : " O f course» 
the union will not directly change anything in the existing 
position of the religious creeds ; nor is it likely that pro-
vincial administrations which have hitherto been Protestant 
would be induced thereby to adopt another religious policy, 
but the closer the Central European union became in course 
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of time, the greater would be the danger for us Protestants 
of becoming, so to speak, historically unrepresented. For 
a papal party might easily be formed which would engross 
the whole of Mid-Europe and would secure religious privileges 
in different States in exchange for international or com-
mercial activities, and which would give Germans a Catholic 
instead of a Protestant character in the eyes of foreigners." 
People are even heard to say that in the united Empire the 
Protestants would be treated somewhat as they now are in 
Bavaria, that is, not injured but pushed aside. 
I too acknowledge that my historical mode of thought 
leaves me in some anxiety in this respect, and all the more 
because the war has greatly weakened the bond between 
Protestant England and Germany, and we cannot tell 
whether or no fellow-feeling between the German, English 
and American Protestants will be quickly revived. It is 
true that no organisation has been broken up in this con-
nection, since none existed, but any one who knows Protes-
tantism is aware how little it depends upon its organisations 
and how much upon informal fellow-feeling. Protestantism 
is weak as a Church, but strong as a union of convictions. 
Protestants recognise each other as such all over the world, 
but-—will they so recognise one another again during the 
next decades ? The war injures us Protestants more than 
the Catholics, for the papal centre, in spite of its geographical 
position in Italy, has remained outside the war owing to 
the behaviour of the present Pope. Amongst us, Protestant 
neutrals do indeed try to preserve the Protestant com-
munity, but they are not sufficiently powerful since they 
themselves formerly derived most of their spiritual guidance 
from Germany and England. Hence, when we are concerned 
about the future of Protestantism as a whole and its mis-
sionary work in foreign parts, it is no very simple matter to 
be obliged at the same time to enter upon an intimate and 
indissoluble union with a Power which is Catholic both in 
theory and practice. We are forced to it by all the indepen-
dent reasons that have been adduced, but we may be allowed 
to state frankly that it involves for us a definite sacrifice 
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from the religious point of view. Others will have different 
sacrifices to make, as is unavoidable in concluding an 
alliance. 
* * * * * * 
The considerations which make it difficult in some degree 
for us as Protestants to set our faces towards Mid-Europe 
will in the same degree render the transition easier for the 
Catholics. But here, too, things are less simple than may 
appear from a merely statistical point of view. The Central 
European Catholics are far from forming a completely 
united body. They are united before the papal chair, but 
not always with one another. It is much easier to combine 
the Protestant minorities in Austria and Hungary with us 
than to mould the Catholics of the German Empire into a 
unity with the Austro-Hungarian Catholics of every tongue. 
To mention one important point, the Catholic clergy in 
Hungary have been an independent body since ancient 
times and are not political in the same sense as the Viennese 
Christian Socialists or the Cologne and Berlin leaders of the 
Centre. In Hungary the almost Calvinistic Protestantism 
of many leading families is actually of much more importance 
than appears from statistics alone. Moreover the strong 
Jewish element among the educated classes helps to safe-
guard the Hungarian kingdom from religious parties. Cer-
tain attempts have been made at a clerical policy but with 
little result. In the Polish districts of Austria, however, 
the Catholic clergy, like those in Prussian Poland, are 
Polish Nationalists rather than universal Catholics or 
political Central Europeans, and go their own way. The 
same thing is notoriously true of Croatian, and especially of 
Southern Slav Catholicism, and indeed of the Tzechs as 
well. They are certainly not all adjusted at present to any 
notion of a Central European Great Power, and it will be 
a good time before they are. Besides the German Centre 
has passed through a lengthy schooling, from which it has 
learnt that excess in one case leads to opposition in others. 
This is perhaps not always noticeable in the campaign 
speeches made by either party, but it is quite evident in 
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parliamentary tactics. And we must not forget that there 
are no small number of Catholics in Austria and Hungary 
who trouble themselves very little about their Catholicism ! 
It must, of course, be understood from the outset, and 
indeed neither side could conceive of anything else, that 
Church and school questions will never, and must never, 
become the concern of the Central European union. Any 
possible influence on religious creeds arising out of the 
union can only be quite indirect, and will, as we hope, be 
balanced by the increasing political fellow-feeling amongst 
the united nations. The more Mid-Europe takes shape, the 
further we recede from the age of religious wars and the 
nearer we approach to the toleration which wishes to live, 
and to let others live, in freedom from political coercion in 
those very matters which are the highest and the most sacred. 
I hear that some people cherish the idea that the political 
union may be used in order to revive old and futile hopes of 
religious agreement. This is well intentioned but dangerous. 
Peace is most lasting in this sphere when it is not too much 
talked about. And truly we have plenty of other things 
to do at present ! 
* * * * * * 
A t this point, between our discussion of creeds and that 
of nationalities, we must say something about the Central 
European Jews. In the German Empire they are regarded as 
a religious sect and lay stress upon their German nationality. 
In the Danubian Monarchy the matter is much more compli-
cated, for here there are not only German Jews, but also 
Polish, Tzechish and Hungarian jews, and they often take 
their place as a separate people in the mixture of nationalities, 
and do not first combine with any of the existing race-
groups. If a Jew from Galicia emigrates to Vienna, that 
does not always mean that he becomes German. Moreover, 
the Jews in the eastern districts in Austria and in parts of 
Hungary live much more closely together, and in a more 
tribal manner ; they are like a special caste with their own 
customs, occupations and language, and do not combine at 
all with the rest of the mixed population. In the long 
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register of Austrian political parties the " Jewish Club " even 
figures as a small party group, whilst of course Jews appear 
in addition in almost all the other parties. There are quite 
a number of fair-sized towns in which the Jews number 
more than 50 per cent, of the population, and thus have 
direct control of the administration. We give the following 
places as examples : Rzeszow, Rawaruska, Brody, Zloczow, 
Tarnopol, Rohatyn, Stanislau, Kolomea (all in Galicia), and 
Munkacs in Hungary. The stability and influence of the 
Jews in the capital towns Vienna, Prague and Cracow 
are, as in Amsterdam and Frankfurt-on-Main, much 
greater than in Berlin and Breslau. In Budapest the 
proportions existing in Warsaw, Odessa and Lodz are 
almost reached. Hence it would be a serious mistake to 
leave the Jews out of account in making schemes for Mid-
Europe. They are there, and have great influence on 
newspapers, on economic life and on politics. On the whole 
we may assume that in the west they can be won over to 
support the extension of the economic area by the creation 
of a Central European economic unity. Of the views of the 
Jews in Galicia I can form no opinion of my own, especially 
now when, like all the inhabitants of Galicia, they have had 
to endure the harsh and perplexing influence of this terrible 
war. 
It is conceivable that the high percentage of Jews in the 
Danubian Monarchy may be advanced by the Anti-Semitic 
party in the German Empire as an argument against the 
foundation of Mid-Europe ; conceivable but not certain, for 
the same party are wont to be very good friends with the 
Germans in Austria, who are in part inclined to Anti-
Semitism, and would willingly work with them. But their 
anti-semitic efforts would probably have no political result, 
especially since the Jewish soldiers, both in the German and 
in the Austrian and Hungarian armies, have done their 
duty during the war like every one else, and like others 
have in many cases ratified their citizenship by death. 
After the war there must be an end to every form of mutual 
irritation, for the trenches jointly held will lie in the 
CREEDS AND NATIONALITIES . 77 
background. These will be worth as much politically as 
baptism. 
* * * * * * 
And thus we have arrived at the problems of nationality 
themselves. The Jewish question is more of a social than 
a national question in the stricter sense of the word, for 
nowhere in Central Europe do the Jews as such wish to 
appear as forming a State. The Zionist party may under-
stand Judaism as a whole as constituting a political power 
within international politics, and may seek in Palestine for 
a centre for combined Jewish influence, but all the same 
this only affects very indirectly the internal situation of the 
Great Central European States. We can and will take 
these international phenomena into account in our political 
calculations when we are considering the Turkish Orient, 
and perhaps also when we remember the western districts 
of Russia. But there are no questions of Jewish language, 
Government and party on a grand scale, ^ either in the 
German Empire or in Austria-Hungary. It is all local and 
highly provincial. All that the Jew here demands, and 
with justice, is recognition as a citizen, nothing more! ^ It 
is his affair in which national group he seeks this recognition. 
But sections of nations which have in their neighbourhood 
greater political State entities of their own race, or which 
compare in memory a brilliant political past with a dismal 
present, will not be satisfied with this more passive citizen-
ship. They aspire to union as a State, and even assured 
advantageous material conditions are no adequate com-
pensation to them for an historical independence which has 
either been lost or never attained. 
All the great European States, and even some of the 
small States, have to struggle with national difficulties of 
this kind. They have been overcome most completely in 
the Latin countries of Italy, Spain and France, because 
here the old language of the rulers has so far supplanted the 
remnants of the popular tongue that the latter only survives 
in provincial dialects, and is inadequate to any effective 
organisation. It is different with the Irish in Great Britain 
78 CENTRAL EUROPE 
and with the Flemish in Belgium. But the headquarters of 
the racial problems is situated where Central Europe passes 
over into the broad Russian plains, on the Baltic, on the 
Vistula, in the Carpathians, and on the Danube as far as 
the Golden Horn of Constantinople. And the centre of all 
these problems at the present time is the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy, the " country of nations." 
We Germans of the Empire have less to do with these 
troubles, and consequently amongst us there is generally 
very little genuine understanding of them, and little desire 
to go into them seriously and systematically. We have, or 
had hitherto, our boundary difficulties in Alsace-Lorraine 
and on the Danish borders, but here there was only a small 
minority in question, so that people thought that matters 
could be arranged by administrative methods, and regarded 
the resistance that showed itself as an unjustifiable opposi-
tion. In these two places a great deal that was mean and of 
which we are ashamed has been done in the name of Ger-
I manism, but the German people as a whole have troubled 
themselves little about the matter. They have hardly 
noticed the varying experiments on the live bodies of these 
small groups, and have considered the authorities concerned 
well able to decide what would make for national safety. 
Now, during the war, many are beginning to form their own 
opinions, but they often start with the most elementary 
scheme—forcible Germanisation—knowing very little of the 
many gloomy experiences which have already resulted from 
this method all over the world, a method still possible in 
Russia but already become impracticable in the Vosges and 
Jutland. Suppose, for example, that people were forbidden 
to speak French in the square at Colmar, such a decree, 
even in war time, would be simply impracticable, even 
ludicrous in its ineffectiveness. To win over a foreign-
speaking section of the population to be citizens of a national 
State with a different language is too complicated a matter 
to be successfully settled by some prohibitions and the 
removal of a few leaders. During the war rapid military 
measures may often be unavoidable, but if we intend, when 
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peace comes, to make any change in the constitution of the 
Reichsland or to incorporate it in the Empire, we shall have 
to make a fresh start in the search for a proper method of 
treating the population. And we must make up our minds 
to learn from Austria in this matter. For we may state 
frankly that, however imperfect are the results of the 
method of handling nationalities in Austria and Hungary, 
there is, nevertheless, much more real understanding there of 
this type of problem than with us, where it is only dealt with 
incidentally and unwillingly. There are so many depart-
ments in which the Austrians can learn from us that we 
need not be afraid to admit cheerfully their wider experience 
in the various matters in which it really exists. 
The same is true in a greater degree of the Polish policy 
of the German Empire and especially of Prussia. Prussia 
took possession of the Poles before it was itself a national 
German State, and had then no idea of wishing to Ger-
manise this piece of country. It was only later on in 
Napoleon's time that the national impulse on both sides 
rose high. Then in 1830 the Prussian Poles were stirred by 
the surging wave of the great but futile Polish revolution, 
the spirit of the dead awoke amongst them and tried 
spasmodically to re-establish a State organism which had 
been ruined by its own weakness and incapacity. Now 
Prussia recognised in Poland a national opponent, without 
being able on this account to release it from the political 
tie, because our entire Eastern frontier becomes an impossi-
bility if a new and politically independent Polish Kingdom 
intersects our difficult line of defence. Prussia took com-
pulsion in one hand and material prosperity in the other 
and demanded mental adhesion in exchange. She brought 
about much material good but discovered no way to the 
heart of the Polish people. Only a few of the high nobility 
sought to further the transition to a Prussian State, and 
they had naturally always been international and connected 
with Germany through marriage. The small group of 
Protestant Poles, too, was at heart royalist and Prussian, 
and remained so for a long time because they had need of 
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religious support, but the mass of Catholic Poles was and is 
Polish Nationalist. Even in so far as they no longer believe 
in the establishment of a Polish State in Prussian territory 
and enjoy material prosperity in Prussia, a division yet 
remains : they are a different race. The German schools 
have made them useful and industrially capable bilinguists, 
but not Germans. A Pole remains a Pole, very often even 
when he goes to live in Berlin or Westphalia. Even as a 
travelling workman he retains his national character and 
dreams of other things than the German inspectors who 
allot him his work. It is not only, and certainly not 
primarily, the opposition between the servant class and 
gentlefolk. This plays a part too in many cases, but it can 
be seen how unwillingly the Polish miner lets himself be 
enrolled in a German Social Democratic union. Even as a 
Social Democrat he must remain a Pole, and insists upon 
his own industrial unions. 
That in spite of all this the Prussian Poles, almost without 
exception, have done and are doing their duty in the present 
war, need surprise no one who has not previously believed 
the talk of the over-zealous opponents of Poland. The mag-
netic and material force of any State which rouses itself up 
to war is so enormous that no section can evade it. Think 
of the many Germans who are unfortunately fighting over 
there in the Russian army ! They have not all been com-
pelled. Like them the Russian Pole marched with the 
Russians, the Prussian Pole with the Germans, the Galician 
Pole with the Austrians. Since he could not fight for the 
vanished Fatherland of his dreams, he placed himself at the 
service of the Power to which he belongs. And if he dies, 
he dies for a Fatherland, from which he asks consideration 
for his brothers. In this case too there must be a great 
review of all methods after the war, a liberation from 
enforced Germanisation, and the adoption of a better 
interior organisation. But this in itself brings us Germans 
nearer to the racial problems in Austria and Hungary. We 
must begin to learn to understand them, we must indeed. 
* * * * * * 
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It makes a great difference whether we approach the 
racial problems in the Southern Dual Monarchy merely as 
Germans or as German Mid-Europeans. We neither ask for 
nor promise any sort of colourless detachment, for this is 
from its nature unprofitable in such questions of political 
life, because it supposes it possible to classify the souls of 
nations in divisions which can be forced upon them from 
outside. We want to think out this business as Germans, 
but not as trivial-minded people who think only of them-
selves and their immediate interests, rather as members 
of the greatest and most weighty nation in Central Europe. 
From the oppressed individual German, who, surrounded by 
Slavs or Magyars, inconvenienced in his business by Poles 
or Roumanians, continually outvoted by Tzechs or Slo-
venians, can find no German school for his children, can get 
no attention paid to his needs by the district superintendent, 
and can have no German recorder in the law courts—from 
this helpless and repressed German peasant or workman who 
daily considers whether or no he must not sadly forsake the 
home of his fathers, we certainly do not expect a philosophical 
detachment from facts, or much fellow-feeling in an over-
burdened heart for the similar troubles of all the other 
detached fragments of nationalities. He fights for himself 
and his own affairs, and when he talks to us his speech is full 
of bitterness and anger. In his abandonment he suffers for 
his nationality. He cannot busy himself with politics in 
company with the Tzechs, Magyars or Roumanians, for he 
has fallen under the wheels, and for the time only obstinacy 
and a tough skin will help him. But this man is not typical 
of the German spirit in general, he merely stands at his post 
as the representative of an oppressed small nation. As such 
he may and must talk as he does, but we feel it painful when 
Germans who are not in the same position adopt the same 
tone. This happens daily, it is true, with other nationalities, 
but all the same it is ungenerous. When a German repre-
sentative of a big industry spoke to me in a similar way, I 
left him in no doubt that I was much troubled by his tone. 
People have no business to play the sufferer when they are 
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not suffering ! We Germans of the Empire want as far as 
possible to help all our oppressed brothers in Central Europe, 
but we avoid pleading merely German claims in every isolated 
language group and in opposition to every fusion up to the 
bitter end. Such a course, were it adopted by every one, 
would be the ruin of the partnership between the two Central 
European States. The Germans who are living over there 
in Austria or Hungary in isolation or as injured persons are 
absolutely certain of our sympathy and protection, but even 
they should, if possible, ponder the fact that reciprocal 
justice elevates a people and that the other nations too wish 
to live with us. 
The Germans in Austria have lost much during the last 
century. From the eighteenth century onwards they were 
a nation maintaining and controlling the State; to-day, in 
the Danubian Monarchy, they have become one people 
amongst many peoples. Their important services in the 
past are not valued, the pains they took to raise up the 
small nations are not remembered. Many hundred years 
ago they were called in by foreign kings and bishops in 
order to increase industrial ability and improve agriculture. 
When fresh districts were to be civilised emigrants from the 
Eifel or Swabia or Thuringia or some other thickly populated 
part were tempted by all kinds of privileges and promises. 
They came, and were hospites, guests, and benefited them-
selves and the country which coveted their services. In this 
way they were intentionally scattered everywhere between 
the Alps and the Carpathians like the salt of the earth, and did 
their duty as citizens faithfully and honestly. They made 
roads on which others now travel, they planned schools in 
which the teaching is now directed against them. And, 
moreover, they have the feeling that they have not been 
overcome by any great opponent strong in himself, but 
that they have often been subjected to the petty makeshifts 
of the crowd, in defiance of those who are yet not in a 
position to reinstate them. This often makes their tone 
gloomy and bitter, which is very natural but is not favourable 
to future political success. Many groups of people in the 
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German Empire have ceased to take interest in the Austrian 
question because they find it hard to tolerate this woeful, 
complaining sort of tone. In this matter, however, both 
sides are wrong, for the Imperial German concerned has for 
the most part no idea what have been the inmost thoughts 
of the Austrian German and of his father. He does not at all 
understand the older generation in the Danubian Monarchy, 
and in the younger he still sees no evidence of its other 
and more vigorous desires and of its more complete and 
conscious adaptation to the world as it now is. 
Richard Charmatz in his pamphlet Österreich-Ungarns 
Erwachen (pamphlets edited by Dr. Ernst Jäckh, Deutsche 
Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart), remarked of the younger genera-
tion of Germans : " They are learning to think more as 
Austrians in the modern sense than their predecessors, with-
out on this account being less German." This seems to us to 
go to the root of the matter. To think as Austrians means 
for them : to begin to think as Mid-Europeans. No German 
living in Austria will be spared this revolution in thought, nor 
indeed will the members of nations speaking other tongues. 
Other valuable points of view are to be found in the books by 
Springer and Popovici referred to in the bibliography. The 
former discusses the question as an Austrian Social Demo-
crat, the latter as a Roumanian Austrian Imperialist. 
* * * * * * 
What fingers in the hearts of many of our German brothers 
in Austria and Hungary is the old position of affairs when 
the State was the property of the House of Hapsburg and 
an administrative district of the German Civil Service. 
These old days in Austria possessed their own distinctive 
character, rather formal, but very respectable and under-
standable. The German Ostmark was historically the 
centre of the Monarchy. With it as starting-point Bohemia 
was linked up, the Adriatic provinces were occupied, 
Hungary was set free and Galicia was annexed. The entire 
State was an enlarged outwork of the German nucleus. It 
was an administrative State which afforded to the nations 
linked up with it the advantages of German organisation ; 
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a police State which attempted to take charge of every one 
whilst regarding them all as subjects. Nowhere has the 
absolute State, carrying on the business of government 
reasonably and possessing neither nationality nor sentiment, 
ever existed so completely as in the old Austrian Empire. 
Such was the State of Maria Theresa and also, of her son 
Joseph II., with his very different outlook. 
Metternich wanted to maintain this ancient Austrian 
State artificially in the midst of a world grown national-
ist. It possessed style and a distinctive character, but a 
character that of course, like everything earthly, had its 
limitations. But before we speak of the cause which 
destroyed this distinctive State we must get a grasp of its 
special merits, for it will only be banished finally if it has 
first been properly valued. This State was less military 
than Prussia, less purely an administrative machine than 
the Electorate of Saxony, less patriarchal than old Bavaria; 
it was in its way a civilising influence, and considering its 
circumstances, modern in spirit. From the military point 
of view it has to its credit the long and by no means easy 
campaigns against the Turks. It played the Great Power in 
Italy and Flanders, combined much vigour with compara-
tively few irritating qualities, and proved what a united, 
disciplined and well-graded civil service could accomplish in 
the hands of an able hereditary monarchy. This old State 
stood the test of Napoleonic times better than Prussia, 
which was more designed to achieve rapid success. It 
showed a surprising tenacity in the defence of its hard-won 
gains and is in its way a product of history which may fairly be 
called vigorous, efficient and imposing. The Dual Monarchy 
lives even to-day on this admirable, homely old Austrian 
State, just as the French Republic lives on what it has 
inherited from its monarchy. The old German-Austrian 
officials live there as though the ancient State still existed. 
It has indeed narrowed its boundaries at various times, 
has given up foreign provinces, such as, in particular, 
Italy. But its tradition is not destroyed, was not even 
destroyed in 1848 when all foundations were shaken, and 
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that not only by the attacks of non-Germans but by the 
wrath of German farmers and townsfolk. For the old 
Austrian State was a German official State but in no sense a 
German national State. The German element in it sat in 
official rooms. It was as little affected by the German 
national movement and democracy as by any other national 
popular movement. It represented the old order of things 
in its essence. But for this very reason it was the object 
of revolutionary attacks from all sides alike, even from the 
German. 
Metternich is principally known to us as the opponent of 
the progressive spirit of his time. He was in his way a 
Central European, but of an old stamp : cavalier, statesman, 
regent with no trace of democratic or national sentiment. 
From the Danube to the mouth of the Elbe he obstructed 
that new spirit to which Friedrich Wilhelm II. of Prussia 
reluctantly submitted himself in the wars of liberation, for he 
knew, or believed, that his State, the ancient Austrian State, 
would be broken if the national ideal triumphed. Hence 
the revolution in 1848 was directed against him and his 
system, and it affected him and his Emperor much more 
seriously than the rulers of, say, Prussia or Bavaria, for the 
Austria of that time was anti-democratic in essence. 
But in what consisted the old German Democracy in 
1848? 
It was and is a government by the governed, logically 
thought out, at that time upheld by aspiring townsfolk and 
small farmers, later adopted by the working classes who 
were pressing up after them. The authority thus aspired 
to, of those who had hitherto been the governed, rests 
theoretically upon the assumption that the masses are 
capable of governing by elected representatives and parlia-
mentary majorities. Against this assumption objections 
were and are raised, based on the nature of the masses 
themselves, on the technique of parliamentary business, and 
above all on the incompatibility of a heterogeneous popula-
tion within a democratic parliamentary system. This latter 
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was the special Austrian problem. All the other demo-
cratic difficulties were experienced in the purely national 
States too, and were for the most part overcome, but 
ancient Austria supplies the pattern instance in the world's 
history of the doubly complicated case of a • polyglot 
parliamentary democracy split up along national lines; 
and the Emperor Franz Joseph I. has lived through this 
experiment in the position of leader from 1848 until now. 
Democracy hands over to the population through the 
franchise a share in the sovereignty, under the assumption 
that it will understand how to form majorities capable of 
governing. This is in itself no easy matter for a people 
who have hitherto been unorganised subjects. In partially 
undeveloped countries they often get the franchise without 
knowing what to do with it. They send up to Parliament 
delegates without cohesion, local celebrities, orators and 
respected citizens, and are surprised if the Government 
manages this jumble of persons as it pleases. As long 
as a democratic representative assembly is undisciplined 
and without a majority, it strengthens in the main the 
bureaucracy, because it frees the latter from the con-
straint of voting taxes without itself being able to take 
over the conduct of affairs. This was the unexpected 
experience of almost all constitutional Governments after 
1848, but most of all that of the Austrian Government. In 
spite of the altered constitution everything remained at 
bottom as of old, allowing for a little more effort on the 
part of the Government. And it would have so remained 
throughout the Danubian Monarchy if in one place, viz. in 
Hungary, a disciplined, self-contained organisation had not 
appeared upon the scene. The Hungarian Revolution of 
1848-49 was the first occasion on which this episode of a 
popular rising reached the dignity of an historical event. 
For this revolution was more than the vague desire for 
government of polyglot democratic farmers and townsfolk, 
it was the armed rising of a national entity which was 
previously almost complete in itself. The Hungarian noble 
was a different kind of revolutionary from the Viennese 
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artisan, for he did not merely wish to parade the streets, to 
protest and to bargain a little with those in authority. He 
wanted to rule himself, and he knew what that meant. The 
really serious nationality problem only arose with the 
Hungarian Revolution. 
* * * * * * 
But before we discuss the Hungarians and their in-
fluence upon all the other non-German elements, we 
must make some further remarks about democracy and 
nationalism. 
Democracy, as we have already said, is the admittance of 
the previously governed to a share in the government. 
This is a lengthy process, for the man who has been nothing 
but medieval serf, labourer and subject has in general no 
desire to govern. He must first, in the course of generations, 
be raised out of his torpor and enlightened before he can 
even conceive of becoming himself a factor in political 
government. This enlightenment was the work of the 
eighteenth century, and even princes and aristocrats shared 
in it without foreseeing the results of their benevolent 
efforts to educate the people. Without desiring it people 
were transforming illiterates into future revolutionists 
within the despotic State itself. When the old society 
sent some crumbs of its knowledge into the servants' hall, 
it was undermining itself. This had been freely done in the 
most innocent manner in the benevolent Austria of pre-
Napoleonic times. 
The people of the eighteenth and indeed also of the 
nineteenth centuries accepted the education offered to them 
from above slowly and suspiciously, because they were not 
accustomed to receive benefits without reservation, and 
because they themselves had no presentiment about what 
was given them. They could not know what sort of 
strength was asleep within them. The period of government 
by the nobility or by the cloister had lasted so long that 
the far-distant times of ancient general freedom and of 
untamed racial migrations were wholly forgotten and lost. 
For when before have the common people been told their 
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own history ? They saw that there were lords over them 
and noticed that the ruling classes used two languages, one 
for their European intercourse, whether knightly or priestly, 
and one for the people. This second language now became 
the subject of popular education. The stammer of the 
wage-earner's cottage became a written language by the 
help of popular education and the national school; the 
dialect of conquered races and the figures of their lost rulers 
became subjects of instruction. Out of the mouths of 
babes and sucklings was made ready the power, a trembling 
power at first, of a newly arising nationality. The national 
lower classes gained ground below the international upper 
classes, and their instinct carried them so far that the 
dwellers in the castles often concealed their knowledge of 
Latin, French or German in order to become the popular 
leaders of these formerly speechless masses. Old German or 
Italian aristocratic families began to speak Tzechish or 
Slovenian, not always indeed, but when they were in the 
country. The once despised language of the crowd became a 
subject of pride, a ground for obstinacy. Often the national 
language lived on and raised itself by means of religious 
contests. Tzechish was spread abroad in early days by 
Johann Hus and his followers. The Hungarians in castle and 
cottage developed a passion for Magyar when they professed 
Calvinism in that language. Religious movements possess 
everywhere the greatest democratic and national influence. 
Even the Catholicism of the Counter-Reformation had such 
an influence, when the nobility were Protestant and the lower 
classes Catholic. The Tyrolese and the Steiermarker peoples 
became German Catholics when, with the help of their priests, 
they drove out their Protestant lords. Many ruined castles 
bear witness to these happenings. In this way nations 
developed from below upwards, their individual souls, their 
special God, their Mother Mary or their Catechism. The 
deeper the faith penetrates among the masses the more 
provincial it becomes. The Polish heaven differs from the 
Roumanian heaven, and the Queen above the stars looks 
differently on the Vistula and on the Isonzo. These 
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are no distinctions of creed in the theological sense, but 
national growths. And the spiritual beginnings are often 
translated with surprising rapidity into the material. 
National poets arise and old songs are written out. National 
dress, which is often only a remnant of an old discarded 
upper-class culture, is held in special honour as inherited. 
Romanticism beautifies and enlarges the homely legends 
and sanctifies the old peasant style of architecture, discover-
ing wonderful secrets in it and in the ancestral food, animals 
and flowers. In such a time of awakening, as in spring-
time, even shabby peoples are beautiful. It is the awaken-
ing of the masses to humanity, the first steps of national 
democracy. 
This process of development took a somewhat different 
course in each of the hitherto neglected and oppressed 
nationalities. But any one who is not familiar with it cannot 
understand whence comes the wonderful vitality and passion 
in the nations which are climbing up out of the depths. He 
judges coldly from a detached point of view and thinks it 
a political insanity that a people of this sort should regard 
itself as the centre of the universe. And this indeed is so if 
we will admit only the successful great nations as worthy 
of life. But every living entity and every nation desires, 
when the mass of its people awake, to have its own day, its 
sacred and sunny maytime, and strives after it so far as is 
in its power. This may be disturbing and absurd, but it is 
very human. Those who have to solve racial disputes must 
never forget this national spirit whose import Herder was 
the first among important thinkers to attempt to disclose. 
Herder, understanding the soul of the people, did not 
believe in the permanency of the Austrian State, a very 
natural attitude for him and for all who study race psycho-
logy without military statesmanship. Psychologically the 
ancient Austrian State is actually burst asunder by the 
birth of the national spirit, and what binds it together is 
the fact that it is impossible for military reasons for small 
sections of nations to maintain themselves in the world. 
The military State coerces the nationalities, the old Germano-
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Austrian administrative State binds together the untamed 
peoples' States of later growth. 
* * * * * * 
But since the Germans in North and South have each 
experienced a similar national awakening, they ought, 
properly speaking, to show understanding of all such popular 
agitations, even if they appear recalcitrant and antagonistic. 
The Germans too were overwhelmed by a Latin-French 
civilisation until they became genuine free Germans. But 
there is one very remarkable fact about the older stages of 
the nations, and I do not remark what follows in order to 
say something conclusive, but to indicate a question which 
is significant for the community feeling in Mid-Europe. 
Why did the Germans after a certain stage feel no more 
genuine sympathy for the agitators among the young nations 
following in their footsteps, and why did they themselves 
cease to exercise Germanising influence ? The two ques-
tions are intimately connected. Only the striver can 
feel love and attachment for those who are beginning to 
strive. Whilst the Latin Franks (the French) were young 
they pressed forward their national boundaries almost up 
to the Rhine ; whilst the non-Latin Teutons (Germans) were 
young they pressed forward their national boundaries far into 
the East, and by missions and the pressure of authority made 
distant lands practically German. But then their force of 
attraction ceased for no visible outward reason. Formerly 
numbers of Slavs or other foreign peoples had emigrated into 
Germany (Brandenburg, Lausitz, Silesia, Pommerania, 
Prussia), but then they were all at once faced by a wall. 
To-day they are still faced by the same wall. How admir-
able it would be for us to convert the Tzechs into Germans 
if it could be done ! But it simply cannot be done. The 
time for it is past, both parties are too old for it. The 
Germans have long since lost the cheerful natural growth, 
the rough vigour, the childlikeness of their mediaeval Ger-
manising spirit, and the Tzechs have long since grown less 
impressionable than were the Sorbs, Wends and Liutitzen, 
or whatever else they may have been called. To overlook 
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these changes brought by time is the tragic error of the 
present Pan-German party. They wish to accomplish by 
school and law what they are now powerless to do imagina-
tively and without set purpose. 
It is by no means unimportant to point out in this con-
nection that the modern Germans almost everywhere in 
the world are unfortunately bad Germanisers. In my 
opinion this is a result of our best qualities. We are 
thinkers, men of understanding, engineers, organisers, 
successful prosaic people, perfect apparatus, invaluable 
voluntary parts of a machine, but just on this account 
strange to the children of nature and to average nations. 
This indeed applies in a much greater degree to the Germans 
of the Empire than to the German Austrians. The same 
ability which opens the markets of the world to us and 
makes our armies victorious, closes to us the hearts of those 
who are climbing up out of the mist. Hence, in distant 
parts of the earth too, we only make passably good colonists. 
We are, if the comparison will not offend, sometimes in the 
position of a privy councillor trying to manage his horse ; 
his groom can do this much better. In other words : those 
Old Austrian officials who were confronted with the new 
national movements had all the advantages of advanced 
political civilisation, but lacked the innate feeling for 
formless creative strength. They were privy councillors 
with all the attendant excellences and deficiencies. Thus it 
came about that in 1848 an unheard-of shock burst upon 
that well-governed Austria, which then included Hungary : 
the peoples, the nations moved according to their own 
inspiration and not in the prescribed forms. Mutterings 
were heard below, at the foundations of the State : the 
molecules were astir in the ancient stones of the monarchy. 
* * * * * * 
The Magyars were the chief nation that revolted in 
ancient Austria. They extorted political separation, not 
at once, indeed, in the year of revolution, but later in 
1866. They became a State, a second ruling nation along-
side of the Germans. Here we are not concerned to discuss 
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the details of their alienation from the Hapsburg dynasty, 
an alienation which may be traced back to the pre-Turkish 
period. We are only anxious that we Imperial Germans 
should grasp the extraordinarily powerful and undisputed 
part that they play within the monarchy to which we are 
allied. I have, indeed, often pondered over this.remarkable 
people, neither Slavonic nor German, which dwells in our 
midst and is even now helping to decide the fate of Germany. 
They are unlike other nations, not so high strung as the 
Western peoples, not such deep thinkers as the Germans, not 
dreamy and inactive as are often the Slavs, not medisevally 
chivalrous like the Turks, but a wonderful modern nation, 
based on an ancient racial migration, self-assertive, efficient, 
proud, masterful, political, above all tenacious in their 
nationalism. To whom shall I compare such a nation ? In 
their fate and in their character they have something in 
common with the Spaniards, however far removed from them 
they may be in race. The Spaniards and the Magyars, in 
West and East, are the first nations who freed themselves 
from Mohammedan control. They were not in subjection so 
long or so completely as the nations in the Balkans or 
Morocco, but sufficiently long to have to bear the yoke of 
foreign rule. They did not only, like we Germans, experience 
some years of Napoleonism, but incomparably more. Their 
whole national existence was at stake during the Turkish 
period, and noble, priest and people grew up cramped in the 
school of servitude. But the Turkish suzerainty, on the other 
hand, was so far an outside influence that they remained 
a nation. The Turks, as we have already noted, had no 
idea of converting them to Mohammedanism. Subdued 
but not broken in spirit and well trained to arms, they 
awaited a change in the situation, and when the Austrians, 
after an heroic struggle, completely freed them from Turkish 
control, they were very far from blending with the nation of 
their liberators out of sheer gratitude. The Hungarians had 
as little desire to be Austrian as the Roumanians, to-day, 
have to be Russian. But the Austrians came as conquerors 
opposed to Turkey, and were scarcely more liberators as 
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such than were later the Russians. They sent German 
officials into the districts that had been freed of Turks, and 
expected the Magyars to behave like some little Slav people 
that had been set free. But this expectation could not be 
realised. The negotiations were protracted from decade to 
decade, the elective Kingdom of Hungary became an 
inheritance of the Hapsburg dynasty, out of opposition 
came compromises. But at last the Magyars lost patience, 
and made use of the West European democratic revolution 
of 1848 as an opportunity for their own differently constituted 
national revolution, which was so fiery that the Austrians 
could only put it down with the help of Russian troops. In 
this revolution the national Government of the Magyars 
was, in the first instance, ruined for the second time, but 
only in order to reassert itself with renewed vigour so soon 
as the monarchy was in danger and needed the Magyars. 
The Battle of Koniggratz was a victory for both Prussian 
and Magyar, although the latter did not appear as a com-
batant. The Saxon Minister Beust was summoned to 
Vienna and, with the aid of the Empress Elizabeth and the 
co-operation of Deak and Andrassy, this clever non-Austrian 
formulated the Austro-Hungarian Dualism. This put an 
end to the old centralised Austria, and from Budapest 
started the Dual Monarchy and the present State with its 
reorganised distinct nationalities 
* * * * * * 
But while in 1867, the year of the Ausgleich, the Austrians 
were not obliged forthwith to regulate anew all their tradi-
tions of nationality policy, the Magyars in Hungary had to 
settle the basis of their future relations to their own small 
nationalities. Here then, for the first time, the principles 
of racial policy had to be worked out by a nation which had 
hitherto been itself under the yoke of a foreign people. 
What success did they have ? 
The Hungarian Nationality Law of 1868 is essentially a 
language law. It is published in the collections of statutes, 
but its main provisions are also printed in that instructive 
work, Geschichte der Deutschen in Ungarn, by R, F- Kaindel 
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(Gotha, 1912). Every inhabitant of Hungary is entitled to 
draw up memorials to the Central Government in Budapest 
in his mother tongue, and the Government is obliged in its 
reply to use both Magyar and the language in which the 
memorial was written. Laws are to be issued in Magyar, 
but translated into all the languages used in the country. 
In the counties the records may also be kept in a' non-Magyar 
language if this is demanded by a fifth of the members. In 
the county assemblies every one may use his own language 
unconditionally. Private persons and communes may write 
to their county authority in their own language. The 
representative councils in the communes choose for them-
selves the language for official use and for their records. In 
the law courts every one may use his mother tongue pro-
vided this is authorised for use in the records. Nationality 
cannot be counted as an obstacle to appointment to an 
office or to the conferment of an honour. The Minister of 
Education has the duty of deciding the language used for 
instruction in the Government institutions, but he is bound 
to see that, in respect of primary and intermediate schools, 
each racial group of people living together in considerable 
numbers is provided with educational institutions using its 
own tongue. The language employed in private institutions 
and by societies is determined by the founder. 
This law of 1868 is well planned, a great project for a 
contentious period, but it was much limited by later additions 
and became more and more adapted to the insistence upon a 
Magyar official language. In 1879 instruction in the Magyar 
language was made compulsory in the primary schools. 
Any teacher may be dismissed whose scholars are not 
proficient in speaking and writing the Magyar language at 
the end of four years ! A law of 1883 insisted on the study 
of the Magyar language in the intermediate schools to such 
an extent that instruction in other departments was bound 
to suffer. The candidates for teachers' posts must do their 
examinations in Magyar. That hinders even the German 
head teachers from visiting German universities. 
In respect to the law courts, too, the original law suffered 
from a retrograde movement. The President of the Court 
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may decide on the exclusive use of the Magyar language. 
The jury are obliged to be proficient in Magyar. 
The conversion of place and personal names into Magyar 
is officially insisted upon. 
And the provisions introduced by law and regulation in 
opposition to the spirit of the original law were still further 
emphasised by everyday practice. Although " for all 
citizens living together in considerable numbers, of whatever 
nationality," intermediate schools must be provided near 
the district where they live, yet we read in the official 
report for 1911, that altogether 4102 Government educa 
tional institutions (kindergartens, primary schools, inter-
mediate schools and gymnasia) use Magyar as the language 
of instruction. Of the 3299 educational institutions which 
are maintained by the individual political communes, 3028 
use the Magyar language exclusively. Although, under 
conditions therein stated, the original law allowed it to be 
decided by resolution that the commune records should be 
kept in a non-Magyar language, yet such resolutions when 
passed are most commonly annulled by the Government 
authorities. German books are forbidden, German news-
papers were kept out by various tricks when there was an 
opportunity up to the very outbreak of war. 
Thus it is evident that the matter is by no means settled 
by what is in itself a clear and good fundamental statute. 
This should be noted especially by those who believe that 
racial peace could be magically brought about to-morrow by 
a wisely thought out model law. Customs and administra-
tive usages are at least as important as laws. But all over 
the world these are of slow growth and involve innumerable 
discussions. 
* * * * * * 
We shall try to put ourselves into the mental attitude of 
the ruling Magyars, which is indeed not so very difficult 
for us, since Germans, wherever they are in power, are in-
clined to think in quite the same way. To the Magyars, 
naturally, the racial complexity of their State is always 
present. They know that they themselves, counted by 
heads, number less than half, and that with equal, free 
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suffrage, and a fair partition into electoral districts, they 
could always be driven from power by a combination of the 
remaining elements. Hence the task to which they, whose 
national will to govern created the State, devote themselves, 
is on the one hand to guard against an equalising democracy, 
whether openly or secretly, and on the other to increase the 
number of Magyars. 
The avoidance of democracy, which presumes a somewhat 
tortuous thought process in a nation which has obtained 
independence by revolution, is brought about by franchise 
devices, the partition into electoral districts and administra-
tive mechanism, the morality of which we shall not here 
discuss, but only the facts. In Prussia, too, similar things 
did and do occur. But all such methods have only a limited 
duration, for all over the world the nations are approaching 
universal suffrage by way of the primary school and universal 
conscription. This is the more true in Hungary since there 
people know from experience that the ruling dynasty may 
any day place equal franchise rights upon its programme 
if it believes that the Magyar aristocracy are becoming too 
unmanageable. It may do this, and that is enough ! Hence 
the Magyar control of the State is only secured if in the 
future there are more than 50 per cent, of Magyars. Therein 
lies the explanation of the violent zeal to Magyarise. And 
in fact Hungarian statistics report some tangible successes. 
Between 1900 and 1910 the percentage of those who gave 
Magyar as their mother tongue, or who could not prevent 
its being assigned to them, increased from 45.4 per cent, to 
48.1 per cent., and the number of those who were generally 
proficient in the Magyar language increased from 52.9 per 
cent, to 57.4 per cent. If this is continued for a few more 
decades a safe majority will be created statistically, and 
later on also in reality. When this exists universal 
suffrage will be less terrifying. Accordingly—gain time and 
Magyarise ! 
This train of thought has much in its favour politically, 
and we should not really have done justice to our business 
of understanding if we were prepared to trace it all back 
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to the egoism and to the material interests of the rulers. It 
is obviously indisputable that these play their part, but it 
is disputable that they are decisive. Even with us in 
Prussia there are not a few Conservatives who honestly 
believe that the State can only be maintained by them 
and with the aid of the three-class voting system, and it 
must be acknowledged that similar views are even more 
natural to the Magyar politician. He is generally well 
instructed in political law and foresees the doubtful con-
sequences of a polyglot and unstable parliamentary system. 
As we have remarked above, a polyglot parliamentary 
system, incapable of stable majorities, strengthens the 
bureaucracy, which with some skill and a few recurrent 
favours always plays off the disputants one against the 
other. The Magyars see this going on before their eyes 
over in Austria, and under no circumstances will they 
tolerate it amongst themselves, for with them there would 
not even exist that bureaucratic tradition which in Austria 
has been influential from old days down to the present. 
Hungary is a young State which only since 1867 has had 
to devise for itself a system of government adapted to the 
old Austrian machinery, and which is still in a state of 
transition between the old county administration and a 
modern government by State officials. The parliamentary 
power of the two opposing Magyar parties does not upset 
this still developing machinery, since both Magyar groups 
have a share in it, but a direct victory of the united non-
Magyars would doubtless overthrow it, and would result 
in a dictatorship from Vienna if not in worse disasters. 
Thus finally there is a struggle between parliamentary rule 
and the democratic principle of equality, the former being 
Magyar, whilst the latter is the concern of the small nations, 
the Roumanians, the Slovaks, the Slovenians and the 
Hungarian Germans. 
* * * * * * 
But in war time all forms of political wisdom are con-
strained to increase their knowledge. The various speeches 
of Graf Tisza, the Hungarian Minister-President, show how 
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much he is occupied with the racial problem in the midst 
of the international struggle. For indeed the Hungarian 
system of government, whose actual foundation we have 
just attempted to describe from the Magyar point of view, 
excludes small nations inconsiderately and permanently 
from any share in the government, and consequently 
there remains amongst these same small nations a measure 
of uneasiness which is only too easily understood. This 
does not show itself during the war in the case of the 
Germans because the whole war is carried on in such close 
connection with Germany, but it appears amongst the 
Roumanians and Southern Slavs. 
The three million Roumanians are certainly better off in 
a material sense in Hungary than they would have been in 
Roumania, for the Hungarian State, in spite of many defects 
in administration, is in a higher stage of development. But 
of course in Roumania they would have belonged to the 
ruling nation, and here they do not. It is the same with 
the Serbs, but not quite with the Croats, who are half 
independent in Hungary. But they, too, have in their 
hearts their own suppressed thoughts of domination, for 
they are all tempted by the impressive and dazzling example 
of the Magyars. As far as this is concerned it is of little 
use to represent to the small nations that each of them 
would be of very small importance in Roumania or Serbia, 
because though this is true enough it is no consolation. It 
must be frankly confessed that unsatisfied aspirations will 
persist both here and in all similar cases in the rest of 
Central Europe until the neighbouring small nations, 
which exercise a magnetic effect upon the fragments of their 
race in the great Empires, are brought alongside of us 
into a great free Central European union, and until in the 
great Empires stable and universally applicable nationality 
regulations are drawn up and actually enforced. But even 
if a Central European super-State and Central European 
racial toleration must one day exist, this would not 
on the other hand portend any complete sovereignty of 
the small nations. This is painful, but the teaching of 
CREEDS AND NATIONALITIES . 123 
universal history makes it inevitable: political small 
concerns require support. Hence unsatisfied national aspira-
tions will remain, disillusionments which no Peace Congress 
or Minister-President can turn into joy. But nevertheless 
the State to which these sectional nations belong has every 
inducement not to drive them to sullen despair, or even to 
passive opposition. This is the lesson that must be learnt 
during the war. Indulgence, for the sake of preserving the 
State, in the things which can be granted without danger 
to the State ! A more friendly way of regarding nationalist 
minorities is a pressing need everywhere, without exception, 
in Central Europe. This must be the very genuine inspira-
tion of our Mid-European State federation if the latter is 
to be at all prosperous. There must be much more real, 
palpable liberalism even extending beyond the hmits of 
language ! This is essential if we are not to shed our blood 
in racial strife. 
* * * * * * 
The racial problem in Hungary differs greatly from the 
racial problem in " the kingdoms and lands represented in 
the Reichsrat," that is in the principal portion of the earlier 
single Empire of the Hapsburgs, which remained over after 
the separation of Hungary. Here the Hungarian example 
influenced especially the Tzechs, who possessed a . ancient 
tradition of monarchy and would gladly, like the Hungarians, 
have formed themselves into an independent State whilst 
at the same time the Hapsburg dynasty was maintained. 
And they have for many years abstained from any share in 
the Austrian parliamentary system as a protest against the 
German Government in Austria, which denied them their 
Bohemian State rights. They are the inventors of that 
method of fighting which employs abstinence, obstruc-
tion and street rioting to interrupt public business until 
demands are satisfied, a method which in the disturbed 
times after the Baden Language Ordinance was occasionally 
borrowed by the Germans, and was also at times practised 
by the Ruthenians and Poles. 
Although before and especially during the year 1848 the 
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Bohemians of all shades of opinion had been amongst the 
most active in demanding parliamentary, provincial and 
State representation, they were the first to risk the Parlia-
mentary system which they had acquired in order to obtain 
concessions of State rights from the Government. And the 
same Government which a few decades earlier would hear 
nothing of popular representation now showed-a motherly 
concern to maintain the forms of the parliamentary system in 
order to demonstrate the unity of the State by means of the 
House of Representatives. Of all parliamentary histories 
none is richer than the Austrian in storms, fights over 
business procedure, ill-advised behaviour, and remarkable 
solutions of desperate complications, for nowhere in the 
world has the parliamentary system to cope with more 
difficult tasks. This was so under the old franchise system, 
when the voters were divided into curiae, and things are 
not very different since the great franchise reform of 
1907. Readers of our German newspapers generally hear 
only about the uproarious scenes and the defects in the 
parliamentary machine, and easily forget what worrying 
work has been carried on between the explosions. As 
a rule the Austrians of all languages, as a result of the 
endless debates, are much better trained in parliamen-
tary fights than we need to be with our simpler conditions. 
To any one who wants to understand the details of this 
dispute we recommend as an introduction the second 
volume of Charmatz's Osterreichs innere Geschichte von 
1848-1907 (Teubner, Leipzig) and then the books already 
referred to by Springer and Popovici. But for our purpose 
here we can only treat quite generally of the nature of 
the influence of racial disputes upon the conduct of the 
Austrian State as a whole. 
The subjects of dispute are almost the same as those 
already touched upon in discussing the Hungarian separa-
tion : official language, and that both for home and foreign 
affairs, language used in the law courts, conditions of the 
appointment of officials, national industrial policy, school 
and university questions. The question of military language 
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was raised too, and with this the point was reached where 
the ruling house, controlling all alike, could not give way. 
All the other points in the end admit of discussion, but 
of course no statesman will find any binding formulae which 
will exclude all uncertainty, especially in case of mutual 
ill-will. There have been endless discussions and delibera-
tions about the matter, and there must indeed be many and 
prolonged further discussions after the war. The struggle 
seems repeatedly to endanger the cohesion of the State 
altogether, and often the Reichsrat in Vienna as well as the 
Landtag in Prague have only been able to make a show of 
carrying on their deliberations, and a complete official 
despotism has come to the rescue armed with the much-
discussed Clause 14. The most serious needs of the State, 
such as especially the Austro-Hungarian financial Ausgleich, 
have not been definitely settled, because a business which 
from a distance people would be inclined to regard as a 
purely technical matter really involved the very deter-
mination to maintain the State at all. The parliamentary 
system which is a product of the democratic age has become 
unusable because it is handicapped by nationalism, the 
second result of democracy. The impulse of the nations to 
govern got possession of the machinery for popular repre-
sentation and for the time thrust aside all other points of 
view, demanded a franchise and provincial boundaries only 
according to its own need, and destroyed the legends of the 
all-healing force of a normal democratic Government 
independent of race. 
* * * * * * 
The Germans in Austria, so long as Galicia is represented 
in the Reichsrat, are, it is true, the ancient ruling nation, 
but they make up hardly more than 35 per cent, of the 
population. Hence, with the existing political limits of 
Austria, they are quite unable to carry out any policy with 
regard to the Magyars, even if they wished to do so. But 
who can say whether or no they do wish it ? They have 
had none of the schooling of oppression ; on the contrary 
they have been the most faithful and much indulged servants 
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of the reigning dynasty. Consequently they are lacking 
from the outset in strength of mind and determination, 
which are hardly to be found in them even in the height of 
combat. I t is difficult for them to understand that they 
too must educate and force themselves on their side to 
become a national power in the country of nations, and no 
sooner is the political atmosphere bearable - than they 
relapse into their gentle calm, charming but dangerous to 
themselves. Many of them are much more interested in 
the foreign politics of Austria-Hungary as a Great Power, 
and in its economic and social policy, than in the contest 
about whether the representative of the commune or the 
school superintendent in a Bohemian country town should 
be German or not. But what use was it ? The problem 
was there and was forced upon them. Only in actual fight 
could they be roused up to resentment and passion, and 
hence, somewhat heartbroken, they slowly and inevitably 
become a nation like the others in the country of nations. 
But how, so they ask themselves in the midst of this enforced 
development, can and ought a State to subsist which is 
solely composed of nations, some of whom celebrate their 
festival of brotherhood in the East, others in the North, 
and yet others in the South ? We recall the time when the 
spokesman of the Austrian Germans came to us of the 
Empire to talk of a day of revenge which should bring about 
the end of all political union with Slavs. It was about the 
year 1888 that I, as a young student in Leipzig, heard for the 
first time a threatening revolutionary speech of that kind 
from Prague students, which was later followed by many 
other such speeches by older men. We remember the days 
when Tzechs sent greetings to Russians in speeches savouring 
of the clang of swords, and went to Nancy to drink a wordy 
brotherhood with the French; when similar tokens of 
a friendship dangerous to the State were sent by the Austrian 
Italians to Italy and by the South Austrian Slavs to Serbia. 
All this actually happened. People spoke openly of Pan-
Slavism, of Greater Serbia, of Greater Roumania, of the 
Italian Irredenta, of Pan-Germanism, and of every barely 
CREEDS AND NATIONALITIES . 103 
conceivable eccentric sort of alliance, whilst according to 
the judgment of a prominent scholar a commission was 
deliberating in Vienna whether or no Austria should continue 
to be a State at all. But even as we bring all this home to 
ourselves, the completed picture ends by bringing us comfort, 
for, in the midst of all this tension and national dismember-
ment, the Austrian State nevertheless maintained a pro-
gressive economic life, and a military power which now 
during the war is showing itself more clearly the longer the 
test goes on. All the national groups have declared at some 
time or other that the State must perish, but those con-
demned to death often live longest, and when foreign foes 
threaten the old distracted Austria with death, almost all 
these groups take fright and take down their weapons from 
the wall for Emperor and Fatherland ! 
This real unity might have manifested itself at the 
beginning of the war with quite a different fortune for the 
monarchy if the Austrian Government had had sufficient 
confidence to summon the House of Representatives to 
Vienna in the early days of August 1914, as was done in 
Berlin and Budapest. The omission to summon Parliament 
throws more light than anything else on the position of 
affairs in the country of nations. The Parliament of these 
disputing peoples is, even at the outbreak of war, no simple 
and obviously essential expression of the will of the State. 
It has quarrelled so much in the past, it has been so difficult 
to foster the majority habit there! But this neglect at the 
beginning of the war, due to a really unnecessary feeling of 
anxiety, must be compensated for at the end, for at some 
time the National Assembly must at least take upon 
their shoulders the State finances. Things will be much 
more difficult indeed than they would have been in August, 
but the day when the Austrian House of Representatives 
assembles will show if and how the great joint war with its 
numberless bloody sacrifices has strengthened the feeling for 
the common State among the conflicting nations, so that they 
all again wish to be Austrian because there is and can be no 
longer anything else for them. After the war, we hope, the 
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Pan-Slav dream will have vanished, the Italian boundary 
question will be somehow settled, Pan-German particularism 
will be transformed into a genuine feeling for the union of the 
two Central European Powers. It will be, indeed, necessary 
to balance accounts subsequently with the traitors, and some 
very difficult national differences will burst out as soon as 
the guns are silent; but this will pass, the peoples themselves 
and the State will remain. The wounds resulting from the 
war must somehow heal up. And then we wish to share 
the experience of these things without obtrusiveness but with 
the active co-operation of the German Empire. 
* * * * * * 
Whilst the different nationalities were thus passionately 
quarrelling, a remarkably powerful companion to the 
ancient Austrian bureaucracy, the rapidly growing Social 
Democracy, was growing up alongside of developing industry. 
The tactics of the Austrian Social Democracy are both 
interesting and instructive, and the more so since the party 
has been well managed and on a definite theory, and the 
records of its conferences afford important evidence of its 
development. We will attempt shortly to describe the 
process. The beginnings of the Austrian Social Democracy 
are of German origin. At one time it was hardly incorrect 
for a well-known German member of the party to say to 
me : " I n Austria we Social Democrats are the most powerful 
Germanising influence.'' Withal it was tacitly supposed that 
the Tzechs, Poles, Ruthenians or even the Slovenians, 
gripped and awakened by the German agitation, would 
also, in a more distant future, be weaned from their accus-
tomed purpose by the party leaders in Vienna. It was, 
indeed, properly an Imperial Social Democracy. Active 
against capitalism, agrarianism and bureaucracy, determined 
in all the demands of labour, it believed that the destructive 
influence of nationality might be overcome by an inter-
national programme. This, as we know, was not quite 
successful. As the foreign-speaking children grew up they 
broke loose. Now the party consists of national clubs with 
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a very loose common superstructure; even the trade unions 
are involved in the separation of nationalities, and in the 
districts where racial disputes are hottest the national 
unions are already organised separately. Nationalism was 
stronger than proletarianism. This need not always be so, 
but it is the existing state of affairs. 
The first dictum which the Austrian Social Democrats 
used to turn aside racial disputes runs thus : " That is a 
middle-class, capitalist affair, for it is at bottom nothing 
but a quarrel about political advantages and political 
burdens." Correctly thought out from the materialistic 
standpoint but not adequate in practice ! It is actually 
true that in all disputes about nationality and language 
certain financial or business interests are fought for too. 
When, for instance, the Hungarian agrarians set up their 
national Government they did this not without regard to 
the land laws, the corn trade and the regulation of wages. 
When the German-Bohemian and the Tzechish manufac-
turers quarrelled over their respective influence on the 
Ministry, Government contracts were certainly not absent 
from their thoughts. When the German provinces protested 
against the Galician Poles, they were influenced in no small 
degree by the fact that under the rule of the Polish majority 
they, as the richer minority, had to pay for Polish canals 
and banks of credit in which they had not the least interest. 
All over the world political power signifies also economic 
interests and money. And when the Social Democrats 
called attention to this, they as proletarians had an indis-
putable and logical right to do so, only they overstretched 
their bow by often in the course of their agitation putting 
forward this solution as the only genuine explanation of the 
matter; and this reacted on themselves. The Moravian 
Slovaks and other comrades did not permanently believe 
what the party orators said : that it was all the same 
to them as workmen whether German or Slovak were 
the legal language in Briinn. Even the simplest work-
man, and indeed he especially, is influenced and pervaded 
by the party spirit of his nationality. Moreover a polyglot 
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party system and trade union machinery is almost as 
clumsy as a polyglot Parliament. 
But in order to establish definitely their avoidance of 
racial quarrels in the face of the national movements which 
arose even in the proletarian class and were, intentionally 
made use of by the opposing parties, the Social Democrats 
could not confine themselves to a perfectly general inter-
national creed, but were obliged to adopt an attitude 
towards local questions. This was so in the Social Demo-
crats' national programme of 1899. This programme was 
Issued some seven years before the struggle for the franchise, 
which has hitherto been the most effective achievement of the 
Austrian Social Democrats. Hence it goes without saying 
that universal, equal and direct suffrage were put forward 
as the solution of the racial dispute. We have already 
remarked that this healing influence has at least not taken 
immediate effect. It may rather be said that the growing 
agitation and the increased number of active members of 
the party has widened the division between the groups. It 
may be that with a thoroughgoing democracy social problems 
would ultimately become so important that they would 
overrule language problems, but certainly this is not to be 
looked for until definite nationality regulations have come 
into force throughout the whole of the country of nations 
as a result of numerous debates and resolutions. The social 
democrats demand such a regulation of nationalities in the 
place of the traditional self-governing bodies of the Crown 
lands with national boundaries. And in this they concur 
with the German nationalist demand for the division of 
Bohemia. The resulting nationalist unions must conduct 
their own business, whilst a general law in force everywhere 
protects the minority. A State language is not to be recog-
nised, but a language of intercourse is allowed as possible. 
Whether this language will not ultimately be necessary 
for all the higher authorities and will not, in the case of 
the army, unavoidably develop into a State language, 
is not worked out in detail. Finally, the right of every 
nationality to national existence and national develop-
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ment is recognised, but it is also stated that the pro-
gress of civilisation depends on the united solidarity of all 
nations. 
All this can be accepted as correct, although we miss any 
explanation of how the special rights of nationalities will 
combine with the necessary solidarity. Social democracy, 
too, must ultimately result in a number of different settle-
ments made according to the relative strength of the several 
elements at a particular time, and according to general 
political laws. But it has an undoubted advantage over 
the radical popular parties in that it puts the sense of 
common needs which inspires social legislation much more 
prominently into the foreground, andlthis is a practical and 
satisfactory preparatory work for all Mid-European schemes. * * * * * * 
A section on Poland might be demanded at this stage of 
our work, but during the war all Polish conditions and plans 
are so unsettled that, although the Polish question would 
occupy the chief place in any discussion on the " objects 
of the war," it does not as yet fall within an argument as 
to the permanent constitution of Mid-Europe. Upon the 
form assumed by victory and the conclusion of peace will 
depend the importance of this war as a turning-point in 
Polish history. The Poles themselves desire, so far as I can 
understand, first union, and then, if it be possible, self-
government. Amongst the politically instructed represen-
tative Poles only a few believe in a new absolutely inde-
pendent Poland lying between Russia and Mid-Europe. A 
larger number hope for an Austrian Poland, which would 
include the greater part of the nation and would secure a 
sort of Hungarian independence within the Danubian 
Monarchy. It is difficult to believe that Prussia will alter 
her eastern frontier very much unless she is compelled to do 
so. Whether Austria will grant a subordinate autonomy to 
her Poles, and whether they are in a position financially 
to have their own subordinate state, must be discussed by 
both sides. There is much in favour of this solution from 
the point of view of the Austrian Germans. But what will 
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then become of the Ruthenians if they stay in Galicia ? 
Yet so much must be said during the next months in many 
other connections about this and allied questions relating 
to the eastern frontier that it is unnecessary that we should 
here adopt any direct attitude towards the important 
political questions of the day. It may very well be that 
the establishment of Poland will be the strongest impulse 
towards the creation of Mid-Europe. But this, if it comes 
to pass, will be accomplished in the first instance in the 
rooms of the diplomatists, for only there can the necessary 
understandings between the sovereigns be prepared for. It 
is, however, certain that the new Poland is hardly conceivable 
without a previous treaty between the Central European 
States. 
* * * * * * 
And over all these, over the Germans, French, Danes and 
Poles in the German Empire, over the Magyars, Germans, 
Roumanians, Slovaks, Croats and Serbs in Hungary, over 
the Germans, Tzechs, Slovaks, Poles and Southern Slavs in 
Austria, let us imagine once again the controlling concept 
of Mid-Europe. Mid-Europe will have a German nucleus, 
will voluntarily use the German language, which is known all 
over the world and is already the language of intercourse 
within Central Europe, but must from the outset display 
toleration and flexibility in regard to all the neighbouring 
languages that are associated with it. For only so can that 
fundamental harmony grow up which is essential for a 
Great State, pressed and threatened from all sides. We 
Germans of the Empire need to devote much more genuine 
attention and care to this central problem of the allied 
monarchy than we have done hitherto. And not only to the 
technical and political problem in itself, but especially to 
the feelings of the peoples who are to be allied with us for 
better or for worse. In this respect much has been lacking 
before the war, for although our interest in the fate of our 
German brethren in Austria and Hungary was not very 
extensive, yet it is notorious that our knowledge of the 
previous history and affairs of the Hungarians, Bohemians, 
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Poles and Southern Slavs has been still more limited. Our 
eyes were directed towards the West. We were studying 
the nations of an older civilisation, and learnt much and 
discovered much from them, but the developing smaller 
civilisations in the East were not important enough for us, 
just because people felt a more personal relation with the 
Romance cultured languages than with the speech of their 
companions in arms. In this respect the new generation 
growing up after the war will do better than the old people, 
so that a type of Mid-European may be worked out including 
all elements of culture and strength, the bearer of a civilisa-
tion of rich and varied content, growing up around the 
German nationality. 
I think of the first days after the war. Whither shall we 
proceed ? In the first place most of the Romance countries 
will be as good as closed. Journey, you birds of passage, 
into the Carpathians, take your mandolins with you, let 
the gypsies play something for you in the forest towns. 
Climb, you mountaineers, not only as heretofore in the 
Tyrol and the Dolomites, but also further east, as far as 
Steiermark and Karst, and then bathe in the broad sunny 
Platten Lake. Visit, you seekers of art, the beautiful secret 
corners, the castles and churches, the homely town architec-
ture ; examine the curiosities of Prague, the antiquities 
of Cracow, and the proud and beautiful Graz ! There, 
everywhere you will find both Gothic and Baroque as well 
as many fine modern buildings. Go to Passau on the 
Danube and let them take you to the Kaiserstadt, and then 
again to Gran and to the magnificent castle and town of 
Ofen and Pest! If you are interested in racial matters go 
and visit the isolated fragments of peoples in the Zips or 
in Siebenbürgen, or near Struhlweisenburg. Tell your 
chauffeurs, you owners of motor-cars, that the Imperial 
roads are excellent, and try, you hunters and cavaliers, 
whether the Beskiden or the Bosnien are not delightful 
mountains for you, such as cannot be found in the over-
civilised West. Visit, you wounded soldiers, the battle 
fields of the greatest mountain war in the history of the 
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world ! If every year a hundred thousand more Germans 
of the Empire would travel in the faithful neighbour-
ing country, then in addition to the pleasure it would 
produce, it would also be of much political value, for there 
the people are franker than in the more frequented foreign 
countries. I remember, as I write, many glorious hours on 
the Polish ridge in the Tatra and as far as Dalmatia. How 
brilliant was the evening on the Danube travelling to 
Budapest! And how genuinely national was the dance up 
there on the Koralp in Steiermark! Well, a pleasant 
journey 1 
C H A P T E R I V 
T H E ECONOMIC L I F E OF C E N T R A L E U R O P E 
C R E E D S and nationalities constitute the oldest and most 
tangible, but by no means the only, lines of division amongst 
the population. There are other cleavages which are more 
connected with economic position and occupation, without 
being wholly economic. Differences which we wish to 
express as economic temperament or economic character. 
These cannot be discussed with statistical data like the 
creeds and nationalities, which are now become stable. 
Here everything is still in solution, and every sort of 
transitional form is possible and is constantly met with. 
May I first speak of the economic temperament in North 
and Central Germany? In the eighteenth century this 
North German district still possessed no economic character 
of its own. Its population in the agricultural districts, in 
the industries in the small towns, and even in the few large 
towns, consisted of very much the same type of people as 
those who were then living in Bohemia, Austria, and as far 
away as Cracow. They were a people the unschooled lower 
stratum of which worked plainly and laboriously in order 
that above them might be set up an educated middle-class 
and a landowning nobility. These were often surprisingly 
homely, according to our ideas, in their style of living and 
the absence of luxuries, but possessed comforts in food and 
drink and were experienced in all the finer domestic arts 
and customs. This was the old world at the end of its days 
when on German soil Goethe and Mozart appeared as its 
wonderful offspring. Nowadays we refer to the remnant of 
the former lower stratum of these fine old times as 
"illiterate," and with this foreign pedantic word dismiss 
i n 
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them from the ranks of still vital breeds. In North Germany 
these good old people, the illiterates, have almost entirely 
died out; they can hardly now be found even in the most 
isolated Polish farm-houses; they are as dead as gypsies, 
three-field agriculture, tilt carts and wolves. People are 
generally ashamed that only a short time ago there were 
men amongst us here who could not write their own names, 
although we are well aware that the most splendid civilisa-
tions from Athens to Versailles and London have only been 
possible with these old unlettered folk as a basis. The 
normal type of the average educated man appeared in 
North and Middle Germany with an uncomfortable intru-
siveness, a type the like of which did not exist in the older 
southern and western civilisations. In the Electorate of 
Saxony, in Brandenburg, and also on either side of the 
Mittelgebirge in Württemberg, the process of transformation 
was beginning. Subsequently the French and English, too, 
tried to become educated peoples, but it did not altogether 
suit them. Compulsory primary education always works 
with them rather hke an imported machine. But the 
development of an educated people in North and Central 
Germany is not the same thing as the development of the 
capitalist spirit, which Professor Sombart discusses in 
numerous books. Indeed it is not at all the same, since 
a hundred and fifty years ago the provinces of which we 
are speaking were still, as far as capitalism was concerned, 
very poor outlying districts, and were in no sense in the 
forefront of the movement. As princely mercantilist terri-
tories they desired to be included in the capitalist com-
munity, but at first they were imitators somewhat as the 
Balkan States are to-day. Nevertheless, something deve-
loped in them which in course of time was to outdistance in 
method and efficiency the already existing capitalistic civilisa-
tions of earlier growth ; a homely skill in the popular ability 
to transform dreamers into workers by the aid of letters and 
memory exercises. Thus there grew up unconsciously and 
involuntarily the basal form of the second period of capi-
talism : a mechanism of work based on trained and educated 
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workers. The capitalist employer of the earlier period 
developed, as Sombart shows us, in Upper and Central 
Italy, France, London and Amsterdam, and only came 
thence, like some foreign imported skill, to the Central 
European regions beyond. This capitalist finds and creates 
the chief centre of his world in London. From his stand-
point there, at the height of his power, he threatens the 
type of capitalism that will succeed him : the new, more 
impersonal group form of the new working humanity which 
began as individualist. He looks on Berlin (and in a some-
what different sense New York) as the home of this 
dangerous new type. A careful investigation into the 
causes of the Great War will reveal, when English-German 
antagonism is examined, the fundamental difference between 
the two distinct basal forms of capitalistic humanity. The 
capitalism of the first period defends itself against the 
capitalism of the second stage, whose advent is being 
proclaimed, the disciplined normal capitalism of Germany. 
The latter is to the former in its very essence insupportable. 
But for what reason have Saxony, Brandenburg, Württem-
berg and later in a higher degree Rhenish Westphalia, 
Hamburg, the Middle Rhine districts and gradually the 
whole of Germany become the home of this new human 
type which is still in process of formation ? This point 
deserves consideration and must be understood if we are 
to explain the character of Mid-Europe and the part it 
should play in the world. What is this economic Prus-
sianism and Germanism which to-day enforces the attention 
and arouses the aversion of the world, and how did it come 
about ? What is the origin of our new social-economic 
creed ? 
* * * * * * 
During the war we are all wondering why we Germans, 
and especially we Germans of the Empire, are so little 
beloved by the rest of the world. To many well-meaning 
and sociable people this international dislike is something 
quite horrible, and they rack their brains to discover what 
H 
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we must do in order to find favour again. But they often 
look for the source of the ill-will of other nations in very 
secondary matters, such as perhaps in the lack of social 
good tone in those who travel abroad, loud-voiced German 
tourists dressed in Tyrolese homespun, or in the theatrical 
sword-clanging of some discharged general, and not in the 
economic national type itself, because they share in the 
economic and mental changes in their own nation much too 
unconsciously. It hardly even occurs to them that we are 
unloved because we have found a method of work in which 
I now and for a long time to come no other European nation 
can imitate us, and which consequently the others do not 
regard as fair. It is this to which we have just referred as 
the transition to the impersonal capitalism of the second 
stage, a process which with us has demanded about a 
century and a half of work and education. 
In order by illustration to make clearer at the outset the 
distinction between the older and the newer economic 
creed of capitalism I will begin with a little story about 
London. I wanted to look at the London docks, and said 
so to a respected English friend, whom in spite of the war 
I greet from across the trenches. He replied, " No one here 
goes to look at the docks ! " Then I inquired at the Inter-
national Tourist Offices of Cook and Son whether they 
arranged for visits to the docks ? Answer : No, because 
there were no London docks like, for instance, the Hamburg 
docks, which one could visit and inspect as a whole ; the 
London docks are an unsystematic succession of many very 
big establishments, each of which belongs to a separate 
private firm. Thus, as to quantity, labour, money value, 
goods, the London shipping trade exceeds, that of Hamburg ; 
but as to unity, articulation, organisation they already 
represent a more antiquated form of life. Hamburg learned 
from London, but added to its learning quite of itself 
something peculiarly German, which at the outset appeared, 
like some chance additional characteristic, merely as stricter 
police supervision and regulation, but which developed in 
course of time into an essential feature. Why, we ask, 
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does the smaller German sea trade possess the greatest 
shipping companies ? 
Or another example : in 1900 I was in Paris during the 
Exhibition and was talking to a German wood-carver (fine 
joiner), who had worked for a long time in France, about the 
difference between Germans and French. The man, so far 
as I can remember now after fifteen years, spoke somewhat 
thus : If a French joiner has thirty workmen and can get 
a larger order employing more than this number, he accepts 
it indeed, but puts it out on commission, because he has 
not sufficient confidence in himself or will not take the 
trouble to deal with more than thirty workmen. Meanwhile 
the corresponding German employer would accept the order 
for himself, would enlarge his workshop, and by reason of 
this enlargement would seek further new orders. If one of 
the Frenchmen acts differently, then he is certain to be 
from Alsace or Switzerland. Thus the Germans have the 
greater organising ability both in medium-sized businesses 
and in skilled handwork. 
The peculiarity of the Germans does not consist in an 
essentially new attribute which has not appeared elsewhere 
in the world, but in the methodical, trained progress in an 
ability which has existed and does still exist among the 
hitherto leading nations, but has not been so systematically 
and intentionally developed. From our own point of view 
we are still a long way from having arrived at perfection of 
organisation, but in the eyes of others we have already 
deviated far from their style of living. We are an unfree 
people because we have learnt better than they have how 
to carry out our work on a common plan and to a common 
rhythm. And this applies to all types of work. It is not 
as if industrialism were a special German characteristic, for 
the English are an industrial, machine-using, manufacturing 
nation, and were so before us. Moreover, the peculiar 
German spirit of which we are speaking shows itself at least 
as much in our agricultural occupations as in our manu-
factures. 
Of course there are all sorts of attempts at organisation 
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and co-operation in English and French agriculture, as for 
example among the wine-growers in Southern France. But 
when examined closely these attempts are nearly all quite 
feeble, whereas German agriculture, although the indepen-
dence of the peasantry is definitely safeguarded, is already 
almost entirely managed by systematic co-operation, or at 
least is making daily progress towards this goal. By the 
joint action of agricultural boards, agricultural schools, loan 
banks, granaries and dairies, a strong net is woven round 
the individual. He has become a peasant co-operator, 
member of a definite profession. He can, no doubt, evade 
all these regulations, but it is to his own injury if he does 
so. For the sake of personal interest he becomes a member 
of an impersonal institution and works for it as for himself. 
This insertion of the individual ego into the joint ego is our 
special ability by which we attain a more intensive cultiva-
tion, a better assorted production, and better marketing 
qualities for international trade. Individualism is fully 
developed, but it is then carried up into the next higher form 
of economic co-operative existence. 
Owing to a like intrinsic impulse our industrial life is 
similarly full of ideas of organisation and regulations for 
combines. I mean to speak elsewhere of the economic 
syndicates or cartels, so that here I will merely call attention 
to the fact that during the last twenty years our German 
industries have taken on an entirely new appearance. In 
growing they have become interlaced. By means of 
employers' federations, payment cartels, zone compacts, and 
price agreements, a complicated machinery of spheres of 
business and subordinations has come into being, in which 
the outsider can hardly find his way, but which has been 
created step by step as needed, and by means of which the 
private employer of the old style has quite gently slipped 
over into the disciplined, industrial community, and that in 
the course of one generation and even when at the outset he 
was quite unwilling. He has become a federated employer. 
The employers of the first and second generations perhaps 
only adapted themselves reluctantly to these developments 
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and would rather have remained individualist capitalists in 
the West European sense, but the employer of the third 
generation is for the most part born into a combination from 
the outset. Thus in a certain sense he becomes the free, 
directing employee of a society which produces steel or yarn 
or sugar or spirits. The industrial basis of the age is thus 
discovered, and its spirit is now steadily penetrating deeper. 
In another twenty years we shall see before us the whole 
scheme of a powerful industry with its domestic regulations 
and its divisions of labour. The regulation of production is 
on the way. Things that forty years ago would have 
seemed like the unreal idealism of socialist and state-
socialist dreamers, now appear with incredible certainty as 
realities which have come into being in the interval. 
Germany is on the way to become not merely an industrial 
State, but above all an organised State. 
In complete correspondence with this is our experience 
with the wage-earners, and following their example, with 
all the employees in the higher groups. The old ideal of 
the individual who sells his working strength when, where 
and how he likes has almost disappeared in the social ideal 
of the common unions of wage-earners and workers. The 
non-unionist is still numerous it is true, but he is in no way 
the leader. And what distinguishes the German trade 
unionist, so far as we can see, from the older English type, 
is his greater coherence and discipline, which he has pain-
fully but successfully won by fighting, in spite of socialistic 
law and police intrigue, against the policy of the Government 
and of the employers. The German masses mean to make 
their advance as organised groups, that is their guiding 
principle. It is inadequate to say that they combine in order 
to obtain increased wages. Any one who knows the unionists 
knows that calculated self-interest is only one side of their 
existence, and that, especially in the case of the leaders, it is 
the least decisive influence. They have formed their trade 
unionist ideal of conduct, narrow and inflexible, as could 
hardly be otherwise with people of moderate means who have 
but little scope for action in their lives, but yet firmly decided 
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upon and definite in itself. The idea of a super-personal 
economic leadership of the masses in work and in the sale and 
consumption of its products is prevalent and becomes a mere 
matter of course. In this the German working classes differ 
from all the Latin nations, for what in France and Italy is 
called socialism is indeed related in word and theory to the 
German workmen's unions, but has none of the sternness 
of inward determination which has been attained by our 
social democrats, or even by other unionist groups. 
All travel along the same path : engineers, teachers, head-
teachers, scholars, doctors, even artists. The guilds of 
handworkers are coming to life again and adapting them-
selves to the altered conditions of the time. We are a 
uniform nation in spite of all the quarrels among the 
numerous associations of opposing interests ; magnificently 
uniform in this method of organising our daily life and 
work. Primary schools, universal conscription, police, 
science and socialistic propaganda, have all worked together 
to this end. We were hardly aware that we desired all this 
in reality: this disciplined work of the second period 
of capitalism, which may be described as the transition 
from private capitalism to socialism, if the word socialism 
be not applied solely to a proletarian vision of great busi-
nesses, but is understood, broadly, as an ordering of the 
nation for the increase of the joint product of each for 
ah. 
This new German type is incomprehensible to the indi-
vidualist nations, to whom he appears partly as a relapse 
into past times of constraint, and partly as an artificial 
product of coercion that belies and overcomes humanity. 
In educated circles in Paris and London they feel a mixture 
of pity, fear, respect and aversion towards this German 
type. Even if they could produce the same thing there, 
they would not wish to do so, for they have no desire for 
this disciplined soul, they do not desire it because it would 
be the death and the surrender of the individual soul. No 
one can quite understand this unless he has occasionally 
tried to look at Germany with the eyes of a foreigner. To 
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the German who knows only Germany, the intrinsic strength 
of this opposition must necessarily remain hidden ; he does 
not realise how strange he has already become to even the 
best men of the Western nations, not owing to any particular 
thing which he does but merely owing to what he is. 
* * * * * * 
This new German character has by no means been pro-
duced amongst us in the German Empire without opposition, 
for it is something distinct from the old German condition 
of life and heart. The old German was much more natural, 
slower, wilder or weaker just as it happened. All our 
Romanticism lacks the organising spirit; it is loyal, self-
sacrificing and companionable, but it is wanting in any 
guiding idea of aim. The good, ridiculous Germans of 
former days were thus no objects of general enmity. 
People thought of them at times as coarse, and wished they 
had a larger share of French politeness, but they had at 
bottom nothing against the worthy bears, who let themselves 
be pushed hither and thither and yet laughed at it them-
selves. But no one ever supposed that this old, com-
fortably coarse, downright fellow would one day shake off 
his dream and stand up as the thinker of labour. Even 
when philosophers of the highest rank appeared amongst 
us foreigners never thought that this signified a practical 
and economic change in the German character. Indeed we 
hardly noticed ourselves how much our philosophers were 
practical prophets. They were regarded as artists in ideas 
and as reformers of the world, without its being realised that, 
emanating from them, a spirit of labour inspired by reason 
would transform the entire world in the course of a century. 
Indeed the thinkers themselves did not perceive to what 
purpose they were there. They thought about pure and 
practical reason in the sense of intellect and morality. But 
after them came their followers and tried to introduce 
the reason they conceived of into Government, Law and 
Administration. They were, it is true, only partially 
successful, but again, in the next generation, keen, highly 
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trained thinkers about actual possibilities were found in all 
departments of work. Neither Bismarck nor Savigny nor 
Helmholz nor either of the two Siemens is conceivable 
without this philosopher's oil poured out for the second and 
third time. Our technical and agricultural schools are 
German institutions for thought which aims at realisation 
in fact, and are nowadays almost more characteristic of our 
national nature than the old-established universities. The 
" high school" with a practical object is a novelty which we 
first had to assimilate ourselves, and which the people of 
older civilizations most heartily grudged us when it appeared, 
because for them knowledge was more an amusement than 
a practical ability. 
In the quite recent past, and until our character was thus 
transformed in this matter of technical organisation, the 
English were always very friendly to us Germans. The great 
English thinker Carlyle, it is true, understood what was pre-
paring in the German spirit, but his fellow-countrymen ac-
cepted what they saw before their eyes : the Germans have 
good schools and buy English machinery ! It was not until 
by reason of their schools they set up their own machines and 
offered them to foreign nations that they lost the English 
goodwill; for how could the learned brother on the Continent 
be so bold as to mix himself up in business ? This learned 
German technical scholar appeared in all occupations like 
something essentially improper. The old English world was 
not adapted to make a systematic working alliance between 
thought and international trade ! From the time of this 
memorable change onwards the educated Englishman felt 
himself deceived by the German and called him a dangerous 
competitor, as indeed he really was, and that too in virtue 
of the English universal watchword; free play for the 
strong ; but with a quite differently trained strength. 
How closely the new German method of work is a 
continuation of the German trained thought can only be 
realised from a comparison between German management 
of important undertakings by leading men and the corre-
sponding foreign non-German management. Our financial 
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policy has a perceptible doctrinaire tendency, but on this 
very account is most successful. Our military education is 
markedly scientific, but is not injured thereby. Our great mer-
chants are almost economists and statisticians by profession. 
Our woodcraft is almost as logically thought out as a textbook 
on grammar. Our shipbuilding is highly mathematical, our 
steel plates are scientific works, our dyes are chemical in-
ventions. Into everything there enters to-day less of the 
lucky spirit of invention than of patient, educated industry. 
Or to put it otherwise : we believe in combined work. 
That connection with systematic science which we find 
throughout in the new agriculture and in all the more 
extensive industrial undertakings was and still is the 
peculiar quality of German social democracy. Dr. Engels, 
the friend of Karl Marx, said of it that it was the heiress of 
German philosophy, and if the saying is not taken to mean 
the sole heiress, then there is a large kernel of truth in it. 
Of all working classes, only the German (and the German-
Austrian) is theoretical in its group instruction in the sense 
of pure Marxism. This instruction may often be false in 
details and may be far over the pupils' heads, and remote from 
present-day problems, but the actual fact that we possess 
the most theoretical labour movement in the world is part 
of the picture of German economic life. This working class 
in combination with its educated employers, with our 
syndicate leaders, with our Civil Service and officers, does 
not offer the most charming and amusing society possible, 
but does constitute the most practical, safe and durable 
human machinery. This living national machine goes its 
way whether the individual lives or dies, it is impersonal or 
super-personal, has its frictions and interruptions, but is as 
a whole something that has never come to pass exactly in 
this way before ; it is the historically developed German 
character. 
* * * * * * 
We are all being much confirmed in this our German 
method of work by the progress of the war. From the very 
first days this war, which had been forced upon us, was 
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regarded as a necessary and quite universal duty and task 
which must be performed. Every one looked to those in 
responsible positions for a planned organisation reaching 
even to the smallest details. As soon as it was felt that 
this existed, the troops and the workers at home showed 
themselves ready for the greatest and most exceptional 
efforts, without crediting themselves with this as any 
special merit. The war was really only a continuation of 
our previous life with other tools but based on the same 
methods. In this indeed lies the secret of success. We 
conquer less through individuals than through the disciplined 
feeling for combined difficult work, and those who take the 
field to amend us after their own pattern must try in battle 
to equal us. If our opponents like to label this intrinsic 
connection between the work of war and peace as " German 
militarism," we can only regard this as reasonable, for 
Prussian military discipline influences us all in actual fact, 
from the captain of industry to the maker of earthworks. 
All that we object to is the secondary implication which has 
associated itself with the word militarism, and which in the 
management of barracks in the peace years it was difficult 
entirely to avoid. But after the war we shall certainly 
remain much more closely agreed in our common esteem for 
the voluntary discipline of a great national, military or 
industrial army so long as the men are still living who have 
kept at their posts during this struggle. Happen what will 
the German spirit has received its baptism of fire : the 
national genius was and is a reality. Both to ourselves and 
to the outside world we have shown ourselves as in essence a 
single unit. Now it is our concern to carry through to its 
goal this essential German character, proved in the most 
sinister of wars. This will and must be set on foot directly 
peace is concluded. 
For on this day all Imperial and State officials and all 
parties and societies will produce their memoranda wherein 
are noted the things that must be altered after the war. I 
wager that three-fourths of these memoranda will contain 
the words : better organisation ! Our foreign service, our 
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Red Cross, our hospital system, our military clothing, our 
military purveying, our horse-breeding, our food-supply, all 
this and much else must be much more rigidly thought out 
and calculated for beforehand, so that we shall not again 
be so situated as now in the ill-advised debates on food. 
But all organisation consists in statistics, grouping, analysis, 
synthesis, control and regulation, and thus there grows up 
from all sides a State or national socialism, there grows up 
the *' systematised national economy." Fichte and Hegel ^ 
nod approval from the walls: now, after the war, the 
German is at last becoming heart and soul a political 
economic citizen. His ideal is and will be the organism and 
not free will, reason and not the blind struggle for existence. 
This constitutes our freedom, our self-development. By its 
means we shall enjoy our golden age as other conquering 
nations in other ages and with other abilities and excellences 
have done before us. Our epoch dawns when English capi-
talism has reached and overstepped its highest point, and we 
have been educated for this epoch by Friedrich II., Kant, 
Scharnhorst, Siemens, Krupp, Bismarck, Bebel, Legien, 
Kirdorf and Baffin. Our dead have fallen on the field for 
the sake of this our Fatherland. Germany, foremost in the 
world ! 
* * * * * * 
And now let us return to Mid-Europe. The German 
economic creed must become in future more and more the 
characteristic of Mid-Europe. The military defensive alli-
ance will thus grow into a genuine partnership. A united 
economic people will develop, cutting across all constitu-
tional boundaries. 
This could not succeed were it the freshly conceived 
scheme of individuals. But we are only putting into words 
what has for long been taking shape of itself; we- express it 
in order to further a process that is already going on. The 
Austrians and Hungarians have already had a share in our 
life for economically they are of our race, even those who 
speak a different language. The German-Austrians sat 
with us on the same school benches and have supplied us 
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with excellent fellow-workers and teachers of the same 
technical training and outlook. The Tzechs or Poles or 
Magyars may indeed often be anti-German and uncongenial 
to us in actions and feelings unconnected with business, but, 
all the same, they have not escaped the attraction of our 
working methods, and have not even thought of doing so. 
France was for them the ideal country of the "finer arts, 
England the technical and financial queen of the world aloof 
from Continental struggles, Russia, perchance, the mysterious 
future Power of unlimited possibilities, but the economic fife 
of all the Austro-Hungarian nations and sections of races is 
quite overwhelmingly of German origin. They have bor-
rowed their international, technical and business development 
from the Germans, often without being especially conscious 
of it or desiring it. Often the German-speaking Jews have 
acted as intermediaries. Their co-operation is not to be 
underestimated, for whatever banks, joint-stock companies, 
means of communication, corn warehouses, wood consign-
ments and even manufactures exist in Austria-Hungary are 
workable amongst all the separate nationalities chiefly 
because the Polish, Magyar, Tzech and German Jews are 
accustomed to a mutual understanding. In spite of all the 
protests of the Anti-Semites the Jews are an indispensable 
factor in the economic life of the Dual Monarchy. No doubt 
to most of them the kernel of military organisation peculiar 
to the German economic character is unknown, but they 
are born teachers of commercialism as such, and thus they 
prepare the way and make ready for modern work. 
It would be quite erroneous for any North German to 
think himself called upon to introduce the first elements of 
capitalist theory to the Southern members of the union. 
Indeed he might put his foot into it thereby, for the Budapest 
corn traders, the Vienna bankers, the Bohemian manufac-
turers are truly no growths of yesterday. Good-natured as 
they may seem they are very good men of business. In all 
these matters the North German must not forget that though 
he is better organised he is no cleverer than his Southern neigh-
bour. The two things are not quite the same. The amazing 
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economic vigour of the North is no pure outcome of intellect 
if this is understood as a general versatility of mind. The 
successful North Germans are often not so specially active 
intellectually, but they are tenacious and stick to a thing 
and force themselves and others into systematic progress. 
In this lies their strength. We are concerned with the prob-
lem of combining this strength and the versatile qualities 
of the Danubian State into a Central European economic 
system to the common profit, and of developing out of nature, 
tradition and breeding a successful scheme of joint work. * * * * * * 
In discussing these matters with German-Austrians I 
have frequently heard the phrase, " You must help us." 
But when I have tried to translate this recurrent demand 
into practical measures, there was a standstill. For it was 
generally quite uncertain at what point and with what 
objects they were to be helped. Then it was, " Oh well, 
you must give the starting push ! " " Yes, but if we do 
that you will be the first to resent i t ! " " Oh well, that is 
true, but all the same we can't get out alone." Then, 
without further circumlocution : what is it these Austrians 
want to get out of ? 
As individuals they are quite as clever and as skilful in 
business and profession as any of us and they generally 
know our business affairs better than we do theirs. In 
details we could more often learn from them than they 
from us. All that they lack is any general manifestation of 
that Prusso-German business spirit described above. They 
do not exactly desire this but they would like to enjoy its 
fruits, for they see that it makes for prosperity and strength, 
and that for the entire nation. Individuals have become 
exceedingly rich as often on the Danube as on the Spree, 
both in the old aristocratic and in the modern capitalist 
periods. But as a whole there are obstacles to the economic 
life there, about which even the best of friends cannot be 
silent. The productivity of the land in Austria and Hungary 
is less developed than it ought to be with modern expedients 
and in relation to the value of the soil and the amount of 
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the population. It is not as if Austro-Hungarian agriculture 
made no progress! On the contrary it does progress, 
becomes more- productive and more varied, but it does not 
quite keep pace with Germany in front, nor with the pressure 
of the smaller, developing nations behind. Bohemia indeed 
is almost like the Germany on its borders, but the-further one 
goes into the centre and east of the Danube countries the 
more are there leaden weights on the feet of those who try 
to advance. There is still much unassisted poverty, much 
wasted effort, much red tapeism without any proper object. 
All this is burdensome and is sometimes felt as a reproach, 
and only a few strong-minded persons can rise above these 
feelings and go their way boldly and successfully. Thus it 
appears, to me at least, that the economic system of the 
Danubian Kingdom is wanting less in something technical 
which might easily be introduced into it, than in something 
psychical which must first be trained, and which is needed 
just as much by the farmers as by the craftsmen and artisans, 
and just as much by the employers as by the workpeople. 
I should partially fail to carry out the purpose of this book 
of mine if, owing to a natural and easily understood caution, 
I were not prepared to speak frankly in this connection. 
Such matters only cease to be painful when they are stated 
in plain terms. 
I once travelled with a German-speaking Ruthenian from 
Oderberg to Breslau, and enjoyed his ready grasp of what 
was to him the new life on either side of the railway. He 
said something of this sort: " What surprises me is that 
here the peasants are really human beings." Of course 
from the railway he could not see how many troubled and 
oppressed existences there were even in Silesia, and that 
frequently both in agricultural and town occupations, and 
how little the position there to-day corresponds to our ideal 
of the upraising of the whole nation. But all the same it is 
true that the people whom one sees at the station buildings 
over there in Galicia or in Hungary, on either side of the 
Carpathians, make a quite different impression as less cared 
for and less independent. 
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To express the same point in other words : A few weeks 
ago I heard an Austrian economist remark : " With us 
two-thirds of the population are beggars." He did not say 
proletarians but beggars, and he was well aware of the 
distinction between the two words. I will leave it an open 
question whether or no the estimate of two-thirds was 
exaggerated, but it remains true that almost everywhere, 
and of course especially in the east, one meets with men 
and women who, so to speak, never escape from their rags 
their whole life long. These people own little and can do 
little, they drag along from one day to another, and are 
remarkably moderate in their demands on themselves and 
on the rest of the world and society. From the economists' 
standpoint they and their work are not actually worth 
much more than the few kronen which pass through their 
hands, but it would be possible to make them much more 
valuable. This is the problem. We Germans of the 
Empire know this problem for ourselves, but we have 
already partially climbed the mountain, we have got over 
the roughest parts, and hence the Austrians say to us : 
" You must help us ! " 
Why do so many people emigrate? As many as, or 
more than, 170,000 men emigrated overseas from Austria in 
a few years, and many others went across the land frontiers. 
In 1907 193,000 even, emigrated from Hungary. It is true 
that a certain proportion of the emigrants come back again, 
but in exchange fresh troops of them are always hoisting their 
bundles on their backs and going to look for bread and 
money in Europe or America. We too have known this 
emigration in earlier times in East and West Prussia, 
Saxony, Württemberg, the Palatinate and elsewhere, and 
even in the last century in the early eighties we lost a large 
number of our people through emigration to America, but 
we have got over the difficulty. This final jerk over is still 
needed in Austria and Hungary. It must come however, 
for it is poor comfort that the emigrants send or bring 
home money. A good economic system does not need to 
cast out its children but acts as an attraction, and keeps the 
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superfluous ones itself to increase home industry. The 
Danube country too must cease to act as a nursery for 
foreign nations. 
A social policy is good and necessary, but first and above 
all there must be employment. I remember still how 
things appeared in the Saxon Erzgebirge when I was a 
child. First one family and then another could endure it 
no longer, and packed up their scanty possessions. And 
they were always the most efficient, for the under-nourished 
and the poor-blooded can never get away. Thus fifty years 
ago, healthy people were quite literally in beggary there. 
I tell this purposely so that no one can feel that my previous 
statements were made in a pharisaical spirit. Nothing is 
further from my thoughts. But when I think about Mid-
Europe, I do not only think of kings, courts and general 
superintendents, but of the whole immense crowd, of our 
combined great nation in all its ranks, and I consult with 
the economists of neighbouring lands to devise how things 
may be improved. For it is only by means of healthier, 
better-educated and better-nourished masses that the 
military, financial and civilised Mid-Europe of which we 
dream can come into existence. 
•I* sf* sfs sfc 
It is not of much use to hold moral discussions and talk 
compassionately about the poverty of the masses, for they 
will get no better fed or stronger in consequence. Even the 
school is not by itself adequate to the task, however indis-
pensable it is. The primary school transforms a homely but 
helpless population of illiterates into arithmeticians, letter-
writers and newspaper readers. It enlarges the sphere of 
activity and supplies a basis for further progress, but it 
cannot supply work in a district where employment is 
scarce. The most enterprising boys often go away the 
farthest into foreign countries. Moreover the primary school 
only makes its influence felt economically in the third or 
fourth generation, because without home education from 
the earliest years onwards too much ground is lost again 
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after leaving school. The great importance of the agricul-
tural and technical schools has already been noticed, but in 
order that they should prosper they presuppose undertakings 
arranged on progressive lines, which everywhere demand 
trained ability. Hence the fact that Austria and Hungary 
have done much for their school system during the last decade 
is in accordance with their position and task in Mid-Europe 
and will certainly have excellent results in the course of time, 
but the education question must not be regarded as the only 
decisive factor. The first and most pressing economic prob-
lem relates to the productiveness of labour. 
Suppose a hundred men complete a piece of work which 
could have been done by sixty, it is evident at once that 
the hundred must be worse clothed and nourished than the 
sixty. In a natural economic condition of life this follows 
directly of itself. Each of the latter workmen gets more 
corn, flax, wine or salt. And with a system of money wages 
and money values the same simple law holds good. All 
can have more to consume if all produce more. The main 
difference then between the economic system of the German 
Empire and that of Austria-Hungary—to which however a 
hundred exceptions may be granted from the outset—seems 
to be that with us, by reason of that economic character 
described above, the same work is on the average done by 
fewer persons. The North and South Germans have them-
selves learnt this lesson but slowly, for by nature we all, 
without exception, are slow and take our time. Nor is it 
desirable that the efficiency of labour should be increased 
so artificially and excessively as is demanded by Taylor's 
American system, because this is too harmful to the workers 
themselves; but however simple the matter appears it yet 
constitutes the primary economic anxiety for Mid-Europe : 
we must speed up those who are lingering in the old habits 
of work, so that they approximate to the labour rhythm of 
the progressive. 
Moreover, the Government must lead the way by setting 
a good example, and must overhaul its official machinery so 
that fewer but better paid officials may do the same services 
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as are now carried out by too many poorly paid ones. This 
reform in the public services will not be a saving of money 
but of wasted hours of work. In this respect there is much 
to tighten up even on the north of the Erzgebirge, but still 
more on the south. Professor v. Philippovich has more 
than once called attention to this important matter. Owing 
to the impressive example which the officials in town and 
country offer to the rest of the inhabitants, they are the 
primary agents in setting the rhythm. From above down-
wards there must be some degree of speeding up amongst 
them from year to year. Perhaps this will not in the first 
instance make the officials more amicable, but it will raise 
them as men, as a class, and as models for the crowd. Later 
on the pleasant manner of life may reappear, if indeed it 
exists independently in the race. Economically that State 
is the best which carries out the most public work with the 
fewest employees. 
Reforms to increase production are often indeed attempted 
in a mistaken way, when, the pay remaining the same, a 
higher production is enforced by supervision and threats. 
The ¡attempt is explicable but can only afford a quite transi-
tory success, as any horse-owner can tell you from his own 
experience. And this course is wrong too for economic 
reasons, for a decrease in the number of employees acts as 
a decline in the general purchasing power, if the individuals 
do not at the same time increase their consumption. 
That portion of the population which is no longer to sit in 
the office needs to find in the increased demands of those 
more fully employed the starting-point of an opportunity 
to earn. 
And here we touch upon the popular counter-argument 
against the systématisation of work in all departments. It 
is said that in this case there will be still more of the unem-
ployed, the unoccupied and the emigrants. But each 
country where work is more strictly disciplined offers an 
obvious proof that exactly the contrary is true. Wherever 
work is quick there consumption is abundant, and there 
wages and salaries rise, even if attempts are made to keep 
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them down, and the home market extends daily. Where 
much is earned and consumed there is abundant opportunity 
for work. 
When, fifty years ago, Lassalle began his brilliant social 
democratic agitation among the German workpeople, he 
used the much disliked and much misunderstood phrase, 
" cursed modesty." Fundamentally however he was right. 
I grew up in the very neighbourhood in which he first 
spoke to poor home-workers. There I found that very 
state of things from which to-day a few districts of Germany 
and many districts in Austria-Hungary are suffering : badly 
organised work, old, rattling looms, long hours, low rate of 
production per hour, miserable wages, exhaustion and under-
feeding. This deserved condemnation as " unworthy of 
humanity" in order that the working ability might be 
raised out of that worthlessness which was borne only too 
submissively, and also in order that German industry, at 
that time hard pressed, might be able to compete everywhere 
in the world's markets. The will to rise must be awakened, 
the call to a fresh creed of work must be sounded. Some 
workers may at first understand this as meaning for them 
that they can earn more wages and increase their consump-
tion without increased production. But this, which is a 
vain attempt in the long run, is as natural from their point 
of view as that converse attempt on the part of the employers 
to pay less for better work, to which we referred above. 
I am almost afraid to dwell in such detail upon these 
simple matters, but since in what follows much must be 
said of the intensity of the Mid-European economic system, 
it appeared doubly necessary not to hurry over these 
essential preliminary principles. 
What might not the Hungarians do with their land ! I 
see Hungary in mental picture before me : woods on the 
mountains and on the edges of the plains, and in addition 
pastures and meadows. Both together occupy roughly half 
the land. But then comes the wheat district, the centre 
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point of all Hungarian life. According to the year from 
35,000 to 39,000 qkm. are cultivated as wheat-fields. How 
much might be grown there! What a splendid golden 
harvest of twice the thickness ! 
Of course men must not be blamed for the effects of the 
climate, but allowing for this we have to deplore a-production 
acknowledged orr all sides to be painfully small. Hungary 
with its excellent soil produces about half as much per 
acre as does Germany. In other words : Germany in many 
years produces on half the wheat land the same quantity 
of wheat as in Hungary is grown on double the area. Our 
statistical section gives more exact figures. 
But besides this a hectare in Germany although it produces 
double is cultivated with less labour than in Hungary. This 
is shown if we compare the number of the agricultural 
population with the total acreage of arable land. 
How it comes about that there is so much less agricultural 
energy available in agrarian Hungary than in industrial 
Germany is a problem frequently discussed but by no means 
simple. On the one hand it involves quite general socio-
logical experiences and on the other adjustments special to 
Hungary. Agricultural machinery of all kinds results in a 
turning back of labourers out of the barn and field into the 
workshop. The more agriculture is done by machinery the 
more labourers drawn from the farms are found in industry. 
This has happened to a great extent in the German Empire 
and also in Bohemia. At the same time the more agri-
cultural machinery is used the more the number of labourers 
who are permanent through the winter decreases, and thus 
the resident agricultural population in general diminishes. 
The effect is reciprocal. The machine drives out the 
labourer and the want of labour cries out for more machines. 
Not that the Hungarian large estates have no machines ! 
I visited the fine agricultural museum in Budapest and 
congratulated on this occasion all those who interested 
themselves in Hungarian farming. There are working 
models there of all the most modern contrivances, and the 
general trend of mind will be found fully to accord with 
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our own. Yet, all the same, many of the big estates and 
most of the peasant holdings are notoriously in the old 
pre-industrial stage. A factor which almost equals in 
importance the introduction of machinery is the use of 
artificial manures according to the quality of the soil and 
its requirements. Machines and manure presuppose men 
who know how to use them, and who'Se self-interest is 
adequately aroused. This means for the small farmer a 
sale from which he himself gets the advantage of his work. 
Here, from what I can learn, special Hungarian conditions 
begin to have their effect. Of these I cannot speak since 
I have no personal knowledge of the matter : viz. the 
organisation of the Hungarian corn trade. 
If Hungary could so increase its agricultural output as 
to produce a third more, Mid-Europe would be thereby 
assured of an independent food-supply. The existing small 
production is thus a potential asset for the future. 
German and Hungarian interests are here in the closest 
agreement. I picture to myself the future Austrian and 
German Imperial corn-store as being in Budapest. 
* * * * * * 
Influenced by such thoughts as these I have attempted, 
in regard to various industries, to determine by means of 
the published evidence the difference in the productivity of 
the labour employed in Austria and in Germany respectively. 
But my results are not free from objection because the 
methods of payment employed in the two cases only 
partially correspond. In coal-mining, so far as I was able 
to calculate, I consider the difference to be not very great ; 
in lignite-mining it appears extraordinary; in the production 
of pig-iron I obtained no clear results because here the 
supply of machinery is of primary importance. The nearer 
to the northern frontier of Austria these occupations are 
carried on the more they approximate to the Saxon and 
Silesian enterprises. But the actual fact that the workman 
in Austria-Hungary does not quite attain to the average 
economic efficiency of the German may be taken as admitted. 
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Amongst other troubles connected with Austrian company 
legislation, taxation and the freightage conditions, the 
Austrian employers usually put forward this difference in the 
comparative value of the workers as one important reason 
why they cannot enter upon a joint economic life with the 
industries of the German Empire -without special guarantees. 
Of course it must not be left out of account in this connection 
that the Austrian workman gets on the average lower wages. 
Here too strictly accurate comparisons are hardly possible 
since each district in either State has its own wage fluctua-
tions. But miners' wages in Germany, for example, are in 
general higher in marks than they are in Austria in kronen. 
The prevailing wage for unskilled work is decidedly lower in 
Austria than in Germany. 
Whether or no economic statistics, either now or in the 
future, might supply better material with regard to all these 
very important distinctions, for our purpose here we are 
only concerned to get a general grasp of the state of affairs. 
We attempt to picture the economic life of Central 
Europe as a whole, and then find that it does not exist as 
complete in itself or comparable. But this awakens appre-
hensions on both sides at the thought of combination. The 
stronger section fears the competition of poorer and cheaper 
labour, the weaker section fears the more established power. 
These hesitations present a slightly different appearance in 
each department but they are nowhere entirely absent. 
We frankly admit that these apprehensions will prove a 
hindrance to all negotiations concerning tariffs and syndi-
cates. At the same time their importance need not be 
exaggerated, because we have already endured unharmed 
very noticeable differences of this kind in each of our 
separate States and in all the provinces. Within the 
German Empire possibilities of profit and production are 
quite different. The value of labour is very various in town 
and country and in east and west. Wages in Upper Silesia 
are quite different from those in the industrial district of 
Rhenish-Westphalia, and the conditions of employment for 
private employees and for communal officials vary also. 
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T h e same thing applies to B o h e m i a as compared wi th the 
Steiermark, to B u d a p e s t as compared wi th Siebenbürgen. 
T h u s a Central European economic union would not result 
in something fundamental ly new, b u t only in a repetition 
of a sufficiently well-known condition or occurrence over a 
wider area. . .. 
Moreover, in this connection everything is continual ly 
changing W h a t seems to us t o - d a y a low rate of produc-
t ion w a s not long ago a h igh rate. I t is most interesting to 
t u r n over the older tables on this subject . T h a t stage of 
development which appears b a c k w a r d to the present-day 
observer from the German E m p i r e w a s once our own 
condition, and that too in not such a v e r y far distant past 
A n d of course occasional alterations in the methods of 
collecting the published d a t a are disturbing. If we neglect 
them for the m o m e n t it m a y perhaps be said t h a t agricul-
tural ly G e r m a n y t w e n t y years ago w a s where Austr ia now 
is and forty years ago w a s where H u n g a r y now is. B u t 
w h a t are t w e n t y years for such an extensive development ? 
T h e same thing m a y be noticed in the case of industry . I t 
is a strong argument against a n y pride on the part of the 
progressive or a n y despondency on the part of districts and 
branches of work that h a v e gone forward more s lowly. 11 
once these things are looked at f rom a certain distance the 
contrasts grow smaller. Central E u r o p e a n working folk 
represent old and new periods in a var ious ly coloured inter-
mixture, b u t nevertheless essentially t h e y are even now on 
the point of becoming a united people. 
* * * * * * 
B u t of course it must not be t h o u g h t t h a t there is every-
where present in the D a n u b i a n Monarchy a desire t o adopt 
the new German economic spirit w i t h its strained energy of 
w o r k and its strong organisation ! W i t h us too this spirit 
grew u p b u t slowly and under m u c h protest and opposition, 
and there are no small number of people in the G e r m a n 
E m p i r e , in agriculture, industry and small trades w h o even 
t o - d a y regret the " good old t i m e s , " and b l a m e capital ism 
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for having destroyed the security of their business ; believers 
in the older economic creed, and its more comfortable rate 
of living ! Often, indeed, it is only the old who talk in this 
way, while their sons are resolute children of the present, 
and as such belong to or incline to the farmers' union or 
the retailers' association or the handworkers' guild. All 
these economic unions with their banks, their adjustment of 
relations and obligations could not indeed do otherwise than 
demand from their members a sure turnover, increased 
solidity, efforts towards increased production, adaptability 
and work on a cash basis. In this sense they are at bottom 
capitalist structures in spite of their partially anti-capitalist 
speeches. All the unions for fixing rates of wages too, and 
the other societies for workers and employees have a like 
intrinsic tendency, and are generally very well aware of this 
themselves. Each trade unionist when he joins, bids fare-
well to the old life of unregulated work done as it happened 
to suit. Hence if we want to find the really old people we 
do not find them in the economic unions, they are the 
separate individuals : the normal men, now growing infirm, 
of an earlier vanished economic period; the numerous 
small millers, jobbing butchers, ropemakers, tanners, tailors 
or shoemakers, with whom things often go very badly, or 
the isolated small farmer, without instruction, discipline and 
assistance, or those wandering or resident traders who did 
not learn arithmetic and understand nothing of their own 
goods. Such honest but unhelpable individuals, who to-day, 
as sixty years ago, have learnt neither technique nor com-
bination, live with the feeling that they are terribly ill-
treated by their contemporaries, grown covetous and orga-
nised ; they do not understand that the average demands 
on working men and on trade production must increase. 
People of this kind, however, appear afresh with each 
intermittent advance in management, and consequently 
will be met with everywhere to some extent, even in the 
most advanced industries of all. They have been incorrectly 
termed the decaying middle class. The term is incorrect 
because out of that same old middle class too all the most 
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vigorous employers have raised themselves and are daily 
ascending. Whence otherwise could they come ? To speak, 
for instance, of the joiners ; they, on the whole, make 
marked progress, receiving numbers of orders owing to the 
increased incomes of the population. But some of them 
cannot rise with the rest because they lack means or quality. 
These ally themselves to the complainers everywhere, and 
thus increase a social-political group which accomplishes 
hardly anything positive, because, or as long as, it has no 
ideals of education or organisation, but which may prove a 
serious obstacle to general progress. In the German Empire 
this stream of protest against the new economic creed has 
for the most part died out, and has largely been absorbed 
into forms of association that are efficient for work. If I 
am not greatly mistaken, however, opposing humours of the 
kind may be expected in a greater degree in Austria and 
perhaps too in Hungary, so soon as the idea of an economic 
Mid-Europe is taken in earnest, for here in the Dual Monarchy 
the olden time is still very powerful in men's minds. A 
Central European combination, however prudently and 
moderately carried out, must inevitably be followed by a 
period of economic protesters and romanticists who wish to 
hear and see nothing of all this rubbish of organised capi-
talism. About this we may be certain from the outset, and 
need not lose our heads when it happens. It will last 
perhaps half a generation in its passionate form and will 
decline in proportion as the success of the stricter, newer 
system becomes evident. 
But as has already appeared in social evolution up to the 
present, these unimportant individuals who are passed over 
in the process of development are joined by a certain section 
of the nobility and clergy, from no personal necessity, but 
because these latter are patriarchal romanticists. To them 
the progress of democracy which is involved in all intensifica-
tion of work is unpleasant. For in fact a man's average 
production cannot be increased without raising him as a 
person. The man who can tend a machine is to the ordinary 
man with a shovel as a rider is to a foot-passenger. He 
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feels himself worth two. People must regard him in quite 
a different way because he can make or spoil more. This 
applies just as much in the villages as in the town and 
makes itself apparent without agitation. If there is agita-
tion in addition it aggravates the transition, and the 
patriarchal directors of the older processes of work and of 
the religious life naturally in the first instance regard 
the whole modern technique as ruin. There need, however, 
be no lasting opposition here, for the aristocrats learn 
quickly to obtain higher profits through better workmen 
whereby both sides gain, and the clergy make the unex-
pected discovery that they can well hold their own even 
in the new economic church. Let inquiries be made in 
Rhenish-Westphalia and Upper Silesia ! Hence the opposi-
tion of the patriarchal upper class is neither absolute nor 
permanent. But it may be anticipated in every case 
of improvement in average technique and activity. And 
all sorts of good and justifiable feelings come into play 
here. The old economic world with its comfort and 
despotism, in which however, as Professor Max Weber 
says, " the familiar ' thou ' can only be employed from 
one side," has its own attraction, more indeed for those 
above than for those below, but still it has attraction. The 
old castle with no factory chimney in its neighbourhood, 
the fallow land on which Nature is trying to set herself to 
rights again, the neglected swamp with all its teeming 
animal life, the little town with its clumsiness and credulity, 
all this and much else besides is like a mediaeval fairy tale 
which one does not like to spoil. This fairy-tale spirit is 
much more frequent in Austria-Hungary than in the German 
Empire. Go into the woods for instance! Watch the 
country people on Sunday outside the church ! Must all 
this indeed be disciplined into the normal, and estimated 
according to its utilitarian value ? The Danube people 
think it so dull on the Elbe, because the latter has become 
such a much more reasonable river. These romantic 
temperaments are opposed to the modernisation of the 
economic system. They do not want to have their old 
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spirit artificially cleaned and repaired, for—" What does it 
profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own 
soul ? " 
Come hither, dear romanticists, we want to talk together 
as friends ! I will not tell you that people can increase 
their production by technique and organisation without 
altering themselves. That won't do. To enter the economic 
system of Mid-Europe is a soul-transforming decision. That 
the unavoidable transformation accompanying the entrance 
into modernity will give more to the soul of the man affected 
than it takes from it, you may perhaps wish to deny, but 
on this point I venture really to speak from experience and 
observation. The old race of pre-capitalist wage-earners, 
small townsfolk, handworkers and miners are generally 
imagined by your aesthetic people as very different and 
much more picturesque than the reality. The reality is 
harsh and monotonous and poor, both inwardly and out-
wardly, in the good things of life ! These old lower orders 
gain spiritually everywhere by the introduction of the new 
method of work, even if they struggle against the new epoch 
owing to ignorance and to the danger, referred to above, 
of an economic decline. The beautiful old culture hardly 
belonged to you at all. In the churches alone, and, be it 
admitted, even in the churches of the villages and small 
towns, had the resident people of the old style any share in 
the beautiful art of their age. The good done by the church 
in this respect should not be forgotten. But does this 
constitute the whole of what is attainable by the poor man 
and his family ? No, it is certainly not he who loses by 
the change into modernity. For a time all his existing 
ideas totter with his growing independence, but that is a 
state of transition. Whatever is good in what he retains 
of his past soon shows itself again. But of course there is 
a certain section which was on the upper side, and, on the 
basis of this needy underworld, fostered a pleasant culture 
with skill in fine handicrafts and the laying out of parks. 
This section has learnt to demand more in the meanwhile, 
and uses motor-cars, lends its money advantageously to the 
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bank, dresses in good machine-made cloth, reads daily a 
newspaper printed by night workmen with a rotary printing 
press, whilst it wishes in addition to all this to keep up the 
delightful appearance of comfortable grandfatherly days 
and to mingle the magic of the patriarchal past with the 
utility of the technical present, in a confused but pleasantly 
flavoured drink. If you romanticists really wanted to 
preserve the good old time, with all its attendant features, 
thatched roofs, loss of time and smells, then, though I 
should not join you, I should respect you as privileged and 
interesting eccentrics. But you don't want this at al l ! 
And indeed you could not! You could not because you 
yourselves would be much too poor for this new pretentious 
present. Therein lies coercion for you too, and the more so 
since after the war there will be much to pay. With rising 
prices it is impossible to be an economic romanticist without 
sinking in the social scale. 
* * * * * * 
Nevertheless there is an element of justice in this anxiety 
in face of the supremacy of the organising business intel-
lect. And it is in this very matter that Austria, and 
especially Vienna, can supplement Berlin and the North in 
a salutary and excellent manner. The North has created 
the type of successful, disciplined man. In this way a good 
general efficiency has been attained which can be applied in 
the most varied departments of work. Industrial militarism 
can be set up as well in forestry as in sugar production or 
the manufacture of shoes. But this general capability is 
not in itself sufficient to secure markets if taste and form 
are not added. For railway lines and kitchen pots indeed 
utility is almost everything and form almost nothing, but 
there are a hundred objects which are not quite complete 
unless the progressive methods of work are combined with 
a well-devised form and colour. Every one knows what 
efforts we have made in this respect under the guidance of 
the " German Work Union." But when in the last months 
before the war the Union held its fine exhibition at Cologne-
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on-Rhine, the " Austrian House " excelled ah the others. 
How quiet the pompous members suddenly became in 
there, members who might easily have thought other-
wise that they could do everything perfectly ! That was 
a lasting, unforgettable success. If such splendid ability 
is omitted from Mid-Europe, then it will lack something 
invaluable and rich in future possibilities. 
Thus we reject all conceptions of the common economic 
life as a one-sided extension of our North German agricul-
tural and industrial methods up to the lower Danube, 
instead of a simultaneous interchange from South to North. 
Not control, but intermixture. We have more horse-power, 
and you more music. We think more in terms of quantity, 
the best of you think rather in terms of quality. If we can 
unite our respective abilities, then and for the first time the 
hard North German civilisation will secure by your assistance 
that touch of charm which will make it tolerable to the 
outside world. 
As we have said before, Paris has long possessed a magic 
attraction for us Germans of the Empire in North and 
South. And fresh threads will timidly begin to spin them-
selves again after the war, for the home of so much delicacy 
and competence does not lose its power through military 
events of however serious a kind. But even so, something 
has been broken. Here Vienna ought to seize its opportunity. 
The whole of Germany is now more open to the Viennese 
crafts than ever before. The Viennese might make an 
artistic conquest extending to Hamburg and Danzig. There 
are numerous finishing trades in which the Austrians will 
produce quite original goods if they can only get a firm 
start in respect to technique and capital. This is evident 
enough already in the glass trade, in pottery, in paper 
manufacture, in hats, veils, chairs and many other things. 
Where intelligence prevails it will not be injured by 
machinery, but will only remain terrified in the corner so 
long as the machines are not helpful. And the world wants 
skilfully made things. We want to join together to supply 
the rest of the world, through the ports of Hamburg and 
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Trieste, with all the beautiful things they need for their house-
holds. 
* * * * * * 
We have so far said little in this section of the Southern 
Germans of the Empire. This omission had a definite 
purpose, for it is only now after the problem of establishing 
a common economic spirit has been worked- out that we 
wish to bring forward our Southern Germans as an example 
and model of success. Almost the same anxieties and 
scruples about a closer union with North Germany existed 
before 1870 in Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse and 
Frankfurt-on-Main. These countries were members, it is 
true, of the Customs Union, but in other respects they main-
tained a strong and suspicious particularism towards each 
other and very much more towards Prussia. In culture and 
economic life they wished to stay as they were. In Bavaria 
especially the new Empire was greeted in no very friendly 
way as, in the upper Bavarian phrase, an Empire of barracks 
and Jews. The Berliner was for long an alien, and is still 
so in parts even to-day. Nevertheless the unification was 
consummated. To-day the majority of South German 
farmers belong to the farmers' union, and the South 
German employers belong, according to the nature of their 
business and their further inclinations, either to the central 
industrial association or to the German industrial union. 
The merchants belong to the German commercial congress, 
the towns to the town congress, the workpeople to the 
Social Democrats, the Christian or the Hirsch-Duncker 
unions, the employees to the union of persons with fixed 
salaries or to one of the two associations of technical workers, 
and so on. There is no separate South German working 
population, advancing along a path of its own, no special 
unions for South Germans, no division at the Main for 
co-operative stores or economic cartels, the whole now lives 
with a common breath. People are still conscious that there 
were differences, but they are no longer disturbing. And 
with all this the Southerners have certainly suffered no 
economic loss. What industries are flourishing in Nürem-
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berg, Munich, Augsburg, on the Neckar from Reutlingen 
through Stuttgart to Heilbronn, on the Rhine from Mann-
heim and Ludwigshafen to Offenbach and Mainz ! The 
South German peasant farmer has made marked progress. 
His profits are rising and the number of his live stock is 
increasing. No one wants to put an end to the joint develop-
ment, no one. There are, however, people enough who would 
prefer to drop what still remains of separate railway 
authority, water authority, postage stamps and such like. 
The Southern German does, however, wish and intend to 
maintain after his own manner his strong political and social 
liberalism ; and this indeed he wants to introduce into 
Prussia. Since 1870 he has had a noticeable influence in 
forming the German national character, and is very far 
from regarding himself as a mere appendage. Catholics 
and Protestants, Bavarians and Alemani declare this 
unanimously. All the earlier humours of the Confedera-
tion of the Rhine are washed away as though they had 
never existed. People quarrel, as is the custom of mankind, 
over a hundred things, but certainly not over that inclu-
sion in the German economic system which is henceforth 
indispensable. 
This example is instructive for Mid-Europe. We admit 
at once that the task now is greater and more difficult than 
then, because we have to combine nations speaking different 
languages and with wider economic differences. But then 
has not every one in the interval gained a wider under-
standing of the need for more extensive alliances ? Half a 
century of railway communication and international com-
merce has educated us all. But perhaps it is the especial 
task of the South Germans to be available as intermediaries 
when the time comes for the various associations of trade and 
industry to seek out and discover one another across the 
German-Austrian-Hungarian frontiers. 
* * * * * * 
To unite Central Europe by mere political measures so 
long as the economic groups themselves do not call for unity 
will certainly be a futile beginning. Incipient evidence 
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of such a call is already present, but for the most part 
only in the German-speaking districts. Points of contact in 
congresses exist in scientific, technical, agricultural and 
industrial circles. One quite old union is that in the 
bookselling trade. Amongst political parties the Social 
Democrats have fostered unity the most, and to some 
extent also the Anti-Semites and the Pan-Germans. In this 
connection, so far as I know, the German-Austrians are 
more diligent visitors of German institutions than vice versa. 
There is a German-Austrian-Hungarian economic union, a 
Central European economic association and other similar 
societies. These kinds of reunions must on principle be 
increased and systematised, and out of voluntary congresses 
permanent associations must be formed for common enter-
prises. 
Any one who studies the preliminary history of the founda-
tion of the German Empire will come across records of 
numerous assemblies and festivals, at which toasts were 
drunk, songs were sung and speeches made. Individually 
they may be of doubtful value, but regarded as a whole 
they served as practice for the joint political life, they were 
the " walking out " together before the betrothal. This 
obviously happens infinitely more easily with people speaking 
the same language than with those of alien tongues. But 
since in Austria and Hungary most of the leading men of 
all professions and occupations are proficient in German, 
language is no absolute hindrance if only goodwill is 
present. This will be so much the more the case with 
professional meetings if practical and material advantages 
are pursued and obtained. 
From henceforth the attention of the directors of pro-
fessional and other unions ought to be turned much more 
than before towards joint conferences. The aim is as 
follows : a Mid-European trade union, handworkers' union, 
technical experts' union and so on. These unions will, hke 
all new unions, seem at first to be founded somewhat 
insubstantially and artificially, but from year to year their 
inner life and the sphere of their activities will grow. First 
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there is the already existing mutual interchange of members 
by migration across the frontiers, the mutual recognition of 
membership rights which have been won, the partnership in 
union literature, and where necessary its translation. Then 
follows the closer combination of cartells, banks, insurance 
institutions and credit banks. In the first instance people 
will draw together through the adjustment of statutes, the 
examination of differences, the insertion of guarantee 
clauses, until the two machines will one day agree so closely 
that they could be made into one without any great shock. 
All that need be demanded of the Governments in this 
connection is that they do not hinder and that they remove 
any obstacles, such as legal definitions concerning the right 
to form unions or other difficulties of a similar nature. The 
people themselves must desire to combine together in their 
workers' organisations. If this is not the case, mere talking 
round the subject by outsiders will be in vain. 
Will this be the case ? Now, after the war, the attempt 
must be made. Now is the right time for it. Workpeople 
of Central Europe, we call upon you ! 
K 
CHAPTER V 
JOINT PROBLEMS IN W A R ECONOMICS 
B E F O R E the war we all lived in an age of growing inter-
national commerce. Each year we bought more from 
foreign markets and worked for and sold more to foreign 
nations. It is true that this was partially restricted on the 
frontiers and at the ports by tariffs and similar measures, 
but these protective or prohibitive tendencies could not stop 
the process of development altogether, and indeed were 
hardly intended to do so. They were rather intended to 
regulate prices than to guide economic development. When 
once modern means of intercommunication have been 
established it is impossible to prevent them from leading to 
the foundation of an extensive system of international 
exchange. Our consumption internationalises itself in regard 
to all sorts of materials and departments of demand, and this 
applies not only to the consumption of luxuries, which has 
always had something of an international character, but 
also to the demands of the masses. Everywhere, from 
upper and lower sections of the population, there is a 
demand for means of enjoyment which the home country 
cannot supply ; clothing is worn the stuff for which is 
not produced by us ; we make up materials which our 
own soil does not supply. Each of us needs only to in-
quire into the country of origin of the things he uses daily 
to show him how much of an international person he is, and 
how far removed he is from our simple forefathers, who 
dressed in home-grown woollens and ate flummery and 
groats. This universal progress towards economic exchange 
will not cease after the war ; in spite of all attempts to 
prevent it, it will increase yet further with the age of inter-
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communication, so soon as our railways have again free 
access to all parts of the world and our ports are again 
loading and unloading as abundantly and actively as 
before. 
The war has, however, signified an important epoch in 
this development of international trade, for it has and still 
does signify for Central Europe a breaking off of its world 
commerce. By the will of England we are almost com-
pletely shut off from our wide foreign trade. We Germans 
and Austrians and Hungarians have together gone through 
this notable economic experience ; we sat, or rather sit 
together in an economic prison. This is a partnership 
whose whole significance we shall only realise when the 
closed doors are open again and we begin, once more to 
trade with the world which has been shut off from us for a 
considerable time, and which has not had just this experience 
of ours. After the war every nation will have economic dis-
turbances to relate ; all will welcome the new possibilities of 
exchange. But we Central Europeans shall have learnt and 
endured something definite and peculiar, for we have 
actually been a " self-contained commercial State "—that 
bold dream of the German philosopher Fichte which has 
become a reality to us during the war owing to fate and our 
geographical position. Our enemies wished to do us an 
injury, but God, the God whom Fichte believed in and 
preached, has thought to turn it into a blessing. 
It is a characteristically English notion to wish to humble 
and punish us by cutting off our foreign trade. England 
created overseas foreign trade and permits those who 
acquiesce in her leadership to take part in it. That is the 
meaning of the phrase Command of the Seas : we have 
in the past underestimated the importance of the English 
power at sea. We knew well enough that the English 
controlled the most ports, coaling stations, maritime routes 
and cables, but since we could use them all too we did not 
think it particularly hard that they should have practically 
sole command of the machinery. And the English for 
their part were not illiberal in the exercise of their power 
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during the years of peace, since for a long time they them-
selves had been accustomed to think in terms of exchange 
and of international trade. According to their economic 
doctrine of Free Trade and the joys of commerce, the happi-
ness of mankind consisted in access to their world-encircling 
system of exchange. The English necessarily regard it as 
the greatest penalty on earth for a nation to be excluded 
from the felicitous system of exchange because, for England, 
it would in fact be fatal. Exclusion is to be put out of 
the sun into the shade. When the Englishman travelled 
round the world he was proud to belong to the nation which 
controlled this universally beneficent system; moreover, 
he considered how it might be to put a refractory person 
into confinement so as to reduce him to bread and water. 
And such thoughts occurred readily to Englishmen because 
they have had to record in their history the Napoleonic 
continental blockade, the first great economic war in the 
history of the world. Unfortunately ah this has for long 
not concerned us in the same degree. We have indeed 
often talked about the possibility that England would one 
day cut us off from our access to foreign countries, but we 
have never seriously thought it over. Had we thought it 
out thoroughly we should have been economically prepared 
for it in a very different fashion. I remember many dis-
cussions in which, before the war, we spoke of the possi-
bilities of exclusion. Generally the dependence of neutrals 
on the English system was taken for much less than it has 
been in reality. In general, too, only bread-corn was 
spoken of, seldom fodder for cattle, and still more rarely the 
other branches of our imports. But England, on the other 
hand, had a much more adequate notion of the kind of 
weapon that lay ready to her hand. She examined our 
annual imports and secretly rejoiced at the thought of the 
day when she would force us to our knees by threatening to 
cut us off from commerce or by actually doing so. It must 
be acknowledged that our economic dependence was better 
known in the Foreign Office in London than in the corre-
sponding offices in Berlin and Vienna. Without this 
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knowledge England would not have used for her own 
settlement of accounts with Germany the war on two 
frontiers which we had to fight out with France and Russia. 
She thought herself sure of her ground : to exclude imports 
from Central Europe must of itself bring about a deprivation 
of food and of work ! He who does not belong to the 
world's economic system must die ! 
* * * * * * 
In preparing this careful and malicious plan of blockade the 
English were very clever in regard to our economic position, 
but yet they miscalculated. They omitted two things from 
their estimate : the powerful counter-effect of the exclusion 
of such a big economic area on the countries remaining 
in the international union, and the stores in Central Europe 
not previously included in any statistics. We must examine 
this latter point more closely because it will have further 
results in the future. The plan of blockade was, so to 
speak, abstract economics. The statistical year-books of 
the Central European States were looked at in London, 
and it was read therein how much bread-corn, fodder, 
cotton, wool, copper, leather, saltpetre, iron ore, char-
coal, rice, tobacco, coffee and rubber we used annually. 
The total record was of millions of tons, milliards of marks 
and kronen : this represented the annual demand ! This 
amount would not be bought and paid for annually by the 
Germans and Austrians, so the reasoning went on. if they 
had not serious need of it every year ! Thus, if the larger 
half alone could be cut off, poor Central Europe would be 
conquered. This manner of calculating we are sufficiently 
familiar with, since we have partially applied it during 
the war in much the same way to the question of food-
supply. Our food professors, and we with them, said : 
there is lacking such and such an amount, and conse-
quently we cannot hold out without the most severe 
exertions ! In this view we were further strongly con-
firmed by the amazingly low estimates of existing stocks 
of corn and potatoes which were made by producers and 
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owners. We had received somewhat false estimates pre-
viously, and had made mental allowances for them, but 
that the first direct attempt at a Government inventory of 
the quantity of food-stuffs should yield such false results 
was beyond all expectation, for we are accustomed to much 
greater accuracy in the case of taxes on income and property. 
This is only mentioned here in order to point out that an 
economic opinion or general rule based on existing statistical 
material may be correct, and yet false as to facts. Accord-
ing to calculation our anxieties and the English scheme were 
quite correct, but fortunately the actual stock of all necessary 
articles was much greater than any economist believed. We 
were not living so much from hand to mouth as was 
supposed by the English and by the German statisticians, 
Our economic system had been much more prudent than 
we thought and very sound in its storing up of goods. We, 
as a whole country, have had the experience which often, 
though unfortunately not always, falls to the lot of besieged 
fortresses, viz. that they can hold out months longer than is 
possible according to their inventory of goods. It was 
amazing what turned up out of all sorts of corners and how 
resourceful people became in finding out every usable 
material. We remember how for some time wool ran short; 
seek and ye shall find ! Some appeared from abroad in 
defiance of England's threats, whether openly or secretly 
and with or without a gift in return, but much more sneaked 
out of our own coffers and bales. We thought for a long 
time, and perhaps still think, that copper would run short. 
Hence we began to notice for the first time that there was 
copper everywhere that could be taken and recast. When-
ever a material was lacking people looked for or invented a 
substitute. We still do not know what new discoveries and 
contrivances will come permanently into use in consequence 
of the needs of this war, but hardly any part of its history 
will subsequently be so interesting as this. Just as a 
hundred years ago beet sugar and continental cotton 
printing were introduced on the isolated continent in 
consequence of the English continental blockade in the 
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time of Napoleon, so an industrial resourcefulness will date 
from the time of this Central European war of ours, which 
will make us much more independent than before. This 
school to which we have been forcibly sent is strict and 
arduous but yet useful and beneficial. We are learning to 
stand on our own feet in international commerce. Neither 
England nor France are learning this ; this school is our 
privilege the silver lining to our cloud; it constitutes 
a special' Central European experience. Together we have 
accomplished something remarkable, not only from a 
military but also from an economic point of view. This is 
the introduction to the joint economic organisation we are 
going to have in the future. We shall energe from the war, 
whether we wish it or not, like boys who have sat together 
on the same bench in school. From Hamburg to Trieste 
and Fiume our economic designs have been forced m a like 
direction : a system of storage and a system of adaptability 
with a view to independence ! 
* * * * * * 
We may be allowed to enter somewhat more closely into 
our important economic experience during the war, even if 
it apparently leads us away from the Central European 
question. It will be seen later that we have not thereby 
forgotten the object of our work. In this connection we 
shall speak first more fully of the experiences of the German 
Empire, assuming that they apply in their degree to Austria 
and Hungary. 
The English war of exclusion was based on ideas that 
were correct according to the figures, but were inorganic. 
That is to say : the individual economic events were looked 
at in isolation, but not thoroughly grasped as simultaneous 
and reciprocal in effect. The following principles are correct: 
(a) If a nation suffers a serious and rapidly effective 
deprivation of raw material and markets owing to its 
exclusion from international commerce, violent disturbances 
and economic catastrophes must occur in it. 
(b) If a nation is deprived of about one-sixth of its 
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accustomed food-supply, and a much greater proportion of 
its fodder, scarcity, dearness and famine are inevitable 
amongst the poorer classes. 
(c) If a nation is obliged to send a twelfth or a tenth 
part of its population away from their civil occupations into 
military service, all trades and all equilibrium between 
interdependent stages of work will be so disturbed that 
economic chaos will supervene in proportion as industrialism 
was developed. 
Thus the German economic system ought to have crumbled 
up in three directions at once : want of supplies and markets, 
want of food-stuffs and want of work. And indeed we 
watched these three dangers drawing near like grey clouds 
in the sky. I can think of many meetings and discussions 
in August and September 1914, in which people tried to 
devise precautions against the expected state of distress. 
We counted on much more disturbance and poverty than 
subsequently occurred. To our delighted surprise all these 
matters settled themselves much more readily than we 
could have expected because one need cured another. 
If we suppose that we had suffered an economic exclusion 
from international trade without having war at the same 
time (it is merely a theoretical supposition, since exclusion 
would at once force us to declare war), it will be admitted 
that we should have had all our working ability sitting at 
home and no systematic imports or exports—it would have 
been intolerable ! That would be the most serious economic 
crisis that can be imagined. But since the disturbance of 
trade happened simultaneously with the summoning of men 
to the army, something took place which, to use an expression 
borrowed from Leibniz, may be described as " pre-established 
harmony," as a providential arrangement; for the curve 
of men called up and the curve of loss of work mutually 
counteracted one another. That need not have been so, 
but it was so. 
If we suppose, further, that we had suffered the depriva-
tion of food-supplies under the laws of peace time, it would 
probably have led to the most extreme scarcity, usury and 
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hunger riots. But since martial law was in force it was 
possible to carry out in a few months a policy which would 
otherwise have needed a lifetime of discussions : the declara-
tion that all necessary stocks were State property, and the 
substitution of public officials and Government companies 
for private trade. State Socialism made giant strides 
forward in a single night. Before the war it was axiomatic 
that, " I can do what I like with my own potatoes." Now 
this axiom holds : " Your potatoes are our potatoes." We 
do not yet know how it will run after the war. The old 
state of things will certainly not come back again entirely 
since the beneficial possibilities of the concept of State 
Socialism have become too obvious, and since we shall keep 
in mind the economic experiences of the war. 
But all this involved an unheard-of labour of organisation, 
for the balance between the calling up to the army and 
the decreasing employment did not come about of itself, 
and the taking over of raw material and food-stuffs by 
the War Purchase Companies and the War Corn or Potato 
Companies was and is still no small trouble. In peace 
time Government Offices would have been very timid 
about both measures, but as it was they had to attack 
the work with half the usual official staff and it was a 
success. They would have been much less successful in 
peace time for then every one would have presumed upon 
his accustomed rights, but the war conferred undreamed-of 
powers : you must, you ought, you can ! A willing people 
with an economic dictatorship voluntarily endured, can do 
infinite things. The dictatorship was incomplete, for here 
too previous mobilisation was lacking, but it became effective 
by degrees. What we see around us is certainly not exactly 
what, in Karl Marx's phrase, is termed " the Dictatorship of 
the Proletariat," but we are yet reminded of the expression 
in some respects : a step towards socialism under the leader-
ship of the Government ! It is an economic dictatorship of 
Government Offices advised and supported by those most 
nearly affected. 
$ ^ * * * $ 
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The great and unusual changes in the economic system 
during the war were accomplished, notwithstanding all 
unavoidable friction, with comparative ease, which would 
not have happened if there had not been a remarkable 
mobility of money and labour. Neither was taken for 
granted at the outset, either by the calculating English or 
by the many anxious Germans. We had, almost without 
exception, no adequate idea of the demands of a modern 
war. We only now know what masses of material it 
recklessly swallows up each day. It uses much more than 
even the boldest imaginations had supposed, much more 
munitions, weapons, artillery, horses, wagons, motor-cars, 
tires, cement, wood, corrugated iron, wire, leather, clothing 
material, chemicals, field-glasses, cooking apparatus, jams 
and a hundred other things, which hardly any one had pre-
viously thought of as needed by an army. The Army 
became the most important purchaser and orderer. Like a 
giant turtle rising out of the water this enormous purchaser 
climbed up in a few months and replaced the lost foreign 
customers. Milliards were lacking in commerce, but mil-
liards were paid out in compensation by the military officials. 
Money flowed in. Even if it flowed in rather unsystemati-
cally at times, yet the main point, from the economic point 
of view, is that it did flow. Only in a few trades was there a 
complete stoppage, in many more we experienced obstacles, 
rearrangements, half-time, in not a few there was high pres-
sure with night work, overtime, high wages and great, some-
times excessive profits. The home country became, so to 
speak, one large factory for the war. The war was the con-
tinuation of the national economic system. The wheels 
rolled onwards. 
It was thus that we first fully learnt the meaning of the 
words " national economics." We had frequently had it 
on our lips when we said that national economics stood 
between private economics and international economics. 
But apart from tariff questions and socio-political laws, the 
peculiarity of national economics as such, the supremacy of 
national economic ideas had not yet entered into our heads. 
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People suspected indeed that in between private economics 
and international economics there existed a special and 
peculiar principle of organisation, but had not yet worked 
it out really definitely : the economic maintenance of the 
State. The State needed first to fight for its life before it 
could attain mighty independence and make itself at once the 
purpose and the director of the whole process of production. 
That we Germans have glided into this State Socialism, 
or into this national economic business (for that is strictly 
what it is), as if it had always been our natural habit—that 
is what we have learnt about ourselves during this war. 
When we emerge from the war we shall no longer be the same 
economic beings as before. The period of essential indi-
vidualism, the period of imitation of the already declining 
English economic system is thus gone by, but so also is the 
period of an internationalism boldly looking beyond the 
existing State. By reason of our experiences during the war 
we demand an ordered economic system : the regulation of 
production from the standpoint of political necessity. 
Similar impulses will indeed show themselves independently 
in the world amongst other nations, even amongst the 
English, but with us, in our isolated State, they have matured 
more than anywhere else. We brought to it the German 
spirit of organisation described above, and the war has 
wrought it into permanence. This is an occurrence of the 
first importance in international economics, and it will 
probably be much better and more clearly understood in its 
far-reaching significance by later generations than by us 
who have first experienced it. 
There is in this a certain reconciliation between the 
economic conception of national citizenship and that of 
socialism. Even before the war we knew that the opposi-
tion was decreasing, since producers were organising them-
selves and workers were carrying out a strong and realistic 
trade-union policy within the existing State. Even before 
the war the theories of both sides were further separated than 
their practice. But now the practice of war has accom-
plished a notable work : the dispute about the management 
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of labour and the produce of labour continues, but the process 
of labour itself is grasped, above all during the war, as 
above party and of common interest: we are a nation, 
and have learnt and discovered our national economics iri 
the midst of a world of enemies and in an economic prison 
This will remain as a background for everything that may 
befall later on. 
* * * * * * 
But the State, when it appears thus as a giant customer, 
needs much money which cannot be obtained from abroad! 
From the outset Havenstein, the Director of the Reichsbank, 
as General of Finance, took his place by the side of State 
Secretary Delbrück, the General of Administration. These 
two men have become historical figures just as much as 
Hindenburg and Mackensen. Had it not been for their 
work much trouble would have been wasted. Havenstein has 
enabled the German Empire to raise the loans of milliards 
and thus kept the war going effectively. And this he has 
accomplished without a moratorium, that is without per-
mitting financial uncertainty, and without giving up the 
principle of a gold cover against note issue. He issued 
money in the first instance before drawing it in again as a 
loan. He issued it in the self-contained commercial State 
where it could not be lost to the nation. These loans would 
have been inconceivable without the war, for then the 
increased capital would have passed into buildings, 
machinery, fresh enterprises or foreign investments. But 
now that there were hardly any new enterprises, these loans 
proved the only salvation of a capitalism that would other-
wise have been ruined. Havenstein's financial policy saved 
it and the Fatherland at the same time. And meanwhile, 
under the auspices of the Imperial Home Office the capitalism 
and industrialism thus supported by the State was con-
strained into stable paths and trained to efficient political 
assistance. State Secretary Delbrück succeeded in forming 
a national economic War State out of the individualistic 
economic Peace State without dispensing with the parlia-
mentary system, and in laying the foundation lines of an 
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economic system which will have much broader results than 
the majority of people dream of to-day. When our troops 
return home they will find another Germany, but they 
themselves will in the interval have experienced the life and 
death socialism of war, so that what they find will seem to 
them like their own flesh and blood. 
But whilst we keep up our military power in this way by 
loans and organisation, we burden the future with far-
reaching obligations, with the duty of passing over from a 
war organisation to an orderly condition of peace and with 
the duty of beginning a policy of finance and of taxation 
which will discover a way out of the debt. Both tasks are 
in close connection with one another, as the veriest outsider 
will admit. We will begin the discussion of these connected 
duties with the financial side. 
No one yet knows how great our Imperial debt will be at 
the end of the war, and whether and to what extent the 
payment of war indemnities may be counted upon. Owing 
to this uncertainty we avoid any estimate in figures. So 
much is, however, certain : that we shall have to raise a 
very large sum which cannot be met by a rise in the existing 
taxes. Every form of taxation carries its own limits 
within itself. In the past time before the war I calculated 
that the wealthy classes paid down, in various ways, one-
sixth of their incomes to Empire, State and Commune. 
There were local differences, but prolonged observation has 
convinced me of the truth of a South German banker's 
remark : " We work for the State for two months in the 
year ! " In like manner I calculate that a man living on 
his wages also gives, in the form of direct and more especially 
of indirect taxes, about one-sixth of his income to the 
State (and also to the classes assisted by the national tariff 
policy). Owing to these already existing imposts on pro-
duction both sections are sensitive to any new burdens 
imposed in the old forms. New methods of taxation must 
be sought for, if the burden of the war (loans, new con-
structions, payments to invalids, pensions) are to be met. 
This is an occasion when the financial obligations arising 
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out of the war must lead to fresh organisation. The new 
phenomenon which gives warning of its approach may be 
called either a State industrial monopoly or the taxation of 
syndicates, but these are in essence only two different 
expressions for the same thing. 
* * * * * . * 
Forty years ago when socialist problems made their 
appearance there were three kinds of theoretical socialism : 
State Socialism, Producers' Socialism and Workers' Socialism. 
State Socialism was the concept of taking over a larger 
section of industrial life into direct State control, after the 
manner of the nationalised railways and post office, and in 
this way of meeting the financial requirements of the State. 
Producers' Socialism was the concept of creating a self-
administrating and self-governing body out of the property-
owning and industrial classes by combining the great 
industrial and agricultural federations, and thus reducing 
mutual competition. 
Workers' Socialism was the idea of weakening the authority 
of the employers by combinations of both the upper and the 
lower labour forces and of the consumers, and of a transition 
to self-government by the working masses, and thus securing 
for the workers the employers' profits. 
Each of these three forms has made progress, but no one 
of them alone has become the determinative basis of the 
period. The air has been full of attempts at organisation 
without any final general concept of this development 
emerging. It can only be said that a more complete victory 
of any one of the normal types appeared out of the ques-
tion. But in the meanwhile intermediate forms made their 
appearance, which combined two or even all three of the 
basal ideas : combined management, communal joint-stock 
companies, State syndicates, tariff union enterprises, public 
management with private shareholders and employees 
resembling officials. All this seemed to those not concerned 
therein to be very complex and hard to understand, but to 
those in the midst of things it all soon became quite easily 
managed and practicable. Almost all the big town councils 
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started enterprises in combined management, gas and 
electricity works, tramways, slaughter-houses, companies for 
workmen's dwellings, in which communal socialism appeared 
as a pioneer in future methods of business arrangement. 
The best known of these enterprises is the alkali monopoly, 
with its imperial protection, imperial compulsion and work-
man's insurance. The correctness of its policy in details is 
much disputed, but the constructive idea underlying it has 
already been recognised as a new basal form. When the 
petroleum monopoly was under consideration people went 
back to a similar train of reasoning. The State does not 
thereby become a monopolist pure and simple, but it holds 
a decisive number of shares and controls its portion and also 
the terms of payment for employees and workpeople. An 
arrangement of this sort has the value of a new invention 
in national economic machinery, which may perhaps be 
compared to the invention of balloons. The apparatus of 
aeronautics also resulted from a combination of different 
existing models and technical expedients. We shall not 
assert that the social problem is " solved " by the combined 
types of management of State joint-stock companies or 
State syndicates, but it will be admitted that herein is 
proclaimed something that has been demanded through long 
decades. This roughly was the position before the war. 
And the war has matured these beginnings. 
Now for the time the war freed us from all the control of 
theoretical principles and forced us to organise solely for 
practical ends. And it immediately became evident that 
Government, producers' syndicates and workmens' trade 
unions are only organs of a common system of life, of the 
economic nation. In order to carry out the immense tasks 
of war economics all the usual dogmatism had to be thrown 
aside and people had to see how the most effective type of 
administration might be established with the peaceable and 
active participation of all required energies. Much has been 
left indefinite during the process, in particular guarantees to 
workers and employees in the combined management of 
national economic enterprises, but the different State joint-
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stock companies for war purchase, for military supplies, 
for food administration embody evident future develop-
ments. They are present to the minds of those who have 
to approach the new financial problems. 
* * * * * * 
To put it briefly and in a way generally comprehensible : 
financial policy after the war must rest mainly upon State 
syndicates combined with guarantees for workpeople. The 
latter are an essential constituent, without which the State 
syndicate would become an instrument of class government, 
and without which no parliamentary majority in its favour 
could be secured or maintained. For our existing popula-
tion a monopoly without systematic limitation of its abso-
lute control over its workpeople constitutes an intolerable 
menace to personal freedom and to that standard of fife 
which it will be difficult enough to maintain in face of the 
rise in prices that will probably continue after the war. 
Financially the State syndicate involves the imposition of 
a tax obligation upon an industrial association which 
receives in compensation the right to be the only one of its 
kind. To illustrate from the case of the alcohol syndicate : 
the State does not of itself devise new taxes on pro-
duction or manufacture, but requires the management of 
the syndicate to produce the required millions in what-
ever way they think wise commercially. The producers 
and manufacturers who do not at present belong to 
the syndicate have to adapt themselves to its assess-
ment, which supplies a very strong motive for joining 
it. Should this syndicate, based upon a politically favoured 
voluntarism, break down or for any reason be discontinued, 
a Government tax on the quantities sold or manufactured 
will be enforced, which prospect conduces greatly to the 
maintenance of the syndicate. The settlement of prices 
and the methods of sale are the concerns of the syndicate, 
but the State possesses a very simple remedy in case of 
excess or of neglect of the workmen's guarantees : it can 
alter the tax if required as educational pressure. This is 
the easiest way for the State to secure simultaneously money 
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and commercial pliancy. The State money will be 
abstracted during the process of production before it has 
become private money. Milliards must be raised somehow, 
and consequently the national economic system must be 
burdened somehow and at some place. Wealth must 
unquestionably be withdrawn, the only problem is by what 
method. The method here indicated has the immense 
advantage over all other conceivable ones in that it makes 
for commercial and technical concentration and improve-
ment. The self-interest of producers' associations is made 
to serve the interests of the State. 
The scheme for this method of supplying the much 
increasing needs of the State can only be completely matured 
in practice, and will take different forms for different 
industries. Alcohol exists under different conditions from 
sugar, sugar under different ones from iron and steel, and 
steel again under different ones from coal or yarn or cement. 
It can only be determined step by step which branches of 
industry will come in question. The general principle is : 
the more an industry lends itself to the formation of syndi-
cates the more suitable it is for State participation. 
This train of thought will inevitably provoke much 
contradiction and many doubts at the outset, but it will 
probably meet with no serious opposition from amongst the 
directors of the existing syndicates since through it, in the 
first instance, they themselves were firmly established. 
Now they are already not merely the deputies of their 
shareholders, but at the same time managers and governors 
of their departments of the national economic system. 
According to our reasoning, this will be politically recognised, 
and it will on the other hand be recognised that the workers, 
through their unions, are to be represented on the managing 
and financial bodies. The process of evolution moves of itself 
in the direction indicated, only it would all have taken much 
longer if it had not been accelerated by the financial need 
of the State. The war has made all sections of the nation 
much more docile about violent transformations and political 
necessities. Now an important step may easily be taken 
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and—what else could we do ? We ask each one who objects 
to this sort of scheme, from reasons and hesitations which are 
in themselves justified, how he himself thinks of obtaining 
the milliards. Mere criticism avails nothing at all. 
* * * * * * 
In addition to financial motives a second great impelling 
force in the same direction is the necessity for a State system 
of storage. 
Hitherto we have luckily been able to surmount the 
English blockade policy by means of existing private 
economic stores, but this basis is much too insecure for 
future war anxieties. When the war is over we shall plan 
a State storehouse, or one controlled by the State, for the 
most necessary materials. This may already be described 
as a national demand without distinction of party. But 
this storage policy is essentially an interference with the 
individualistic economic system, for it means that in future 
prices will not determine themselves according to supply 
and demand in the old sense, but will be liable to influence 
in an upward or downward direction through the State 
storehouse. This applies to all departments. The State, 
by holding an available reserve of copper, caoutchouc or 
saltpetre or wool becomes at once a factor in the market, an 
agent in the processes of exchange. Preparation for an eco-
nomic war thus leads here also to a kind of State socialism, and 
that of a very obscure and unexplored kind. As a rule the 
plan will not, for practical reasons, lead to an undisturbed 
store of material, but rather to larger trade reserves than are 
necessary for the purposes of a purely private commercial 
system. The attempt to establish the petroleum monopoly 
was an easily understood example : either the petroleum 
trade increases its reserve stock or the State establishes its 
own storehouse with authority to trade. Practically no 
material will bear storage for ten years, so that any one who 
has a stock must carry on sales. In a word, storage policy 
thus includes much more than appears at first sight: State 
commercial policy. 
JOINT PROBLEMS IN WAR ECONOMICS 163 
Storage obligations must be laid upon the syndicates on 
behalf of the State in addition to the financial obligations 
referred to above, and State commercial management or a 
State commercial monopoly must be introduced for such 
objects of commerce as are not in the hands of a syndicate 
or cannot easily be so controlled. This applies primarily to 
food-supplies and fodder. Here the Government and the 
representatives of the people are called upon to make 
decisions. 
The elder ones among us still remember very well the 
time, about twenty years ago, when the " Kanitz proposal " 
was occupying all the agricultural conferences. It was the 
idea of a State monopoly of foreign trade in corn. At that 
time these endeavours arose from the desire to keep the 
price of corn, with the help of legislation, at the definite 
height desired by the farmers. The prices demanded then 
have now long since become very low. But in those days 
there was, in fact, much more dispute over the amount of 
the price than over the principle itself. The latter, indeed, 
might be opposed from the Liberal, but hardly from the 
Socialist standpoint. However, the Social Democrats treated 
the affair at the time almost entirely as a temporary ques-
tion of price. Thus it came about that the Kanitz proposal 
was dropped, and was replaced by a strong and successful 
agrarian tariff agitation. Now all these already half for-
gotten quarrels are being revived, but with respect to the 
storage policy. The old debates are taken up again with 
fresh vigour under the new conditions. It is a difficult task 
to propfiesy anything as to the result of these discussions. 
A useful proposal often breaks down for incidental reasons. 
But at bottom the matter stands thus : if an automatic 
method of determining prices is agreed upon as between 
agrarians and Social Democrats, there will be nothing left 
for the rest of us but to help to establish the contrivance, 
or at least not to obstruct the State corn warehouse. 
This is essentially an outcome of the war. We shall 
remain politically unquiet until we possess it. " National 
economics " demands it as a necessity of State, in order to 
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make future wars of starvation impossible. Perhaps this is 
the greatest interference with private economic enterprise 
which will be introduced owing to the war, but here too 
we may ask : how could we possibly do anything else so 
as to avoid future anxiety about starvation ? 
Of course this is only a very fragmentary discussion of 
the abundance of economic problems connected with the 
end of the war. The transition from war to peace forms a 
chapter in itself, and might give all statesmen much to think 
over even to-day, although such thoughts run the risk of 
entangling themselves in false anxieties and expectations 
like a boat among reeds. It will be best to try to pick out 
the elements of certainty first of all. 
For our economic system the end of the war will mean 
I the draining out and emptying of all stocks of imports and 
materials, and consequently at the same time an unnatural 
abundance of some (not indeed of very many) export stocks 
in such industries as have wished to employ their machinery 
and their remaining workpeople without being able to join 
in the war industries. Hence it follows that there will be 
a great stimulus to the import trade, especially by sea, 
combined with insufficient facilities for transport, a fight 
for ship space and dock berths, a strained and heightened 
condition of commercial life with excessive prices, unless 
opportune regulation is introduced in this department. 
Hamburg, which has grown unnaturally quiet during the 
war, will be reanimated, but will need prudence meanwhile, 
like an invalid when he first leaves the hospital. The same 
thing will apply to Trieste and the other ports. And also 
to the Rhine navigation. 
Further, the end of the war will mean at the outset an 
immediate replenishing of the military stores that have now 
become empty, since in all human probability peace will 
come upon the world slowly, and not without renewed 
risks of complications. As formerly at the Vienna Congress, 
and recently at the London Conference at the end of the 
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Balkan Wars, the international position will remain very 
insecure, just as rubbish still glows after a fire when the 
big flames have been extinguished. That is to say, more 
loans and more war industries and works of restoration will 
follow the war immediately, without its being possible to 
count on any long continuance of these renovation industries. 
The return of the soldiers to civil life at the end of the 
war will bring not only joy but also much trouble. Only a 
portion of the number returning will readily find their old 
posts again. The women will frequently be driven out of 
the occupations which they have taken over in the interval, 
small businesses, unfortunately, will have in part disap-
peared, and the question of unemployment may result in 
calamity after the war if there is any unwisely rapid breaking 
up of war formations. This need not be so, but it will be if 
mistakes are made or if there is a lack of precaution. 
The money market will be pulled hither and thither in a 
thoroughly embarrassing manner, for the imposing unity of 
the war loan system will be cut across by a formerly unknown 
demand for private credit for which at first all basis will 
be lacking, since all savings have been absorbed into war 
and communal loans. Moreover, the filling of the stores 
of which we speak will require money, and indeed the 
exportation of money abroad, because imports will begin to 
flow again earlier and more extensively than exports. We 
may have to endure unaccustomed fluctuations in values, 
but not we alone. The whole of the international money 
market will be like a storm-tossed sea, and many businesses 
which are still holding on during the war will be carried off 
like wreckage on the waves. 
It is to be supposed that the war will conclude with a 
big rise of prices in all departments, in the midst of which 
legal maximum prices for important supplies could only be 
maintained by sacrifices from the State Treasury. All the 
accustomed international price standards will be in doubt 
and must be settled afresh. Thus there will be possibilities 
of great profits and losses, and especially a very painful 
interval of social struggles, until prices, wages and salaries 
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have again found a tolerable mutual relationship. Immense 
problems will confront the producers' federations and the 
trade unions during this period. The demand for housing 
too will be more disturbed than during the war, as soon as 
the war subsidies and the contributions of the .big munici-
palities cease. 
We do not specify all this in order to spread fear and 
anxiety, but only to show for what reasons that trend 
towards State Socialism which we have described will 
outlast the war. A nation that has fought through a 
war of such unheard-of difficulty so remarkably will not 
be beaten by problems of this kind. It only needs 
to learn in due course that the war organisation with 
all, or at least with many, of its consequences must 
be continued through the peace preliminaries. When the 
doors of the economic prison are opened, the prisoner needs 
a careful diet lest he should be more upset by freedom than 
by his imprisonment. 
In other words, the social struggle for existence, which is 
now restrained by general consent and regard for the party 
truce, must wait somewhat longer before it can take its 
course with its old licence. This is unpleasant hearing for 
all the discontented citizens of every camp and party, for 
they have already collected material for the day when they 
can attack one another after the old fashion. But here, too, 
reason will remain victorious over the passion, in other 
respects justified, for individual interests. And thus the 
period after the war, between imprisonment and freedom, 
and before the dawn of a new future, will perhaps prove of 
especial fruitfulness in efforts of value for the promotion 
of mutual understanding. In this connection I am think-
ing of the question, repeatedly raised, of public labour 
exchanges, advised and controlled by representatives of 
those concerned, of a more settled arrangement for suitable 
arbitration procedure in wages disputes, of the organisation 
of house-owners and tenants, of a closer fusion of hitherto 
competing professional representative bodies. All this must 
not be entered upon for the sake of a social theory, for 
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under the circumstances no one has time or mind for 
academic reforms, but in all probability the thing will in 
practice arise of itself out of the peace difficulties. The 
social harvest of the war will be reaped while the party 
truce is still half maintained, until such time as the political 
heaven becomes so far clear that we can, without risk or 
injury, begin anew to quarrel, as belongs to a healthy condi-
tion of body and soul. 
* * * * * * 
When, however, we re-enter the system of world-eco-
nomics after the war, we shall have been markedly changed 
in the interval by the pressure of our enemies. A much 
more compact, self-contained whole has developed out of 
our many-sided German system. We a 11 think much 
more in terms of State economy and buy and sell much 
more as a whole ; for it is obvious that State syndicates 
and State monopolies with regular guarantees for the 
workpeople work differently from mere competing private 
traders. Of course all this applies only to those parts 
of the German economic system which are suited to union. 
The manufacturers of finished goods are, as it is, less 
affected by the change, and amongst the small farmers 
house and farm will be found faithfully kept going by wife 
and children. The small trader, in so far as he returns 
home safely, remains as he is, and seeks his own markets in 
the usual way. Above all, the aspect of German foreign 
trade will be changed if the country comes forward as 
buyer and seller in the world's market in a much more 
compact shape in respect to many raw products. Foreigners 
will talk even more than before about German economic 
militarism, but we are convinced that the enforced transfor-
mation of the war period will not suit us badly. The 
organised economic State will be strongest when the organisa-
tion is able to go on living on itself. But it is just this 
which we believe we have learnt to accomplish in virtue of 
our wartime experiences. 
Of course it is not certain that all these very complicated 
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problems will be solved exactly as we have briefly indicated 
here. There are numerous byways and variations. But 
in essence our account is probably correct. What we have 
described in the previous section as the German peculiarity, 
the vigorous and living organisability, will be immensely 
increased by the war. We shall appear on the scene as 
economically even more German than before. We shall 
do this whether we are alone or in partnership with Austria-
Hungary. 
But it is a question and anxiety for Austria and Hungary 
whether or no they desire and are able to tread this path 
with us. This is their problem. 
* * * * * * 
What has Austria-Hungary accomplished during the war 
in the economic sphere ? 
The first answer is as follows : Here too things have 
gone much easier and better than could have been expected. 
Austria and Hungary have had their very great racial 
difficulties, but as far as the economic position is concerned 
special distress has only appeared in districts directly 
affected by the war. The sufferings that we have gone 
through in the parts of East Prussia that have been occupied 
by the Russians have lasted much longer in the case of 
Galicia and have affected a much wider area of country. 
Moreover, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, so far as can be 
learnt, the disturbances due to the war are not inconsiderable. 
None of this is as bad as what the French are enduring in 
the districts occupied by the German troops—although as 
a matter of course the Germans have shown much more 
forbearance in respect to the economic conditions in Northern 
France than the Russians did in Galicia—for in North 
France there has been at least a year's produce lost in 
agriculture and very considerable industrial losses in the 
French economic system. But still the Austrian economic 
injuries are not small, and the recovery from them consti-
tutes a very difficult war problem. In addition to the 
financial problems which are in any case bound up with 
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the wax, there will be the remaking of the destroyed roads, 
fortifications, public buildings, schools, churches, and the 
assistance needed by the population in country and town 
when they take up their systematic occupations again. 
Already in the wake of the advancing army precautions are 
taken and attempts made to help where possible, but it is 
doubtful how far this can go on, because the distribution 
of the burden of renewal cannot be definitely settled from 
the outset. Who will have to pay ? Galicia or Austria or 
Austria-Hungary ? Here already we come upon the con-
sideration which we regard as a main problem for the allied 
States, and which crops up in the most varied directions : 
Are we concerned with a single economic State or with two 
or with several ? 
When the German Empire was founded, the desire to 
establish an economic entity was a principal object through-
out the whole historic movement. It is only necessary to 
look in the Constitution of the North German Confedera-
tion and in the German Imperial Constitution based 
upon it, at the careful enumeration of the departments 
reserved for Imperial legislation, in order to realise how 
deliberately everything economic, with the exception of 
purely agrarian legislation, was made the business of the 
Empire. The economic federation was formed out of the 
Customs Union. Hence in individual cases it was left for 
future consideration, how far the Imperial legislature should 
take over the regulation of trade, industry, financial law, 
the bourse, patents, social policy and the prevention of 
adulteration, but the right to legislate on all these matters 
was firmly established, and we have seen how very exten-
sively this right was put into practice during the next forty 
years. In any doubtful case the Empire is competent to act 
if it desires to do so ; only the enforcement and the adminis-
tration appertain to the federated States. But no such 
economic unity exists in the Dual Monarchy of Austria-
Hungary, nor was it intended, but on the contrary until 
now it has been expressly excluded by the fundamental 
law of December 21, 1867, concerning the constitutional 
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Ausgleich. The true position of the matter is sufficiently well 
known in Austria and Hungary, but must be emphasised 
for readers in the German Empire, because they are often 
inclined to apply Imperial German conditions to Austria-
Hungary without further ceremony. 
For the case immediately in point this means that accord-
ing to the theory of State rights and the legal position, both 
States, it is true, following the provisions of the existing 
settlement, are answerable for their joint possession of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but not in like manner for Galicia. 
The chief burden of Galicia rests on the kingdoms and lands 
represented in the Reichsrat. But this burden may still 
give rise to complicated discussions, if say at the end of the 
war a fresh section of land that had hitherto been Russo-
Polish were added to the rest of the monarchy. Who will 
then be liable for its financial equipment ? Will it be the 
Polish districts themselves, and will they be capable of it ? 
Will it be Austria ? Will it be the whole monarchy ? 
* * * * * * 
In the fundamental law of 1867 the unity of Austro-
Hungarian economic policy is declared in so fax as it 
relates to politico-commercial representation abroad, and 
the principle of equality is kept in view with regard to 
tariffs, indirect taxes, the monetary system and the con-
struction of such railways as affect the interests of both 
halves of the Empire. That is al l ! There is no joint 
economic legislation, no department corresponding to our 
Imperial Department for Home Affairs. Hence too there 
is no joint war economic system. 
This division of the economic life into two is most obvious 
in regard to the question of food-supply. Austria was 
approximately in the position of Western Germany : it 
needed to import corn ; Hungary was and is the fortunate 
possessor of a surplus of corn. To an ingenuous mind 
nothing seems more obvious than that a compensatory 
arrangement, similar to that which exists in the German 
Empire between districts with a surplus and districts with 
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a demand, will be found also throughout the territory of 
the belligerent Danube Monarchy. But deference to State 
rights produced a different position. Without being sepa-
rated from Austria by tariff barriers Hungary has and carries 
on in the midst of the war its own policy in regard to corn, 
its own maximum prices, its own railway management, and 
the effect is indeed almost as though two foreign States were 
negotiating together. This situation is aggravated by the 
fact that any possible Roumanian supplies can only reach 
Vienna by way of Hungary. During the joint war Austria 
is kept in sensible dependence upon Hungary. There is no 
object in moralising about this ; the Hungarians are doubt-
less right in theory, they insist on their bond. They have 
always, even in doubtful cases, advocated a special Hungarian 
economic State, and are only keeping up in war time their 
conviction and custom on other occasions. But the economic 
union in war time is not a part of the Ausgleich of 1867. 
People are shedding their blood together and yet the corn 
prices in selling Budapest are intentionally higher than m 
purchasing Vienna. 
Although an understanding will of course be arrived at 
ultimately, there still remains a difficult question for the 
future. The future preparation for war, of which we have 
already spoken, rests on a complete co-operation between 
military affairs and the national economic system, and hence 
the suppositions at the basis of the Ausgleich of 1867 must 
be re-tested in the light of military preparedness. Here the 
triple organisation of the army will come under considera-
tion, but this we will not discuss at present. The underlying 
idea' in 1867 was a military partnership with economic 
separation, a conception which was very explicable at that 
time, but which in this war has already led to all kinds of 
painful complications, and which will prove still more de-
structive when the future precautionary war-storage system 
is introduced. 
It may, indeed, be admitted as certain that a permanent 
defensive and trench-making alliance between Germany 
and Austria-Hungary will only be possible on the basis of 
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a system of war storage carried out by both sides. I do 
not say a joint storage system, because that is desirable 
but not absolutely necessary. A situation can easily be 
conceived in which two allied States keep then economic 
system separate, but in which, with mutual rights of control, 
they promise and agree what and how much each shall 
store up and hold in readiness. If this latter provision be 
neglected it will be impossible, according to the experiences 
of this war, to conclude any further treaty for mutual 
defence at all. The possibilities arising during the war 
without this are too serious. 
Let us suppose then that in the first instance Austria and 
Hungary make the system of corn storage a subject of 
negotiations in drawing up the renewed Ausgleich, and 
then together come to an arrangement with the storage 
administration of the German Empire. In this case there 
are various conceivable ways of satisfying requirements. 
The starting-point of the discussions in question might be 
a system of Austrian State corn stores, which would collect 
the necessary supplies. After the expiration of the existing 
commercial treaty there is nothing connected with the 
rights of the individual States to prevent Austria from 
taking up, for herself alone, the State purchase of corn, and 
especially since Hungary has continually insisted on the 
economic independence of the two halves of the Empire. 
The system of Austrian State corn stores would in this case 
carry on business with the associated corn merchants in 
Budapest just as with other foreign corn firms, whilst 
Hungary would simultaneously make sure of its own State 
stores in case of war, not a difficult matter for Hungary. 
This position of affairs would be a direct continuation of 
the procedure adopted during the war, but is certainly not 
without difficulty for the partnership of both sections in 
other respects. We are convinced that another solution of 
the problem will be discovered according to which Hungary 
will occupy that central position in the business of providing 
corn for Mid-Europe which corresponds to its agricultural 
strength. But it would seem like interference if we in 
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Germany tried to make proposals about a matter which is, 
in the first instance, the home concern of the Danubian 
Monarchy, however closely we may be interested in the 
results of this very decision. 
* * * * * * 
Nor can the remaining war-storage problems be quite 
decided without going more closely into the problem of the 
Ausgleich between Austria and Hungary. A whole number 
of joint economic regulations have already been taken in 
hand up to the present in virtue of the common tariff and 
the common system of indirect taxation. Such, for example, 
is the State treatment of breweries, brandy distilleries, 
mineral oil works, sugar factories, patents and joint-stock 
companies. In like manner joint superintendence and 
administration will be introduced in the warehouses 
declared necessary for the purposes of the new system of 
war storage. For instance, a copper monopoly or a copper 
syndicate under State influence will be unavoidable as well 
as a caoutchouc and rubber syndicate and State regulation 
of the stores of petroleum. It is impossible to say before-
hand to which materials this method of treatment will be 
extended, nor do we wish to anticipate here the possible 
work of a future Military Economic Commission. We wish 
merely to show, and to indicate the reasons thereof, that in 
Austria-Hungary, just as with us, the effect of the war is 
to transform the economic system. Even should Austria-
Hungary, contrary to our desires, not be united with the 
German Empire in permanent preparedness for war, the 
Danubian Monarchy must still, and more especially indeed 
in this event, in view of its risky geographical position, 
devote the utmost care to plans for war storage. But if, 
as we hope and suppose, the two Central European Powers 
attain to a permanent political union, joint regulation of 
the storage system will have much to recommend it, 
especially for those materials which can either be pro-
duced more extensively or further worked up in one of the 
two Imperial districts, because in this case partnership will 
ensure a wider oversight and more economy. We must set 
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up a Central European War Provision Office as a centre from 
which all the store places shall be established and filled, 
proposed to the several governments and parliaments and 
inspected as to their contents. Thus the beginning of 
a joint economic system will grow up almost of itself and 
of necessity, out of the joint defensive system. This 
economic partnership is not voluntary in its origin, but 
is forced upon us by our history ; it is no theoretical 
academical demand but is a practical precept, and its chief 
supporters must be the Ministers of War on both sides. 
* * * * * * 
But probably the further development of the financial 
question in Austria-Hungary will be of even greater import-
ance for the future interrelations of the two Empires now 
allied in the war. On the whole the condition of finance in 
the Danubian Monarchy during the war has been better than 
was expected. Our general statement that the Austro-
Hungarian economic system had sustained the war remark-
ably well, applies especially to monetary matters. The 
loans in both Austria and Hungary have aroused surprise 
at home and abroad, and, considering the conditions of life, 
have been as much an economic victory as those in the 
German Empire. The Dual Monarchy has sufficient capital 
and also procures enough milliards for public purposes during 
the war. One difference consists in the fact that as a 
matter of course the system of a gold cover was less strictly 
enforced than in Germany, and that hardly any gold was in 
the hands of the population, for Austria-Hungary had 
previously withdrawn the gold from circulation or had 
never issued it. Consequently the reserve was necessarily 
smaller, which expressed itself in a sharp fall in the foreign 
exchange value of the bank-note. We also have had our 
exchange difficulties, for we need only go to Switzerland or 
Holland to find out at once that a German hundred mark 
note is no longer worth the same as before the war. But 
in the judgment of all the experts the decline in the value 
of our bank-note is only temporary, and is due to the fact 
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that we keep back our gold whilst we import much more 
from abroad than we export thither, so that a stock of 
German treasury notes that are difficult to dispose of 
collects on the other side of the frontiers. After the war our 
renewed exports will be paid for with them, and also the 
interest, which will again be payable, on foreign securities. 
The decline in Austrian values is from its nature more 
serious, since it cannot be explained merely by reason of a 
negative balance of trade due to one-sided displacement, 
but is connected with the question of a gold cover. No 
exact estimate of the quantitative relation between the 
cover in specie and the note issue can be made, and hence 
all these matters are for the present somewhat obscure, but 
the disturbance in the relative values of the paper mark 
and the paper krone is evidence of how the state of affairs 
is conceived of in banking circles. No definite and per-
manent standard exists between the Imperial German 
paper money and that of Austria-Hungary. We shall have 
to consider this point in our investigation into the future 
commercial policy of Mid-Europe, as forming a serious 
obstacle to any economic partnership, here we refer to it in 
the first instance as an Austro-Hungarian economic problem 
that will give much food for thought to the Finance Minister 
over there. 
An adverse exchange signifies amongst other things that 
more must be paid than formerly for debts to foreign 
countries, that less will be obtained from foreign debtors if 
they have to pay in domestic money, that imported goods 
will be made yet dearer owing to the exchange, in addition 
to other general causes, that foreign loans can only be 
raised at great sacrifice. All this will probably make the 
day when international commerce is re-established a very 
critical time for Austria-Hungary. Not that the weakness 
cannot be overcome, but it will not pass without rapid and 
energetic financial operations. The taxable capacity of the 
Dual Monarchy must immediately be called upon in a 
marked degree if a period of congestion is to be surmounted. 
Austria and Hungary must make good the lack of gold, in 
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so far as such a lack exists, by obvious evidence of the 
solvency—based on the products of taxation—of the State 
Treasury. The most severe economic trial will not be felt 
until then, and that will be the very moment when people 
would like to allow those who are returning from the war a 
comfortable interval in which to make themselves at home 
again. 
* * * * * * 
We know up to the present even less of course than in 
the case of the German Empire what forms of taxation will 
be selected by the various financial bodies in the Dual 
Monarchy. Only this much may readily be pointed out: 
that Austria and Hungary like ourselves will be in no 
position to fight shy of new and productive State enterprises 
or State regulated syndicates. There is an instructive little 
book on Osterreichs Finanzen und der Krieg by Hofrat 
' Meisel and Professor Spiethoff (Dunckler und Humblot, 
1915), in which is calculated in a most interesting way 
how many millions could be saved in Austrian finance, if 
Government, parties and nationalities wished to economise. 
We take it for granted that the most vigorous efforts will 
. be made in this direction, but nevertheless, if the war goes on 
for long, there will be a big, new deficit in taxation to over-
come. Taxes on luxuries and expenditure will certainly 
play their part here, but they will not suffice. We cannot 
judge whether or no further types of direct taxation will be 
considered. Certainly, however, in Austria too it will 
finally come to this : the process of conversion into capital 
must be tapped where it is still impersonal. But how can 
this be done, without, as in the Austro-Hungarian taxation 
of shares, directly checking business expansion ? Austria-
Hungary too will at this stage find syndicate questions 
becoming more pressing than, on purely economic grounds, 
they are at present : the most highly concentrated intensi-
fication of industry with a view to solving the financial 
problems of the State ! 
Thus we arrive again at the position already reached in 
the previous section : the transition to the labour tempo 
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and labour methods of the German Empire appears to be a 
condition preliminary to surmounting the financial burdens 
of the war. After the war we shall both need primarily to 
economise and work for a long time with all our energies 
and resources, in order to get free from its consequences. 
The more we do this in partnership the greater will be our 
success. We Germans of the Empire, for all the sufficiently 
adequate reasons cited, must desire for Austria-Hungary the 
greatest conceivable vitality and good management, and 
must do everything that we can with a view to setting our 
comrade in the union upon a stable financial footing. If the 
Austrians and Hungarians wish it, if they desire it and 
demand it, the German financial and organising power must 
be at their service. We say if they wish it, because success 
is otherwise not conceivable. An economic partnership 
accepted unwillingly and suspiciously is pointless, it would 
only prejudice and estrange people. Hence the energies of 
the German Empire ought not to make the offer of them-
selves. That would only arouse or increase the suspicion 
that the Germans wished to get through the period of 
stagnation after the war by means of the Austro-Hungarian 
business, until such time as international commerce was 
admissible in its old form. This suspicious notion is possible 
and indeed exists in certain quarters, and it is on this 
account that I repeat that those of us who are striving after 
an honourable, permanent, economic partnership in Mid-
Europe feel no pleasure when intrusive advisers and specu-
lators wish, forsooth, to use the circumstances of the union 
as a pretext for their selfish interests. Endless harm may 
be done in this matter by those who cannot act tactfully 
and with foresight. But we have confidence that the big 
Imperial banking houses and directors of syndicates will 
grasp the seriousness of the situation and will understand 
what is at stake. No oppression, no intrigue, no self-
interested exploitation of any possibly existent weakness, 
but a frank and honest readiness to answer the call in case 
it sounds ! 
We have sat together in the economic prison, together 
M 
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we will break the chains and go hand in hand into the fresh 
air again. And if all kinds of war infirmities still cling to 
us, we shall help each other so that subsequently even a 
great matter will not trouble us. We shall all have much 
to do, truly very much ! Shall we do it together or shall 
each one act for himself ? 
CHAPTER VI 
OUR POSITION IN T H E W O R L D ' S ECONOMIC 
SYSTEM 
E V E N if Germany and Austria-Hungary fuse themselves into 
an economic unity, they will together make up no great 
structure from the point of view of the world's economic 
system, for all our notions about great and small have 
altered more during the war than in the whole of the previous 
decade. We have seen the giant States rising up to crush 
us. They have not succeeded, but we shall not forget the 
moment when Russia began to move on the West and 
when Great Britain called on her Indians and Canadians. 
The future will be even more concerned with phenomena on 
this grand scale, for the experiences of the European War will 
be studied in all Government Offices all over the world, and 
every Government, even as far as East Asia and Argentina, 
will be impregnated with new conceptions of quantity. It 
will not only be Central Europe that will emerge from the 
war with schemes for equipment and defence, but all the 
other States as well. Even a growing inclination among 
the people towards peace can do little to alter this steady 
preparation for coming wars, for the historical moment 
when mankind will combine into one single immense organi-
sation is still far distant. Before the organisation of 
humanity, the " United States of the World," can come 
into existence, there will probably be a very long period 
during which groups of humanity, reaching beyond the 
dimensions of a nation, will struggle to direct the fates of 
mankind and to secure the product of its labour. Mid-
Europe comes forward as one such group, and that indeed 
a small one : vigorous but lean ! 
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Sovereignty, which formerly was a possession widespread 
amongst the nations of the earth, concentrates itself more 
markedly as time goes on at quite a few places. There 
only remain a limited number of central points amongst 
mankind where government is really exercised: London, 
New York, Moscow (or Petersburg) stand firm. It is still 
doubtful whether or no an East Asiatic world-centre 
will grow up in Japan or China. It is at least very ques-
tionable whether or no India or Africa will ever produce such 
a central point of the first importance. The same thing 
applies to South America. The future significance for 
mankind of any East Asiatic and South American centres 
that may possibly arise is not, however, at present a question 
of practical politics for general history. But, on the other 
hand, the question whether or no a separate centre in 
Mid-Europe can maintain itself between Russia and England 
is even now being fought out with all the energies of Europe 
and with endless bloodshed. The human group Mid-Europe 
is playing for its position in the world. If we lose the 
fight we shall probably be condemned for ever to be a 
satellite nation. If we are half victorious, then we shall be 
obliged to fight again later. If we win a lasting victory we 
shall hghten the task for our children and grandchildren, 
for then Mid-Europe will be entered in the Domesday Book 
of the coming centuries. 
What is meant by a satellite nation in this connection ? 
We might also say a planet State. Such States have then-
own life, their own summer and winter, their culture, their 
anxieties and their splendour, but they no longer follow their 
own laws along the great paths of universal history, but 
add strength to the guiding group to which they belong. 
In this way the United States of North America seek 
gradually to bind to themselves all types of States in North 
and South America, not in order to absorb them but in 
order to direct them. Russia also, though in very different 
fashion, is drawing all the nations within its borders: 
Finns, Poles, Little Russians, the Caucasian races, Armenians, 
Turkomans, Tungusians, etc. So, too, Great Britain sur-
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rounds itself with Africanders, Australians, Indians, Egyp-
tians and Portuguese, and now during the war is even trying 
to include the two Latin nations, France and Italy, in its 
rotation, although they themselves in virtue of past great-
ness and considerable performances would gladly still count 
as individual centres. 
But round about the satellite States there still exists a 
certain mass of unorganised national material, which has 
either not hitherto desired inclusion, or for some reason or 
other has not arrived at i t ; asteroids or comets, which for 
the most part call themselves neutral because they belong 
to no sun. In their way they are a very old political family, 
much older than the conquering super-national syndicate 
States, for they represent the old small middle class in the 
family of nations. But at some time or other each of them 
will be swept away into the satellite relationship, for it 
seems impossible that an ancient small Power should endure 
uninjured through the centuries in the midst of a world of 
concentrated Great Sovereignties of immense bulk. 
All these movements towards organisation are still very 
much in process of becoming. Practically every combina-
tion may reappear as loosened once more or as linked 
up together in another way. And in fact the commercial 
age which has called forth the World-Powers has only 
been actually in existence for a couple of generations, so 
that its effects cannot be in any sense yet determined. The 
period of groups of humanity has not yet arrived, though it 
is already at the door. The same thing applies to them on 
a large scale as applies to industrial syndicates on a small 
scale : the adhesions are still changing continually, but the 
principle of adhesion itself will not die out. Groups of 
humanity will come into being because such new technical 
apparatus as steam-power and electricity cannot work with 
State formations that are still under the influence of earlier 
and now vanished forms of international intercourse. What 
is a territory of half a million square kilometres to-day ? 
It has become a single day's journey. 
* * * * * * 
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But before we discuss the Mid-European group of 
humanity, we shall attempt to grasp the new super-national 
structure in itself with somewhat more sociological accuracy. 
We shall examine then the three great organisms that are 
relatively complete : Great Britain, America, Russia. Each 
of these is more potent in extent and in mass than Mid-
Europe can ever be. In the most favourable event, so far as 
human foresight can tell to-day, Mid-Europe will only be 
the fourth World State. 
Of the three first World States which have already come 
into being during the preceding period, the Russian is based 
mostly on coercion and the American on free-will; England 
stands between the two. No general law can be established 
as to whether the compulsory or the voluntary formation is 
the more permanent and solid, for either principle applied 
to excess will break up the State. Every super-national 
Great State is a work of art, a venture, an experiment daily 
renewed. It is like a great machine which continually 
needs repairs somewhere or other to keep it in working 
order. And as every work of art is determined by the 
artist and the material so the Great State grows out of the 
leading nation and the nations that accompany it, out of 
the ideas and customs of the rulers and the qualities of the 
ruled, out of the ability of great men and the desires of the 
broad masses, out of history, geography, agriculture, manual 
work and technique. 
The psychical character of the Great State ought never 
to be left out of account if its essence is to be grasped. A 
bare, mechanical way of looking at it is absolutely useless. 
The greater and the more educated and the more exacting 
the multitudes to be governed become, the more elasticity 
is required in their management, an elasticity which must 
be passed on as inherited wisdom from generation to genera-
tion. The proper mixture of enforced unity and permitted 
freedom acts magnetically on the satellite portions. But 
no physical or organic comparison can quite express the 
politically formative inner condition, yet this condition 
must be felt in retrospect by any one who ponders in the 
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spirit of a creator over a fresh great formation which is just 
coming into existence. Very many instruments must be 
harmonised together in the super-national Great State, so 
as to keep in unison many opposing human elements. This 
does not come about in accordance with definite formulas, 
and written laws and constitutions too are only a very inade-
quate and incomplete expression of the manifold activity, 
in which daily mistakes must be surpassed by daily 
achievements. 
The Russians, with all their crudity of nature, possess an 
undeniable charm which attracts half-civilised peoples to 
them. We find this magnetic power of the Russian spirit, 
a power hard for us to understand, all along our Eastern 
frontier, amongst all the peoples intermediate between 
Finland and the Balkans, all of whom waver in their senti-
ments as to whether or no they do not prefer the unsys-
tematised Russian in his natural vigour, to the German who 
for them is quite too rational and precise. It is a great 
mistake to explain the Russian influence as entirely due to 
fear of the knout. Fear does form a part of the Government 
machinery of this group of peoples, but not fear alone. 
The Russian can really govern after his fashion, and possesses 
a diplomacy which looks back on a long series of successes. 
Here, to be sure, methods are often employed which pre-
suppose very robust consciences. Gloves are worn but 
they have holes in them. What we despise in the Russians 
is what partly constitutes their vigour, just as on the other 
hand what in us is offensive to the Russians makes up a 
part of our best strength. What we previously termed 
elasticity, with the Russians takes the form of caprice, an 
official despotism softened by corruptibility and humours, 
very comprehensible to populations who would govern in just 
the same way if once they had the command. Half the 
Russian corruption, nay a quarter or a tenth of it, would ruin 
our State, but the Russian organism can stand much, very 
much, as the war shows. Even new revolutionary move-
ments, should they appear, as is very possible, will indeed 
curb the Russian strength for a moment, and will disturb the 
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machinery of government, but according to all historical 
experience they will in no sense mean the end, for they too 
are in keeping with the whole character. 
How differently the Englishman administers his world ! 
He requests, so long as it is possible, instead of commanding. 
His sea and colonial empire, scattered over all parts of the 
earth, is organised quite without system, just as the history 
of each world province and the chance process of its acquisi-
tion has brought it about. Hence monarchical, aristocratic 
and democratic contrivances are employed according to 
requirements and just as seems serviceable, as a ship is 
constructed according to requirements out of iron, wood, 
copper and canvas. The English elasticity consists in this : 
that what we call principles, it regards as working methods, 
an instructive, calm adaptability amongst its leading men, 
combined with an unshakable self-confidence. The un-
systematic character of English Imperialism has often been 
pointed to as a deficiency by theoretical critics among the 
Germans, and people believed that the loosely constructed 
building would break in pieces by reason of the super-
ficiality of the links between its many members. But the 
war has shown, in this case too, that loose threads, when 
they are properly put together, can hold fast. The Empire, 
geographically so varied, spread out on every coast, has 
remained a unity. There may be shocks in India or Egypt, 
and some indications suggest that these will not be altogether 
wanting. But a flexible administrative skill reacts even 
on the entirely foreign races, the subjugated masses of 
the Asiatic and African territories, and always successfully 
postpones again the moment of danger. 
The great American State works in yet another way. It 
is the most non-military great human organism that has 
ever existed. A business State in virtue of a detached 
geographical position and a popularly intelligible doctrine 
of democratic principles. Its strength lies in the truly 
rational division of competence between municipal, county, 
State and Federal governments. The concept of •'majority 
rule prevails everywhere as a matter of course, and justifies 
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itself as State machinery on the whole in spite of all the 
troublesome accessories which must be taken with it as 
part of the bargain. For with an unconditional principle 
of majority rule the formation of a majority becomes a 
profitable business, and thus, according to our feeling, 
commercialism enters much too strongly into politics, makes 
parties into business undertakings and materialises the 
finest ideals. But the American can live politically even 
with these methods of his, for, as we have already said 
elsewhere, he has the voyage across the ocean behind him, 
is a modern utilitarian, and wants above all neat, trans-
parent formulae. He is essentially lacking in political 
mysticism. His State gods too are excessively human. 
He will have no mysterious, moral, joint ego. His morality 
is private, not political. The State is a Clearing House 
for interests. He maintains the State by limiting the 
concept of State. Thus he does not easily arrive at 
serious internal crises, such as are still the order of the day 
in South America. At most these only occur over presi-
dential rivalries. In this case the crisis signifies that one 
clique of business-politicians, with or without an assertion of 
principles, has been thrust out by another. But it does not 
indicate that the State itself is in question, for if it broke 
up to-day, to-morrow it would be set up again in accordance 
with exactly the same simple axioms. 
These groups of humanity are thus no mere administrative 
districts of a homogeneous human society developing 
according to like rules. On the contrary the super-national 
structures possess something in themselves which is inter-
mediate between nation and humanity, a specific essence 
which cannot be taken away from them without danger, 
because it is just this that forms the bond of union between 
the very various constituent elements. 
* * * * * * 
Each of the three old Great States is intrinsically inter-
national. In them is actually expressed as much of the 
international idea as can be realised in the present epoch. 
The international idea was in the first instance religious 
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an heirloom of the Roman Empire surviving in Christianity. 
All Christian ideas, in so far as they are not hampered by 
sectarianism, are directed towards mankind as a whole : 
" G o ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every 
creature ! " But religious unity has not come to pass. 
The Papacy in Rome remains as the incomplete attempt at 
a spiritual union of all the nations on the earth. Christ's 
kingdom on earth is a concept, a prophecy and a prayer 
but no tangible reality. It desired to organise what is 
noblest and highest in man before his material needs could 
be organised. The stupidity of dogmatism, the aspirations 
of nations not satisfied with church membership, the 
geographical separation in earlier centuries, the human nature 
displayed even in the management of the superhuman, all 
these have destroyed Catholic unity. Christ's kingdom has 
become a plurality of creeds. Only a prophetic expectation 
makes itself heard quite softly throughout all creeds, that 
some time, in the wisdom of God, and by different methods 
and fresh energies and in a more materialistic sense, a road 
will be again broken through to that goal which the splendid 
efforts of so many apostles, synods, councils and bishops 
failed to reach. 
Next the international idea became a philosophical 
concept. Almost all great philosophers are in some degree 
cosmopolitan. And under their inspiration literature be-
came impregnated with evidences, small and great, of the 
longing for a universal civilisation, which reached out to the 
goal of evolution across all historical narrownesses. But 
when national struggles became serious and when the spirit 
of nationality was awakened, the philosophers and men of 
letters for the most part took their stand again by the rank 
and file of their nation, as Fichte and Schleiermacher did in 
typical fashion with us Germans. Philosophical teaching, 
free from the churches, could not bring about what the 
Church had failed to accomplish. Like Christianity it 
embodied human desires, but bare abstract thought is too 
delicate and too weak to organise mankind. 
Whilst, however, the philosophical teaching of humanity 
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was still at the height of its influence the international idea 
was adopted by English commerce and spread over the rest 
of the world. The free trade concept comprehended man-
kind in realistic fashion as an immense but yet ultimately 
limited and calculable multitude of working faculties, 
buyers and sellers, and found the purpose of humanity 
in the business of exchange. We have already pointed 
out that the English always regarded themselves as the 
creators and supporters of this internationalism, a fact 
which is bound up with the historical characteristics of 
this commercial type of cosmopolitanism. Moreover, this 
tendency contained very much pure international idealism 
along with its utilitarian theories : a peaceful liberation of 
the nations from political limitations, the repression of 
possibilities of strife, the raising of all through all. The 
results of this process of thought have become quite enormous 
in virtue of the machinery of exchange which set it going and 
accompanies it. There exists to-day in fact a world united 
in the economic sense, a world of steamers, railways, letters 
and telegrams, a world of sewing machines, grain silos, planta-
tions and warehouses. International commerce and divi-
sion of labour are estabhshed amongst the nations. All this 
will return after the interruption due to the war, but not in 
its old unbroken and unreserved character. The war has 
shown that exchange alone is not peace, for it possesses by 
itself no governing and controlling strength, no force to 
compel peace. The old well-established military and admini-
strative States live on within a world of international ex-
change and struggle with all the means at their disposal over 
the profits and the supreme control of the world-machinery. 
Social Democracy took over the concept of inter-
nationalism from middle-class commercial liberalism and 
deepened it essentially in that it sought to make an associa-
tion of mankind for production out of an association of 
mankind for mere exchange. Since it is primarily and in 
origin a proletarian organisation, social democracy possesses 
a highly developed sense of organisation in general, and hence 
has been the first to get a genuine grasp of the organising 
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character of the social epoch which is now dawning. With 
bold, dialectic imagination it enlarged its experiences of 
socialistic organisation to fit mankind, and conceived as its 
final aim an administrative State which should include all 
nations. There is something dreamlike about this, but a 
hundred years earlier the free trade ideal was also imagina-
tive in much the same way. If all nations are to trade with 
one another, the conditions of life of the workers in every zone 
must continually grow more alike, methods of work must 
approximate to one another, goods must be classified and 
money values must be exchangeable, average requirements 
must arise and a housekeeping scheme for mankind belongs 
not to the inconceivable for those who think in centuries. 
Even to-day we have a world-corn-harvest and a world-
production of cotton, a world-coffee-market, a world-produc-
tion of iron, a world-demand for saltpetre and much that is 
similar. Most of the syndicates that have arisen locally or 
been promoted by a State, form associations reaching 
beyond the frontiers of the country and endeavour to secure 
the control of the whole of their department of production 
in all parts of the world. The great directors of the economic 
system have long since ceased to think in terms of single 
States. Capitalism becomes international through its own 
impulse towards growth, and socialism, being contained in 
it, follows in its footsteps. All this is already beginning to 
be actual fact and will persist. But the war has broken 
through this socially deepened conception of internationalism, 
the ideal of organisation is not merely economic, is not only 
made up of syndicates, markets and trade unions, but the 
basis of all human order and organisation, of all law and of 
all coercion is the State. And the State does not make the 
leap across from national State and territorial State to 
humanity, for it is no creature of thought but an organic 
reality, which grows according to its nature, which widens 
its boundaries and which yields nothing that it has earned 
or established unless it is vanquished. A world-organisation 
without political character can still only exist in the sectional 
spheres of commerce or finance, but States are tenacious and 
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fight for their life, that is for the preservation of their authority 
within their borders, of their control of production, of their 
financial strength, and now also of their storage system. 
* * * * * * 
But whilst the States are thus fighting, those same 
central points of which we speak are arising and extending 
their power. For the military struggle of the States is no 
game which is continually set up afresh on the same chess-
board and with the same pieces. The demands on each 
combatant State increase owing to military technique, the 
bulk of the armies and the height of the war expenses, and 
any State that cannot keep up in the race will be displaced 
to the third or fourth rank of sovereignty. A stern, inexor-
able law of selection rules here. How many States have 
already gone under ! How many are organised into federal 
States or State confederations ! The foundation of the 
German Empire is a classical example of the politico-
economic process of enlargement. This development is 
independent of all our individual wills. Even those who 
regard it with horror in its relation to personal and national 
culture are forced to recognise it as fact. There are grow-
ing States which are continually driven further forward by 
their own size. In them is realised a side of internationalism 
which is not simple commercial exchange, and even the 
exchange of goods submits itself on the frontiers to the 
commands and claims of such States. Thus, within the 
world of exchange, there arise great State or super-State 
economic provinces, which ultimately begin to formulate 
their economic law and draw up their demand and their 
scheme of management. On the way to the ultimate world-
economy lie these great economic States. They begin by 
creating a regulation of labour for their own areas, and they 
deal with one another in world-exchange like great corporate 
businesses. They do not, it is true, realise the dreams 
of religion, philosophy, free trade and socialism, but they 
are the greatest vision of humanity that is attainable 
at the present time. Any one who wishes to look forward 
hopefully to the far distant future may regard them as the 
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early stages of the final organisation of mankind, but that 
is his private affair. They themselves wish chiefly to live as 
independent existences and to build up for themselves first 
their Right and their Might. Whether or no Central Europe 
possesses the strength within itself to become such a world-
group economic body * on a political basis, is our problem. 
This is how our international question presents itself. 
* * * * * * 
It is in no sense unpatriotic to answer in the negative the 
question whether Central Europe is capable of becoming a 
special world-group economic organism, for if it is to turn 
out later that, notwithstanding all our goodwill, we lack the 
material preliminary conditions, or the spiritual energies 
needed, the vain attempt will, under the circumstances, 
mean increased difficulties in our subsequent position. 
At present there still exists a possibility, even after this war 
or perhaps on account of it, of joining either the English 
or the Russian system of trade and sovereignty. It may 
seem difficult to believe this whilst the guns are roaring in 
East and West, but all the public and private talk about a 
separate peace either with Russia or England implies at 
bottom, if the matter is thought out, a future economic or 
political union with one side or the other, for after a war 
imposing such sacrifices, peace will not readily be concluded 
for the sake of a mere breathing-space to repair weapons. 
After this war each nation will want to secure a permanent 
position to compensate for its immense sacrifice. It may 
be that circumstances will oblige us to ally ourselves with 
one side, it may be that one or other of our opponents will 
seek an interval for the sake of self-preservation and that 
we shall grant him favourable conditions for the sake 
of gaining strength. But in such a case the Mid-European 
* Weltwirthschaftskorpey. This and other similar terms must be read in 
connection with the phrase "groups of h u m a n i t y " above. There are to 
be great world-group bodies intermediate between Nations and Humanity. 
The world is to be partitioned between these bodies, and they alone will 
count in determining its future. Hence the term welt. " World-group " has 
been used for welt in the compounds Weltwirthschaftskorpey, etc., since 
neither " world " nor " international " is unambiguous in this connection.— 
T R A N S L A T O R ' S N O T E . 
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idea, according to the position of the matter, will be either 
partially adjourned or wholly decided. Let us then look 
matters frankly in the face and acknowledge to ourselves 
and to others what may happen if we decide, either volun-
tarily or through compulsion, that we are incapable of 
creating Mid-Europe. 
We win take as the first possibility a permanent treaty 
with Russia. From an economic point of view this offers 
dazzling prospects, for it opens a selling market of the first 
rank to our industry, since the French milliards, in that 
case lost, have during the last two decades secured the 
first victory over Russian economic barbarism. As things 
are to-day the Russian and German economic systems 
supplement each other wonderfully well. B y a system of 
corn storage we can protect our agriculture from a glut in 
the supply, and for the rest we can make Russia the chief 
source of our food-stuffs and raw material, so far as the 
character of the country and the stage of development over 
there admit of it. Our capital will then quicken the further 
progress of Russian agriculture and the very promising 
increase in mining, trade and industry. Looked at purely 
from an economic standpoint the arrangement is the most 
productive of all for us if it is permanent in c h a r a c t e r -
but only i f ! But this is impossible so long as we are the 
opponents of Russia in Turkey, in the Balkans and in the 
Slav districts of Austria-Hungary. Herein lies the insur-
mountable obstacle placed by history. In such a case we 
barter our independent political future for a temporarily 
great economic advantage, for through this alliance our 
prosperity will indeed develop but so also will Russia's 
strength, until finally Russia will shake us off, because she 
no longer needs us. We shall become a Western nation 
dependent on the Eastern Power, certainly not unconsidered, 
but not the leader. Bad Russian management will shelter 
behind our good name, and our technical skill and our capital 
will improve the soil on which millions of Russians and half-
Russians will be born, who will never resemble us and will 
never trust us. We shall thus act as engineer to promote 
192 CENTRAL EUROPE 
the military and economic victory of the Russian World-
Power. A great nation with such an ascent behind it as 
that of the German Empire during the last century, cannot 
do a thing of this sort. Our conceptions of civilisation rise 
up against it, and our hearts will never be wholly in the 
business. Never ! Better small and solitary than Russian ! 
As a matter of sentiment, and that in spite of all the war 
" songs of hate," it is easier for us to contemplate a per-
manent union with the English World-Power. In this case 
we shall become, as one of my friends puts it, the junior 
partner in the English world-firm, shall supply it with 
confidential agents and clerks, build ships and send teachers 
to the colonies, furnish English international emporiums 
with German goods, industriously made and well paid for, 
speak English outside our own four walls, enjoy English 
internationalism, and fight the future English battles 
against Russia. Our navy and submarines will in this case 
no longer serve any specially German purpose, for who else 
could wish to dispute English sea-power if we have sub-
mitted ourselves to it ? All this would be regulated, after 
the English fashion, in quite reasonable and pleasant 
forms, but our German Imperial history would have become 
a history of a territory as is to-day that of Saxony or 
Württemberg. A great nation only does a thing like this 
when nothing else remains to it. We know that most of 
the nations on the globe have no choice but to seek such 
an alliance, on one side or another, but a greater aim tempts 
us in virtue of our strength and experience : to become a 
central point ourselves ! 
To many Germans to-day this dilemma does not appear 
to have yet presented itself. They wish to become neither 
Russian nor English nor even responsible for a new world-
group economic organism intermediate between the two. 
They call their view national independence and self-suffi-
ciency ! But they fail to appreciate that our own sphere of 
existence is too small for the purpose. That " small and 
solitary " which we have ourselves just proclaimed in contrast 
to the possibility of a Russian alliance, is indeed, as we must 
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now assert, in no sense the same thing as, say, when Friedrich 
the Great's State rejoiced in its solitary position after the 
Seven Years War. In the interval the world's economic 
system has become so much more narrow and everywhere the 
principle of syndicates and of exclusion has made conditions 
very different from what they were in the individualistic 
atmosphere of the early beginnings of capitalism. He who 
is alone to-day will find himself outside to-morrow. In such 
a case we put ourselves in the position of industrial enter-
prises which in order to be free wish to remain isolated 
from the combines growing up around them, but whose 
freedom from thenceforth endures only in a state of con-
tinual defence against boycott and combined competition. 
Thus everywhere we are met by the tendency of the de-
veloping great associated bodies to round off their sphere of 
control The better regulated the world's economic system 
becomes the less can a nation of only seventy millions go on 
its own economic path alone, for in its isolation it would be 
overwhelmed by the cries : England for the English, America 
for the Americans, Russia for the Russians ! All the great 
bodies endeavour to look after their own interests 
within the world's system. Even Greater Britain will, 
if we remain in isolation, surround herself with tariffs 
and systematically make it more difficult for us to share in 
the use of her trading and coaling stations. The notion of 
encircling and starving out will be further considered, and 
calculations will be made as to how, next time, we can be 
hit more sharply. No doubt we shall always be able to sell 
the products of our labour on the English-Russian-American 
world markets in time of peace, and we shall be in a position 
to turn our military strength to good account between the 
great combatants, as is the fashion of neutrals. But we 
shall be powerless against the further rounding off of the 
more powerful bodies, against their tariff policy, com-
mercial intrigues, limitation of imports, metal monopolies, 
cotton trusts, against their colonial dominion and world-
encircling policy. We shall, it is true, be the strongest of 
the small nations, and hence our position will remain better 
N 
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than that of our weaker competitors, but the idea of a 
purely national independence offers no cheerful prospect to 
our children and grandchildren in this economic age. He 
who does not grow, declines. As once the Prussians were 
forced to create the Customs Union in order not to remain 
small and solitary, so must we keep before bur eyes the 
Central European economic world-group. This is the 
meaning of our history whether it suits us or not. 
* * * * * * 
So long then as the sun still shines on us it must be our 
purpose to enter the first class of the economic world-group 
Powers. This involves the adhesion of the other Central 
European States and nations. Except to our comrades 
of German race living in Austria and Hungary, it is indeed 
of no special direct interest to these peoples that we 
Germans should sit in the upper council of universal 
history. It is not to be expected of them that they 
should share our historical sentiments, since there beats 
within them a heart of another race and of different stuff. 
They will put the question to themselves from their own 
point of view : whether, in the choice of German, Russian 
or English leadership, they wish to belong to the German 
world-union or not. Their position is similar to what 
we have just described in discussing how it would be 
with us if we were to join the Russian or English Union, 
only with this difference, that the smaller nations have 
not the possibility of imagining themselves as leaders 
of economic world-groups. They have in fact only to 
choose between isolation and adhesion, and for them, for 
the reasons adduced, isolation will hardly be any longer 
tolerable by the end of another generation. Hence sooner 
or later they must anyway decide with which union they 
will or can range themselves, according to geographical 
position, production and mental leanings. This is a harsh 
necessity, a heavy fate, but it is the overpowering tendency 
of the age, the categorical imperative of human evolution. 
When once the powerful intermediate forms have intro-
duced themselves between territorial and national States 
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on the one hand and humanity on the other, struggles and 
complaints avail nothing. People may submit to necessity 
earlier or later, freely or from compulsion, but the universal 
watchword is spoken and must be complied with. And 
those who conform to it earlier will in general secure better 
conditions for the future than those who let themselves be 
forced and pushed beyond the historical moment. There is 
no need whatever to proclaim this to opponents wifh many 
words, for words are feeble in this connection, but economic 
experiences will speak. Small States which cannot carry 
through any tariff war, but need daily imports and exports, 
must in future be registered with one of the great world-
firms, as soon as the super-firms themselves mutually 
separate off from one another even more than they had done 
before the war. 
* * * * * * 
If, however, the foundation of the Mid-European union 
is to be attempted in the midst of this human evolution, it 
must be admitted as a matter of course that Mid-Europe 
will be no such natural growth, no such already coagulating 
organism as the three great unions already in existence. 
The Mid-European structure must be erected with judgment 
and deliberation from stones already shaped and repeatedly 
used in building. Unfortunately it did not grow up out of 
the old instinct for power before the period when mankind 
began to make schemes for setting its house in order. This 
constitutes a weakness and a very considerable practical 
and politico-technical difficulty. The building of Mid-
Europe will be even more an intellectual achievement 
than the foundation of the German Empire, but it will 
be the intellectual achievement of that nation which can 
say of itself without vanity that it is gifted and trained 
like no other for organising an economic world-group 
of this nature. We refer in this connection to the exposi-
tion that we have given earlier. No one amongst us 
or amongst our neighbours doubts that the Germans can 
accomplish the economic organisation involved, if it is at 
all humanly possible. But it is a somewhat different 
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question whether or no we have, in addition to organisation 
and technique, that indispensable quality for world-union 
which we have previously termed elasticity, that flexible 
skill which we find in three different forms amongst 
Russians, English and Americans. We are somewhat 
hard, masterful, taciturn, have but little patience for 
our slower fellow-creatures, and demand that things shall 
be done precisely as we wish. All this has its good' side, 
but in order to be a leading, directing economic nation 
some sort of international oil is needed, the art, the great 
art of managing men, sympathy with others, the power to 
enter into their nature and aims. Scientifically we can 
accomplish the thing irreproachably. In retrospect we are 
the most sympathetic of all nations, but practically we 
have not seldom been small schoolmasters of the old style 
or non-commissioned officers with pencil and mustachios. 
This indeed applies least of all to our leading merchants, 
but often to our trade secretaries, directors, officials. The 
German nation as a whole needs first to grow into its 
new task. But this too it will be able to do if it is neces-
sary. It needs only to be put plainly to us in the first 
instance. We are still rather too young as a world-group 
nation, too close to the narrowness of the old provincial 
manners and the habits of thought of small nations, not 
yet free enough from the old position of subjection of the 
pre-'48 period, not sufficiently assured in intercourse, and 
hence often rude and insolent from want of self-confidence. 
Respect for those with whom we wish to work in prosperity 
and failure is not yet a matter of course. I say all this 
openly and repeatedly with intention because herein lie 
much greater hindrances than in clauses and statutes. Yet 
already the race of men who are now returning home from 
the war, and the race of women who have in the meanwhile 
worked like men, are more flexible and readier for great 
things. We all wish to begin anew, and so, and so only, not 
with our old positiveness, we approach our neighbours and 
ask whether or no they will enter into our union. 
i{i jjc sjc ;Jc s{c 
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Whom must and can we invite ? 
At this point a section of our work begins over which 
more than over the others the word " caution " should be 
written, for we are still living in the midst of the war, must 
publish nothing about the " aims of the w a r " in the 
narrower sense of the word for very sufficient reasons, and 
cannot count everywhere upon a friendly interpretation 
of our statements in the passionately excited war conditions 
in neighbouring foreign countries. Then rather a word too 
little than too much ! 
Even now there are, it is true, in Germany as elsewhere 
in Em-ope a number of people who put no curb on their 
capricious imagination and talk as though the government 
of Holland, Scandinavia, Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece and 
the Turkish Empire were their merely secondary duty and 
they needed only to write the names of these countries on 
paper in order to receive them into the Central European 
economic world-group. Yes, there are daring thinkers 
who wish at the same time to attract Switzerland, France, 
Spain and, after a certain purifying interval, even Italy, and 
so found the United States of Europe with or without 
Belgium. All this has only the value of a play with possi-
bilities, but is harmful if it is read in the States concerned, 
because it is almost always conceived from a one-sided 
German standpoint, and does not take into consideration 
that it needs at least two, each of whom has his own interests 
and anxieties, to conclude a treaty. He who wants too tnuch 
in this matter, at bottom wants nothing at all except to 
express himself. We dissociate ourselves most distinctly 
from this facile and superficial treatment of the problem, 
and on this very account have confined ourselves throughout 
our work up to the present to the discussion of the union 
between Germany and Austria-Hungary, because we are con-
vinced that the two Central Powers must first be united 
before any application to a more distant State can have even 
the smallest prospect of success. The basal forms of the 
new treaties and arrangements must originate between the 
German Empire and Austria and Hungary. If the attempt 
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miscarries here then other States need not be troubled at 
all. If it succeeds we shall know what we can offer to the 
others concerned, and shall talk to them with concrete 
numbers and in calculable values. Hence it is also a 
mistake to talk of a German-Austrian-Hungarian partner-
ship only, as it were, in passing, as an auxiliary means to 
Germano-Turkish objects, as though the latter were the 
principal thing and the former only a work of secondary 
importance to be settled anyhow. All this will be carefully 
noted in Austria and Hungary and will in no sense increase 
the desire to enter into serious and difficult negotiations. 
The Austrians and Hungarians think of their own Balkan and 
Turkish interests, which mean more to them than ours can 
do, and are surprised that we Germans should, so to speak, 
carry on our Turkish policy over their heads. And they are 
right in this ! They know that all German-Turkish schemes 
are nothing but water without Trieste and Fiume. 
* * * * * * 
The German-Austrian-Hungarian economic area, as now 
it lies before us, shut off by the war from the rest of the 
world, is obviously not sufficient for an economic world-
province, for it is far too much of an area for the import of 
food-stuffs and raw materials, and is already much too one-
sidedly directed towards industrial exports to be able to 
support itself by its own energy and without further addi-
tions, even in the principal articles. On this point, as 
formerly, we refer the reader to the statistical section of this 
book. A vital Mid-Europe needs agrarian territories on its 
boundaries, and must make the accession easy and desirable 
to them. It needs, if possible, an extension of its northern 
and southern sea-coasts, it needs its share in oversea colonial 
possessions. But how can all this be talked of now without 
getting involved in inconclusive discussions of neutrality or 
in the coming negotiations at the Peace Congress ? 
So far as the German colonies are concerned they have 
held out well and bravely during the war, and in doing so 
have everywhere supplied valuable proof to the German 
Colonial Government that we are not so incapable of 
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colonisation as was believed in some places both at home 
and abroad. Both white and coloured people have done 
their duty so far as we know, in a surprisingly splendid 
manner. The whites have kept up the defence till the last 
man and till the last possible moment and the natives have, 
with few exceptions, stood by them faithfully. Now, 
however we are cut off from the colonies. Whether and to 
what extent and in what condition we shall get them back 
again through the exchange proceedings when peace is 
made no one yet knows. In our opinion we ought not at 
any cost to allow ourselves to be deprived of colonial activity 
and if it is unavoidable we must make concessions oi 
occupied land in Europe, in order not to cease to be a 
colonial nation. But all these general statements show 
how vague our future economic situation in the worlds 
economy is at the present time. 
And who is prepared to say where the future Central 
European trench-made boundaries will run ? Whether they 
will pass on the inner or the outer side of Roumama or on 
this or that side of Bessarabia ? Whether they will follow 
the Vistula or not ? Whether Bulgaria is to be included m 
the Central European sphere of interest or not ? Whether 
or no we shall secure a line of railway to Constantinople m 
the trusty hands of allies ? What Mediterranean seaports 
will come into consideration as the starting-point of Central 
European railway lines ? What will become of Antwerp ? 
How the Baltic Sea will appear after the war? Thus 
there are a hundred questions which will still remain to be 
answered. So much only is clear : that their answers will 
be essentially affected according to whether the German-
Austrian union is, at bottom, something that is desued and 
determined upon or not. Here and here only is the 
birthplace of Mid-Europe. 
* * * * * * 
But let us suppose for once that a beginning has been 
made with the German-Austrian-Hungarian union and that 
it has been satisfactorily steered through the Peace Congress 
that it has at its disposal adequate seaports on the North 
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Sea and the Mediterranean, and that northern and southern 
accessions to the union are under consideration. Let us 
suppose further that Turkey has come out of the war intact 
and thus with a belief in the future, and that there devolves 
on us a not too small tropical or sub-tropical colonial 
territory. With these favourable assumption's, which in 
themselves contain nothing extravagant, an economic State 
makes its appearance, whose statistical position each may 
easily reckon out for himself in its main numerical relations, 
but which we shall not express in figures for reasons already 
mentioned. How will this economic State be able to main-
tain itself in the midst of the world's economic system ? 
Undoubtedly it is much stronger than Germany alone 
or Austria-Hungary alone, for it is a more powerful buyer 
and seller and can negotiate in a different way with foreign 
customs unions and economic bodies than is possible to 
a separated and isolated individual State. This advantage 
exists under all circumstances, even though we must subse-
quently assert that quantitative possibilities for the life and 
economic development of Mid-Europe remain limited even 
if progress be favourable. 
Of course there is no simple method of estimating the 
strength of such a union, for political and economic energies 
will in general not allow themselves to be brought to a 
common denominator. Could the estimate be even approxi-
mately arrived at we should not need war in the history 
of the world. War is only unavoidable because there is 
no recognised measure for evaluating the claims that are 
put forward. If, for example, Japan, Russia, England, 
America and other States dispute over the extent of 
their influence in China, there is no recognised procedure 
of apportionment according to which their mortgages 
on China can be measured. The actual discovery of such 
a procedure would be pacifism. The Court of Arbitration, 
taken by itself, is only a proposal for a machinery of 
justice, but at present there is no sketch of a fundamental 
law for its decisions. Under these circumstances, what 
remains but to put it to the test of blood how highly each 
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one who makes a claim is in a position to value it ? Thus 
in all future international affairs Mid-Europe too will 
ultimately be referred back to its military strength. That 
this is very great the war has given satisfactory proof. 
But after all even the war only shows that Central Europe 
has been able to hold its ground, by exerting all its energies, 
under existing social and economic conditions. It is no 
guarantee that, in a later stage of mankind's development, 
just the same trial could be endured again. After the war 
people will set to work afresh to build, to plant, to gather in, 
to dig, to forge, to weave, to water, to calculate and to 
save, until the trial must once again be made whether or 
no the new organisation has been, on the whole, a strengthen-
ing and an advance. 
We ask, therefore, whether or no the new economic 
world-group of Mid-Europe offers prospects of growth 
according to human foresight and in so far as we are 
able to judge. In putting this question the wish may 
easily be the father to the thought, but just because it is 
easy and pleasant to paint glowing pictures of the future, 
we regard it as our duty to call special attention at the 
outset to the difficulties and obscurities of the matter. 
* * * * * * 
We will begin then with the geographical relations of size. 
What is the area of Mid-Europe ? 
To any one who journeys, staff in hand, from the Baltic 
to the Adriatic Sea the country lying between naturally 
appears spacious, varied, broad and extensive. But he who 
compares it with the available areas on the inhabited earth 
must perforce call it very small. That is to say, if we 
begin to reckon in millions of square kilometres our two 
home countries dwindle to quite small fractions of the total 
available area. The inhabited surface of the earth, includ-
ing the deserts but not the polar regions, amounts to about 
132 millions of square kilometres. This amount contains 
much land of lesser value, out of which no meadows or 
plantations have been made in the course of centuries, but 
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still: the housekeeping area of the world with its hinter-
lands and waste lands is of this size, and no one knows 
what metals, salts, coal and power-sources may be opened 
up even in districts that are now unusable. The home 
countries of Germany, Austria and Hungary make up only 
1.2 million of this 132 million square kilometres, that is, less 
than 1 per cent. ! By adding in a number of neighbouring 
European States we can make it up to about 2.5 million. 
Further, if we claim all European and Asiatic Turkey our 
share is increased to about 6.7 million by taking charge of 
a good many Arabs. If we add on the former colonies of 
the German Empire we may register about 9.3 million. If 
we venture to count in, to a, it is true, somewhat arbitrary 
extent, the overseas possessions of neighbouring States 
which have not yet joined us, it is possible to arrive at 
about 13 million. But this means that, by a very favour-
able calculation, the Mid-European economic body will be 
in a position, in some more distant future, to control one-
tenth of the available amount of land. Even so, this 
one-tenth is still hardly above the average in its productive-
ness. In contrast to this Great Britain alone, with Egypt, 
but without its satellite States, possesses 34.4 million, 
Russia 23.7 million, France alone 11.4, China 11.1, the 
United States alone without other American States 9.4, 
Brazil 9 million square kilometres ! 
Whether we with our tenth, to keep to this assumption, 
can supply our own principal needs, can fill our own store-
houses and keep our own economic system going even by 
applying all our strength and technical skill is doubtful, 
at least with the increase in population that is otherwise 
desirable. Of course we must increase our own agricultural 
production very much, especially in Hungary and perhaps 
in the neighbouring States that join us—this we shall do. 
Also we shall help Turkey to irrigate Mesopotamia and to 
induce a pleasant fruitfulness there, but the dowry of land 
is at the outset somewhat meagre both for Germany and 
Austria-Hungary. 
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How do things stand with the amount of population ? 
This question too can only be answered in outline, for 
there is a very great difference between one man and another, 
and a million Central Europeans cannot be set against a 
million Indians or Tartars. But all the same the population 
figures give something to go by. 
The population of the German Empire and of Austria-
Hungary together amounts to about 116 millions according 
to the last census figures, which are now of course already 
exceeded. Then there is the German colonial population 
of perhaps 14 millions (various estimates). If we count in 
with these 25 millions of European and Asiatic Turks and 
about 20 millions of other Europeans with perhaps 25 millions 
of other non-Europeans, and this is still on a favourable 
assumption which we should not like to put higher at the 
outset, the population of the Mid-European economic 
world-group would be roughly reckoned at about 200 millions 
in round numbers, that is about one-eighth of the present 
supposed world-population. We need not point out again 
how uncertain all estimates of this kind are at the present 
time. The object of these figures is only to give a quite 
general view. For comparison it may serve to note that 
the British Empire was registered some years ago at about 
425 millions, China at 330 millions, Russia at 170 millions, 
the United States 107, France with its colonies 95. 
Our Central European home population would be the 
centre of the fife of an economic body which stretched out 
its grasp into other quarters of the globe. It possesses an 
immense capital in strength if it does not stop increasing. 
The decline in the birth-rate which began before the war must 
be overcome ! The first years after the war will probably 
decide whether or no this will succeed. After the war we 
must everywhere begin afresh, and in this respect more even 
than in anything else. Mid-Europe needs children, children, 
children ! This is the presupposition of all prosperity both 
military and economic. Now that the war has shown us 
obviously in France how helpless and in need of help a nation 
becomes that has lost its taste for growth owing to insistent 
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civilisation and to immorality ; now that it has shown us in 
Russia what the masses signify, even with only a Russian 
training ; now that we have lost a hundred thousand men in 
the war ; now the urgent, heartfelt, beseeching call must 
resound, mingled with the ringing of the peace bells, calling 
to men and women in town and country : beget children ! 
All allowances to public and private officials must estimate 
the father of a family differently from the mere private 
spender. The storage system thus accords with the policy 
of increasing the population, a highly sacred patriotic task. 
This is no party question, no controversial question, it is a 
duty, a vital command. 
* * * * * * 
Whereas hitherto we have on principle banished the 
relevant figures to the statistical portion of our book, an 
exception has been made in the discussion of area and 
population because here no presentation at all could be given 
without numbers. From henceforth, however, we shall 
return to the earlier practice, since otherwise our further 
exposition would be too difficult reading, and since all 
statistical comparisons between the economic products of 
world-group States can only be drawn with very many 
reservations. If, for instance, we establish the quantity 
of wheat produced by England with Scotland and Ireland, 
that has a certain importance for future submarine wars, 
but has only a small value for world-economics. If we 
add what Canada, India, South Africa and Australia pro-
duce, the picture changes enormously. But even these much 
larger figures are not useful for purposes of comparison 
since rice frequently takes the place of wheat in the British 
colonial territories, and especially in India. In order even 
to arrive at a judgment concerning the strength in food-
supply of a world-group Empire, we must be able to 
express in figures the total of food-stuffs produced by it, 
add them up and divide them per head of the popula-
tion. But how can this be done when both adequate 
statistical data and methods of computation are wanting 
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for the purpose ? The attempt at computation employed in 
the publication Die Deutsche Volksernahrung im Krieg by the 
German professors who inquired into food-supplies under 
the direction of Professor Eltzbacher is very interesting, 
and win certainly give occasion for other kindred works. 
But it has not proved of immediate value to us m the war 
for economic schemes of national housekeeping, and without 
further investigation no one can transfer the method used 
to the other economic States. With the help of the available 
international surveys and the statistical abstracts of Germany 
and Austria-Hungary, I have done my best to compare the 
Central European economic area with the Russian, English 
and North American areas. I have, however, only succeeded 
in placing side by side some separate series of figures obtain-
able from the statistical abstracts, so that the reader may 
work them out further as he pleases. And in relation to 
the scheme for our Central European economic system the 
further possibilities of development must be taken into 
account at least as much as the present production. But 
in this case also any numerical grasp is quite unobtainable. 
In addition at each individual point we are met with the 
difficulty, already sufficiently discussed, that no statement 
can be made beforehand as to which of the intermediate and 
small European States will sooner or later join the Central 
European union. Hence we must unfortunately be content 
to indicate briefly acknowledged tendencies and tasks. 
* * * * * * 
The English world-group Empire is the first, the 
oldest and the most powerful economic Power. We have 
discussed above its administrative methods, now we must 
realise the abundance of its wealth in land, its goods, 
powers productions, plantations, railways and ships, its 
economic material. Here the Central European reader 
must discard from the outset an error current amongst us, 
that is the undervaluation of the English colonial territory. 
Indeed nowadays these are often no longer colonies at all 
but Imperial provinces, and after the war they will secure 
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a yet greater share in the Government than hitherto. 
Indeed, one of the facts that have become evident in the 
war is that Australia, South Africa and Canada are English 
in will and feeling. They have their own provincial 
pride and their inalienable autonomy, but they wish to be 
independent parts of Greater Britain. After the war they 
will not demand separation from Great Britain but an 
increasing co-operation in the management of the Empire. 
The old Mother Country is being absorbed in the whole 
organism and will be a marketing province for it and the 
centre of finance and industry, but will no longer be the 
seat of all authority. Expressed in economic terms this 
signifies a weakening of the industrial character of the 
Empire for the benefit of the most powerful raw material 
community in the world. London will have for Greater 
Britain something of the value which, under different 
conditions, Petersburg has for Russia—it may one day be 
temporarily cut off without the English Empire as a whole 
being vitally injured thereby. The more the immediate 
future is affected by submarine policy the more this event 
will be accelerated. But this means that the industrial 
competition between Central Europe and Great Britain 
is indeed very important for the economic character of 
Greater Britain but is not an entirely vital question. 
This war is still carried on as an industrial war by Great 
Britain, but it is becoming apparent in the course of it 
that the question whether Great Britain or Germany 
have the lead in the production of iron is by no means 
a vital one for Greater Britain. Its factories will be 
removed much more to the overseas provinces, in so far as 
geographical conditions permit, and there guns will be fused 
and machines constructed. Out of a colonising country 
will develop a State of incomparable self-sufficiency as 
regards agriculture and raw material and with its own 
developing industries. This State will, as we believe, 
gradually set on one side the old English trader policy, 
will more and more leave to the Parliament in London only 
the domestic administration of Great Britain, and will set 
OUR POSITION IN THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM 207 
up a Super-Government with economic boundaries such as 
Joseph Chamberlain tried to introduce more than a decade 
ago. The watchword of the World-Empire will be economic 
independence, but at the same time the repayment of war 
debts will provide a strong inducement to the establishment 
of an Imperial war chest with the revenue from tariffs. 
Now that free trade internationalism has broken down, the 
English genius will apply itself resolutely to a Greater 
British protectionism, and, from the economic point of 
view, everything is ready for this except the boundaries, 
for this Empire lying scattered on every ocean is assailable 
at all its corners. Its trenches lie in the water. Sea-
militarism ! 
* * * * * * 
Greater Britain has a wellnigh inexhaustible basis of 
arable land and cattle pasture, more indeed than the United 
States of North America. It possesses forest lands in 
Canada and Central Africa, meadow lands in Australia and 
South Africa, herds of cattle in Canada and India, cotton 
plantations in India and Egypt, sugar plantations in India, 
coal in Great Britain and also in parts of India, South 
Africa and Australia. It lacks coffee, cocoa and iron-ore 
but instead there is abundance of gold in Africa, Australia 
and also in India, silver in Australia and rubber in Africa. 
We are still without any economic work which treats this 
whole territory as a unity so that an inventory and balance 
sheet can be drawn up. Generally we can see only the 
demand of the mother-province of Great Britain and cannot 
see at the same time how far it can be met by the other 
provinces. We see the demand of the European Mother-
Country for cotton without at the same glance surveying 
the cotton ports of India and Egypt. The same is true of 
wheat and other materials. 
All exchange within Greater Britain is naturally accom-
plished by water routes and has consequently, as already 
remarked, an insecurity which can never be entirely 
removed. But what man can do to establish an adequate 
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system of transport that England has done. Her merchant 
fleet, in comparison with the merchant fleets of Germany 
and Austria-Hungary together, is as 136 to 36. The 
command of the sea is not only a claim but an actual fact. 
The floating multitude of England's freight-carriers stands 
far above the means of intercourse possessed by all the 
other seafaring Powers. These carriers may be interrupted 
in the war but not replaced, not dispensed with. 
It is necessary to give an impression of these quantitative 
relations, because there are too many worthy Central 
Europeans who think it a small matter to make the building 
of Greater Britain totter. Certainly Greater Britain suffers 
from the war ; it trembles and alters and shifts its internal 
formations, but—after the war it will still be there. 
Even if we consider the United States of North America 
without Mexico and without South America, it forms an 
economic Power which is indeed far behind Greater Britain 
(with India) in population, but is full of unlimited wealth 
in land and of possibilities. The decisive point here is the 
nature of the population : there are nearly 88 per cent, of 
Europeans or their descendants, so that the average type 
of human being is fundamentally above the average in 
Greater Britain (always including India) in economic 
efficiency. But at the same time the old English leadership 
is much weaker than in Greater Britain, much more mixed 
with inflowings of another type. The displacement of the 
upper class in the country is indeed one of the most serious 
problems, perhaps as serious for the United States as ocean 
connections are for Greater Britain. It appears from a sum-
mary of the immigration since 1821 that a greater increase 
has come from Germany and Austria-Hungary than from 
Great Britain and Ireland, but this increase has been 
worked into the original old English community. Yet 
difficulties are increasing now that Russians, Austrian and 
Hungarian Slavs and Roumanians, Italians and even East 
Asiatics crowd in far more than do English, Germans, Irish 
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and Scandinavians. This may not be very dangerous 
politically because all these elements immediately take their 
stand on the footing of the democratic system already 
briefly described, and there are no serious problems relating 
to the defence of the country. But from the economic 
point of view it involves a certain average decline to the 
proletarian standard, which decline is perhaps somewhat 
blunted by the marvellous swing upwards of the last hundred 
years. And after all, the foundation of material advantages, 
success and will power is so strong that we must still be 
prepared for new manifestations of American efficiency. 
And whereas Greater Britain is engaged in shifting 
round from being an industrial country to being the leading 
raw material Power in the world, North America is obviously 
moving in the opposite direction. It is adding a daily 
growing industrialism to its immense production of raw 
material, and in this way fulfils all the necessary presup-
positions of a wealthy, rising, powerful, world-group economic 
area. Railways here are what steamships are to Greater 
Britain. The American is essentially a railway man. The 
area employed in agriculture here is nearly as great as the 
agricultural area in European Russia, the forest area is 
greater than the Russian, the unused land is still extensive. 
The North American wheat area is in proportion to the 
German-Austrian-Hungarian as 203 to 68. The product 
per acre is not yet as high as our average, but is increasing. 
The United States cattle herds are only surpassed by those 
in India. The number of pigs is almost twice as great as 
in the central States of Mid-Europe. Above all, the United 
States is the leading cotton country in the world, far ahead 
of Greater Britain, producing more than half the total 
world harvest. In coal the United States equals Germany 
and Great Britain together. Of iron-ore it has nearly twice 
as much as Germany. The profits from iron exceed the 
total of Great Britain, Germany and Austria-Hungary. In 
gold the United States is surpassed only by South Africa, 
in silver it holds the first place. On such a basis the 
Americans work with the fearless, good sense of a business-
o 
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like and indefatigable nation, and understand the organisa-
tion of trades and syndicates just as well as we do. Since, 
moreover, they are not really injured by the war, but on 
the contrary are making much money out of it, they will 
enter upon the next period of international- economics in 
an uncomfortably healthy condition as our most powerful 
competitors. 
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And how do matters stand with Russia ? Just now 
during the war so many wise things are said about Russia 
that one becomes silent. Even those to whom the country 
is not unknown, mostly differ in their opinions. No one 
knows what western frontiers Russia will have after the 
war. But this much is certain, that Russia has shown 
more military and organising power than many well-
informed people expected. People talked to us of Russian 
corruption as though it were an absolute impediment to 
corporate action. But that is not the case : a big elephant 
can tolerate many insects. What we cannot form an 
opinion about is the effect of the war on the Russian nation. 
Perhaps war and defeat will mean a beginning of far-reaching 
reforms, which will have something of the effect of the 
reforms of Stein and Hardenberg in Prussia. Perhaps ! 
But in any case there will remain immense quantities of 
people and material. Russia has the best increase in 
population in the world. If it treats its people wastefully, 
they grow again. In addition it has forest and arable land 
in abundance. Its European forest land is in proportion 
to that of Germany-Austria-Hungary as 168 to 33. Then, 
too, there are the Caucasian and Siberian forests. And 
forests are increasing in value, as we have already said, 
in world-economics. Russia's European agricultural area 
is in proportion to that of the two Central European 
Powers as 210 to 68. Russia's wheat production is in 
proportion to that of Central Europe as 228 to 112, but the 
product per hectare of the Russian land may still be 
immensely increased. The number of cattle and sheep is 
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great, and above all is capable of increase. In beet sugar 
Russia comes next to Germany and Austria-Hungary. The 
number of its cotton-spindles is less than that in Germany 
but more than that in Austria-Hungary. In coal it ranks 
comparatively low, but in petroleum it stands higher than 
all the countries, except the United States, together. In 
iron-ore it surpasses Austria-Hungary. In pig-iron it ranks 
only a little below France, the fifth iron-power in the world. 
Its gold cannot be compared with the stores of Greater 
Britain and the United States but stands much the highest 
in Europe. All these materials wait for capital and labour. 
It is exceedingly doubtful how things will look with Russian 
capital after the war, but capital will come from somewhere 
or other so soon as materials, demand and labour power 
are present. To awaken, in the economic sense, this rich 
Russia is one of the greatest tasks of world-economics, 
much more tempting than even the induction of China into 
the capitalist system. Notwithstanding all the crises and 
fluctuations that are still to be expected, this awakening will 
sometime succeed, and then the masses of the Russian 
population will take on form and content. When this 
happens we need to be already well ahead in Mid-Europe 
in order not to be overpowered. 
* * * * * * 
The object of these three scanty surveys is only to supply 
the right proportions for Mid-Europe. Many of us are still 
far too much involved in small conceptions, and fail to 
appreciate the greatness of the older world-group economic 
areas. We can no longer work up to the quantitative 
measure of these three Empires, at least not in the, for us, 
visible future. This is no argument against the foundation 
of Mid-Europe; but a strong argument for accomplishing it 
quickly and thoroughly. If we wait another generation, the 
neighbouring nations and colonies that are now perhaps 
still attainable for us, will be lost. For the Great Powers 
will work onwards and will follow the law of their own 
weight. 
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The individual producer, great estate owner, farmer, 
forest owner, manufacturer or mine-owner asks what it 
matters to him whether he tries to make his profit in a 
small State or in a world-group economic Power, and 
often replies to himself that he would rather be an important 
man in small surroundings than a member of an almost 
boundless economic union. Moreover, he points to the 
Russian producer, who has to put up with severe oppression 
in spite of the extent of his markets. This latter point may 
be readily yielded, and it may be acknowledged that a 
smaller, better managed State has advantages over a larger 
one badly managed. It may also be admitted that more 
effective aid is often given by the Government of a small 
State than by that of a great Power, since all Great Powers 
have, on account of their size, something of a free trade 
character. But the main fact remains that extensive 
markets are the first preliminary condition of economic 
expansion and vigour. So long as the agriculture and 
industries of economic small States like Belgium and 
Denmark can share without further ceremony in the English 
international trade system without at the same time making 
themselves dependent either in the political or economie 
sense, the industrial producers in those States will find no 
occasion to think other than provincially. But as soon as 
the gates of Greater Britain are closed they will inquire 
very quickly and minutely where, in the world's economic 
system, they shall and can find shelter. Individual pro-
ducers are often quite unable to imagine how an inter-
national economic displacement will work. I can still 
remember clearly how, when I was a child, the weavers in 
Saxony were greatly troubled when Alsatian Miihlhausen 
was taken into our economic union. They would have 
preferred to remain by themselves ! And what has now 
become of all these anxieties ? We know nothing more 
about them. It will be the same when Mid-Europe has 
been in existence for a generation. 
To-day we need to get away from all such very natural 
anxieties; we must do so if we do not wish to be involved 
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for all future time in economic dependence and insignificance. 
No farmer or manager of a business in a great Empire wishes 
to desert his wider sphere and go back to the old limitations. 
Has any one ever heard of a Hanoverian, even if politically 
he be a Guelph from head to foot, has any one ever heard 
of such a one who wishes to abandon the Prusso-German 
customs and economic union ? There is no such person! 
And thus later no Hungarian and no Austrian will desire to 
go back again, if only the connection is made so complete 
that an economic world-group really comes into existence. 
* * * * * * 
And if now we are willing to venture on the founda-
tion of Mid-Europe, let us examine our assets. What 
do we possess ? In our investigations so far we have 
already spoken of this. We have a country which is small 
compared with the countries of the older economic Powers 
and will remain small even if it is increased by further 
adhesions and colonial acquisitions. But we use our 
country up to the last corner, and shall also bring into 
complete and intelligent use the land which to-day is only 
half employed. Our forests are looked after in rather a 
different fashion from those in Russia, our arable lands are 
grateful and responsive to industrious cultivation. Our 
herds of cattle are a source of pride, and will amply win 
back their old abundance after the war. Our Central 
European people know how to deal with nature and under-
stand the growth of plants and cattle as hardly any other 
does, for it respects natural development and loves the 
individuals. Let us number the cattle and pigs that we 
own between the North Sea and the Balkans ! Look at 
our wheat! Look at our oats! Look at our fields of 
potatoes, at our sugar-beet ! These, as we have just 
experienced during the war, constitute a basis of fife which 
under a reasonable system of storage will guard our joint 
territory from foreign dependence! And then go into 
our mining districts and hear there the daily murmur 
and rumble of work; look at the ironworks and ports. 
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Look at the factories ! Notice also the industry of the 
artisans, the activity of the merchants, the ability of the 
legions of workers ! We do not want to overrate ourselves 
and our powers, and we wish to teach our children still 
better than we have learnt ourselves, but our joint popula-
tion is a splendid and valuable capital. Even in a limited 
space 120 or 150 millions of such people are a power, when 
rhythm pervades their actions, and they are supported, 
sustained and spurred on by organisation. 
It is true that we lack essential material unless we discover 
some unexpectedly great colonial supplement. In the first 
place we lack cotton, then wool, then corn to some extent 
and fodder to a great extent, we lack copper, iron-ore, 
leather, coffee, rice, tobacco, also wood, maize, jute fibre, 
petroleum, chemical materials and many other things. We 
lack more than Greater Britain and North America, we 
have fewer quantitative possibilities than Russia. But 
there exists no world-group economic area quite without 
supplementary requirements, and we can make and lay by 
in our storehouses sufficient to save us from anxiety in a 
serious emergency. A population that possesses such stores 
of coal, such machines, and can work as ours can, can also 
purchase, save and economise. 
When we are once united we can make our common 
economic scheme as a part of the developing world-group 
economic scheme. We shall think over what we have, 
what we ourselves produce, what we must buy and what 
we can sell; in this way all our work will become much more 
definite and distinct. We shall calculate for all of us 
together. In this matter all economic unions of producers, 
employees and workmen will help. This will be our practical 
world-group socialism. 
* * * * * * 
And how will things go with the people of moderate income 
in our Central European nations ? It is obvious that the 
great and strong will gain when their sphere is enlarged. But 
how will it be in this case with the moderate-sized under-
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takings, the dependent energies ? We have already touched 
slightly upon this question, which is always at hand, since 
a nation's future is not merely the future of its directors. 
But here we must once more indicate two fundamental facts 
which we have already experienced in the German Empire, 
and which we are in a position to point out to the Austrians 
and Hungarians in virtue of the occurrences in our own 
nation. , . . . , 
We have found that with the growth of capitalism the 
small independent businesses have indeed gone through a 
severe crisis, but are far from having been rumed in the 
mass as had often been prophesied of them. There are 
developing and declining manual trades, and others remain-
ing level. The butchers and bakers serve as an example of 
the first class, linen weavers and tanners of the second, 
bricklayers, shoemakers and indeed also tailors of the third. 
In the small trades that are endangered it always happens 
that a section raises itself up, whilst another and larger one 
declines, but the decline is generally such that the old 
people drop out and, frankly, often very painfully, whilst 
their children begin from the outset as wage-earners. But, 
on the whole, the great bulk of the small trades continue 
about level, they do not grow but they maintain themselves, 
for wherever there are agricultural or industrial profits, a 
smaller middle class of auxiliary industries grows up near 
the chief centres, small shopkeepers, innkeepers, clothiers, 
agents To these is added the new middle class of Govern-
ment communal, bank, commercial and industrial officials. 
These all make their living out of the general progress of the 
world's economic business. When work and business is 
brisk they live well. For them, according to their locality, 
the prices of wood, corn and cattle, the bank balance, 
commercial settlements, salaries and, above all, wages, are 
the indirect bases of their existence. It is almost impos-
sible to help them by legislation, even if people wish it 
ever so much, they can better help themselves mutually 
by comradeship. But the really important thing for 
them is nothing, nothing else at all, but the magnitude 
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of the national economic business. But this business depends 
on the activities of the world's economic system, and hence 
these smaller and weaker individuals, too, are connected 
with the most important economic questions. A Viennese 
member of the House of Representatives once said : " I f 
only our manual workers were as well paid as those in the 
German Empire ; that is all they wish for ! " But this and 
more besides they will never attain as long as Austria and 
Hungary remain in isolation. 
And we have further found that with a growing economic 
development the working classes everywhere become not 
only very much more numerous, but above all better 
nourished, better cared for and better paid. Of course 
many very important and well-warranted desires remain 
unsatisfied and will be brought forward by the trade unions 
at every opportunity. But no one will dispute the fact 
itself, that in a developing economic State the workpeople 
rise. The whole of our modern labour system would be 
worthless were this not the case. I have heard impressive 
accounts by Austrian social democrats of the difficulties and 
necessities amidst which they work. They too use the 
same phrase : " If we were only as far on as you are in 
Germany ! " In the pursuit of their own special interests 
these men must be the most ardent champions of Mid-
Europe. In narrow conditions all labour movements remain 
weak ; they can protest loudly but attain little. But so 
soon as the horizon widens, the area of passionate ardour 
increases and the wheels revolve a thousandfold, for in such 
a case even the members of the proletariat can demand then-
due wages for work necessary to the world-group system. 
The concept of a Central European economic world-
group is in no sense, or perhaps only in the first instance, 
a producers' affair. It may even be that for some producers 
the benefit that is to be won thereby will ultimately vanish 
No, it is a national concern, the problem of the masses : 
how will you rise, if you are willing to remain as you 
are ? 
C H A P T E R V I I 
T A R I F F PROBLEMS 
No part of the Mid-European economic system has 
hitherto been so much discussed and written about as the 
customs partnership : its feasibility, its consequences, and 
also its limitations and its questionableness. Military part-
nership, financial partnership, closer approach in matters of 
intercommunication, law and administration, associations of 
syndicates and trade unions, have only been spoken of 
vaguely and in whispers. But the customs or commercial 
partnership formed the subject of meetings, schemes and 
congresses even before the war, and has continued to do so 
during the war. This is readily to be understood owing to 
various causes presently to be discussed, only people must 
not be deceived thereby into thinking that a mere customs 
and commercial partnership by itself is feasible either from 
the Austrian, the Hungarian or the German standpoint. 
The reasons for this in each case are somewhat various, 
and we shall state them at the beginning of this chapter as 
introductory to its main subject-matter. We shall speak 
then in the first instance of the customs partnership quite 
generally as the removal of frontier tariffs, and shall leave 
it until later to define more closely the possible extent of 
this removal. 
Suppose that on the frontiers between Germany and 
Austria in the Tyrol, in the Bavarian forest, on the ridge of 
the Bohmerwald, on the Erzgebirge and on the Riesenge-
birge, the customs officers were removed, or that only a 
few articles were left to them to control and on which to 
collect money. What might be the consequences of this 
for the Austrian economic system ? It would not in any 
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way injure Austrian agriculture, nor the really big indus-
tries, which already have their place in international markets, 
nor would it at all disturb the home market. But all 
those businesses that only subsist because the people in 
their immediate neighbourhood order and buy from them 
for local or national reasons would receive a blow, in the 
form of a new, unusual competition, which would, it is true, 
have to bear the greater costs of transport and distance, but 
which in other respects would work under more favourable 
conditions. This latter point is here the important thing : 
the frontier customs officials can only be removed if the 
remaining conditions of production are as far as possible 
equalised either beforehand, or simultaneously, or at least 
soon afterwards. Quite equal they will never be made, and 
moreover, as we have already remarked, there are consider-
able internal differences within the German Empire and 
within every economic world-group. But a certain measure 
of equality is under all circumstances the presupposition 
of the removal of frontier barriers. For example, if it 
costs more for a North Bohemian manufacturer to procure 
cotton than it does for a Saxon producer in the same industry, 
the latter will gain an immediate advantage from the 
removal of the duty. It follows that the policy relating to 
freights and railway rates must go hand in hand with the 
customs partnership. Or if a joint-stock company in 
Austria has to pay many more taxes than in Prussia, then, 
when barriers are removed the Austrian company will if 
possible remove itself to Silesia. Or if, owing to the 
diminished value of the Austrian currency, an Austrian 
manufacturer must pay more in kronen for his half-finished 
goods sent from Germany than his competitor in the German 
Empire pays in marks, it will be difficult for him to sell at 
the same price. If the Austrian, owing to a certain formalism 
in his Government administration, can only get his new 
engine-house built two years later than the German, this 
interval is sufficient to give the latter the advantage. We 
might go on talking in this way for a considerable time and 
the outcome of it all is : the customs partnership will only 
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suit the Austrians if it is at the same time much more than 
a customs partnership ! 
The same thing is anyhow broadly true for Hungary as 
weH but Hungarian affairs are much more complicated and 
demand special discussion. We shall not touch upon the 
matter as it affects State rights until the next chapter, here 
we need only speak of the interconnection of the economic 
questions With regard to this point we call to mind the 
account in a previous chapter of the two economic States 
united in the Dual Monarchy, and the section relating to it 
in the statistical portion of our book. The question is, then, 
how win it affect Hungary if there are no longer customs 
officials on the mountain ridges between it and Germany. 
The effect would be the same as on Austria if Hungary and 
Germany were bounded directly by one another on one or 
two important routes of communication, but since this is 
not the case the Hungarians will, so to speak, get the benefit 
of the customs partnership at second hand. This might be 
somewhat compensated for later on if the inclusion of the 
powerful Balkan countries bordering on Hungary came into 
question. But in the meantime, so long as only the German 
Austrian-Hungarian customs relations are the order of the 
day Hungary is actually dependent on the goodwill of the 
Austrian traffic administration. A very big, profitable 
market for its numerous natural productions opens out to 
it but in between is another economic territory that also, 
of course, wishes to buy and sell for itself. Consequently 
Hungary, too, is not helped by a mere commercial partner-
ship without further additional clauses. Like Austria it 
must demand a closer approach in legal and administrative 
matters. But besides this it needs a guarantee that the 
raw materials and half or wholly manufactured goods which 
it obtains from Germany will not be detained on the way or 
made more than necessarily costly, and likewise that its con-
signments of cattle, fruit vans, grapes, packets of vegetables 
and butter casks will reach Berlin as quickly as possible. 
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The Hungarians are distrustful in this matter, and hence 
would gladly go a step further and demand in the union a 
return to the earlier conditions of a special intermediate 
customs frontier between themselves and the Austrians. 
We|shall here discuss this point, but only in relation to 
economics, deferring, as before, the question of its bearing 
on State rights. We have had to touch on similar matters 
already in discussing the problems of war economics. The 
conception of a special Hungarian economic State exists, and 
will possibly be reawakened by the unavoidable necessity of 
discussing the Mid-European commercial partnership. This 
must not surprise us, for the Hungarians, it may perhaps 
be remarked, are in general much stronger State politicians 
than economic politicians. Their political and national 
energy is very great and enforces admiration even though it 
may be exceedingly inconvenient to the rest of us in particular 
cases, but the economic ideal is less worked out, otherwise 
economic particularism would already be more on the 
decline. For if any part of Central Europe is certain to 
gain much from the union, it is Hungary. We have already 
pointed out what difficulties it must get into if it were left 
outside the German-Austrian corn trading system. In this 
case it would be in the same position as Roumania and 
must sell its corn at Roumanian prices. The difference in 
prices between Bucharest and Budapest would disappear, 
and this almost entirely to the disadvantage of Hungary. 
To put it otherwise : the economic boundaries of the corn 
trade between Vienna and Odessa would lie on the Leitha. 
The same is true in some measure in regard to cattle and 
other products of forest and field. As opposed to this the 
interests of certain Hungarian textile and iron manufactures 
and similar undertakings in a protective tariff will naturally 
be relegated to the background from the Hungarian stand-
point. A country with such a big export trade in raw 
materials as Hungary cannot really seriously contemplate 
an isolated economic position when the possibility of inclusion 
in a country with a corn tariff is offered to it. But the 
presuppositions are : partnership in traffic communications, 
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partnership in tariff, unimpeded rights of economic cirizenship 
in the big common union. 
* * * * * * 
Nor can the German Empire, for its part, admit a mere 
easing of customs duties without another and more extensive 
economic partnership. Formerly we had an economic 
treaty with Austria-Hungary as with Russia and other 
States with tariffs. After the war, of course, this can be 
continued, renewed, and altered in details according to the 
wishes of both sides. But in this case so soon as we mean 
to go beyond the limits of the arrangements and to grant 
specially easy conditions to the Austrians and the Hun-
garians the difficulty arises that we cannot simultaneously 
yield up to another Power the advantages which we grant 
to the Danubian Monarchy. We render all our remaining 
commercial treaties more difficult for ourselves, yet without 
gaining thereby anything substantial for our economic 
future. Moreover, the same thing also applies in a lesser 
degree to Austria-Hungary. In such a case we neither of 
us gain the advantages of the enlargement of free markets, 
and we hinder ourselves in all our " most favoured nation " 
relations in regard to the other economic world-groups. 
We must bear in mind here that of course for Austria-
Hungary the trade with the German Empire far exceeds 
all its remaining foreign trade (imports for home con-
sumption 39.5 per cent., exports of domestic produce 
40.8 per cent.), but that this same trade is of much 
less importance in the foreign commerce of the German 
Empire (imports 7.7 per cent., exports 10.9 per cent.). 
Hence if we increase our exchange with Austria-Hun-
gary, but owing to this make our exchange with other 
countries more difficult, this is quite a different matter for 
us and for Austria-Hungary respectively. For Austria-
Hungary the German trade is absolutely the primary factor 
in commercial policy, an unconditional, vital necessity, 
whereas for us the trade with Austria-Hungary holds the 
second place indeed in exports, but only the fourth in 
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imports. It is important enough, but is not a decisive 
factor in our development. It must be readily admitted in 
this connection that immediately after the war the mutual 
connection will for both sides come more strongly into 
evidence than hitherto. But all the same-: for purely 
economic reasons Germany will not be able to enter into 
any one-sided preferential position in respect to Austria-
Hungary at the expense of its relations with the rest of the 
economic world. For us the matter appears in this light : 
either Austria-Hungary is a foreign economic State like 
other States, in which case, with all possible consideration, 
it will yet in the main receive equal treatment; or it is and 
will remain our partner in the union and our comrade for 
life in the narrow and strict meaning of the words, in which 
case all foreignness vanishes and we take over its interests 
as it takes over ours. In this case we shall have no treaty, 
as with Russia, France or the United States, but we shall 
be or shall become a unity, and together shall confront all the 
world in buying and selling and in all treaties. It is evident 
that this cannot be attained all at once, but even now our first 
steps must depend on whether we desire this whole or not. 
* * * * * * 
Nevertheless a great deal, and much that is expert, has 
already been said and written in connection with other 
general Mid-European economic questions about this very 
point of the transaction of a special commercial treaty. 
And this will certainly be all to the good, for the intrinsic 
logic of the matter will lead of itself from this starting-
point to further developments. The choice of this starting-
point for the discussions has, however, a special cause 
in present-day facts and a special cause in history. The 
former cause is this : that the military, technical-finan-
cial and commercial matters connected with the union, 
as well as the question of syndicates, are of such a 
specialised technical character that each one of them can 
only be really surveyed and prepared by a limited number 
of men; whereas tariff negotiations, on the other hand, 
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have always been the subject of public debates and have 
constantly aroused lively interest in Parliament and in 
books. Even here, it is true, the number of people who can 
really attain insight and an intelligent survey is not great. 
But the general fundamental concepts are easily accessible, 
and the statistical material is ready at hand. Here every 
figure is available whilst in questions relating to money and 
syndicates often the very most important points of all 
remain business secrets. Thus it is not merely its actual 
value that has placed this point above all the other matters 
to be discussed. And in addition there is the historical reason, 
that the remaining schemes for combination are new ideas 
which have only just arisen, whilst the German-Austrian-
Hungarian customs union is a very old and already much con-
tested problem, an inheritance from the previous century. 
Professor v. Philippovich, the most distinguished repre-
sentative of scientific economic doctrine in Austria, in his 
work, Ein Wirthschafts-und Zollverband zwischen Deutschland 
mid ' Österreich-Ungarn (published by Hirzel, 1915), has 
given an excellent historical account of the earlier ideas and 
schemes about commercial policy. Friedrich List here 
comes to the fore as the most original thinker on the German 
side ; List, the prophet of our railways, chambers of com-
merce and eastern colonisation. Bruck, the Minister of 
Commerce, was the leader of Austrian thought in this 
connection. List is brought conveniently within reach of 
present-day readers in the edition of his works now shortly 
to be brought out by Geh. Finanzrat Losch of Stuttgart. 
And Philippovich gives us an admirable sketch of the broad 
outlook of the Austrian statesman who was Minister of 
Commerce in 1850 when the tariff barriers were removed 
between Austria and Hungary. At that time there arose 
almost simultaneously from South Germany and Vienna the 
demand of the " Greater Germany " party for an economic 
partnership extending from the Adriatic to the North and 
Baltic Seas. But Prussia refused all these ideas, for in 
accordance with her " Lesser Germany " policy, she wanted 
by all means to keep Austria from any share in the admini-
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stration of the Customs Union. The economic movements 
of the period before 1866 cannot be understood at all apart 
from contemporary politics, for they form a part of the 
latter. We have explained in an earlier chapter how 
essential Bismarck's founding of the German Empire was 
for the whole of Central Europe, but that it was not the 
final settlement of the Central European question. With a 
like meaning Philippovich remarks of Brucks plan : " His-
tory has decided otherwise, but has not buried Bruck's 
conceptions." Bismarck's various utterances about the 
impracticability of a Customs Union date from this period 
between 1852 and 1866, and, as is almost always the case 
with his statements, their tone of uncompromising rejec-
tion is to be explained by the circumstances of contemporary 
history. The economist Schäffle, who was afterwards 
Austrian Minister, judged the matter differently : " I live 
more than ever in the hope that, even if only very slowly, 
this idea will attain to full recognition." 
pH * * * * * * 
||.Thus people in Austria are falling back upon this old 
Austrian scheme, which was at that time fruitless, whilst in 
the German Empire we are reminded once again of the 
former Prusso-German Customs Union because it points the 
way to Central European unity. In those days the German 
Empire developed out of the Customs Union, and in like 
manner a newer and greater State association may form 
itself out of a present-day customs partnership with Austria-
Hungary. Truth is mingled with error in this way of 
looking at things. The error consists in an over-estima-
tion of the political influence of mere customs unions in 
general. It must not be forgotten that the Prussian 
Customs Union with Hanover, Bavaria and Württemberg did 
not prevent these States from taking up arms against each 
other in 1866. It is true that the Customs Union persisted, 
and outlasted the war, but it was not in itself strong enough 
to make war impossible, The same thing was demonstrated 
in 1870 in the case of France, which had an excellent tariff 
treaty with Prussia. And the most favoured nation clause 
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of commercial policy which Bismarck inserted in the Franco-
German peace terms ripened into no political rapprochement. 
Tariff questions had no such strong influence then, and 
have even less of it to-day. The German Imperial union 
became a self-contained political whole only because its 
unity stretched far, very far beyond questions^of^tariffs and 
commerce and was reciprocally military, legal, financial and 
industrial. It was this alone that made an economic 
organism out of the constituent States. Therefore if to-day 
we wish to establish a future Mid-European political unity, 
the history of this old Prusso-German Customs Union shows 
that a most favoured nation arrangement will not by itself 
be sufficient. It seems to be the most convenient step 
towards the great object, and on account of its comparative 
facility will be regarded by the Government departments 
concerned in the question as, for the time being, the best 
means to a nearer approach. But there is the danger that 
we shall then believe that something tangible has been 
attained which is yet not the case. B y this method we 
shall arrive at greater reciprocal adaptation of imports and 
exports, but also at a permanent atmosphere of continuous 
tariff rivalries and mutual agitations. So long as the old 
Customs Union lasted it was, it is true, certainly an aid 
to compromise, but the feeling of mutually belonging to 
one another altogether was wanting. Even the Customs 
Parliament of 1867 to 1870 played only a secondary part. 
And the general temperature was much more tuned to com-
mercial policy at that time than it is to-day, for it was the 
period of strengthening belief in free trade. The removal of 
tariffs served the general cause of progress. These matters are 
not so simple, however, to our present way of thinking. 
* * * * * * 
I may be allowed here to insert a personal confession in 
respect to the tariff question as a whole, because I have to 
justify co-operation in the Central European customs union 
to myself and my own past commercial policy. In the years 
1901 to 1903 under the leadership of my dead friend Theodor 
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Barth, of ineffaceable memory, and guided by my honoured 
friend Professor Brentano, I shared with all my energies 
in the agitation against the raising of the German customs 
tariff, and especially in the opposition to higher bread 
prices, and I have expressed the principles underlying 
this action more recently still in my Neudeutsche Wirthschafts-
| politik written in 1905. I am not in the least ashamed 
of my attitude at that time, because it entirely corresponded 
to my convictions, and I still find pleasure in retrospect 
over the vigorous fight. As far as pure theory is con-
cerned I have nothing to retract from the views then 
advocated, for I am still of the opinion that our economic 
system in the German Empire and our material preparedness 
for war would have been somewhat different, but no weaker, 
if the older system had been continued. But in the interval 
the world has gone on further and the decisive politico-
economic victory of the German protectionist party in 
Decsmber 1902 has brought about conditions in the German 
economic system which cannot be ignored even by those 
who previously opposed the new movement. The position 
here is similar to that in all important political adjust-
ments. Some Liberals and Social Democrats, to take 
this as an example, were at the time prejudiced for different 
reasons against Old Age and Sickness Insurance, partly 
on principle and partly on account of its piecemeal achieve-
ment. But when it was once in existence it became a 
constituent part of our life, and though it might be reformed 
and improved it could not be cut out again. Obviously it 
is now very difficult for those who opposed it at the time to 
say, after the event, how things would have turned out if 
their proposals had been adopted. The conquered has no 
evidence, even if much suggests that he was, to say the 
least, as reasonable and well-disposed as the conqueror. 
Thus, in brief, I maintain that the increase in German 
agricultural production has not been essentially affected by 
the new tariff which came into force on April 1, 1906, but 
would, on the whole, have gone its own way upwards even 
if the old Caprivi duties had been retained. The rise in 
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price was very desirable in the individualistic economic 
interests of those concerned, but it has ushered in no 
new epoch from the standpoint of national economics. 
There has been a certain relatively small increase in the 
area harvested, but the product per hectare has kept on its 
previous line which was already rising (with variations 
according to the year's harvest). The same is true of 
cattle-raising, only here it is allowable to think that our 
stock of cattle available at the beginning of the war might 
have been still greater under a system of cheaper fodder 
imports, without our own production of fodder being any 
less in consequence than it is at present. Comparison with 
duty-free agriculture in Switzerland, Belgium, Holland and 
Denmark shows that the improvement is at least as great 
in the duty-free countries as in those with protective tariffs. 
When, therefore, at the present day the agrarians express 
the opinion that the economic war was won by the customs 
tariff of 1902-3 and by the treaty tariff which came into 
force on April 1, 1906, I for my part regard this as mis-
chievous agitation, and oppose it in the interests of actual 
fact and of truth. Our reasoning in 1902 was just as good 
as that of our opponents, but the question now is for us 
whether or no we can turn back to the old starting-point 
of 1902 or, indeed, to that of 1881. This is what I deny, 
at least for the period which we are now in a position in 
some degree to survey. For by reason of the general inter-
national economic movement upwards the rise in tariffs 
and in the prices of necessaries has been compensated 
for by the rising wages, salaries and prices of all goods 
to a much greater extent than we and our opponents 
were able to take for granted beforehand. Things do not 
turn out either exactly as they hoped nor yet as we feared. 
They had to find by experience that their financial gain was 
absorbed by the increase in their private and public expendi-
ture. We, for our part, found or could have found that the 
prophesied lowering of the standard of life among the 
working classes did not make its appearance because, with 
the co-operation of the trade-union organisations, wages 
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adapted themselves more quickly than was expected to the 
altered conditions of prices. All prices rose : real estate, 
goods, labour power. This meant a burden on our foreign 
trade, but no noticeable displacement at home. Moreover, 
the foreign trade could bear the burden because the amounts 
demanded on the international market increased extra-
ordinarily, and also because elsewhere a simultaneous 
depreciation in the value of money set in. Owing to a 
combination of circumstances and to rapid adaptation the 
whole proceeding was of much less importance than it 
should have been according to the predictions of both sides. 
This explains what I said above : that tariff questions 
were of more importance fifty years ago than at present. 
But it also explains my assertion that we cannot simply turn 
back to the earlier state of things because for a long time 
it has been no mere question of forcing back certain items 
in the tariff, but of bending back all prices and with them 
the value of money within Germany. If officials and 
workers are asked whether, supposing the corn prices of 
1902 were re-established, they would be willing to return 
also to the salaries and wages of that time seeing that 
the principal reason for the rise in wages would be obviated, 
they find this notion, to say the least of it, not unques-
tionable. It is, however, certain that we cannot make 
such an experiment at the moment, amidst the uncertainty 
of the whole economic system after the war, when anyhow 
there is prospect of a further reduction in the value of 
money. At present we must work on further on the founda-
tion laid against our will. And in addition there is a 
constant parliamentary majority in favour of the existing 
tariff system, and we have too much else to do in German 
politics during these next years to begin afresh after the 
war, with no prospect of securing a majority, a theoretical 
tariff dispute between the existing and the new regulation 
of trade. 
* * * * * * 
But now for the matter itself ! What comes to us from 
Austria-Hungary, and vice versa ? Of course we shall 
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mention only the big items and refer to the statistical section 
of our book. 
The idea still frequently subsists that Austria-Hungary, 
the " agrarian country," supplies the German Empire with 
much corn and other agricultural products. The reader 
who has followed our previous exposition knows already that 
this is not the case, especially during recent years. Rye 
is sent, according to the yearly harvest, by us to them, and 
wheat-flour, of rather higher value, by them to us, but this 
is no great matter whilst the product per hectare in Hungary 
stands at its present level. Of much greater importance are 
malt-barley, malt and hops for our beer breweries. Potatoes 
are only exchanged in certain districts. Fruit of all kinds 
comes to us from over there in not inconsiderable quantities. 
The importation of wood from Austria-Hungary is of very 
much more importance, because wood, generally speaking, 
is a vital factor in the Danubian Monarchy : timber, planks, 
wood pulp, mine timber, wood alcohol. The imports of 
cattle and cattle products are exceedingly numerous : eggs, 
oxen, horses, cows, geese, chickens, goats, milk, butter, bed-
feathers, calves' skins, sheepskins. Other hides, skins and 
furs are exchanged so that certain qualities go in one direc-
tion and others in the other. The mutual relations in 
regard to wool are fairly complex, for a part of the overseas 
wool reaches Austria-Hungary through German hands. 
Manufactured woollens go as half-finished goods more from 
Germany to Austria-Hungary than vice versa. Linen yarn 
comes from Austria-Hungary to us. Cotton waste is 
exchanged, cotton yarn has recently been imported in 
larger quantities to Germany (perhaps temporarily). In 
coal and coal products the German importation into Austria-
Hungary is very great, whereas in lignite Austria surpasses 
us. Books are exported more from Germany than vice 
versa. Purely industrial goods pass quite preponderatingly 
from Germany to Austria-Hungary : tubes, stoves, machines 
of all kinds, motors, ships, electrical appliances, chemicals, 
leather goods, clothing materials, etc. The springs gush out 
from both sides, flow hither and thither and are worked up 
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a thousandfold in opposition to one another and on behalf 
of one another. All this is a daily changing, revolving life 
and cannot be expressed at all in a few general formulae. 
It must be followed bit by bit with the help of the statistical 
tables. But then we find that all relations anyhow possible 
in our mutual economic relationship are actually to be met 
with somewhere or other. Austria-Hungary is a raw material 
country to us, but yet not so much so as to be for us a raw 
material country as such. It is the exchange country for 
specialities which exist either here or there in great quantities 
or excellent qualities. It is the receiving country for our 
industries, but not in the sense that it has not similar 
industries of its own, or tries to promote them. As a whole 
the position is more like the relation between two brothers 
than that between man and wife ; competition between 
brothers, which is best settled by their both taking a share 
in the business. 
Geh. Finanzrat Losch of Stuttgart, in his work, Der Mittel-
Europaische Wirtschaftsblock, attempted to mark out three 
principal groups from the multitude of cases : partnership 
in demand, supplementary partnership and pure competi-
tion. We wish to follow this classification, not as though 
it included everything, but because it helps towards insight 
into the reality to be mastered, and actual perception is 
here more important than a formal discussion of tariff 
classifications. 
To the class of goods for which there is partnership in 
demand belong all those goods which the two great States 
either do not produce at all or only in small quantities (such 
as perhaps tobacco). These are primarily the products of 
subtropical and tropical climates. Cotton is imported by 
both parties in large quantities. Here there is no question of 
any necessity for protection, but a commercial union can, as 
has been remarked before, make use of the joint annual 
purchase of almost 900 million marks as a means of securing 
better terms from foreign nations. Coffee is in the same 
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position, and in this case the taxation of a luxury comes 
into view The joint purchase is nearly 350 million marks. 
The same applies with sundry differences to wool, copper, 
silk, tobacco, rice and many southern fruits, food-stuffs 
other metals, caoutchouc, foreign woods, petroleum (except 
the Galician production), tea, furs, etc. When the new 
joint classification is being prepared, it will be best to place 
by itself this group of goods for which there is a partnership 
in demand, because from the outset it forms a common 
objective. , 
The matter is not so clearly defined for the group ot 
goods for which supplementary partnership exists. For m 
this case both customs areas generally produce a con-
siderable amount for their own use and only supply one 
another with the surplus, so that as a rule other sources of 
supply come into account. The example for Germany is wood. 
Here Germany has a demand of 350 million marks, Austria-
Hungary a surplus of over 200 million, which is capable of 
further increase. The easier the export of wood for Austria-
Hungary to Germany is made, the more will Austrian wood 
be able to force all other woods off the German market, 
which wiU benefit Austria-Hungary and do no direct injury 
to Germany, since the readjustment will work mainly to the 
disadvantage of the Russians. The only question is how 
this favour to Austria will affect the Russo-German com-
mercial treaty. Here the one advantage must be weighed 
against the other. The case is the same in regard to the 
big demand in Germany for eggs. Varying with the annual 
production it is almost entirely met by Austria and Russia, 
and it is possible by our commercial policy greatly to 
increase Austria's share to the disadvantage of Russia. In 
1913 Russia supplied us with eggs to the value of 80 million 
marks and Austria to the value of 76 million. These figures 
might be transposed so soon as Galicia is again in order and 
the hens there have recovered from the Russian invasion. 
The position is reversed in the case of coal, an article which 
has not hitherto been touched by the tariff system, but 
which by joint syndicates with tariff barriers under State 
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control may be helped forward into partnership. Germany 
exports pit-coal of the value of 450 million marks (along 
with an importation, mostly from England, of 200 million) 
But Austria-Hungary has a demand of over 150 million in 
excess of its own coal. Of course differences of quality must 
be taken into account, but there is no doubt that a better 
adjustment is possible. Austria is already in possession of 
the attainable German market for lignite. Things are very 
much the same in the case of maize, barley, malt, fruit, in 
short, for all the home products of our zone which are 
produced in surplus in one or another place in Central 
Europe. This group too must be put into the classification 
by itself, since it stands out with a character of its own. 
The third group, which we have called the purely com-
petitive group, includes a 11 those products and manufactures 
which from the outset are produced in both customs 
areas with a view to foreign trade, and in respect to 
which Germans, Austrians and Hungarians come forward as 
sellers to the foreigner, but in respect to which, according 
to the degree of their ability, Germans will prevail in the 
Austro-Hungarian market and vice versa. Many of the 
raw materials and some of the half-manufactured goods 
required for this group belong to the first group mentioned 
above. The mutual competition in cotton-spinning and 
machine-making affords an example. The German manu-
facturers supply cycles to Austria, but the Austrian cycle 
makers wish, with equal justice, to supply them to Germany. 
Both dispute together over the market for cycles in the 
Balkan States. The same applies to arms, locomotives, 
agricultural machines, stoves, cooking utensils, clothing 
materials, ready-made underlinen and a hundred other 
things. In this connection it must be taken into considera-
tion that an industry which wishes to succeed in foreign 
markets needs, for its own safety, to have firm possession 
of the home market. Thus, for instance, a Bohemian textile 
manufacturer cannot succeed in Roumania if meanwhile the 
Viennese market is taken from him by competitors from the 
German Empire. Herein lie the most characteristic diffi-
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culties of a customs partnership. The more Austria-
Hungary becomes an industrial State the more anxiously 
will her export industries regard an event whose results 
cannot be estimated in advance. It may be that everything 
will go much more easily than people think beforehand, but 
no one can give any guarantee for this. Hence the closest 
attention must be directed towards this group in the case of 
a customs union, just as in the case of preferential treat-
ment. Things are simpler even now with regard to the 
vigorous mutual export trade in sugar, for which already 
agreements have been arrived at. 
* * * * * * 
A special group is formed by the temporary duty-free 
importation of articles to be re-exported after being worked 
up (Veredelung). I confess that it is not easy to get a good 
grasp of this greatly varied class. Some examples must 
serve to throw light on the matter : the Austrian chocolate 
factories get their cocoa from abroad, work it up with 
home-grown sugar and other ingredients and sell the finished 
product abroad, of course generally elsewhere than in the 
place of origin of the raw material. But in this way the 
original raw material is only, so to speak, on a visit in 
Austria, and is treated by the customs administration as 
only temporarily present, the duty being refunded, or 
cancelled if it has merely been entered. But sugar is 
exported combined with the original product, cocoa, so that 
the country outside the tariff barrier is confronted with 
a new dutiable article. Or half-finished furniture in the 
rough is imported into Austria, there polished, veneered, 
upholstered and then again disposed of in foreign countries. 
In this case practically no new material is added, but only 
the value of labour. It may so happen that a sale is effected 
when the customs frontier is crossed, but very often the 
object remains, during its detention in Austria, in the posses-
sion of perhaps some German of the Empire, who has the 
work in question done in Austria because it is done there 
specially well or cheaply. In the branches of the textile 
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trade it frequently happens that dressing or dyeing is 
carried out across the customs barrier since the land frontier 
often accidentally cuts through an industrial province. The 
most extensive business procedure of this kind in Germany 
is in the case of rice polishing : to the value of 85 million 
marks. Then there is benzine refining, wood and iron 
finishing, the fitting up of machinery, etc. Here the closer ; 
approach of the two customs areas ought to be received j 
from the outset in as conciliatory a spirit as is in any way 1 
possible, for nothing promotes the joint economic system so j 
much as this kind of partnership in work. As concerns j 
foreign countries the customs and financial boundaries will 
remain in existence, but in the common home country they 
ought in principle to disappear in regard to all working-up 
processes. 
* * * * * * 
All duties are from their nature somewhat arbitrary, for they 
are an additional factor introduced deliberately into the for- j 
mation of prices. In the case of the most important duties, the • 
frontier imposts on corn, an attempt has indeed been made to 
establish a sort of theory of the proper height of the duty out of 
the difference between home and foreign cost of production, 
and to say perhaps : the farmer in the Argentine can supply 
wheat at so many marks per ton cheaper than can the 
farmer in Germany, hence the difference in cost of production 
must be expressed in the duty. We shall not indeed deny ' 
that there is actually some justice about this conception of 
the matter, but yet it involves serious omission. For what 
is taken as the home cost of production is already influenced 
by increases of price due to tariffs, both past and to be 
expected, and hence is not purely natural, and above all 
costs of production even in the home country differ widely 
among themselves and are dependent upon the prices of . 
land, whether actual or aspired to. No duty can in itself 
be fixed on any calculable basis, it is essentially an act 
of volition. This does not exclude the fact that the duties 
may be so interconnected, that if A has been decided 
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on, B must follow it. So long as there are duties on articles 
used for fodder, there must also be duties on cattle, since 
otherwise evidently cattle imports from abroad will be 
artificially impelled in this direction to the injury of the 
home cattle-breeder. So long as there are corn duties there 
must be corresponding duties on flour. A superstructure 
of duties on worked-up products builds itself upon every 
duty on raw material. In this sense there are duties 
of the first grade and duties of later stages. Thus, in order 
to establish a customs association, it is necessary to go 
down to the primary duties and from thence work the 
equality upwards. This is not difficult, as things are, in the 
case of the corn tariff, for the treaty duties since 1906 are 
almost equal, viz. for rye in Germany 5-00 M„ in Austria-
Hungary 6.00 Kr., for wheat 5-50 M. and 6.50 Kr. for the 
xoo kilograms. This could easily (with a uniform standard) 
be brought to a common denominator, so that from this 
starting-point the whole department of corn, flour, bread 
and fodder would reach uniformity. The case of iron 
presents rather more difficulties, for pig-iron pays in Germany 
1.00 M„ in Austria-Hungary 1.5 K r . = i .2 7 M. And the 
superstructure dependent on this base figure shows greater 
differences still. Bar-iron pays, expressed in marks, 2.5 M. 
in Germany, 5.20 M. in Austria-Hungary. Tin in Germany 
varies from 3.00 M. to 4.50 M„ but in Austria-Hungary it 
pays 7.65 M. ! The differences in the case of tools, screws 
and cutlery are quite enormous ; here in some cases the 
Austrian duty is five times that of the German Empire. 
These duties on finished iron goods are directed against the 
imports from Germany. Thus here it would not suffice to 
make the primary figure the same, but in addition the whole 
superstructure must be agreed upon. The department of 
textiles does not show quite such extensive differences, but 
yet contains very notable distinctions ; here, however, the 
number of items is so great that the existing conditions can 
hardly be expressed in any understandable form by a few 
figures. The duty on worsted begins in Germany at 8 M. 
and increases according to the qualities up to 24 M., in 
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Austria-Hungary it begins at 10.20 M. and increases up to ; 
40.80 M. ! Any one who has not a copy of the tariff duties 
himself will find further data of this kind in the work by i 
Professor Philippovich which we have already referred to, 
Ein Wirtschafts-uni Zollverband zwischen Deutschland und | 
Österreich-Ungarn. There are also goods which are duty- j 
free in Germany because we have no competition to fear in ; 
regard to them, but which are protected by a tariff in i 
Austria-Hungary, as for example many chemicals. These 
differences are mostly the result of forcible pressure by the i 
interests affected, and will be insisted on so much the more j 
because in the first instance they were secured laboriously, I 
with difficulty and entreaties. Consequently, any one who ! 
wants to make alterations here will meet with opposition at 
every turn from those most nearly concerned. And in such 
questions where it is a matter of money figures, those ; 
interested are generally obstinate and are often actually 
fighting for the lucrativeness of their capital and machinery. 
Thus no one need suppose that a customs unity can be 
produced, so to speak, by a stroke of the pen from above. 
But above all it follows from this that the persons interested 
cannot be made the only judges in their own affairs, because 
in this case the great national economic object will hardly be 
attained. 
* * * * * * 
If we suppose for a moment that the war had not hap-
pened just now, we should be faced by the question of the 
renewal of the present commercial treaty system. Then 
both sides would propose the alterations they desired, but 
Austria-Hungary in particular would try to improve the : 
position of their customs policy in regard to Germany. For 
there exists a widespread conviction in Austria-Hungary that 
in 1903 the special interests of the country were falsely 
represented. At that time the Austro-Hungarian negotiators 
still proceeded on the assumption that a reduction in the 
German corn duties was of vital importance for them. But 
this was a mistake, for the moment was at hand when 
Austria-Hungary herself would need corn from abroad. 
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Austria-Hungary increased in amount of population and 
consuming ability, but her agricultural production did 
not increase to the same extent. And the Austrian corn 
duties had no noticeable effect on the latter. The conse-
quence was that a part of the Austro-Hungarian energies 
were wrongly directed. And hence for the more important 
export items, namely, cattle, cattle products, wood and 
also fruit, according to the Austrian understanding of 
the matter, that relief was not obtained which a different 
procedure would have secured. Whether this latter is true 
or not (and it is hard to say after the event), it may anyhow 
be taken for granted that, but for the war, a serious effort 
would have been made by Austria-Hungary to obtain 
further concessions for the articles of export mentioned by 
a further screwing up of the industrial duties. It would 
certainly not have been carried to the length of a tariff war, 
but the negotiations would have taken no very smooth 
course. Temper in respect to customs policy was not 
quite harmonious since there was an obvious decline in the 
export trade to Germany in various directions. This 
temper is now restrained by the overpowering importance 
of the war partnership, but it will not be entirely under the 
surface during the negotiations. We must count on it, and 
may be prepared for a regular trench-making war round 
each individual item during the conferences over the tariff. 
If, then, economic unity is to be attained Austria-Hungary 
must at' the same time be assured that it will not be thrust 
into a corner. But this means that intermediate customs 
duties or something similar must be set up between the 
two countries as a protective measure. 
* * * * * * 
We have already mentioned incidentally that German and 
Austrian textile firms may encounter one another on the 
Roumanian market. This was no example chosen at hap-
hazard, for rivalries in the sphere of the Balkan markets 
form one of the special difficulties in the commercial policy 
of the two Great Powers. It is not what is bought there 
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that makes the matter difficult, but what is to be sold there. 
The Austrian manufacturers cannot equal the manufac-
turers of the German Empire in distant and overseas 
countries, and go thither gladly under the protection of 
German export firms and consulates, but in the Balkan 
States they think they possess a kind of unwritten preroga-
tive, and take it amiss that in recent years before the war 
the Germans of the Empire offered their goods with visibly 
increasing success in Roumania, Bulgaria and even in 
Serbia. How this is connected with the Austro-Hungarian 
Balkan policy may here be left undecided : the actual fact 
is that in three years (1910-1913) the exports from the 
German Empire to Roumania increased in value from 66 to 
140 million marks, and to Bulgaria from 19 to 30 million 
marks, not indeed for the most part directly at the expense 
of Austria, but yet in such a way that Germany stands for 
140 as a seller in Roumania, but Austria only for 114. The 
corresponding figures for Bulgaria are in reverse order, 
30 : 40 ; for Serbia 19 : 37. Similar feelings and experiences 
also characterise the Austro-Hungarian export trade to 
Turkey. If we attempt to obtain a more exact picture in 
this case from the customs records, we shall find that the 
German advance does not proceed with equal weight in all 
departments of industry. It is greater in iron than in 
woollen goods, but this must be admitted : Austria-Hungary 
has no country except Bulgaria and Serbia where it is of 
more importance industrially than Germany. Without 
colonies, and almost without special economic spheres of 
interest, it is yet obliged to export goods in order not to 
force its population to emigrate to an even greater extent 
than at present. We Germans of the Empire ought first 
really to get a grasp of this confined and isolated position, 
before we object to the suspicion with which the Austrians 
and Hungarians frequently watch our successful economic 
policy. To speak frankly : the Austrian has for us on 
many occasions the same feeling that we have for the English 
world-group economic system, a mixture of respect, envy 
and defiance. It is unusual to speak of such intangibilities : 
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the literature relating to the customs partnership avoids 
these less palpable matters, but I am firmly persuaded that 
without a perfectly frank exposure of ah the depths the 
Mid-European lifelong union will never come about. We 
need for it not only a bargaining spirit, but a sympathetic 
creative conviction. But this means when translated into 
practice : the tariff and commercial treaty between Germany 
and Austria-Hungary will only have a constructive signifi-
cance if it reaches out beyond the mutual barter of advan-
tages and disadvantages to the joint regulation of the foreign 
markets to be kept or to be won. If this is not arrived at, 
the treaty will in all probability be a treaty of estrangement. 
* * * * * * 
The above, in our opinion, describes the Central European 
commercial problem in general, but we have not yet entered 
upon the question at the root of the present discussions : 
what must be the character of the new treaty. So far we 
have insisted on uniformity in the classification of goods, 
and have spoken of the necessity for a considerate adjust-
ment of the transition ; two demands which must be made 
whatever be the nature of the solution. But the technical 
question at the root of the matter is whether the two, or 
three, commercial States desire to have and are able to have 
a joint commercial policy with intermediate frontiers 
between the countries, or two commercial policies in whose 
adjustment they co-operate. It is the old question of a 
federal State or a State confederation transferred to 
commercial policy. But the remembrance of this same old 
political dispute shows us how vague and transitory all 
concepts are in this connection, because in practice the 
federal State may have its bonds so weakened by numerous 
exceptions that it means less than a confederation of States 
with developing organs for common activities. Hence 
it is useless to swear by one of these formula: from the 
outset, in any doctrinaire spirit. What is needed is to create 
the will to bring out further developments from well-
conceived beginnings. The existing technical possibilities 
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are ably analysed in a pamphlet by Professor Julius Wolf: 
Ein deutsr.h-osterreichish-ungarischer Zollveriand (published 
at Leipzig by Deichert). There the question is stated thus : 
Customs union or preferential treatment ? 
A customs union means that round the frontier of the 
joint territory (that is round the trench-made frontier of 
Central Europe) there will be established the customs 
administration of the union, with frontier stations and 
officials, all controlled from some central place in Mid-
Europe. This administration will levy the same duties and 
imports in accordance with like principles and reckoned in a 
unified standard of value, and so strict will this equality be 
that it will be just the same whether the wheat-ship or the 
barley-steamer came to port in Hamburg, Bremen, Mann-
heim or Trieste, or whether the coffee or caoutchouc is used 
in Antwerp, Fiume or Cattaro. A head of cattle will be 
treated no differently in Flensburg than in Semlin provided 
that no further agreements are made with these countries. 
This idea supposes a joint machinery and that the people 
managing it will be interchangeable over the whole fine, 
since only in this way can equality of application be 
ensured. 
Preferential treatment, on the other hand, means that the 
two (or three ?) commercial States will remain in existence 
afterwards as before, and will have their own separate 
machinery for the collection of customs, as Austria and 
Hungary have at present, but that they will agree with one 
another to apply a joint classification of goods with as far 
as possible equal customs rates at the outer frontiers border-
ing on foreign countries; whilst on their mutual joint 
frontier either special mitigations or deductions of duty 
will be accorded, so that perhaps 20 per cent, less duty 
is collected from friend than from foreigner. Of course 
the percentage rate of the deduction may be variously 
arranged. 
Intermediate forms may indeed be conceived of between 
these two fundamental forms, and the future discussions 
will probably centre round these intermediate forms. But 
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before speaking of them it will be useful to consider the 
fundamental forms themselves. 
* * * * * * 
Preferential treatment offers one very evident advantage, 
that with it all State rights remain as they were before 
and that each section can do what it likes in the future 
within the conditions of the treaty. On this account it is 
liked at the present time, especially by the Austrians and 
Hungarians, and appears the easier solution. This notion 
must, however, be somewhat disturbed when the matter is 
examined more closely, for preferential treatment involves 
serious grounds for hesitation for Austria-Hungary, which 
will be understood in virtue of our previous exposition. In 
the first place it must be taken into account that export 
from Austria-Hungary to Germany (according to the 
German statistics 827 million marks in value) is substantially 
less than the export from Germany to Austria-Hungary 
(1105 million in value). So that if an equal preferential 
quota is chosen it will certainly work out more to the 
advantage of Germany than to that of Austria-Hungary. 
But besides this the German exports belong far more to 
the group called competitive than do the Austro-Hungarian. 
All the articles in the group which we have called above 
that of supplementary partnership, disturb our home 
production only a little or not at all. For example, if 
mine timber comes to us from Austria and not from Russia, 
this is pleasant for Austria without endangering our own 
production of wood. But if German small-iron is brought 
into Austria more cheaply it will be noticed in the iron trade 
over there as a direct pressure on the home market. This 
is exactly what Austria-Hungary wishes to avoid, viz. 
pressure on an industrial system which is only just beginning 
to be conscious of advance. In order to avoid these results 
an attempt might indeed be made to facilitate supplementary 
importation to Germany by the Austrians and Hungarians, 
whilst encouraging the German competitive imports as little 
as possible. But this will result in an agreement which does 
9* 
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not differ in essentials from the existing situation and 
which can only be of minor interest to the German Empire 
since it offers no closer political union, sensibly disturbs 
the treaties with Russia and other States, and does not 
create a Central European world-group. The more accu-
rately the preference idea is thought out the more dangerous 
it appears for Austria-Hungary, and especially because 
it includes no security for the Austrian foreign trade to 
the Balkan States or to other foreign countries. If Austria-
Hungary as a whole were still an agricultural State in 
the old style, preferential treatment would be a sensible 
arrangement for both sides. But since this condition is 
past, and since the Dual Monarchy has little more to offer 
us in respect to the most important food-stuffs, every settle-
ment which is based on simple give and take must narrow 
down Austria's position still further. By this procedure it 
gains too little on the German market, nothing on foreign 
markets, and must endanger its home production. I should 
not have thought it necessary, merely from the standpoint 
of .German industry, to make these statements with such 
deliberate clearness but that I am of opinion that Mid-
European modes of thought should show themselves from 
the beginning in this matter, and that the interests of our 
companion in the union should be regarded equally with 
our own. And so I consider it a duty to make my under-
standing of the position of affairs as intelligible as possible. 
We have already emphasised the fact that a customs 
partnership will involve much greater introductory diffi-
culties and more serious problems connected with individual 
State rights. But it alone will render it feasible for the 
German Empire to make provision for the Austro-Hungarian 
economic future as well as for its own. It involves for 
Austria a certain sacrifice, not to be regarded lightly, of 
economic independence and of its rights as a free State. 
But in the first place the bond is mutual, in the second 
place the Austro-Hungarian economic benefit will be great, 
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and in the third place the transaction is necessary, according 
to the teaching of history, to the further continuance of the 
Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. An Austria-Hungary 
isolated in the world's economic system cannot put forth 
sufficient financial strength to raise up its own industries 
from under the burden of war debts. Let us grant that 
Austria-Hungary must first re-examine thoroughly all 
other possibilities before taking the irrevocable step of 
forming the customs partnership. Irrevocable it will be 
even if provision is made in the treaty of union for notice 
of withdrawal, which I for my part advocate because the 
possibility of withdrawal is a certain safety-valve against 
dissension, and affords a handle for necessary alterations. 
But the fusion, even in a single economic period, will be so 
powerful that it will no longer be possible to talk seriously 
of complete separation, so long as the mutual economic 
resources, with the joint increase per cent., correspond 
roughly with present conditions. As soon as Austria-
Hungary has convinced herself, after careful examination of 
all other possibilities, of the necessity of the future economic 
partnership, it will be able to approach Germany with quite 
different demands than in the case of a mere preferential 
treaty. For from thenceforward it will be not merely 
economic advantage set against economic advantage, but 
both parties will unite to establish a world-group economic 
area. And the extent of the area thus united will be such 
that no resources need be wasted in any part whatever of the 
whole. When once this foundation is laid Austria-Hungary 
will not only have the right, but it will be her sacred duty 
to demand our agreement and co-operation in all the 
measures which may facilitate the transition and render 
easy the further working out of all Austro-Hungarian 
possibilities of development. In this way the customs 
partnership will, of itself, become more than a customs 
partnership. For when once the two sections have come to 
an understanding over the desire for unity, they are techni-
cally on the way not only to find means for the customs 
treaties, but also to solve with other and better methods 
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some portion of the joint economic problem, such as a 
State system of storage and association in syndicates. 
In various parts of our book we have already alluded to 
the effects which the experiences of war economics will 
continue to have in the future after the war. In particular 
the storage of food-stuffs and of endangered raw materials 
and the regulation of syndicates for the purposes of taxa-
tion will come under consideration. If we assume that 
both will be taken in hand in an assured partnership, then 
what has hitherto appeared as a commercial treaty will 
divide itself into three interconnected groups of treaties : 
storage treaties, syndicate treaties, and a commercial treaty 
in the narrower sense of the word. This aspect of the 
matter has been much too little considered by previous 
authors. 
The central point of the storage treaties will be the State 
granaries. How far these must be extended to fodder-
stuffs, we shall leave for later consideration. Here it is 
essential from the outset to place the Hungarian system of 
farming, which supplies the only agricultural surplus in the 
whole area, and whose surplus can become much 
larger, in an assured position. The Hungarian farmer 
must be placed completely on a level with the corn-growers 
in Germany and Austria in the unified economic system, 
and be differentiated once for all from all foreign com-
petitors. There would be no absolute necessity for this 
under a bare system of commercial treaties, but from the 
outset it forms one of the principles of a complete union. 
In this case the Hungarian corn-growers are the same to us as 
are our own great landed proprietors and small farmers : 
they form the basis of an economic system of food-supply in 
the Mid-European union. After our previous statements 
there is no need to explain further what this signifies for 
Hungary. 
The central point of the syndicate treaties will be the 
Central European iron syndicate, through which, with the 
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co-operation of the State Governments concerned, the 
position of the Austrian and Hungarian iron industrials, 
hitherto assured to them through tariffs and State protection, 
win be guaranteed in the form of zones determined by 
cartels. What is thought of as the intermediate customs 
duty between the two countries will become the tax paid 
to the cartel, and the cartel as a whole will pay the State 
Government, a point to which we shall allude again later. 
In this way too a definite partition of the foreign export 
market can be arrived at, and in this way alone. The 
proved organising powers of the syndicates on both sides 
will be placed at the service of the joint economic area. 
This, if it succeeds, will be much better and more effective 
for the Austrian and Hungarian iron industry, with all its 
ramifications and superstructures, than any mere protection 
of the home market by tariff. But when once the model of 
a joint syndicate has been discovered in the important 
department of iron, this plan can be applied, with needful 
alterations, to all industries where syndicates are feasible. 
In this way the group of products for which intermediate 
duties are needed will decrease with every new fusion into a 
syndicate. Combined syndicates with well-calculated quotas 
and with a preferential limitation of the home market under 
politically guaranteed penalties for their agreements, need 
nothing more than the common customs line against the 
foreigner. This is conceived in a very strongly syndicalistic 
spirit and may on this account seem distasteful at first to 
many of those engaged in industry. But the fact itself that 
we are face to face with the formation of syndicates in all 
main departments of the manufacture of half-finished goods 
and of wholesale goods is already in evidence, and it is only 
a question of laying hold of the existing bias of the age and 
placing it in relation to the Central European problem. 
It is much to be desired that the foundation lines of the 
future systems of storage and of the regulation of syndicates 
should be laid down before the erection of the new Central 
European tariff system is entered upon. For this will 
present quite a different appearance as soon as the most 
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difficult main items of the intermediate customs problem 
are removed. To guide public discussions in this direction 
is one essential purpose of our book. 
* * * * * . * 
But what will then be the position of the intermediate 
duties so often referred to ? They will still be necessary as 
a means of adjustment for all those productions which 
cannot be better regulated in any different way. The 
following cases may be distinguished : 
(a) One of the two economic areas needs no duty at all 
on certain goods because it stands of itself above all com-
petitors, as for example in many sections of the German 
chemical industry. In this case the other area may be 
in the position of having a small but yet not worthless 
industry to protect. Then, supposing that regulation by 
syndicate is inapplicable, the second area must be entitled 
to add an additional duty to the joint tariff on its outer 
frontiers, and to levy this additional sum as an intermediate 
duty on the boundary between Germany and Austria. 
(b) In both areas industries of the same kind exist which 
demand a like protection with regard to the foreigner, 
but which are of such different strengths compared with one 
another that the one desires protection against the other 
in home trade, as for instance certain sections of the German 
glass industry or of the Austrian clothing manufacture. In 
this case a duty will be levied on the inner boundary in 
favour of the weaker party. This duty will be less than 
the tariff for foreigners, but high enough to do away with the 
superiority. This group may be called that of industrial 
maintenance duties (Aufrechterhaltungszolle). 
(c) In both areas there exist products which are in a 
weak position in international trade, but which are saved 
from extinction by the support of the home population. 
Examples of this are tobacco as cultivated on certain tracts 
of land in Germany, grapes grown in the less favourable 
districts, fruits cultivated in indifferent climates. These 
cases will need to be examined to see whether here also risks 
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do not arise from the union which may be warded off by 
preservative duties (.Bewahrungszolle). 
The difference between the second and third groups is 
this that the industrial maintenance duties may, m the 
abstract, be of a temporary character, either serving as 
educational duties (Erziehungszolle) for infant industries or 
making possible a peaceful remoulding of the industries 
affected. On the other hand the preservative duties are 
essentially of a more permanent character. It is clear from 
this distinction that the demand to do away with the inter-
mediate duties cannot be urged in like manner for all such 
duties, at any rate not within a measurable space of time. 
What intermediate duties and how many of them will be 
necessary can only be investigated in a most laborious 
manner by going through all the separate items. In this 
matter the first preliminary is to establish the joint classifica-
tion. A possible average of the existing duties will next be 
entered in this classification as against foreign countries, and 
submitted for discussion. Whether or no in individual 
cases not only duties against the foreigner, except for 
articles in group {a), but also intermediate duties calculated 
to correspond with them will be needed, the attempt to 
draw up the tariff must show. In every case where a super-
structure is added on to the common tariff, it will appear 
automatically on the inner frontier as an intermediate duty 
By this arrangement a customs service will still be needed 
on the inner boundary for a very long time. But this is 
hardly avoidable and has its advantages, for by its means 
the economic position on both sides can still be distinguished 
for statistical purposes, so that people can tell what each 
party has gained or lost through the new joint system. 
This is particularly necessary for the weaker section con-
cerned, so that it can protect itself if the arrangements do 
not have the effect that they ought to have. 
* * * * * * 
To provide for the development of the Austrian foreign 
export trade is one of the most essential and also one of the 
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most difficult problems of the joint commercial policy. 
Things are much simpler so far as Hungary comes into 
question, since in this case the exports are of raw materials, 
and of worked-up products of wood and corn, and will 
remain predominantly so in the future. But Austria, as we 
have repeatedly said, is in such a position that she thrusts 
her finished manufactures, which from their nature cannot be 
sold in industrial Germany, across the frontiers in any direc-
tion where they will not be so fatally pressed by competition 
from the German Empire and elsewhere. We have previously 
remarked that should the economic partnership not come 
into existence there will be no possibility or inducement for 
Germany to make over to the Austrians and (so far as they 
wish it) to the Hungarians, the Balkan market or any other 
eligible section of the international market, as a special zone. 
Now we must touch upon the same question again on the 
hypothesis of an economic partnership, and declare in prin-
ciple that the Austro-Hungarian industries will need not only 
intermediate duties for internal trade, but in the case of 
certain neighbouring localities will need also preferential con-
ditions for their export trade. According to tariff technicalities 
this is not easy, for it must either be done through commercial 
treaties with the neighbouring States affected, in which case 
these must agree, or through export premiums for assignable 
Austro-Hungarian products, which must be paid from the 
joint customs receipts. The ministries of commerce and 
chief customs administrations will probably only enter upon 
this kind of regulation with reluctance, but provisionally we 
know of nothing better. 
In connection, too, with the important matter of the 
Turkish treaties, care must be taken from the outset that 
Austria-Hungary is not passed over. The difference between 
mere preferential tariffs in the sense of commercial treaties 
and complete economic partnership is in practice hardly so 
great anywhere as here. But we do not intend to write 
about future Turkish economic problems so long as fighting 
troops are occupying the trenches in Gallipoli. 
A customs and economic partnership which removes or 
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reduces intermediate duties, involves, as a matter of course, 
financial consequences for the State treasuries, since the 
customs receipts will be regarded as a part of the Imperial 
and State revenues. We shah speak at first of the matter 
not as it affects State rights but only as it affects State 
economics. Even this subject is so complex that here 
only its most general characteristics can be indicated. 
The German Empire receives about 700 million marks a 
year from customs duties, in which administrative repay-
ments are not included, since these would make the matter 
still more complicated. The Austt 0 Hungarian j oint admini-
stration receives about 240 millio 11 kronen. But the question 
arises whether this is properly I o be understood as revenue 
from the standpoint of national economics, since each duty 
simultaneously brings receipts into the State treasury and 
increases expenditure. For the State itself is the greatest 
purchaser. All Government offices erect buildings, use iron, 
buy leather, pay for uniforms, employ workpeople. And 
above all, the army of officials rightly demands higher 
salaries with every increase in the price of necessaries. 
Consequently the usual process is that every increase in the 
customs receipts is followed by a screwing up of Government 
expenditure, and my friend Gothein is probably correct in 
saying that the State treasury itself has never yet made 
any real, permanent gain through tariffs. But to infer 
from this that a decrease in the duties will have the effect 
of reducing the expenditure of the State treasury is, to say 
the least, unwise. And it is even more unwise to prophesy 
beforehand whether and how far the decrease in the internal 
duties of the Central European economic union will show 
itself in a decline in State expenditure. In order to avoid 
disappointment the whole amount of the decrease in receipts 
must be written off. What this will be depends on the 
height of and the proceeds from the intermediate duties. 
A complete economic partnership without any intermediate 
duties might mean for Germany a loss of perhaps 60 million 
marks a year, and for Austria-Hungary one of 90 or xoo 
million kronen. It is clear at once that the loss would be 
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greater both in itself and relatively, in Austria-Hungary, a 
fact which would have to be taken into account in dividing 
the joint customs revenue. But no one thinks seriously of 
an unchecked transit of all goods free from intermediate 
duties, so that the amounts to be deducted' in the State 
budgets will be appreciably smaller, perhaps only a third 
of the sums quoted. But all this must be explained from 
the outset so that objections may not subsequently be 
brought forward on account of it. 
In regard to the division of the joint customs revenue 
probably the State treasuries concerned must be assured of 
their existing amount of revenue—so far, indeed, as this 
amount can be obtained under the changed economic 
system after the war—in order that existing conditions may 
be disturbed as little as possible by the new arrangement. 
Whatever surplus there may be over and above the guaran-
teed sums will then belong to joint objects. But this takes 
us well into the subject of the following chapter. 
C H A P T E R V I I I 
CONSTITUTIONAL P R O B L E M S 
As we look forward into a future which we ourselves shall 
never see, but which will be the "present d a y " of our 
grandsons' and granddaughters who are born in these days 
of war, the super-State of Mid-Europe appears before our 
mind's eye as a constitutional body whose existence will 
then rest on its own stable footing and which will need no 
special creation since it is actually there. Is any one still 
engaged to-day in founding the German Empire? It 
exists ! But before Mid-Europe reaches this position of 
obviousness there must unfortunately be an endless number 
of debates and discussions over State rights ; so many that 
I am almost afraid lest people should lose all enthusiasm 
for the business owing to the interminable formal discussions. 
But what is the good? The next generation must go 
through this confusion and noise of State rights. In old 
days an affair of this sort passed comparatively painlessly 
since it was accomplished over the heads of the mass of 
little people. But now, in this age of democracy and 
newspapers, now every sentence will be turned over a 
hundred times. This is a part of the very character and 
essence of our time and also of the essence of the Mid-
European question, for Mid-Europe will assuredly be no 
gift of princes but the desire of the nations. The princes 
will take part in what is necessary, as they nearly always do, 
with more or less pleasure and inward sympathy, but they 
do not of themselves readily cross the laboriously established 
boundaries of sovereign territories, unless the passing to and 
fro of the peoples is already becoming a mighty flood. And 
the existing Government officials especially are generally 
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conservative in the sense of maintaining their previous 
mode of life, and they defend themselves partly against an 
increase in their duties, partly against the enforced under-
standing with foreign officials, partly against the disarrange-
ment of spheres. of competence and business customs in 
general. Almost all the great things in the world have to 
be wrung from those most nearly concerned in carrying on 
affairs, for these are the greatest experts indeed, but at the 
same time they are the most affected by any alteration. Of 
course a creative spirit may always arise in their midst, as 
Bismarck revealed himself in the Frankfurt Federal Diet, 
but such a development is no historical necessity. And thé 
more difficult and insuperable a transaction appears at the 
outset, the less is a complicated heavily worked system 
inclined to burden itself with preliminary labours whose 
results he in the distance and whose success cannot be 
foreseen with certainty. Thus even the most important of 
present-day problems cannot be left with simple confidence 
only to those Government officials most nearly concerned. 
Naturally they will ultimately have the last word to say in 
this matter and will undertake the technical formulation, 
but before they speak the air must be permeated by Mid-
European ideas. In this great present-day affair the will of 
the people will have to show itself less in the fact that the 
representatives in Parliament finally give their assent to the 
treaties of union than in the fact that the temper of the 
populations demands the new creation as a preliminary to 
all treaties and proposals. Mid-Europe must be talked 
about, Mid-Europe the coming, necessary, indispensable 
State association and union of nations. Every journalist up 
to the very frontier places ought to help in this. Every one 
who has oratorical power ought to do his share of public 
speaking. Now is the time for this, even now before the 
Peace Congress and before the decisive moment for humanity. 
Rise, Mid-Europe, in poetry and prose be exalted ! 
* * * * * * 
The greatest danger in such thoughts and proposals is, 
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however, that the opposition of the existing forces, arrange-
ments and departments may be underestimated. It is so easy 
to draft upon paper an ideal Mid-European construction ! 
It is merely necessary to borrow a few quite general ideas 
out of the treasure of existing conceptions of State rights, 
and to apply them to the subject to be dealt with. In so 
doing it is always supposed that there is an invisible dicta-
torial power over the existing Governments, which can 
make these ideas into binding precepts. But this is not 
the case. The carrying out of all our ideas rests in reality 
in those same hands which have guided our States so far. 
Certain changes of personnel may indeed be made, but in 
the main the new, as old Liebknecht once expressed it, 
must always be " the legitimate child of the present." We 
are no Utopia, but an area occupied by ancient State forma-
tions of the longest standing which have grown up promis-
cuously together. Whether we conclude treaties or make 
adjustments they must all, in order to be valid, bear the 
signature of the German Emperor, of the Austrian Emperor 
and of the King of Hungary, and must be resolved upon by 
the Bundesrat, the Delegations, the Reichsrat and the 
Reichstag. We enter upon the work with earnest and 
serious remembrance of all these essential factors and 
co-operators, none of whom must fail if the enterprise is to 
succeed. 
It is very important at this stage that the content of the 
problem should not be increased, but on the contrary 
decreased as far as possible, since an overladen boat cannot 
be pushed off from the bank at all. The final aims should 
be great, but the immediate demands should be attainable. 
We cannot venture to ask that the super-State of Mid-
Europe shall be in existence after a short delay, but only 
that its beginnings shall be so well conceived that the first 
steps will thereupon of themselves lead further forward. 
Moreover it is essential that the first settlements should be 
planned only between Germany, Austria and Hungary. 
The nucleus must be there before further crystallisation can 
take place, The discussion of many European States at 
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once destroys businesslike progress from the outset. What 
is wanted here is restrained and disciplined political imagina-
tion, no universal, boldly arbitrary spirit of prophecy, 
leaping over whole decades. 
* * * * * - * 
Looked at as technical politics, the creation of Mid-
Europe is the centralisation of certain political activities, 
that is to say the establishment of fresh central points for 
the joint working of the whole of the enlarged territory. 
But before we speak of such a centralisation it will be 
advisable to dwell upon what we cannot venture to influence 
or to gain by centralisation. For many objections to the 
new ideas arise on all sides from anxiety lest a foreign and 
unfamiliar co-operative Government might interfere with 
matters that we have hitherto desired under all circum-
stances to keep in our own hands. No State becoming a 
partner in the new super-State will consent to sacrifice 
thereby its political dignity, its own sovereignty which it 
has won with difficulty and defended with its blood. To 
begin with the Hungarians, without whom we cannot 
complete Mid-Europe ; they will grasp at once the immense 
advantages of the Mid-European plan from the point of 
view of economics and of historical development, for they 
have an intelligent knowledge of the world and are clever 
calculators. But for them the struggle waged by their 
fathers for the independence of a special Hungarian State 
ranks higher than advantage and than the philosophy of 
history. And they would join in nothing which might at 
the same time lead to any reduction of political rights even 
in the most distant future. On this point they are obdurate, 
and we recognise that they are so. But the same thing 
applies to the sphere of Austrian authority. The Austrian 
State knows its limitations and*its!historical subjections, it 
has emerged from the schooling of continual negotiations 
with the Hungarians over the Ausgleich and of ceaseless 
concessions to its individual refactory members. But in 
spite of all this it retains a vitality of its own, and that indeed 
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both deep-seated and vigorous, which will at no price be 
cut short or injured. And again the same thing applies to 
the German Empire. It discovered, through Bismarck, the 
form suited to it, and has worked with it successfully for a 
period. Shall the German Empire allow itself to be lectured 
about its own concerns by companions who have newly 
joined themselves with it ? People are ready on all sides 
to make certain necessary concessions for Mid-Europe, but 
the dignity of the State itself must not be touched. That 
may not please the purely theoretical thinker, but it is the 
actual situation : Mid-Europe is no new country. Hence 
it is in the interests of all concerned that ambitious schemes 
for fusion should not be brought forward. In other words : 
under the superscription Mid-Europe no new State will be 
created, but a union of existing States will be formed. In 
using the word " super-State " for this union we have 
intended no decrease in political dignity for the separate 
portions ; it ought not, will not and cannot mean this. 
Those who determine on the development, are responsible 
for it and carry it on, will be and will remain the present 
sovereign States concluding the treaty. These will make 
mutual concessions to one another, but it is they who do 
this, and they will not cease to be the subjects of future 
joint activities. If people like to call the new creation a 
confederation of States, this hits its character, but it cannot 
become a federal State. The second would indeed be 
essentially more than the first, but it is not feasible. 
* * * * * * 
If it comes into existence the Mid-European State union 
will decide what matters shall be jointly regulated and 
administered. Here we must exclude from the outset all 
those matters wherein old and sacred rights are inherent in 
local and provincial peculiarities. When we were discussing 
creeds and nationalities we pointed out that these deeply 
intricate questions must not be subjected to any centralised 
regulation, unless insupportable opposition is to be aroused 
from the outset. We shall discover the proper limitation in 
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this matter most easily if we take a general survey of the 
historical changes in the character of the State. The older 
State was based much more on national and Church convic-
tions, and much less on economic organisation than the 
modern great State. The older State embodied the concept 
of unity of religious belief amongst its subjects or citizens, 
and later, when rehgious unity became defective, the 
concept of unity of language. It had very few economic 
questions to regulate since the old type of economic system 
was almost entirely natural, local and purely individualist. 
The commune sufficed for the management of the former 
common lands, the district or the town generally sufficed to 
regulate the old crafts. There were only a few meagre 
State provisions for far-distant trade routes and for extra-
provincial trade rights, and the local police were generally 
sufficient for social duties. But in the place of all this the 
old State busied itself much more forcibly with the questions 
whether and after what manner each of its subjects wor-
shipped God and what was the prevailing form of religious 
ceremony. This was characteristic of the old days when 
the individual, though able to look after the cultivation of 
his fields or his business in primitive fashion, was not capable 
of providing for his spiritual needs. The ancient duty of 
spiritual guidance and the care of souls which pertained to 
the State terminated, however, in some measure as the 
system of State religion became permeated by a certain 
increasing independence of the individual and by the 
developing self-government, apart from the State, of the 
Church corporations. To-day the State is no longer the 
creator of conviction and the ruler of belief, but at the most 
a controlling influence to prevent any infringement of their 
mutual boundaries on the part of religious sects and a 
protector of the system of public rights and of administration 
as such, from any Church interference. These functions, 
so far as they are still necessary, belong exclusively to the 
older types of State, and even in them are handed over as 
much as possible to provincial and specific authorities. The 
world-group economic super-State will have nothing whatever 
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to do with provincial churches, church law, ecclesiastical 
legislation and representation before the papal throne, even 
though cases may be thought of in which the last-named 
matter is not without far-reaching political influence. 
Nor will the super-State have anything to do with school 
affairs. It is true that practically everywhere in Central 
Europe, so far as primary education is concerned, the school 
is a State foundation, and was mostly the work of an 
enlightened State bureaucracy before it was able later to 
become an object of parliamentary care. The private and 
sectarian school did not suffice for the average standard of 
education needed by the developing modern capitalist 
State. But when once the necessity for universal popular 
education is recognised everywhere in principle, this depart-
ment will be made over more and more as time goes on 
to be worked by the local communal administration. It 
ought to be much more decentralised and flexible than it 
generally is at present. It appertains to the legislation, the 
initiative and the control of the individual State, but is 
never a matter for higher State or super-State regulation. 
Even if it be admitted that the training of political opinion 
in the schools greatly affects the world-group super-State, 
yet a sharp limitation must be imposed on sovereign rights 
lest a door should be opened for the effects of majority 
votes and pressure in a sphere where those most nearly 
concerned ought to have the responsibility. Voluntary 
congresses relating to school affairs may, and certainly will, 
be arranged for the whole of Central Europe, but no legis-
lation which goes beyond existing frontiers will be passed 
on the subject. 
In this it is partially implied that the much disputed 
language question must be left to the decision of the indi-
vidual States. Although these language disputes may 
manifest themselves in school or law court or army, and 
must there be settled as required, yet in principle they are 
no subject for Central European deliberations. This may 
indeed appear a somewhat bold statement, because the 
general arrangements for the army and for intercommunica-
R 
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tion in Central Europe will undoubtedly require a certain 
unity of language, as the war has shown us most effectively 
in regard to the railways in Galicia. But it will be quite 
impossible for the small, non-German nations to join them-
selves to Mid-Europe with feelings of complete freedom and 
contentment, if they run any risk of their language question, 
to which they attach such importance, being decided piece-
meal by an unapproachable central authority high above 
them. This shows how little scope there is for a purely 
academic building plan for Mid-Europe if it is to succeed. 
In spite of our sympathy for the language rights of the 
Germans in Hungary we Germans yet cannot dream of 
depriving the Hungarians of any of their self-governing 
powers, in the Magyar sense, by means of any sort of 
superior Mid-European decrees, because this would mean 
the total impossibility of Mid-Europe. We anticipate that 
the union of the Central European States will soften all 
language disputes and will thrust them into the background 
by means of new work, new aims and new successes shared 
in common. We hope that no Pole in Prussia and no 
German in the Banat will in future have unnecessary language 
difficulties, but in our present situation, where it is a question 
of definiteness in regard to State rights, it must be asserted 
firmly that this matter, however important it is, yet cannot 
be of a Mid-European character. 
* * * * * * 
The whole sphere of internal administration, the constitu-
tions of commune and State in the narrower sense of the 
word, will also remain, without further discussion, undis-
turbed by the Central European State union. The question 
of the State constitution demands some further explanation, 
for it is likely that the democratic parties in all the connected 
countries will attempt to direct the great process of trans-
formation which is clearly at hand everywhere after the war, 
in such a way as to secure a standard law for universal, 
equal and direct suffrage in Mid-Europe. The returning 
warriors will say with justice that every humble and insignifi-
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cant man has been obliged to stake his life for the Fatherland, 
and that citizen rights, complete and without reserve, 
are therefore his due. I share this view entirely and shall 
advocate it in Prussia with all my power, but I contest the 
idea that this suffrage fight which will probably set in after 
the war can be a Mid-European concern. Mid-Europe 
includes countries of different composition and at different 
stages of development, hence the existing differences in the 
internal constitutions of the States must be tolerated in 
themselves on principle. No doubt internal political move-
ments of like tendencies will try to get into touch with one 
another, and will learn from each other, but the State 
Parliaments are a law to themselves and must so remain. 
Neither the Hungarian nor the Austrian constitution 
altogether suits us Germans of the Empire and vice versa. 
Here also the situation is this : that the consequences of 
the parliamentary rights of individual States are at the same 
time Mid-European in character, since the economic and 
commercial policy of the State union depends on the com-
position of the governments and representative assemblies 
of the individual States. But—he who tries to grasp too 
much loses everything. Neither Prussia nor Hungary will 
ever commit themselves to a sacrifice of their special historical 
constitutional forms on the Mid-European altar. Struggles 
of this sort must be fought out separately in the different 
territories in future as in the past, until in this way, as we 
hope, a Mid-European standard of citizen rights will grow 
up at last in reality everywhere. 
The same is true of all the laws and ordinances which 
regulate the position of the representative assembly and of 
the Crown. Under no circumstances must Crown rights be 
touched upon through the creation of Mid-Europe, because 
that would be the most certain way to ruin the whole 
affair in its beginnings. This is so obvious that it requires 
no further explanation. Moreover, the different types of 
parliamentary and non-parliamentary government are 
and will remain the business of the countries concerned. 
Hungary is strongly parliamentary in virtue of its franchise 
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law and its electoral practice, Austria is unparliamentary in 
principle with varying concessions in practice to majorities. 
The German Empire as a whole is theoretically unparlia-
mentary with increasing account taken of the position of 
the parliamentary majority. The individual States within 
the German Empire vary from Mecklenburg to Baden. All 
this in the future, too, will grow according to its own law 
of development, and everywhere parliamentary influence will 
surely increase during the great financial negotiations after the 
war, but this can be no concern of the Mid-European union. 
But from this it follows already that the administrative 
bodies and the representative assemblies of the Mid-
European union, so far as these are needed, will not be 
elected or summoned on an equal system. This is a genuine 
and serious defect, for the system by which the managers 
and inspectors of a business are selected is never without 
influence on the business itself. But I repeat what has 
been already often said : Mid-Europe is a superstructure 
and not a new building! The existing buildings must 
remain standing ! 
The attentive reader may be surprised that I, who am at 
such pains to urge the foundation of Mid-Europe, am so 
diligent in reckoning up what must not be Mid-European. 
But whenever I picture to myself in private all the necessary 
partners in the union, I feel myself strongly impelled to 
assure them first of their own long-accustomed ground 
under their feet, before I venture to discuss with them the 
free movements and fresh constructions of universal history. 
Even to-day there are all kinds of anxieties at the thought 
of Mid-Europe, and these anxieties may be the grave of all 
our hopes if we cannot understand how to deal with them 
humanely. The new ought never to come like a landslip, 
it must appear like healthy and gentle growth, like a natural 
increase, not like disorganisation. Hence we shall try to 
build up the plans for unity in what follows only on the basis 
of treaties between sovereign States with equal rights, leaving 
it at first an open question how far such treaties should be 
terminable or not. 
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Numerous treaties already exist to-day between nearly all 
the States, and in particular between Germany and Austria-
Hungary, through which standards of equality are formed 
for the subordinate groups in single departments of the life 
of the State. And such treaties will also be beneficial and 
possible in considerable abundance in realising the goal 
Mid-Europe. To refer to existing precedents we call to 
mind the post and telegraph treaties, extradition treaties, 
navigation treaties, the agreements about intercourse on the 
frontiers, the Austro-German treaty for the avoidance of 
double taxation, the settlement about the law of guardian-
ship, sanitary conventions, the agreement for the sup-
pression of the white slave trade, the international marriage 
law, the Geneva Red Cross Convention, the international 
copyright law, the sugar convention and other similar 
examples. The majority of these treaties are not Central 
European in the narrower sense, but through them an 
available method has been discovered in the past to prepare 
the way for legal and administrative conditions which 
transcend the separate States, without infringing upon 
sovereignty. Treaties of this kind must now be established 
in an increasing number within the Central European terri-
tory. They may be divided into two principal groups : 
treaties which are carried out by each State through its 
own officials in its own way and without joint control, and 
treaties which owing to their nature require a mixed Joint 
Commission to carry them out. The latter group thus paves 
the way for joint administration in limited spheres. It will 
be much more readily and frequently possible between two 
States with a permanent alliance and a joint trench system 
than between two States which still have to reckon with the 
possibility of mutual war. Of it, therefore, we must speak 
more precisely. 
After the war general international treaties will be again 
renewed or established in great numbers. We do not refer 
here to the peace treaty proper or to future political agree-
ments between States about foreign policy ; we are thinking 
rather of treaties like those mentioned above. Their scope 
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extends over the whole politically organised world. Within 
them throbs the evolving world organisation. The special 
State treaty of the united world-group area has, however, 
its special character as compared with them. For here an 
exchange may take place, not only of principles and rules, 
but also of the persons to carry them out. Here the laws 
and orders for enforcement will, whilst preserving complete 
independence, yet conform as far as possible to one another 
even in the wording, and the unity of the whole world-group 
organism will be aimed at, as far as conceivable, by all 
legislative means. In this connection the words " as far 
as possible," " as far as conceivable " are unavoidable, for 
in them lies the independence of the individual sections. 
The final examination into the practicability of any fresh 
modification and adjustment will be effected in the usual way 
in the existing political capitals, just as we have already in 
the past dealt with transport treaties, legal agreements or 
other similar matters in Berlin, Vienna and Budapest. 
Let us suppose as an example that the joint-stock company 
legislation, the insurance company legislation and the 
practice of State inspection of the Exchanges in Mid-Europe 
are to be approximated to one another. Then for this 
purpose there must be an expert Mid-European preparatory 
Commission sent from the proper departments in the 
States concerned. This Commission will do the pre-
liminary work with the assistance of representatives of 
those interested, until the material is taken over by the 
Foreign Offices. If the Foreign Offices have serious hesita-
tions they may refer the business back again to the Mid-
European Commission in question, until a form is arrived 
at which (as in the present procedure in the case of political 
treaties) is submitted as the draft treaty in both the States, 
subject to the assent of the legislative factors. Whether 
this draft treaty may still be referred back again or now 
must simply be accepted or rejected, may be doubtful 
since either procedure has its advantages and disadvantages. 
The content of the treaty will now either be such that each 
State, as already said, carries it out under its own control 
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and with its own administration and jurisdiction, or such 
that through the treaty a Joint Committee will be set up to 
make regulations for carrying it out, for administrative 
decisions, the training of officials and, in the future, also for 
current control and for managing direction, such as, for 
example, a joint Office for granting Permits for Capital 
Issues. These joint managing Commissions or Committees 
can then be freely appointed by the different Governments 
in virtue of the treaty, and paid according to an agreed 
schedule. They are subject to the criticism of all the 
Parliaments concerned, but are independent within then-
sphere of activity for the duration of the treaty. They are 
Mid-European organs, without there being, properly speak-
ing, a Mid-European State. 
* * * * * * 
It is obvious that these arrangements have their serious 
defects and do not appear very inviting, for they require 
homogeneous work from a Board (.Kollegium) which obtains 
its authority from various sources, and they entrust that 
legislative preparatory work, which otherwise would naturally 
fall to a parliamentary commission, to an officially summoned 
Committee. If goodwill is lacking it will be an easy matter 
for each of the federated Governments and every strong 
parliamentary majority to bring this machinery to a stand-
still because its own power of motion is too small. This must 
be readily granted, but it is part of the complicated Mid-
European problem that we should be obliged to follow such 
adventurous paths. Yet here we have complete confidence 
that, given favourable results from the first and second of 
such Mid-European Commissions, the work of the third and 
fourth will be much easier because by that time a tradition 
will have grown up. All political activity in the absence of 
a tradition is like some one trying to ride a bicycle before he 
has learnt how. But when once he has learnt grasp and 
balance, he goes on afterwards almost as though it were his 
nature. And besides, preliminary stages of this kind must 
be gone through in any case, even if the business procedure 
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in Mid-Europe were to be very different and much more 
centralised than we have proposed. 
Even the customs partnership in the sense in which we 
have discussed it in the previous chapter will certainly not 
be possible without some permanent joint mechanism for 
carrying out decisions and settling accounts. The same 
applies to a joint storage system involving the State pur-
chase of corn, and to a joint regulation of syndicates It 
also applies to a joint fund for war debts and indemnities, 
should such a fund be resolved on. Whether or no a joint 
Patent Office will subsequently be added or a joint Railway 
Department or a joint Navigation Department, these and 
many other similar points are for later consideration. Some 
offices of this kind must first be in existence and at work 
before new ones are added. It was for this reason that we 
° U i , f i r s t c h a P t e r > t 0 ^ v e a complete programme 
of future Mid-European State activities. It is to be hoped 
that this may and will be the business of the following 
generation. s 
But when once we picture to ourselves a certain number 
of such Mid-European Commissions or higher administrative 
departments, they form together something like a Mid-
Luropean Central Administration. For this reason the 
Commissions ought to be housed, so far as is feasible, in the 
same place. This place will become for Mid-Europe in a 
modernised and better fashion what once, though with a 
mistaken constitution, Frankfurt-on-Main was or should 
have been m the old German Confederation. But probably 
some of the higher departments must be located where the 
special professional knowledge concerned is available at the 
closest quarters. To show how I conceive of the division 
1 should propose Prague as the Mid-European centre for all 
business connected with treaties that is not obliged to be 
done locally, but at the same time I should locate the centre 
for overseas trade at Hamburg, the central money-market 
at Berlin, and the legal centre at Vienna. But this is only 
of value as a provisional suggestion for the sake of clearness 
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Whilst discussing the treaty system as the basis of 
Mid-European unity we have hitherto tacitly done so as 
though the German Empire on the one hand and the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy on the other were in themselves two 
simply constituted States. But this they are not. They 
are themselves the laborious constructions of treaties, and 
upon their remarkable, historical lower stratum this further 
upper story of treaties must be erected. And, moreover, 
the two Empires are different, very different, in their 
theoretical and actual structure. Hence it will be necessary 
to consider the Mid-European treaty system first from the 
standpoint of the German Empire, and then from that of 
Austria-Hungary. In so doing we shall start in both 
cases from the question how State treaties come into 
existence. 
In the German Empire the right to conclude State treaties 
is definitely and undoubtedly an Imperial right. The 
Emperor, as representative of the Empire in international 
law, has to enter into alliances with foreign States. But 
in matters which fall within the scope of imperial legislation 
he is bound, in regard to the conclusion of the treaty, to 
have the assent of the Bundesrat, and in regard to its 
validity to have the ratification of the Reichstag. Here, in 
theory, there is at once ground for dispute, for it is not 
always clear whether these conditions were satisfied in the 
particular case or not. Still the existing practice has led to 
no special difficulties. So far as we can see, it is necessary 
that all treaties of an economic or legal character or relating 
to means of communication on their technical side, and all 
agreements which involve financial obligations, should take 
their course through the Bundesrat and Reichstag. The 
matter is questionable in regard to purely political treaties 
about foreign policy and military agreements on the one 
hand, and to mere arrangements about ordinances for carry-
ing out measures on the other. We shall speak later on more 
particularly of the first group, the political and military 
State treaties, and it is not worth while to go into details 
here about the ordinances. But there exists already, in the 
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text of Article I i of the Constitution of the German Empire, 
an important distinction between the co-operation of the 
Bundesrat and of the Reichstag. The Bundesrat is re-
quired to conclude (Abschlusz), the Reichstag to ratify 
{Gültigkeit). This means in actual fact that the nego-
tiations for the drawing up of treaties are carried on under 
the direction of the Bundesrat without the direct co-
operation of the Reichstag, whilst only the final draft is 
presented to the Reichstag for acceptance or rejection. But 
since in the case of tariff treaties, and in most other cases, 
the negotiations can only be carried on by the Bundesrat 
on the basis of existing Imperial laws, the Reichstag has 
generally a voice in the matter at the very beginning of 
these negotiations, as for example, through the introduction 
of minimum and maximum rates in the customs tariff. 
This process of conducting the business of treaty-making in 
the German Empire would be very involved if the method 
had not long since been smoothed out and cut short by 
custom. Thus the work of the Bundesrat is accomplished 
through the Imperial Departments and these have in 
practice become much more independent than appears 
from the text of the constitution. Consequently the whole 
preliminary work is carried on by them in constant touch 
with the Prussian Ministry and the representatives of the 
federated States, and in many cases the consent of the 
Bundesrat is only the last and formal acceptance of a 
document which is already in fact complete. That tradition 
already exists of which we have previously said that for 
Mid-Europe it needs first to be formed. Any one who 
looks at the Government machinery of the German Empire 
merely as a student of constitutional forms would think it 
much more complicated than do those who have the oppor-
tunity of observing it at work. Not that no friction occurs ! 
But it is only the necessary friction which is unavoidable 
in all forms of collegial action. The Office of the German 
Imperial Chancellor forms a central point for adjustments 
such as unfortunately does not exist in Austria-Hungary 
with the same efficiency and coherence. A real check 
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can scarcely occur so long and in so far as there is a funda-
mental understanding between the Imperial Chancellor's 
Office and the majority in the Reichstag. This means—• 
and this is significant for the Mid-European problem—that 
the state of affairs is itself sufficiently definite in spite of 
the obscurity of the clauses. The security for the con-
tinuance of the treaty system when begun lies in the per-
manence of the Imperial Chancellor's Office and in the 
comparative stability of the parliamentary relations in the 
German Empire. It cannot be doubted that the deter-
mination to establish Mid-Europe, when once formed, will 
not subsequently be subject to any great variations. The 
first debates will abound in objections and attempts at 
alteration, but then the machinery, as far as the German 
Empire is concerned, will soon work quite quietly, and the 
addition of new treaties to the system when it has once 
started will in all human probability go on without any 
fresh disturbances of importance. 
* * * * * * 
We are not so sure about a quiet progress of events in 
Austria-Hungary since there the constitutional bases and, 
above all, the traditions of government are different. 
Austria and Hungary are two States which are as it is 
dependent on mutual treaties, and which have accomplished 
between themselves almost exactly what should now be 
repeated for them and for us in the upper story of the 
world-group area. Consequently the Austrians and Hun-
garians have incomparably more experience in this matter 
than we Germans of the Empire, but an experience that 
is not without its scars and bruises. In spite of the unity 
of the throne at the head, the department of adjustment 
is lacking which the Imperial Chancellor's Office supplies 
for us. The Sovereign acts, so to speak, by himself in 
his two capacities as Austrian Emperor and as King of 
Hungary. The unity ultimately rests with him, with 
him but not with an Imperial Department, for the joint 
Ministry is not a supreme authority for both States, but 
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a Central Administration based on treaties such as we 
have outlined above for Mid-Europe. Expressed other-
wise : the Imperial unity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
covers many fewer objects than does that of the German 
Empire. In virtue of the law of 1867 it comprises the 
unity of the Foreign Office, of the management of the 
army and the expenses arising out of it, and in addition the 
joint administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
Delegations, that rudimentary Imperial Parliament, have 
only to determine points connected with these matters. 
Everything else appertains to the special Governments of 
the two States. To these appertain, for example, the 
sanctioning of international treaties and the recruiting for 
the army, two points of the very greatest importance for 
our investigation. Thus when we conclude treaties with 
Austria-Hungary, as we have already done and as we wish 
to do very much more in the future, we conclude them 
formally with the homogeneous body representing the 
Foreign Office but actually with two States and two Parlia-
ments. From our point of view it would be simpler if each 
of these two States could do business with us independently, 
since then the number of factors concerned would be smaller. 
But this remark has a merely academic value because we, 
as well as the Austrians and Hungarians, have to reckon 
with the existing position of the State as an actual fact. All 
this would give just as little ground for hesitation as the 
complicated system of political law in the German Empire, 
if the tradition in Austria-Hungary were as firmly established 
as it is with us. But this is unfortunately not the case as 
is shown by the course of events hitherto. The unity of the 
State, it is true, is firmly maintained upon the whole and 
will be more secure after the war than before, but all treaty 
ties between Austria and Hungary are only concluded for 
definite periods of time, and their renewal is invariably 
accompanied by difficult negotiations concerning treaty 
and Ausgleich. According to our political experience it 
will be very unfamiliar and very undesirable for us Germans 
of the Empire to have to share in these convulsions, and 
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many critics on our side, notwithstanding a most sympa-
thetic grasp of the principle involved, hesitate at the 
establishment of a Mid-European system of treaties, because 
they do not wish to be drawn into recurrent conflicts of this 
kind about the Ausgleich. On this account it may be 
allowable to enter somewhat more deeply—so far as an 
outsider can—into the historical bases of this constitutional 
position which for us is difficult to grasp. 
* * * * * * 
The German Imperial constitution is, as was explained in 
the second chapter, the outcome of a national movement 
towards unity, and its aim is consolidation. The Austro-
Hungarian constitution of 1867, on the other hand, is the 
outcome of a national process of partition. Moreover, the 
German Imperial constitution was essentially a result of the 
pressure of economic forces, whilst the Austro-Hungarian 
constitution still shows practically no trace of the economic 
character of this age of intercommunication. 
In order to inquire into the origins of the German Imperial 
constitution we must take up the draft constitution of the 
German national assembly of March 28, 1849, and learn 
from it the aims of the national movement of that date. In 
this old draft the idea of economic partnership prevails 
along with the conception of partnership in mihtary and 
naval power. The following matters were transferred to 
the Imperial authority : the regulation of ocean navigation, 
river navigation, railway affairs, inspection of high-roads, 
the formation of a customs and commercial area, joint 
taxes on production and consumption, industrial legislation, 
the postal system, coinage, weights and measures, the 
banking system, the rights of citizens, sanitation, civil law, 
commercial law, law of exchange, criminal law. The 
German national movement was quite saturated with 
economic tendencies. And afterwards the Imperial constitu-
tion drawn up by Bismarck on the basis of the Frankfurt 
draft was in accordance with it. Article 4 of the German 
Imperial Constitution is a more precise remodelling of the 
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Frankfurt aims, and adds the following to the subjects 
mentioned: patents for invention, protection of literary 
property, protection of German trade abroad, law of con-
tracts. It is very remarkable that in this Article military 
affairs and the navy only occupy the fourteenth place. 
So great was the importance attached to economic claims in 
drawing up the constitution. The German Empire, which is 
generally regarded abroad as a purely military State, is at 
least equally an economic State, and has been from thé very 
first. The two characteristics mutually permeate it and 
give to the whole its firm stability. 
In contrast to this, even in 1867, the Austro-Hungarian 
Ausgleich gave no sign of any feeling of the necessity for a 
closer economic unity, and was entirely dictated by the 
aspirations of the Hungarians to separate themselves as 
much as possible from the existing unity of the State owing 
to their feeling for their own nationalist and political State 
rights. All economic questions are disposed of in Section 2 
of the fundamental law under matters " which will not 
indeed be jointly managed but which will be treated accord-
ing to similar principles to be agreed upon from time to 
time." The hst of matters under this head contains only : 
commercial affairs, especially tariff legislation, legislation 
about indirect taxes which are in close connection with 
industrial production, the establishment of the coinage 
system and the gold standard, arrangements with respect 
to lines of railway which affect the interests of both halves 
of the Empire ; the establishment of a military organisation. 
That is all ! This was the basis on which treaties were 
concluded, not laws enacted or ordinances issued. 
Thus there is the customs and commercial treaty of 
December 30, 1907, between Austria and Hungary, which 
remains valid until December 31, 1917. It covers : uniform 
customs frontiers without intermediate duties, partnership 
in foreign commercial treaties until notice of withdrawal is 
given, regulation of the relations of courts of justice, mutual 
inspection of the customs administration, equality of 
maritime regulations, agreement concerning river navigation, 
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closer connection of railway administration, partnership in 
the consular system, closer connection in statistical work, like 
management of salt and tobacco, equal taxation of beer, 
brandy, petroleum and sugar, maintenance of the system of 
weights and measures, equal treatment of commercial 
travellers, reciprocal recognition of patents and trade marks, 
regulation of the traffic between the separate postal admini-
strations, recognition of joint-stock companies, insurance 
companies and so on, joint procedure for the protection of 
the vine, establishment of a court of arbitration for all these 
questions. 
It is evident how much more is included in the actual 
treaty than was assumed in the few lines in the fundamental 
law. The economic State has won for itself certain oppor-
tunities, but with what effort, and the whole is terminable 
on notice of withdrawal! These economic arrangements 
terminable at will, lend an element of insecurity to the whole 
industrial economic system of the Danubian Monarchy. Since 
the treaty embodying them is only of short duration it renders 
impossible the conclusion of any treaty of long duration. 
Now it is easy enough to say, from the point of view of 
the German Empire, that the Austrians and Hungarians 
must put their treaties on a permanent footing by authorising 
their Delegations to enact economic legislation for the 
whole kingdom. But the Hungarians are unwilling to take 
even this step, because it seems to them like a return to 
the old position of inferiority in respect to Austria. They 
are well aware that the relation here described has serious 
defects, but what can they do in order to arrive at a complete 
Austro-Hungarian economic State without violating the 
nationalism of their fathers and their heroes, a nationalism 
which extends also into economic matters ? 
We for our part can merely state these things, for 
it would not facilitate the attainment of our object in 
Mid-Europe to try to come in from outside with pro-
posals about matters which are essentially of a purely 
Austro-Hungarian character. But there are men among the 
Hungarians and Austrians who are able to understand the 
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world's economic movement, and who possess that inherited 
knowledge about treaty and Ausgleich negotiations which 
is inherent on the Danube. These men will seek some 
way, in spite of opposing clauses, to pave the way for a 
tradition which will make an advantageous and much-
needed Central European economic system possible for all 
parties. Where there is a will there is a way. 
* * * * * * 
These last explanations have brought us quite near to the 
inmost kernel of the Mid-European constitutional problem, 
that is to the progressive separation of the national State 
from the economic State and from the military State. In 
order to grasp this fundamental problem our explanation of 
the world-group economic areas must be kept in mind. 
The world-group area of Mid-Europe must become greater 
than the existing dimensions of the States of Germany, 
Austria and Hungary. We have refrained, by reason of 
the circumstances of the war, from naming definite neigh-
bouring States, and have only worked out in general the 
conception that further accessions are necessary. And 
to what shall these neighbouring States join themselves ? 
To a military union and an economic union ! Everything 
else is superfluous and hence harmful. They ought to and 
must retain their own political independence in all other 
matters. Thus it is important so to cut out the military 
union and the economic union from the remaining multitude 
of political activities as to make it possible to join with them 
separately. Here we shall discuss first the economic union, 
or if people prefer to call it so, the economic State. This 
State is bound up with the language of no country and can 
tolerate the most diverse nationalities and religious creeds 
within its borders. No Central European nationality, not 
even the German, is in itself big enough for a world-group 
economic State. That is the result of the capitalist system 
of interchange. This economic State has its customs 
frontiers just as the military State has its trench defences. 
Within these frontiers it tries to establish a sphere of con~ 
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tinually active exchange. An economic Government is 
required for this which is directly competent for one part 
of the economic laws and for the remaining part advises 
the national Governments. Customs, the regulation of 
syndicates, export organisations, patent law, trade marks, 
the control of material and similar matters are under the 
direct control of the economic State. Commercial law, 
traffic policy, social policy and many other things belong to 
its indirect sphere of activities. But this economic State, 
which is independent of nationality, cannot be decided in 
a day, it must go on growing from one event to another. 
The more it completes itself the more will it create its own 
organs and its economic parliamentary system. 
When we use the expression economic parliamentary 
system we are referring to a development far ahead. But 
we do this in order to come to an understanding in regard 
to scruples about the Mid-European plan which are at 
present making themselves heard in strongly Liberal and 
democratic circles. It is said there : owing to the position 
of affairs the partnership between Germany and Austria-
Hungary cannot come into existence as a federal State 
provided with a parliament, hence this otherwise very 
desirable event means a real loss to practical parliamentary 
work and thus to active citizenship. Theoretically con-
sidered this is certainly true. For if such important depart-
ments of life as customs, a system of storage, the admini-
stration of war debts, the regulation of syndicates, maritime 
regulations, etc., are made the subjects of investigations 
by a Central European Commission and of arrangements by 
treaty, the final assent would still, it is true, rest with 
parliament, but it is indisputable that these matters will be 
put outside the field of practical collaboration even more 
than hitherto. I attach importance to this " even more 
than hitherto," and it was on account of these words that 
I previously termed the whole objection theoretical. For 
any one who follows carefully the progress of important 
economic legislation will already have come to the con-
clusion that often parliament as a whole has but little share 
s 
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in the preliminary work. This is only assigned to individual 
members who are specially interested or expert, and who 
on account of these qualifications would be and will be 
consulted whatever the method of preparation. The work 
of the parliamentary majority-—over and above a few 
changes in detail—lies in the final vote of -acceptance or 
rejection. This results from the nature of the case, for 
no representative of the people can be acquainted with all 
the individual questions of economic life. When the parlia-
mentary system was formed the economic duties of parlia-
ment were immeasurably simpler, and could generally be 
grasped by that normal understanding which may be pre-
sumed in every deputy. In the interval economic policy has 
become a technical matter, much more so than foreign policy. 
If somewhat more of it than hitherto is assigned to Com-
missions and Boards of experts this will be by no means 
merely a loss to the parliamentary system, but will be at 
the same time a certain relief in that it takes from the people's 
representative something of the technical side of national 
economics with which he, strictly speaking, can no longer 
cope. 
* * * * * * 
Yet after all, this only touches upon one side of the 
matter. It is the professional duty of the deputy to see 
that the electoral district or class of people represented by 
him does not come off the loser. How can he do this if he 
does not get a sight of a treaty except in its final stage ? 
The answer to which is that the officials whose business it 
is to choose and to send up the Mid-European Commission 
members and experts, must be attentive, whenever they 
are considering plans of expenditure, to the criticism of the 
popular assembly. That this is no mere figure of speech 
every one will aver who is in a position to know about the 
negotiations of the budget committee of the German 
Reichstag. Moreover the proposed new system will be 
submitted to the judgment of the popular assembly. But 
more cannot in reality be attained. Only ask indeed what 
influence the individual member of the English Parliament 
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has upon the economic policy of Greater Britain ! The 
answer may reveal strange things about the model country 
of the parliamentary system. The development in the 
important relations of communications, commerce and 
labour swallow up the unorganised private motion in parlia-
ment. But organised motions always find their way to an 
effective position. 
This, in truth, is the further answer which must be given 
to the democratic-parliamentary scruples that we have 
mentioned : the Mid-European economic Commissions must 
be bound, in conformity with regulation and treaty, to hear 
and record the representations of the parties interested in 
all the countries and branches of industry involved. This is 
less than an Act of Parliament in one way and more in 
another; less because it at most only deals with hearing, 
more because it is a question of professional experts. In 
this connection it must be established from the outset that 
employees and workpeople must be regarded in all matters 
involving their trade as parties interested. Something 
similar may be established for the consumer in regard to 
articles of consumption. Thus in a natural way may begin 
the economic parliament of the future which we need more 
and more alongside of the political national assembly. We 
need it for economic mobilisation, for the system of storage, 
for the customs tariff and for much besides. 
It would be an essential mistake to set to work now to 
construct, out of the existing popular assemblies, such a 
Mid-European parliament, with powers of final decision in 
economic and tariff matters, even apart from the Austro-
Hungarian constitutional obstacles. For the material for 
deliberation and administration must first be in existence 
before a deliberative body has meaning; and above all, 
Mid-Europe, the new economic State, needs its own future 
economic constitution. It would be a serious blunder to 
burden it with a Delegations Parliament in which all the 
contentions of all the separate parliaments are assembled in 
a mass. Even if the new creation makes its appearance at 
first as formless, shapeless and democratically inadequate, 
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yet the main thing truly is that the new production should 
not be accompanied from the outset by a smell of the past. 
It must be something creative, and three and more nations 
will be on the look-out to see that it is so. 
* * * * * * 
It is permissible to express what has hitherto been stated 
formally in a somewhat more palpable form. Let us 
suppose that in ten years' time, or it may be even longer, 
I go to Prague and visit the Chairman or Deputy Chairman 
(they interchange !) of the Mid-European Economic Com-
mission. He will show me his fine new building, and say : 
" When we came we thought we should have nothing to 
do, and now it is growing up on all sides ! For so long 
as no one considers Mid-Europe in an official capacity, 
Mid-Europe is only an idea. But from the day when an 
office is provided the first cell of a new brain exists, the first 
machine of a new factory. So long as treaties are only 
concluded, without the provision of any location for the 
administration, there is nobody in evidence who advocates 
from his heart the cause on account of which the treaties 
were made, but each contracting party to the treaty is only 
the agent of his State or of the party in which his interests 
are concerned. That," as the shrewd old gentleman 
remarked, " we have gone through here quite sufficiently. 
People come to us from all sides, from Hungary, from Graz, 
from Mannheim, from Altona, also from . . . and from 
. . . Each one wants something for himself, makes 
complaints on his own account, wants a special raisin out of 
the big cake, but we, in contrast to him, look after the 
general interests in a hundred ways. Even the great 
amount of detail we have to concern ourselves with obliges 
us to think over the general nature of Mid-Europe care-
fully, even to the last hole and corner. Thus our con-
ception of it grows with and out of our work. That in 
itself forms the unity between us and our colleagues from 
over there. Little clouds and sun-spots appear, but in the 
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main they signify but little, for our life's ideal is greater 
than us all. Things here are not as they were formerly in 
the Eschersheimer Gasse at Frankfurt-on-Main, for we have 
ten times more to do than those gentlemen, and the world 
economic system is daily throwing fresh material at our 
feet." Thus he spoke, and we went along the edge of 
the hill and saw the town and the bridge. I asked : " How 
do things go with the Tzechs and the other non-German 
Mid-Europeans ? " " Oh," said he, " at first intercourse 
did not come to much, for we speak German in the office ; 
but in the end it became much too serious for the Tzech 
farmers and business people not to be in touch with us. 
And I can put in a few Tzech words here and there ; that 
often goes a long way to make the German easier to under-
stand. We purposely make no question of principle out 
of these things and don't allow ourselves to be forced 
into taking sides within Mid-Europe The Germans at 
first thought rather ill of us on this account, but they too 
see well enough that a world-group area can only be managed 
with a certain measure of common humanity. It is the 
tone that makes the music. And besides, what the people 
who come to us do outside in politics does not concern 
us, for we represent here nothing but economic ideas. But 
it seems to me that this in itself has a soothing effect politi-
cally." " And how is it with the new members of the 
union and their special rights ? " He knew whom I meant, 
I cannot say at present. His answer was : " It always takes 
a little time to get accustomed to things, but since we ask 
nothing beyond what is actually necessary, and since the 
advantages of inclusion within our great market area are 
obvious, all that remains is only discussions about putting 
things into effect. Come, I will show you the hall with the 
statistics on the walls ! Here I always gladly leave strange 
visitors to wait awhile. They see there the pictures of all 
the allied sovereigns and then wall blackboards full of 
imports, exports, production, consumption, so much that 
the size of Mid-Europe is impressed upon them once more 
really effectively, before they enter the room to see me or 
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my colleague. . . ." Thus should I gladly hear him 
speaking if I dreamt of the future of our scheme. 
* * * * * * 
But how will it be with the mihtary State ? It too must 
go beyond the frontiers of the national States, and must 
include the trench-protected community. People have 
coined for it the term " mihtary convention" without 
any one having so far stated exactly all that can and must 
be agreed upon. I myself, as a civilian, am not in a position 
to do this, and if I could make such a statement I should 
perhaps think it more useful to communicate it only to 
those most concerned. We Central European citizens only 
ask to be secure in the military sense for a further period 
of the world's history, and in spite of great financial burdens 
we shall be ready to sanction in our State Parliaments 
what is absolutely necessary for this. Probably this will 
no longer be a party question after the war, but a general 
concern of the nation. But all the experiences of this 
immense war must here be used to the full in order to 
complete and simplify the machinery. In this connection 
it will be impossible to avoid introducing afresh the question 
of the constitution of the army. We intend only to bring 
up here the chief points of the two constitutions. 
In the German Empire the whole of Prussian mihtary 
legislation was placed in the sphere of the federal union by 
Article 61 of the Constitution, and then in 1874 the so-called 
great military law was issued, to which later numerous 
additions and accessory laws have been added. The unifor-
mity is complete with the exception of special provisions 
for Bavaria and Württemberg. 
As far as Bavaria is concerned the treaty of November 23, 
1870, determined, in consideration of the sovereign dignity of 
Bavaria, that Bavaria should bear exclusively and alone the 
expenses and burdens of its military affairs (including the 
maintenance of fortresses within its territory and other 
fortifications). And moreover Bavaria engaged to expend 
the same amount of money upon its contingent as was 
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decided upon, in proportion to the numerical strength, for 
the remaining parts of the union. The Bavarian army 
forms a part of the German federal army, which is complete 
in itself and has an independent administration under the 
military sovereignty of the King of Bavaria ; but which in 
war time, and indeed from the beginning of mobilisation, is 
under the command of the federal commander-in-chief. 
Complete uniformity prevails in respect to organisation, 
formation, instruction, pay and instructions for mobilisation. 
The federal commander-in-chief has the duty and the right 
of assuring himself by inspection as to the uniformity and 
the completeness of the army. Since that time growing 
tradition has modified the statement relating to the financial 
independence of the Bavarian army so that the expenses of 
Bavarian military affairs are in fact defrayed by the Empire 
and all that remains is a process of mutual liquidation of 
accounts. 
The military convention with Württemberg secures to the 
Württemberg division of troops its own colours and designa-
tion. The military oath includes king and federal com-
mander-in-chief alike. Promotions are accorded by the 
king with the consent of the federal commander-in-chief. 
The Württemberg army corps remains in its own territory. 
Interchange of officers is provided for and inspections. 
These German Imperial military agreements do not 
destroy the uniformity of the army, but the conditions in 
Austria-Hungary are more complicated in this department 
too, for there are three army organisations which possess 
their own military machinery, viz. : the joint army, the 
Austrian Landwehr and the Hungarian Landwehr. To 
understand this we must refer again to the fundamental 
law of 1867. There the joint business is explained as : 
" Military affairs, including the navy, but excluding the 
actual sanction by voting of the contingent of recruits, 
legislation relating to the manner and method of dis-
charging the obligation to serve in the army, regulations 
in regard to the removal and maintenance of the army, 
and further regulation of the civil relations and of those 
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rights and obligations of members of the army which do 
not refer to military service." This somewhat difficult 
sentence signifies roughly that the formation of the army 
is the business of the single States whilst the leadership 
of the army is a joint affair. In regard to the formation 
of the army the " establishment of the military organisation " 
is placed in the fundamental law among the objects about 
which from time to time settlements shall be made. Thus, 
here too, in respect to the army we find that feature of termin-
ability already known to us ! The levying and division of the 
expenses of the joint army is subject to the same condition. 
Hungary, notwithstanding its share in the joint army, is 
not willing to dispense with a special, purely Hungarian 
army system. Hence in the agreement of 1867 it preserved 
for itself the right to supplement the Hungarian army proper 
from time to time, and formed or maintained with its special 
system of recruiting and administration its Hungarian 
Landwehr (Honved). The result of this was to bring into 
existence a special Austrian Landwehr, on grounds of 
equality. Before the outbreak of war the position of the 
forces in peace time was numerically that the joint army 
amounted to 339,000 men, the Austrian Landwehr, 49,000, 
the Hungarian Landwehr, 36,000. A memorial which we 
have before us estimates the extra expense of this triple 
system at 75 million kronen a year. Each of the two 
States has two separate organisations for recruitment, 
whence it follows that two different systems of recruiting 
are carried on in the same territory. 
If we look forward, in this case too, beyond the present to 
a somewhat distant future we see that a Mid-European 
army statute will be necessary, which will distinguish 
precisely between the general military obligations of the 
allied States, which must be the same for all who share in 
the trench-protected partnership, and the special rights and 
sovereignty of the single States. The same applies to the 
navy. The navy is a joint business in both Empires and 
will be paid for out of the common treasury. 
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The military partnership results from the conception of 
the world-group economic area. If such an area is to be 
established it must be a self-contained body for purposes 
of defence. This must find constitutional expression after 
the war just as much in Greater Britain as in Mid-Europe. 
And this involves for all the States and sections of States 
concerned a certain limitation of their particular political 
sphere, for they must renounce the ability to wage a special 
war for themselves alone. But at the same time the limita-
tion contains a powerful safeguard for their existence, for 
they can no longer be attacked alone. Any one who belongs 
to the military union is guaranteed by it in so far as this 
is within the power of the joint army. 
We have previously compared this event, rendered 
necessary by the course of history, with the formation of 
industrial syndicates. When a single industrial undertaking 
joins a syndicate it gives up something of its independence, 
but it strengthens its power of existence in so doing. The 
weighing of the advantages and disadvantages of this 
system has given very serious and earnest occupation to 
many large and small industrial and Government under-
takings, but the final result is an almost universal victory 
for the syndicate idea. Owing to the position of the Central 
European States between East and West nothing else is left 
them in the long run but to strengthen themselves mutually 
through association. 
This is conclusive also for the neighbouring small neutral 
States. 
* * * * * * 
The effects of the economic union and the military union 
on the conduct and management of foreign policy are of 
course far-reaching, and involve many material difficulties, 
especially in regard to constitutional technicalities. We 
must say something on this point, but we realise that in 
this matter little can be done by formulation, but that 
things will only be cleared up by actual joint work and 
tradition. 
A complete partnership exists between Austria and 
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Hungary in the conduct of foreign policy. The funda-
mental law says on this point: " Foreign affairs are in 
common, including diplomatic and commercial representa-
tion in foreign countries, as well as arrangements that may 
be necessary in reference to international treaties, whereby 
however the ratification of the international treaties, in so 
far as this is constitutionally necessary, is reserved to the 
representative bodies of the two halves of the Empire (to 
the Reichsrat and to the Hungarian Reichstag)." Thus 
whereas the two halves of the Empire have separate 
Ministries in other cases, they have a joint Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, but he is responsible to two independent 
national representative assemblies. This Minister is selected 
in course of time both from Austria and Hungary. The 
present holder of the office is a Hungarian. It is obvious 
that the system, looked at theoretically, may lead to 
mischievous disputes, but in practice it has not worked 
badly, for which the eminent personality of the Austrian 
Emperor is especially to be thanked. 
In the German Empire the conduct of foreign affairs is 
the business of the Bundesrat and is represented by the 
Imperial Chancellor. But in order to secure a share in de-
termining foreign policy to the small kingdoms in particular 
which belong to the German Empire, a committee to deal with 
foreign affairs has been formed in the Bundesrat, under 
Bavarian presidency, of plenipotentiaries from Bavaria, 
Saxony, Württemberg, and of the representatives of two 
other federated States. This committee has actually met 
only on quite rare occasions, but its existence serves as 
security against one-sided Prussian action. Here too the 
reality has worked more simply than the theory in con-
stitutional law. In reahty the Foreign Office, dependent on 
the Imperial Chancellor, manages the foreign relations and 
submits, in its public acts, to the judgment of the Bundesrat 
and Reichstag. 
In both Empires accordingly the principle of uniform 
conduct of foreign business has prevailed of itself. The 
problem of how the will of the people ought to obtain 
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expression in foreign politics is incompletely solved in both 
cases, but the same applies to all the written and unwritten 
constitutions of every nation. It is technically impossible 
to make the representatives of the people accessories to all 
international relations which are still in an undetermined 
position. Some things may be communicated in parlia-
mentary committees, which with us is indeed happening to 
an increasing extent, but the choice of what information to 
communicate still rests with those who are conducting 
affairs. Here there is a deficiency in the democratic political 
system as such which cannot be supplied by conferring on 
the people's representatives the duty of passing resolutions 
in regard to war and peace or by demanding the publication 
of all secret treaties. In August 1914 we have seen that 
nothing would have come about differently even if that 
national right had been recognised in the text of the Con-
stitution. The voting of war credits and of war-time econo-
mic laws is in reality the same as a parliamentary vote on the 
war itself, but all that results at a given moment within the 
already existing tension of the war is, strictly speaking, an 
act in the war. What saves the nations from rash declara-
tions of war is the knowledge possessed by all Governments 
that in our day no war can be carried on without the sincere 
concurrence of the great majority of the population. 
Democracy has its say in fact but without formulation. 
And it is the same with the treaties. Certainly it would be 
better if yet more treaties were made public, and if thus the 
nations themselves were made guarantors for them. But 
there would still be need for some confidential archives, 
as in the management of every great business. The conduct 
of foreign policy, that foremost and most difficult and 
responsible task of statesmen, remains essentially a confi-
dential matter. This is a somewhat painful fact for all 
citizens, since they must pay for the mistakes of the Foreign 
Office with their lives and money, but it cannot be altered. 
All constitutional definitions in this supreme matter are 
hardly more than attempts at control. 
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The significance of this for Mid-Europe is, however, that 
it will be of but little use for any one to think out a model 
statute for the joint conduct of foreign policy. The attempt 
may be made, but the officials of the allied Empires and 
States will put this paper amongst their many other docu-
ments, and will only produce it in individual'cases when it 
suits them. Moreover, foreign policy is too diverse to be 
managed according to a general scheme worked out before-
hand. We see this now in the war : people work together 
in Vienna and Berlin, dispute, grow irritated, and come to 
an agreement and try to get over misunderstandings by a 
sense of duty and by goodwill. The dualism is there but 
is no absolute hindrance. So far as we can see we shall not 
get out of this situation in principle within any measurable 
space of time, but we shall mutually come to work better 
and better with one another. There will be no change in 
the Constitution, but here too a tradition will grow up. 
Any one who wanted to construct things of this sort out 
of hand without recognition of realities might well demand 
a single Foreign Office for Mid-Europe, just as there is a 
single Minister for Austria and Hungary. But this sugges-
tion overlooks the fact that Austria and Hungary have the 
same sovereign. Without this personal union the single 
Minister for Foreign Affairs could hardly exist, for the unity 
of the source of the orders would be lacking. If Mid-Europe 
were a republic many other things might perhaps be different, 
but it suffices to express this proposition to be conscious of 
its unhistorical character. Moreover the, in itself, natural 
idea of a single Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot be thought 
out at all seriously so long as the mutual relations between 
the allied Empires are themselves foreign politics. The 
treaty system with joint treaty organs as we have expounded 
it, supposes contracting parties on both sides. The new 
feature is thus not a new Foreign Office for Mid-Europe, 
but a growing stability in joint work and adjustments 
between the two Offices already in existence. 
In this connection many other matters come into considera-
tion alongside of the joint economic and commercial com-
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mittees already discussed. Each of the two Empires has its 
own complete system of embassies and consulates. This 
must continue so in the main, but here, too, closer approach 
and joint representation is possible. In the consulate 
system especially, where even as it is mutual representation 
is used in the most diverse places, a single representative 
for small stations should be preferred on principle. Mid-
Europeans abroad must have feelings of fellowship. It 
would be very desirable to organise jointly a place at home 
for the interchange of consular reports. And as regards the 
embassies, there can hardly be any discussion of a joint 
organisation at the present stage of affairs, but it appears 
conceivable that all general letters and communications 
might be interchanged without further ceremony. 
It would certainly be going too far to say that in future 
only joint treaties must be concluded ; for the subjects of 
many treaties in fact concern only one or the other State. 
For example, the agreements about the navigation on the 
Danube down to the Black Sea are the business of Austria-
Hungary, whilst a navigation treaty between Germany and 
Sweden is the affair of the German Empire. But whenever 
both Empires are concerned in the same matter, the attempt 
ought to be made on principle to obtain the same terms. 
This must be desired by both sides ! 
* * * * * * 
And this brings us to the end of our exposition. We 
dedicate it to the statesmen and to the nations. It is not 
necessary to summarise the contents of the book, for the 
reader will have them in mind. He will, we hope, have 
grasped one point as certain, that the Central European 
Empires cannot let themselves be pushed thoughtlessly into 
this affair, but must take a fundamental resolution as to 
whether they desire Mid-Europe or not. If they do not 
desire it they will go to the Peace Conference in quite a 
different spirit from that which will inspire them if they 
do desire it—every question of the war will have a different 
conclusion so soon as the great preliminary question is 
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answered. Our future German Imperial policy will be quite 
different in one case from what it will be in the other. 
And it is the same with Austria-Hungary. Only think of 
Poland, the position in the Balkans, Turkey, the Mediter-
ranean, the commercial settlements in the treaty of peace ; 
everything depends on the Mid-European decision. 
The resolution to desire Mid-Europe is an important step 
for all the States affected and one with momentous conse-
quences. Hence each State will consider carefully and 
unreservedly all the relevant possibilities. We acknowledge 
that this is not easy, and especially for Hungary. Perhaps 
Hungary has to bear the heaviest burden of responsibihty 
since now for the first time Graf Andrassy's policy of 1879 
must be advanced to a national conclusion. Hungary, as a 
non-German State, has in its hands a portion of the future 
fate of the German nation. For if Hungary rejects the 
idea of Mid-Europe decisively it will be hardly possible for 
this idea to be realised. The Hungarians understand this, 
and are preparing themselves to make a decision of primary 
importance in international affairs. If they do not decide 
in the affirmative then for them and for us a fateful moment 
has gone by. But the Austrian Emperor too, in consultation 
with his successors, will weigh the arguments for and against 
Mid-Europe, and with a wisdom ripened by a wonderfully 
eventful life, will know how to distinguish what is transitory 
from what is permanent. He knew the old German Con-
federation, lived before Bismarck and survives him, and his 
last will and testament will be sacred to the nations. He will 
let the teaching of this war make itself heard in his decision. 
And the Austrian people will ponder over the future with 
him from the point of view of general international develop-
ment, and will wish to establish the basis of a new and 
safer period of evolution for themselves and their children. 
In like manner the German Emperor and his people will see 
that they too are faced by a decision which must involve a for-
getting of much that is old and an acceptance of much that 
is new. The Nibelungen faith of the Emperor Wilhelm II 
shall be raised to the formation of a State. Ancient disputes 
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about development, for us already settled, must begin afresh 
in this connection. But does not this great war say to us 
all that we cannot remain where we are ? We shall emerge 
from it other than what we were when we entered upon it. 
We shall emerge from the war as Mid-Europeans. 
* * * * * * 
It was in April that I conceived the plan of this book. At 
that time fighting was still going on in the Carpathians. 
Our sons and sons-in-law were defending Hungary anc' 
Austria, just as previously Austrians and Hungarians had 
sustained for us the Russian impact. In the interval many 
loyal children of Central Europe have been carried off by 
death, or wounded, many good and noble men who had 
their life before them. But they did not die in vain, for 
our joint army pressed back the enemy before it, freed 
Galicia, and released Poland from a Russian jurisdiction of 
a hundred years' duration. The advance has lasted from 
May onwards. This work has grown amidst the news of 
this, the greatest victorious attack in the world's history. 
It is not to be regarded as a speculation which might have 
been framed at any moment; on the contrary it has taken to 
itself flesh and blood out of the war. Thus will it be under-
stood by those who have become different during the war 
from what they were previously. 
What ought to be our profit from the war ? For what 
ought our dead to have died ? To the end that we should 
part from one another again the day after the war and act 
as though we had never known one another ? That would 
be to squander the noblest spiritual good. 
Mid-Europe is the fruit of war. We have sat together in 
the war's economic prison, we have fought together, we 
are determined to live together ! 
C H A P T E R I X 
STATISTICAL AND HISTORICAL 
IN the text of this book hitherto, we have only used figures 
and historical data very sparingly, for the benefit of those 
readers who want to be spared the apparatus of knowledge 
But fortunately these are not the only type of reader, and 
many of the statements and remarks in the text can'only 
be properly illustrated and secure the desired demonstrative 
force by means of figures and numbers. Hence in the 
following section we shall gather together information and 
data, following the course of the previous chapters. 
The statistical material is obtained almost entirely from 
the statistical year books for Germany, Austria and Hungary. 
To these must be added Hübner's geographical and statistical 
tables and Hickmann's pocket atlas of Austria-Hungary. 
) D r - Pistov's book, Die Österreichisch-ungarische Volks-
wirtschaft came out, published by the same publisher, just 
as this book was being completed, and I was able to make 
use of it in a few places. For the compiling of the historical 
tables under Chapter II reference was made to the historical 
summaries in Perthes' Geschichts-atlas. Guttentag's edition 
was used for the constitution of the German Empire; and 
for the fundamental law of the Austro-Hungarian State, 
Giegl's edition (Manz, Vienna). The remaining general 
literature is given in Section X. We may mention the 
following later pamphlets referring to the same subject: 
Philippovich, Professor, Geh. Hofrat, member of the 
Austrian Herrenhaus: Ein Wirtschafts und Zollverband 
^ zwischen Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn, Leipzig, 1915. 
Losch, Geh. Finanzrat: Der mittel europäische Wirth-
schaftsblock und das Schicksal Belgiens, Leipzig, 1914. 
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Munin : Osterreich nach dem Kriege, Forderungen eines 
aktiven ofterreichischen Politikers, Jena, 1915. 
Wolf, Professor: Ein deutsch-österreichisch-ungarischer 
Zollverband, Leipzig, 1915. 
I . PARTNERSHIP IN THE W A R AND ITS R E S U L T S 
In order to simplify the statistical suntnaries, round 
numbers are given throughout. Any one who wishes to 
know the exact figures must refer to the statistical year 
books. Germany is indicated by G., Austria by A., 
Hungary by H., Bosnia by B. We begin with general 
data concerning area and population : 
The area is : 
G 541,000 qkm. 
A.-H 676,000 ,, 
1,217,000 „ 
According to the census of 1910 the population of this 
area is : 
G. . . . 64.9 million inhabitants 
A-"H. • . • 51-4 „ 
i i 6 - 3 „ 
But in the interval up to the war the total population of 
the Central States in Mid-Europe increased to something 
over 120 millions. Whether during the homicidal war the 
total population will have increased or decreased cannot be 
said at the present moment. Probably there will be an 
increase of females and a decrease of males. 
The effective force of the army in peace time was for 
1913-14 : 
G- 800,000 
A.-H 424,000 
1,224,000 
T 
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The Austro-Hungarian army consists, under peace condi-
tions, of the following divisions : 
Joint army . . . . . 340,000 
Austrian Landwehr . . . 48,000 
Hungarian Landwehr . . . - 36,000 
424,000 
Army horses under peace conditions : 
G . . . . . . 160,000 
A . - H 90,000 
250,000 
We can say nothing in respect to the numbers of the two 
armies during the war. 
The navy before the war included : 
G. A.-H. 
Battleships . . 101 . . 30 
Guns . . . 2100 . . 910 
The fleets are not completely comparable owing to the 
difference in types 
The Central European military power is the result of long 
years of development and is closely connected with the 
increase in population. 
Growth of population (reckoned according to the present 
extent of the country) in millions of inhabitants : 
G. A. H. B. 
1850 . • 35-4 17-5 13.2 — 
1870 . 40.8 20.2 — — 
1890 • 49-4 23-7 17-5 — 
I9IO . 64.9 28.6 20.9 I . 9 
The earlier information for Hungary is not given in the 
Statistical Year Book. The figures under H. 1850, which 
come from Hickmann, are in any case correct. At that 
time the territory of the later German Empire had a popula-
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tion about 5 millions in excess of that of Austria-Hungary. 
This was not yet the case in 1800. The change in the 
respective amounts of population took place in the first 
half of the previous century. 
Alterations in population during the last century : 
A . - H . 
G . ( w i t h o u t B . ) 
1800 . 21.0 23.I + 2.1 
1850 • 35-4 3O.7 - 4-7 
1900 • 56.4 45-4 — 1 1 . 0 
1910 • 64.9 49-5 - 15-4 
The backwardness of Austria-Hungary is quite obvious, 
and depends partly on the relation between the births and 
deaths and partly on emigration. 
E X C E S S O F B I R T H S , 1911-12, P E R T H O U S A N D 
B o r n D i e d E x c e s s 
G. . 28.3 15-6 12.7 
A. • 31-5 22.0 9-5 
H. • 35-o 25.1 9.9 
In spite of its smaller number of births, Germany shows 
far the better percentage result. In the German Empire 
there are somewhat too few births, but in Austria, and still 
more in Hungary, there are far more deaths than necessary. 
Emigration Questions. Emigration is at present of little 
importance for Germany, it is rather a question of immigra-
tion. In Austria-Hungary things are different. The over-
seas emigration amounted to : 
1908 . . . . . . 192,000 
1909 . . . . . . 199,000 
1910 . . . . . . 277,000 
191 1 187,000 
JC912 . . . . . . 213,000 
These figures are very high! In addition there is a 
constant seasonal emigration across the land frontiers. 
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Comparison of the increase in population of the Great 
Powers (according to Hickmann), in millions : 
1800 1900 Increase 
European Russia • 38.8 1 1 1 , 3 + 72.5 
United States • 5-3 77.1 + 71-8 
Germany . 21.0 56.4 + 35-4 
Austria-Hungary without B. 23.1 45-4 4- 22.3 
Great Britain . . 16.2 41.6 + 25.4 
France . . 26.9 39-0 4-12.1 
Italy . . 18.1 32.5 + 14-4 
Spain • 1 1 . 5 18.2 + 6.7 
Belgium . • 3-0 6.9 + 3-9 
Roumania • 2.7 6.0 4- 3-3 
Portugal . 2.9 5-1 4- 2.2 
The Netherlands 2.0 5-1 + 3-i 
Sweden . • 2.3 5-1 4- 2.8 
173.8 449-7 
Unfortunately I cannot continue these tables up to the 
present with the information at my disposal, since the 
censuses take place at different times and must therefore 
be converted, and because the exact area of country to 
which Hickmann's tables refer is not known to me in every 
case. But even thus continued only up to 1900 the juxta-
position is of the greatest interest. 
The sequence among the European Great Powers according 
to this manner of reckoning was : 
1800. Russia, France, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, 
Great Britain. 
1900. Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, 
France, Italy. 
(For a comparison of the great World-States with colonial 
provinces see Section V.) 
From a purely statistical point of view European policy 
is frequently nothing but a realisation in political law of 
the above shiftings of population. But the figures alone are 
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not decisive, as is shown by the example of Russia. Amount 
of population is only one of the important historical properties 
of nations. 
I I . O F THE PREVIOUS H I S T O R Y OF CENTRAL E U R O P E 
The following collection of historical dates is only intended 
to remind the reader of individual events which are of 
importance for the previous history of Mid-Europe : 
1211. Saint Elizabeth, Germany's most popular saint, 
comes from Hungary into Thüringia. 
1273-1291. Rudolf I. of Hapsburg founds the Austrian 
Monarchy, defeats Ottokar of Bohemia in 1278 on 
the Marchfeld. 
1314-1330. Struggle between Friedrich of Austria and 
Ludwig of Bavaria for the Imperial Crown. 
1348. King Karl IV. founds the first German University in 
Prague. 
1409. Emigration of the German and Polish students from 
Prague. Foundation of the University of Leipzig. 
1410. Battle of Tannenberg. Jagello of Lithuania and 
Poland. 
1415. Friedrich I. of Hohenzollern, Burggraf of Nürnberg, 
takes over the Mark Brandenburg. 
1419-36. Hussite wars. 
1438. Albrecht II., Duke of Austria, as Sigmund's son-in-
law, becomes also King of Bohemia and Hungary. 
1440-70. Friedrich II. of Brandenburg makes his royal 
residence at Berlin. 
1457. Mathias Corvinus is elected King of Hungary, Georg 
Podiebrad is elected King of Bohemia. 
1466. West Prussia becomes Polish, East Prussia a Polish 
fief. 
1519-56. Emperor Karl V., world-embracing empire on an 
Austro-Spanish basis. 
1525. The Duchy of Prussia. 
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1526. Battle of Mohaes against the Turks. Ferdinand of 
Austria, the brother of Karl V., becomes King of 
Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Hungary. From 
henceforward the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
exists. 
1521-38. Karl V.'s Italian wars. 
1529. Vienna besieged by the Turks. 
1539. Protestant Reformation in Brandenburg. 
1555- Religious Peace of Augsberg; cuius regio eius 
religio. 
1556. Abdication of Karl V. Separation between the 
Austrian and Spanish sections of the World-Power 
1576-1612. Emperor Rudolf I I . ; the Hungarian Protes-
tants revolt. Counter-Reformation. 
1608-9. Formation of the Protestant Union and the 
Catholic League. 
1609. Disputed succession in Jülich and Cleve. Branden-
burg extends itself to West Germany. 
1618. Prussia falls to Brandenburg. 
1618-48. Thirty Years War. 
1620. Battle of the White Hill. Break up of Protestantism 
in Bohemia. 
1630-32. Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden in Germany, 
attempted Baltic Sea Empire. 
1640-88. Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg, the Great 
Elector, the true founder of the North German 
power. 
1660. Prussia freed from Polish suzerainty at the Peace of 
Ohva. 
1681. Strasburg becomes French ; influence of France on 
the west. 
1683. Vienna besieged by the Turks, saved by the Polish 
King Johann Sobieski. 
1697- August the Strong, Elector of Saxony, becomes King 
of Poland. 
it-99 Peace of Carlowitz. Prince Eugene, the noble 
knight. Siebenbürgen secured by Austria. 
1701. Prussia becomes a kingdom. 
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1714. Peace of Rastadt; Emperor Karl VI. receives the 
Spanish Netherlands, Milan, Sardinia, Naples. 
1718. Peace of Passarowitz ; Austria receives Croatia and 
parts of Bosnia and Serbia (lost again in 1739). 
1732. Exiled Salzburg Protestants are received in Prussia. 
1713-38. Pragmatic sanction ; indivisibility of the Austrian 
States, female succession. 
1740-86. King Friedrich II. of Prussia. 
1740-80. Queen Maria Theresa of Austria. 
1740-42. First Silesian War. 
1741-48. War of the Austrian Succession. 
1744-5. Second Silesian War. 
1745-1806. The House of Lorraine on the Imperial throne. 
1756-63. Seven Years War. Prussia becomes the North 
German Great Power. 
1772. First Partition of Poland. 
1778-79. War of the Bavarian Succession. Peace of 
Teschen. Bavaria receives Kurpfalz. 
1792-97. First Coalition War against France. Agreement 
of Pillnitz between Austria and Prussia. 
1793. Second Partition of Poland. 
1795. Third Partition of Poland. Prussia concludes a 
separate peace with France at Basle. 
1797. Peace of Campo Formio. Austria receives Venice, 
Istria and Dalmatia. 
1798-1802. Second Coalition War against France. 
1804. Franz II. as Hereditary Emperor of Austria. 
1805. Third Coalition War without Prussia. Vienna occu-
pied by the French. Battle of Austerlitz. Peace of 
Pressburg. Italian and Tyrolese possessions lost. 
1806. Napoleon establishes the Confederation of the Rhine. 
Franz II. resigns the German Imperial crown. 
1806. Prussia defeated at Jena and Auerstadt, Napoleon 
in Berlin. 
1807. Peace of Tilsit. Prussia reduced. Poland re-estab-
lished. 
1809. Austria fights without Prussia against Napoleon. 
West Galicia to Poland, East Galicia to Russia. 
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1812. The great army of Napoleon advances against Russia. 
Prussia and Austria with France against Russia. 
1813. Prussia and Austria with Russia against France. 
Battle of Leipzig. 
1815. Vienna Congress ; Act of the German Confederation ; 
Austria receives Milan, Venice, Istria, Dalmatia] 
Tyrol. Prussia receives the province of Saxony'. 
Federal Diet at Frankfurt-on-Main under Austrian 
presidency. Poland divided again. 
1815-26. Holy Alliance; Prussia and Austria under 
Russian guidance. Metternich. 
1818-53. Formation of the German Customs Union under 
Prussian guidance. 
1830-31. Polish rising put down. 
1848-49. Revolution in Berlin and Vienna. Hungarian 
nationalist rising. Emperor Franz Josef. German 
Parliament in St. Paul's Church at Frankfurt-on-
Main. Archduke Johann of Austria as Imperial 
administrator. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. of Prussia 
does not accept the Imperial crown. Re-establish-
ment of the German Confederation. Hungary sub-
dued with Russian help. 
1850. Prussia humbles herself at Olmtitz before Austria. 
1853-56. Crimean W a r ; the Western Powers against 
Russia. Austria takes part as the protecting Power 
of Roumania. Prussia remains neutral. Nicholas I. 
dies. Peace of Paris. Russia enters the mouth of 
the Danube. 
1859. The Kingdom of Roumania. 
1861-88. King Wilhelm I. of Prussia. 
1862-90. Bismarck as Minister-President and Imperial 
Chancellor. 
1864. Danish War carried on by Austria and Prussia 
together. 
1866 Austrian, Prussian and Italian W a r ; Battle of 
Koniggratz ; Venice for Italy, North German Con-
federation, Customs Parliament, Prussian treaties 
with South German States. 
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1867. Ausgleich between Austria and Hungary. Franz 
Josef has himself crowned King of Hungary. 
1870-71. Franco-German War. Neutrality of Austria and 
Russia. Foundation of the German Empire, corona-
tion of the Emperor at Versailles. Alsace-Lorraine 
as the Reichsland. Imperial constitution. 
1872. Meeting of the three Emperors. 
1877-78. Russo-Turkish War. Berlin Congress. Serbia, 
Roumania, Montenegro become independent of 
Turkey. Bulgaria becomes a suzerainty. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina come under Austro-Hungarian 
administration. Russia receives Bessarabia, but 
resigns part of Dobrudscha to Roumania. 
1879. Treaty of alliance between Germany and Austria-
Hungary arranged by Bismarck and Count Andrassy. 
1887. Italy joins the Dual Alliance (until 1915 !). 
1888. Emperor Friedrich III. ; beginning of the reign of 
Emperor Wilhelm II. 
I I I . CREEDS AND NATIONALITIES 
Central Europe, the battle-ground of violent religious 
disputes, is very diversified as regards its religious creeds. 
Austria is the most uniform with over nine-tenths Catholics. 
Summary of religious creeds in 1910, in millions : 
Catholics 
Protestants 
Other Christians . 
Jews . 
Eastern Greek Church 
Others 
G. A. H. 
23.8 25-9 I2.9 = 62.6 
40.0 0.6 4.0 = 44.6 
0.3 O.I O.I = 0.5 
0.6 i-3 O.9 = 2.8 
— 0.7 3-0 = 3-7 
0.2 — — == 0.2 
64.9 28.6 20.9 114.4 
Bosnia and Herzegovina are not included in this summary. 
There are there 0.4 Catholics, 0.8 Orthodox Serbs, 0.6 
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Mohammedans and a quite negligible minority of Protestants 
and Jews. 
Members of the United Church subject to the Pope are 
counted as Catholics. 
Any alteration of the Central European land frontiers 
that is at all possible or to be expected at the conclusion of 
peace, except in regard to Kurland or Li viand, will lead 
to an increase in the number of Catholics. 
Of the large towns of over 200,000 inhabitants the follow-
ing are substantially Protestant : Berlin, Hamburg, Dresden, 
Leipzig, Breslau (very mixed), Frankfurt-on-Main, Hanover, 
Nürnberg, Chemnitz, Magdeburg, Bremen, Charlottenburg, 
Kiel, Königsberg, Neukölln, Stettin, Stuttgart; the follow-
ing are substantially Catholic : Vienna, Budapest, Munich, 
Cologne, Prague, Düsseldorf, Lemberg. 
There are strong Jewish minorities (over 5 per cent.) in 
Vienna, Budapest, Prague, Lemberg, Frankfurt, Breslau 
and Berlin. 
Nationalities in the German Empire in thousands. Unfor-
tunately we can only give the somewhat out-of-date figures 
for 1900, since neither the Statistical Year Book nor Hübner's 
Tables give the nationality census for 1910. Apparently it 
is not yet complete. Owing to this a uniform Central 
European table for 1910 cannot be made up. 
Germans 
Poles 
French . 
Masovians 
Danes . 
Lithuanians 
Cassubians 
Wends . 
52,140 = 925 per thousand 
3.090 = 
210 = 
140 = 
140 = 
n o = 
100 = 
90 = 
55 
3-7 
2-5 
2.5 
1.9 
1.8 
1-7 
Those otherwise enumerated are immigrant minorities. 
The preponderance of Germans is obvious. And a part of 
the 1,260,000 " aliens to the Empire " are born Germans. 
The Austrians in Germany number 630,000, the Hungarians 
in Germany 32,000. 
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Nationalities in Austria in thousands, according to the 
census of 1910 : 
Germans 
Bohemians, Mora-
vians, Slovaks 
Poles . 
Ruthenians . 
Slovenians . 
Serbian Croats 
Italians 
Roumanians 
995° = 356 per thousand 
6440 = 230 
4970 = 178 
3520 = 126 
1250 = 45 
781 = 28 
770 = 27 
270 = 10 
The Germans amount to rather more than one-third. 
The political effect of this is that in order to form a majority 
at any time they need to be supplemented by another 
language group, even if they are entirely united, which 
seldom happens. Supposing that in consequence of the 
war Galicia is separated from the union of countries repre-
sented in the Reichsrat, the division of nationalities will be 
as follows : 
Nationalities in Austria without Galicia and Bukowina 
(the Ruthenian question remains untouched in this case) : 
Germans . . . . 9690^ 
Tzechs . 
Slovenians 
Serbian Croats 
Italians 
Poles 
Ruthenians 
6430 
1250 
780 
770 
260 
10/ 
-9500 
This involves a German majority which is almost as 
narrow as the Magyar majority in Hungary. 
Nationalities in Hungary, in thousands, according to the 
census of 1910 : 
Magyars . 
Roumanians 
Germans . 
10,050 = 482 per thousand 
2,950 = 141 „ 
2,030 = 98 „ 
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Slovaks 2,030 = 94 
Croats • 1,830 = 88 
Serbs 1,110 = 53 
Ruthenians 470 = 23 
Others 460 = 21 
94 per thousand 
The position as regards a majority is evident. The 
Magyars, without the help of geometrical manipulation of 
the electoral districts and pressure on the voter, cannot be 
certain that they will not be outvoted on national questions, 
although they are united amongst themselves. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina there are 1760 Serbian Croats 
out of 1930 thousand. The next biggest group is that of the 
Turks with 150 thousand ; they are, however, enumerated 
as " aliens." 
Austria-Hungary with Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is 
the whole monarchy, contains in millions : 
Germans . 
Magyars . 
Bohemians, Slovaks 
Serbian Croats . 
Poles 
Ruthenians 
Roumanians 
Slovenians 
Italians 
Others 
12.0 
10.1 
8-5 
5-5 
5-0 
4.0 
3-2 
1-3 
1.0 
0.2 
50.8 
If the general conception of the Austro-Hungarian Slavs 
is considered, a big group of 24.3 millions can be made up 
of Tzechs, Slovaks, Poles, Serbian Croats, Ruthenians and 
Slovenians, which would be the greatest numerically in the 
whole State ; but the various Slav groups are not a unity 
in this sense. Their strength is noticeable enough without 
this. 
Most of these figures may be altered as a result of the 
conclusion of peace, it is only certain from the outset that 
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any Magyar increase is out of the question, and that a 
German increase is only possible to a very limited extent. 
Further discussions about other possibilities of increase are 
at present ill-timed. It may be noticed merely that the 
number of Russian Poles is given in an out-of-date census 
as about 8 millions. 
I V . T H E ECONOMIC L I F E OF CENTRAL E U R O P E 
The number of illiterates cannot be determined either 
from the recruiting figures or from the population census. 
Germany does the former and Austria-Hungary the latter, 
so that the information is not quite comparable. Germany 
has 0.5 recruits per 1000 who cannot read and write ; Austria 
had 356 per 1000 inhabitants in 1900, a figure which must 
have decreased considerably in the interval; Hungary had 
437 per 1000 inhabitants in 1910, Bosnia as many as 878 ! 
The Hungarian figures sank from 502 to 437 between 1900 
and 1910, because the generation growing up are almost 
universally subject to compulsory education. But the under-
lying and characteristic difference is that we in Germany 
have already reached perhaps the third generation of a 
universally enforced compulsory education, in Austria they 
are on the whole at about the second, in Hungary hardly at 
the first. At present Austria may be regarded as com-
pletely embarked on the normal school system, and Hungary 
as nearly so embarked. In Prussia 1625 per 10,000 inhabi-
tants are primary scholars, in Austria 1705, in Hungary 1319, 
but in Bosnia only 222. 
For the sake of comparison we will add some data con-
cerning the educational system in other States. Great 
Britain has 1664 primary scholars per 10,000 inhabitants, 
France 1435, Belgium 1246, Italy 908, Roumania 831, 
Russia 370, United States 1924. It must be taken into 
account here that the length of compulsory schooling or of 
actual attendance at school is different. 
The censuses of industrial activities are almost entirely 
incomparable, because they are carried out according to 
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different principles. For example, when in Germany 
30.4 per cent., in Austria 42.8 per cent., in Hungary 26.7 per 
cent, of the female population are declared to be engaged in 
industry this does not mean that the employment of women 
is more frequent in Austria than in Germany, but only that 
wives and daughters living at home are counted differently. 
The number of males employed in trades and professions 
appear fairly equal in the two cases as something over 
60 per cent, of the existing male population. Owing to the 
different methods of calculation, however, the equality of the 
occupational groups is very defective, apart from the fact 
that the occupational census was held in different years, and 
the last one available for Austria is that of 1900. 
The following summary of occupational groups must be 
taken with all these limitations and provisos. Out of every 
100 inhabitants the numbers belonging to the following 
occupational groups are : 
In almost every group there are besides still further 
differences in the methods of enumeration. For example, 
inns and public houses are classed under industries in 
Austria-Hungary, but in Germany under trade, which goes 
a long way to explain the different figures for trade. 
Hungary too counts under " others " people whom we in 
Germany do not regard as engaged in industry at all, such 
as dependents and vagrants. 
The degree of organisation in the occupations cannot be 
compared statistically at all except in the case of the wage-
earners, which is a great defect from our point of view. 
Agriculture and forestry 
Industry and mining 
Trade and commerce 
Army and navy 
Public service and independent 
G. A. H. 
35.2 60.9 69.7 
40.0 23.3 13.6 
12.4 5.4 4.2 
2-3 1-7 1-5 
professions 
Domestic and personal service 
Others 
3-9 2.9 2.5 
4-5 3-5 4-4 
1.7 2.3 4.1 
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Even here it would be too risky to attempt to calculate 
percentages. 
G. A. H. 
Trade-union membership 3,754,000 693,000 119,000 
Mill. Mk. Mill. Mk. Mill. Mk. 
Trade-union property . 94 19.7 2.8 
Trade-union receipts . 90 11.4 2.1 
For purposes of comparison we 
membership for various countries : 
Germany . 
Great Britain 
United States 
France 
I t a l y . 
Austria 
Belgium 
Holland 
Denmark 
Switzerland 
Sweden 
Hungary 
give the trade-union 
3,754,000 
3,281,000 
2,526,000 
1,027,000 
872,000 
693,000 
232,000 
189,000 
139,000 
131,000 
122,000 
119,000 
The international significance of a Central European 
centralised system of trade unions is obvious from these 
figures without further discussion. Unfortunately we cannot 
offer a comparison of the degree of organisation amongst 
agricultural and industrial producers. 
The international summaries concerning the average 
produce per hectare of arable land serve best to measure 
the productivity of labour. 
The hectare produces in 100 kilograms as follows : 
Wheat Barley Potatoes 
Belgium . . 26 27 211 
Ireland . . 26 25 161 
Holland . • 25 27 174 
Germany . 24 2 2 159 
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Wheat Barley Potatoes 
Switzerland . 22 19 155 
England . . 21 18 164 
Sweden . . 21 17 100 
Norway . . l8 20 168 
Austria . . 1 5 1 6 1 0 0 
Roumania • 14 11 68 
Canada . • 14 16 112 
Japan • 14 19 100 
Hungary . 1 3 1 4 75 
Italy . 12 9 61 
Bulgaria . . 12 11 44 
United States . I O 1 3 61 
Russia . • 9 10 74 
In order to value this most important and interesting 
table properly the superiority of the North Sea climate for 
the production of corn should not be forgotten. But never-
theless there is food for thought in the fact that the North 
Sea countries (free trade and protectionist without distinc-
tion !) boast the highest rate in agricultural output. In-
dustrial capitalism in the first stage, in which it is most 
strongly developed round the North Sea, indirectly increases 
agricultural productivity in many ways. 
It is regrettable that a comparative estimate of the 
productivity of industrial labour is not feasible or only 
yields very doubtful and arbitrary results. Consequently 
we must attach importance to some indirect data which 
does not concern productive power itself, but only the 
technical and capitalist development of the countries. 
Postal conditions : 
G. A. H. 
Postal packets in general 7.0 1.9 0.7 milliards 
Telephones 2.1 0.3 0.2 
Telegrams 6l 23 13 millions 
Staff . 233,000 71,000 38,000 
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It is clear at once that a post office official in the German 
Empire facilitates more dispatches, telegrams and conversa-
tions than one in Austria or Hungary, but it must be 
remembered that a more thickly populated country is easier 
to provide for. 
Railway conditions : 
G. A.-H. 
Length of railways . 63,000 46,000 km. 
Per 10,000 inhabitants 9.5 9.0 
Stock per km. . . 315,000 274,000 mks. 
Unfortunately in this case, so far- as I can see, the numbers 
of staff cannot be made comparable with certainty owing 
to the difference in the railway systems. 
Joint-stock companies (1911) : 
G. A. H. 
Number of companies 53,000 740 2900 
Nominal capital . 16.3 3.3 2.0 milliard mks. 
Here it must be remembered that in Hungary banks and 
savings banks are included. The small number of joint-
stock companies in Austria is partly explained by the high 
joint-stock company tax. 
The capital in joint-stock companies in Great Britain is 
45.3 milliard mks., in France 10.8, in Russia 5.4, Holland 3.0 
Switzerland 2.6, Belgium 2.3. 
Average market rate of discount 1913 : Paris 3.84, 
London 4.39, Berlin 4.98, Vienna 5.72. 
Another way in which to compare the position of the 
population is by means of the statistics of consumption 
reckoned per head of the population. I quote the following 
summary (1912-13) from the book by Pistov which has just 
appeared : Die österreichisch-ungarische Volkswirtschaft (pub-
lished by G. Reimer, Berlin) : 
G. A.-H. 
881 120 
Rye . . . 1 4 5 ) 2 3 3 84 
Wheat . . . } ' ! ) , kg. 
I233 4)204 
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G. A.-H. 
29.9 kg. 
T . T 
Meat (1910) 52.6 
Coffee 
Rice 
Sugar 
Salt 
Beer 
3-6 
21.6 
24.6 
101 
2.4 
Tobacco 
Cotton . 
1-7 
7.2 
In respect to corn, seed corn and cattle fodder is included, 
so that a direct inference as to the amount of bread con-
sumed per individual cannot be drawn. In the cases of 
salt and sugar too, indirect uses are included. The con-
sumption of bread is certainly somewhat lower in Austria-
Hungary. But the lower average consumption is especially 
striking in regard to meat and sugar, of which Austria-
Hungary produces so much. The primary attainable aim 
of the mass of the Austro-Hungarian population must be 
to arrive at the average consumption of the Germans of the 
Empire. At this point the national and social advantage 
involved in the economic stimulation of the whole province 
shows itself most impressively. 
V . JOINT PROBLEMS IN W A R ECONOMICS 
The connection with the international economic system 
before the war is recognisable from the figures for imports 
and exports. A summary in the appendix to the Statistical 
Year Book for the German Empire gives the following 
sequence : 
Share of the States in international commerce (1912) : 
Million mks. Per cent. 
Great Britain 
Germany . 
United States 
France 
27,400 
21,300 
16,200 
14,800 
11,400 
16.6 
12.9 
9-9 
9.0 
6.9 Holland 
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Belgium 
Russia 
Austria-Hungary 
Italy . 
Millions mks. 
7,000 
5,800 
5,600 
5,100 
Per cent. 
4.2 
3-5 
3-3 
3-1 
The total amount of goods dealt with in exportation and 
importation is valued at 164 milliards, but of course the 
same commodity gets paid for twice, and indeed in case of 
further removals four and more times over. The amount 
dealt with actually in international trade may be fixed at 
60 to 70 milliards, or approximately twice as much as the 
calculable annual proceeds of the German national economic 
system. This immense exchange is in part completely 
destroyed by the war, in part become unsurveyable. 
The English plan of blockade referred originally more to 
Germany than to Austria-Hungary, still Austria-Hungary 
too has had to suffer from its effects, but has held out well. 
The fundamental facts of the blockade scheme were : 
German demand from foreign countries (1912, in million 
marks value) : 
Imports Exports Mill. mks. 
Raw materials 5000 1500 - 3 5 0 0 
Half-finished goods 1200 I I O O — 100 
Finished goods 1500 6400 + 49°° 
Food-stuffs and luxuries 2800 1000 — 1800 
Animals 300 — - 300 
Total . 10,800 10,000 - 800 
Austro-Hungarian demand from foreign countries (1912, 
in million kronen) : 
Imports Exports Mill. kr. 
Raw materials (including 
food-stuffs) . . 2000 960 — 1040 
Half-finished goods . 570 5x0 — 60 
Finished goods . . 980 1260 + 280 
Total 3550 2730 - 820 
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The balance this year (1912) is especially unfavourable 
owing to the weather conditions, but still it marks the 
position of affairs in general. Unfortunately I have not 
yet got the figures for 1913 for Austria. 
The English calculations resulted in this : that we could 
neither of us sell our finished goods abroad and could not 
buy raw material and food-stuffs from abroad. 
The more important items of imports as regards food and 
cattle fodder in Germany are, after exports or re-exports 
are deducted, the following (1913) in millions of marks. 
Imports Exports Mill. inks. 
Wheat . 
Wheaten flour 
Rye . 
Rye flour 
Potatoes 
Beef 
Pork 
Eggs 
Lard 
Butter . 
Rice 
Beet sugar 
Beer 
Coffee 
Apples . 
Herrings 
Barley . 
Bran, rice-dust 
Linseed . 
Oil cakes 
Palm kernels 
Oats 
Clover seed, lucerne seed 
417 88 - 3 2 9 
5 44 4- 39 
42 133 + 91 
— 39 + 39 
25 18 - 7 
36 — - 36 
24 — - 24 
194 2 — 192 
147 — - 147 
1x9 I - 118 
104 43 - 61 
— 265 4-265 
10 15 4- 5 
35 — - 35 
46 — - 46 
73 2 - 71 
390 I - 3 8 9 
149 2 - 147 
130 I — 129 
119 39 - 80 
104 — — 104 
60 93 4- 33 
46 17 - 29 
course, the imports f 
<J O W , , * ^V^II yjiiiy OLI^ IL LIJ' 
disturbed by the war. Still the position was very question-
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able, for it is evident that the only important positive items 
were sugar and rye. But rye largely took the place of 
barley as fodder. Under these circumstances the feeding of 
humans and cattle could only be continued by the consump-
tion of stores and by systematic economy. We cannot so 
far prepare statistical data as to the amount of stores. 
There was more of all the principal stuffs than any one had 
previously thought. 
A collection of the Government regulations for war 
economics will be found in the Mitteilungen und Nachrichter 
der Kriegszentrale des Hansabundes (Hillger, Berlin). 
The best summary of the continually growing materials 
for the science of war economics will be found in Welt-
wirthschafiliches Archiv, edited by Professor Harms of Kiel 
(Fischer, Jena). The speech of State Secretary Helfferich, 
included in the collection Der deutsche Krieg (Part No. 41-42), 
edited by Dr. E. Jäckh, gives information concerning the 
financial position during the war. General points of view 
are given in: Weltwirthschaft und Nationalwirtschaft by 
Professor Franz Oppenheimer, and Vorrathswirthschaft und 
Volkswirtschaft by Professor Herm. Levy. Professor Jas-
trow describes the economic problems at the beginning of 
the war in Im Kriegszustand, die Umformung des öffentlichen 
Lebens in der ersten Kriegswoche (Georg Reimer, Berlin). 
* * * * * * 
With regard to the rise of prices during the war we refer 
to the Weltwirtschaftliche Archiv (memoir by Professor 
Eulenburg). Here we shall only give retail prices of the 
Berlin Co-operative Stores. 
Retail prices (J kg. in pfennige) : 
July 1914 April 1915 
Butter • 136 160 + 24 
Lard . . 66 160 + 94 
Bacon . 80 160 + 80 
Peas . • 25 58 + 33 
Potatoes . 40 95 + 55 
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July 1914 April 1915 
Rye flour • 14 24 + 10 
Wheat flour . I 8 2 6 + 8 
Rice . . 2 6 6 0 + 34 
Bread • SO 44 + 14 
The rise in the price of bread would have been very much 
greater had it not been for the maximum price regulation. 
We find a similar rise in prices, in parts even higher, in 
Austria-Hungary. 
It is a number of years since the whole Austria-
Hungarian Monarchy was completely self-supporting. The 
increased importation in the group " corn, pulse, flour " is 
as follows : 
1911 . . . . . 605,000 tons 
1912 . . . . . 692,000 tons 
In other words: in 1912 Austria-Hungary purchased 
food-stuffs and luxuries from abroad to the value of about 
100 million kronen. 
The following table in millions of kronen, for 1912, is, 
however, important as showing the mutual economic 
relations of Austria and Hungary, and hence as an aid to 
understanding the economic tension during the war : 
From Hungary 
to Austria 
From Austria 
to Hungary 
Corn 
Flour . 
298 mill. kr. 1 
259 » f 
13 mill. kr. 
Rice 13 a 3 
Fruit 8 a 5 
Potatoes 4 >> — 
Beet sugar 6 II — 
Cattle . 161 mill, headi 
4 mill, head Pigs 91 „ „ J 
Milk . 12 mill. kr. — 
Eggs • 15 ti • — 
Butter . 8 >y — 
Lard 13 tr — 
Bacon . 11 }f — 
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Wine 
Meat 
Sugar . 
Tobacco 
From Hungary 
to Austria 
60 mill. kr. 
17 >, 
2 
17 
From Austria 
to Hungary 
15 mill. kr. 
4 
14 
The line (—) in the last column does not mean that 
there is absolutely no importation from Austria to Hungary, 
but only that it is insignificant. The whole picture is quite 
clear : Hungary is the agricultural country for Austria ! 
Austria taken by itself is a country importing agricultural 
produce as much or almost more than Germany. 
The Austrian exports to Hungary include the following as 
chief items (surplus calculated) : 
Coal . 
Coke . 
Cotton yarn 
Cotton goods 
Linen textures 
Sacks 
Woollen goods 
Silk goods . 
Hats . 
Clothes 
Underlinen 
Paper and paper goods 
India-rubber goods 
Leather, leather goods 
Wooden wares 
Glass goods 
Fancy wares 
Iron, iron goods . 
Base metal goods 
Machines, apparatus 
Electrical apparatus 
Boats 
Mill. kr. 
22 
15 
21 
222 
17 
I I 
120 
44 
16 
52 
23 
30 
10 
80 
25 
21 
15 
100 
37 
64 
15 
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Precious metals, jewels 
Mill. kr. 
26 
Instruments, clocks . . . . 19 
Drugs 8 
It is only on the basis of these summaries that we can 
understand the fact that there are two commercial policies 
and two economic States within the Dual Monarchy. But it 
would be the same with us in the German Empire if we had 
a political frontier to cross at the Elbe. Who amongst us 
would wish to have one ? 
V I . O U R POSITION IN THE W O R L D ' S ECONOMIC S Y S T E M 
Hübner's Geographisch-statistischen Tabellen still reckons 
sixty-one independent States on the earth's surface, amongst 
which however are included dwarf States such as Andorra, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Liechten-
stein, San Marino, Monaco, Panama, the Polar regions (!) and 
Samos, and States whose dependence is well known are still 
called independent, such as Egypt, Arabia, Nepal, Oman,' 
Morocco. In reality it is impossible to say exactly how 
many genuinely independent States there are, since the 
concept of sovereignty is variable. But even on a generous 
appreciation there are not more than fifty. 
If we assume that genuine political sovereignty begins at 
a million inhabitants we can construct the following groups. 
Classification of States according to size (with colonies) : 
States of over 100 millions: 
Great Britain 
United States 
States of from 50 to 100 millions : 
France 
Germany . 
Japan 
Austria-Hungary 
China 
Russia 
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States of from 20 to 50 millions 
Netherlands 
I t a l y . 
Brazil 
Turkey 
Belgium 
Spain 
States of from 1 o to 20 millions 
Mexico 
Portugal 
Persia 
States of from 5 to 10 millions: 
Roumania . 
Abyssinia 
Siam . 
Argentina 
Sweden 
Peru 
Columbia 
States of from 1 to 5 millions :, 
Afghanistan 
Bulgaria 
Greece 
Switzerland 
Serbia 
Chile . 
Denmark 
Haiti 
Venezuela 
Bolivia 
Cuba . 
Ecuador 
Guatemala 
Liberia 
Norway 
Uruguay 
44\ 
36 
1170 mill. 22 
22 
21/ 
10) 
40 mill. 
7 V 48 mill. 
6 
6 
5' 
4\ 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
45 mill. 
- / 
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It is unnecessary to say how much States of the same class 
as to size often differ qualitatively. At the same time this 
summary shows the complete victory of the political " large 
scale industry " system. Almost two-thirds of mankind 
belong to the four world-group economic areas of the 
first rank. The world's history is in reality'a game played 
by the first eight Powers. In the game a permanent com-
bination between Germany and Austria-Hungary, even 
without the accession of other neighbouring States, would 
be a change of the greatest significance. It would then be : 
Great Britain, China, Russia, Mid-Europe, the United 
States, France, Japan. But whether China is here a fellow-
player or an object remains to be seen. 
The German colonies hitherto existing were or are as 
follows (area in iooo sq.km.) : 
Population 
Area White Coloured 
East Africa . . 995 5,300 7,660,000 
Kamerun . . 790 1,900 2,650,000 
Togo . . . 87 400 1,030,000 
South West Africa . 835 14,800 84,000 
New Guinea . . 240 1,000} 
Caroline Islands, etc. 2.5 500) 
Samoa . . . 2.6 500 38,000 
Kiantschou . . 0.6 4,500 190,000 
600,000 (?) 
Thus an area of about 3 mill, sq.km., white inhabitants 
only perhaps 30,000, coloured inhabitants something over 
12 millions. The estimates of population fluctuate greatly. 
Austria-Hungary has no colonies. 
The colonial possessions of the European neighbouring 
countries are as follows : 
Belgium possesses the Belgian Congo with an area of 
2.4 million sq.km. and about 15 million inhabitants. 
The Netherlands possess in the East Indies the large and 
small Sunda Islands with an area of almost 2 million sq.km. 
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and about 38 million inhabitants; in addition smaller 
territories in the West Indies. 
Denmark possesses the Faroe Islands, Greenland, West 
Indian islands. About 200,000 sq.km. of inhabitable country, 
140,000 inhabitants. 
Norway and Sweden possess no colonies, nor do Switzer-
land and the Balkan States. 
* * * * * * 
Numbers of populations for all the Central European 
territories between France and Italy on the one side and 
Russia on the other side (colonial populations not counted), 
1910 : 
Mill, inhab. 
Germany . . . . . . 64.9 
Austria-Hungary . . . . 5 1 . 4 
Roumania . . . . . 7.6 
Belgium . . . . . . 7.5 
Netherlands . . . . . 6.2 
Sweden . . . . . . 5.6 
Serbia . . . . . . 4.5 
Bulgaria . . . . . . 4.3 
Greece . . . . . . 4.3 
Switzerland . . . . 3.8 
Denmark . . . . . . 2.8 
Norway . . . . . . 2.4 
Albania . . . . . . 0.8 
Luxemburg . . . . 0.3 
166.4 
Germany and Austria-Hungary together contain more 
than two-thirds of the whole number here considered. It 
lies outside any present xonsideration that all these States 
should ever belong to any sort of union, for there is not only 
their will to be independent, justified as it is by history, to 
take into account, but also their mutual antagonism. 
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The following summaries will serve for the comparison 
of the four great world-group economic areas amongst 
which, under Mid-Europe, Germany and Austria-Hungary 
alone are included. Gr. = Greater Britain, wherein gene-
rally the whole wide international province is not considered, 
but still the greater part of it, that is in addition to the 
European Home Country also British India, New Zealand, 
and Australia. Canada and South Africa are wanting for 
various data. Rs. = Russia, and that unfortunately without 
the Asiatic portions, and occasionally without North 
Caucasia and Finland. The inequality of these statistics 
cannot be remedied even by the Statistical Offices themselves. 
Us. = the United States ; Me. = Mid-Europe. 
Uses made of Soil in millions of hectares 
Gr. Rs. Us. Me. 
Total area . . . 760 516 770 116 
Agriculturally used . 146 210 194 67 
Forest . . . 50 108 220 33 
Here Canada is missing, and its inclusion would noticeably 
increase the figures for the agricultural area and for forest 
in the case of Greater Britain. 
Crops (1912-13) in millions of tons 
Gr. Rs. Us. Me. 
Wheat . . 20 23 21 IX 
Rye . — 25 I l6 
Barley . • 3 12 4 8 
Here Canada is counted in. The quantity of self-produced 
bread-corn is greater for Mid-Europe than for Greater 
Britain or for the United States. 
Live Stock in millions of heads 
Gr. Rs. Us. Me. 
Horses . I I 25 21 9 
Cattle . • 149 37 57 36 
Pigs 8 12 61 37 
Sheep and goats . 212 43 54 22 
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The figures for Greater Britain for cattle are explained by 
India, those for sheep by Australia. 
Sugar Production in millions of tons 
Gr. Rs. Us. Me. 
Beet sugar . — 1.2 0.5 4-1 
Cane sugar . 2.9 — 0.5 — 
2.9 1.2 x.o 4.1 
Here Mid-Europe rules the market. 
Cotton Crop 
Unfortunately dajta from Russia are lacking. Mid-
Europe without colonies has no crop of its own. The world-
crop for 1912-13 amounted to 27.2 million bales. Of these 
the United States yields 14.1 and Greater Britain 5.5. 
Cotton Spindles 
Millions 
Great Britain with India and Canada 63 
United States . . . . 32 
Mid-Europe . . . . . 1 6 
Russia . . . . . 9 
World's total . . . . 145 
Mid-Europe's cotton manufacture ranks third in the 
world. 
Coal and Lignite 
Greater Britain, including Canada, India, Australia, South 
Africa and British Borneo, 307 million tons; Russia, 
including its Asiatic possessions, 31 million tons ; the United 
States, 450 million tons; Mid-Europe, 307 million tons, 
exactly the same as Greater Britain. In addition the Mid-
European coal-supplies are of greater future richness than 
those of Great Britain; it is true that in Greater Britain 
the share of pit 'coal is greater and that of lignite smaller. 
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Iron Ore and Pig-iron in millions of tons 
Gr. Rs. Us. Me. 
Iron ore . . . 15 8 60 38 
Pig-iron . . 10 4 30 20 
Here the struggle between the United States and Mid-
Europe is a future problem in international economics. 
Owing to the dissimilarity in the materials all these 
summaries are uncertain in details, and are based for the 
most part on the groupings given in the appendix to the 
Statistical Year Book for the German Empire. We ought 
to learn from them to think in terms of great national 
economic quantities. So soon as we do this we arrive 
inevitably at the conclusion that even the combined quan-
tities of Germany and Austria-Hungary are not, properly 
speaking, great for international economics, but yet they will 
form a very exceUent basis for the effort and for the future 
of Mid-Europe. 
V I I . T A R I F F PROBLEMS 
According to the statistics of the German Empire, goods 
of the following declared values have been imported and 
exported between Germany and Austria-Hungary during 
recent years. 
German and Austro-Hungarian trade in millions of marks : 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
19 13 
From A.-H. to G. 
750 
760 
740 
830 
830 
From G. to A.-H. 
770 
820 
92O 
IO4O 
IIOO 
The tendency of the development is recognisable at once : 
Austria-Hungary uses its natural products itself to an 
increasing extent and cannot increase its industrial imports 
into Germany as much as the increase in the converse 
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direction. Owing to this development the existing com-
mercial treaty is regarded as unfavourable in Austria 
(-Hungary). 
From the German point of view the increase in our 
exports to Austria-Hungary is not unusually high, for our 
exports have increased since 1907 in the following propor-
tions, if the exportation for 1907 is expressed as 100. 
Growth of German exports, 1907-1913 : 
To Great Britain 
To France 
To Russia 
To the United States 
To Austria-Hungary 
On the average 
as 100 
as 100 
as 100 
as 100 
as 100 
as 100 
136 
176 
201 
109 
154 
155 
German exports increased in value from 1909 to 1913 by 
3.5 milliard marks. Of this immense increase 330 millions 
resulted from the exports to Austria-Hungary, or not 
quite a tenth part of our increase. German exports to 
Russia rose in the same period by 440 million marks, those 
to France by 330, likewise those to Great Britain by 420. 
A quite general emanation of economic vigour in Germany 
is in question, which is only felt more severely in Austria-
Hungary because its own export trade is unable to keep 
pace. 
The Russian imports to Germany during this same period 
rose and fell according to the results of the harvest, whereas 
Austria-Hungary, having little surplus crop to dispose of, 
could share but little in these lucky profits from the German 
years of scarcity. 
German imports from Russia and Austria-Hungary, in 
million marks : 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
From Rs. 
1360 
1390 
1630 
1530 
1420 
From A.-H. 
750 
760 
740 
830 
830 
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Since Russia has no more favourable a commercial 
treaty with Germany than has Austria-Hungary, it is 
evident that the commercial treaty is not responsible for 
the difference. 
If we examine the individual items, Austrian imports to 
Germany have increased in the following principal articles : 
eggs, rough pinewood, calf-skins, hides, linen yarn, bed 
feathers, petroleum, beer, wood for wood pulp, apples, oil 
cakes, china, lubricating oil, skins, mine timber, etc. But 
the imports were decreasing or stationary in the following 
principal articles : lignite, oxen, sawn pinewood, malt, coal, 
hops, horses, cows, purple clover seed, hens, French beans, 
bran, etc. In between there are fluctuating articles. In 
each individual case the decline may be due to very different 
causes, to tariff or climate or home demand, but careful 
reconsideration of the apparently regular occurrence leads 
back always to the fundamental fact that Austria-Hungary, 
owing to its too small average crop per acre in relation to 
its increasing home demand, is, except for forest products, 
ceasing to be an exporting agricultural country, without so 
far having the power to secure a corresponding sale on 
foreign markets by means of its own industries which are 
closely adapted to native products. 
If we attempt to give some meaning to this same process 
with the help of the Austrian statistics, the impression 
strengthens that the demand for imports is growing more 
rapidly than the possibility of exports. The increase in 
importation swells disquietingly, whilst the exportation 
makes slower progress. Expressed in money, the adverse 
balance of trade in 1912 amounted to over 740 million kronen, 
a sum which is out of all proportion to the relations of 
Austria-Hungary to foreign countries in respect to capital. 
According to the Austrian data the total Austro-Hun-
garian exportation for 1907 to 1912 has increased in all by 
268 million kronen, or about by 100 : 1x0. The increase 
consists, if we compare these particular years, in petroleum, 
sugar, eggs, fats, wood and wooden wares, and also in 
horses, but not in cattle, scarcely in malt, little in linen and 
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hemp goods, not at all in corn. Most industries gain access 
to foreign countries slowly and with difficulty. 
Considering the state of affairs it is comprehensible if all 
tariff questions are treated with a certain timidity. It is 
obvious that a national economic system in the position 
and under the special pressure of the effects of the war will 
not embark on experiments which are still incalculable. 
We Germans of the Empire must understand this if we 
want to work together at all with the Austrians and 
Hungarians. But just on account of this position we assert 
that the change to better things cannot be brought about 
by a customs union alone. Austria-Hungary needs the 
increase in intensity and the international-political union 
with Germany, which has already experienced a development 
similar to that which Austria-Hungary is now going through, 
and that about forty years ago, when it was easier to convert 
oneself from an agricultural exporting country into an 
industrial exporting country with increased agricultural 
output at home. 
V I I I . CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
The German Imperial Constitution has the following 
preliminary stages : 
(i) The Roman Imperial German nation, from the Peace 
of Westphalia in 1648 to the abdication of the Imperial 
crown in 1806, was a so-called State of States, that is a 
union of sovereign reigning princes with an Imperial Diet. 
This Imperial Diet consisted of the electoral council, the 
princes' council and the deputies (.Kollegium) of the Imperial 
cities. The Emperor, although the Crown in reality devolved 
by inheritance, was elected after the ancient fashion. He 
summoned the Diet according to the constitution. But from 
1663 onwards the Diet was permanently in session at Regens-
burg. For religious affairs there was the Corpus Catholicorum 
and the Corpus Evangelicorum. An Imperial decree required 
the assent of all the corporate bodies summoned for the 
purpose and the Emperor's decree. The business was 
x 
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carried on by deputations. The resolution of a deputation, if 
confirmed by the Emperor, had the force of an Imperial decree. 
The system remained almost inoperative for joint legisla-
tion. 
(2) The Confederation of the Rhine, 1806-13, arose in 
virtue of the transformation of the Imperial constitution 
by the conclusive resolution of the Imperial deputation in 
1803 under French management. It included all Germany 
with the exception of Austria, Prussia on the right bank of 
the Elbe, the Swedish and Danish possessions and the 
Hansa towns. The Confederation took over the existing 
Imperial rights so far as the alterations were not ex-
pressly stated. The Diet of the Rhenish Confederation 
was to be summoned at Frankfurt-on-Main, but it never 
met. 
(3) The German Confederation, 1815-48, was based on 
the Act of the German Confederation of the Vienna Congress. 
It included only those territories in Austria and Prussia 
which had earlier belonged to the Roman Empire of German 
nations, and in addition all the German moderate-sized and 
small States, even those which like Hanover and Schleswig-
Holstein were united with sovereign States with extra-
German rulers. The Confederation was, as Arndt expresses 
it in Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches, a " union according to 
international law of German sovereign princes and free 
towns." Its inner constitution was based on treaties, and it 
wished to appear as a politically united Power in its outward 
relations. Every extension of the Confederation's sphere of 
activity required the unanimity of the Diet meeting in 
Frankfurt-on-Main, owing to the adherence to the treaty 
system. This Diet was under the presidency of Austria, and 
consisted of representatives of the princes and States con-
cerned. There was no special army of the Confederation, 
but only an obligation to keep contingents in readiness. 
(4) The Revolution Parliament, 1848-50. The National 
Assembly met in Frankfurt-on-Main as a meeting to prepare 
the way for a German Imperial Constitution, and passed a 
draft constitution, the principal parts of which were later 
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adopted by Bismarck. This draft constitution altered 
nothing in the previous extent of the Empire, and thus 
included Austria and Prussia only to the extent of the old 
German constituent parts. In regard to polyglot State 
provinces it was resolved : " If a German province and a 
non-German province have the same sovereign, the German 
province shall have a separate constitution, Government 
and administration." Military power was declared to be 
completely an Imperial matter. Legal regulations, and 
legislation on economic or commercial matters may only 
be taken in hand by the Imperial authority in so far as 
the organs of the Empire determine on it. In this con-
dition lies the essence of the federal State as opposed to 
the State confederation. Imperial laws take precedence 
of provincial laws. The Diet consists of a federal Chamber 
(Staatenhaus) and a popular Chamber (Volkshaus), of which 
the former corresponded, say, to the Diet of the German 
Confederation at Frankfurt-on-Main, the second was con-
ceived somewhat like the later German Reichstag. The 
Imperial Crown was offered to the Prussian King by 290 
votes to 248 abstentions. The whole scheme collapsed 
when this offer was refused. 
(5) The German Confederation, 1850-66, is not distin-
guished in public law from the Confederation as hitherto 
existing, but, at its side, grows up the Customs Union founded 
by Prussia which, since about 1852, comprehended the 
territory of the later German Empire. In virtue of the 
Peace of Prague the Austrian Emperor acknowledges the 
dissolution of the existing confederation, and gives his 
consent to a German formation without the inclusion of the 
Austrian Imperial State. 
(6) The North German Confederation, 1866-71, embraces 
North Germany up to the boundary of the Main. The 
constitution is the same as the present Imperial constitution 
in all essential parts. The King of Prussia is hereditary 
President, and has executive power. Legislative power 
rests with the Bundesrat and Reichstag. The Bundesrat is 
formed in Berlin on the plan of the Frankfurt example. 
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Alongside of the North German Reichstag there is the 
Customs Parliament in which representatives of South 
Germany take part. The North German Confederation is 
a federal State, for it has its own legislative powers. 
(7) The German Empire from 1871 onwards is an exten-
sion of the North German Confederation by the accession 
of the South German States and by the inclusion of the 
Customs Union in the confederate organisation. The Prussian 
King bears the title of German Emperor. Special agree-
ments are in force with Bavaria and Württemberg, of the 
military part of which we have already spoken in the text 
of our book. The Imperial organs of government are the 
Emperor, the Bundesrat and the Reichstag. 
The Emperor is General and President of the Confedera-
tion, as King of Prussia he instructs the Prussian delegation 
in the Bundesrat, and appoints and removes from office the 
Imperial Chancellor. Since the foundation of the Empire 
his position has on the whole gained in importance as the 
Imperial activities have increased. 
There are sixty-one votes in the Bundesrat, of which 
Prussia has only seventeen. But in addition Prussia has the 
right in respect to military, customs and taxation questions 
to prevent any alteration by her adverse vote alone. Deci-
sions by a majority vote very seldom occur. The Bundesrat 
has in fact become a permanent representative body which 
issues proposals for laws as well as regulations for their 
enforcement. Constitutionally the Bundesrat gives instruc-
tions to the Imperial Departments subordinate to the 
Imperial Chancellor, but in reality the actual initiative 
often rests with these Departments. The Imperial Depart-
ments are : the Foreign Office, the Imperial Home Office, 
the Admiralty, the Imperial Department of Justice, the 
Imperial Treasury Department, the Imperial Railway 
Bureau, the Imperial Colonial Office, etc. There is no 
Imperial War Office since there still exist Prussian, Bavarian 
and Württembergish armies. In reality the Prussian 
Minister of War is almost the same as an Imperial Minister 
of War. 
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The Reichstag results from direct election and has nothing 
to do with delegations from other representative bodies. It 
is the surest evidence of the existence of Imperial citizen-
ship rights. It contains 397 deputies. The consent of the 
Reichstag is necessary in order to suspend or alter any 
Imperial law, and schemes for home finance and loans are 
counted as laws for this purpose. 
This superstructure formed of Emperor, Bundesrat and 
Reichstag has produced a thoroughly individual and satis-
factory political life for the German Empire. Demands for 
alterations refer rather to the often very antiquated con-
stitutions of the separate States than to the Imperial 
constitution. 
* * * * * * 
The Austro-Hungarian Constitution is not a uniform 
State constitution in the same sense as the German Imperial 
Constitution. Its older stages are, in respect to the German 
Austrian Crown lands, the same as those of the German 
Empire. But the homogeneity of Austria-Hungary is 
expressed in principle in the Pragmatic Sanction of the 
Emperor Karl V. in 1713, wherein all the sectional possessions 
of the whole monarchy bound themselves to the same order 
of succession and thus to permanent association. The 
unity of the State is from the outset monarchical. The title 
of Emperor of Austria dates from 1804. 
The constitution of the centralised State was legally 
formed by the Imperial Diploma of i860 and the Patent of 
1861, depending on it. This constitution comprises a 
Landtag and Reichsrat with almost the same principle of 
division as in the German Imperial draft constitution of 
1848, except that there is only the one sovereign in question 
throughout. A distinction is also made in this Act of the 
Constitution between the countries belonging to the Hun-
garian Crown and those of the Austrian section, but the 
preponderating intention is centralisation. 
The decisive year for the constitution of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy is that of 1867, the year of the political 
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separation and peaceable union between Austria and 
Hungary. 
The legal independence and territorial integrity of Hungary 
and its neighbouring countries is solemnly declared by the 
oath of the sovereign. In this the older Hungarian con-
stitutions are recurred to, and especially the revolutionary 
legislation of 1848. By this act of separation two States, 
themselves divided several times, arose with foundation and 
superstructure, each of which already has an imperial con-
stitution superior to its provincial constitutions, but which 
have the same monarch, and hence carry on certain joint 
institutions either naturally or by means of a treaty. The 
principal concerns of the united State are : the joint Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, the Imperial Ministry for War for all 
matters relating to the joint army and the navy (the Land-
wehr on both sides being still maintained), the joint 
Ministry for Finance for joint expenses, whilst the financial 
systems are separate, a joint administration for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The preliminary estimate for joint expenses 
is presented to a meeting of the Delegations for deliberation 
(and to be passed), which meeting consists of deputations 
from the parliaments of both sides. 
Germans of the Empire frequently compare the sessions 
of the Delegations with the German Reichstag, but this is a 
mistake. Each half of the Empire sends sixty representa-
tives, one-third of whom are chosen from the House of 
Lords (Herrenhaus) or Table of Magnates respectively. The 
sessions are public and not joint, since each Delegation 
discusses in its native language. The intercourse between 
the Delegations is in writing. Differences of opinion, if 
written communications have been exchanged three times 
without agreement resulting, are settled in a joint full 
session by voting without debate. The speech from the 
throne is given twice, in German and Magyar. It is obvious 
that this machinery is not formed to produce joint political 
feeling, but that, on the contrary, it is arranged to settle the 
necessary joint business with the least conceivable mutual 
contact. 
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The agreements at present valid between Austria and 
Hungary date from December 1907 and last till Decem-
ber 31, 1917. They include the determination of the 
contribution obligatory on both sides (Beitragspflicht) and 
the customs and commercial treaty. The collection and 
administration of the customs is still left, within the frontiers 
of the States in question, to the Governments of the two 
parties concluding the treaty. Inspectors are appointed by 
both sides for the mutual supervision of the customs admini-
stration, and they have the right to examine the business 
routine in the said administration in the other State. There 
is a Court of Arbitration for disputed questions. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina were taken into the joint customs 
union in 1879. In this respect nothing was altered by the 
declaration of the hereditary sovereignty of the Imperial 
house in 1908. The administration there is inspected by 
Austria and by Hungary. 
Central European treaties are prepared by the joint 
Foreign Office, but must be passed by the separate national 
representative bodies. Hence it is true to say : we do not 
know exactly whether we have to deal with one or with two 
States. 
C H A P T E R X 
B I B L I O G R A P H Y 
IN the following pages books and pamphlets are mentioned 
from which Austrians and Hungarians can learn to know 
the policy of the German Empire, and the Germans of the 
Empire can learn to know that of Austria-Hungary. The 
list of Austro-Hungarian literature is borrowed from Richard 
Charmatz, the author of the Wegweiser durch die Literature 
der österreichischen Geschichte (Stuttgart, Cotta, 1912), and is 
published in the Hilfe (No. 23, 19x5). The list for the 
German Empire has been compiled for the purpose by a 
group of competent men and women as an aid to a Central 
European rapprochement. In both cases many books have 
of course been omitted which might equally well have been 
included. The choice made in particular cases may always 
be called in question, since the value of a book always differs 
according to the reader's taste and type of education, and 
since in various places writings of lesser merit must be 
mentioned because no better ones existed or were known. 
The few notes interspersed are borrowed from Herr R. 
Charmatz in the case of the Austro-Hungarian list, and are 
by me in the case of the German list. They are only 
intended to give hints as to the use of the books. 
A U S T R O - H U N G A R I A N L I T E R A T U R E 
For those who cannot devote too much time to the study 
of Austria-Hungary we must first mention the most important 
books and those writings which give a survey. The follow-
ing, especially, will facilitate a knowledge of the events in 
the nineteenth century : 
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Anton Springer, Geschichte Österreichs seit dem Wiener 
Frieden, 1809, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1863 and 1865. (Goes 
down to 1849.) 
Heinrich Friedjung, Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in 
Deutschland, 1859-1866, 2 vols., 9th edition. Cotta, 
Stuttgart. (A monumental Austrian work.) 
Heinrich Friedjung, Österreich von 1848-1860. Hitherto 
2 vols., several editions. Cotta, Stuttgart. (Very arrest-
ing and informative.) 
Two books published in the collection Aus Natur und 
Geisteswelt supply a brief survey : 
Richard Charmatz, Geschichte der auswärtigen Politik Öster-
reichs im 19. Jahrhundert, 2 vols. Leipzig. 
Richard Charmatz, Österreichs innere Geschichte von 1848 
bis 1907, 2 vols., 2nd edition. Leipzig. 
The following are mentioned for an explanation of foreign 
policy : 
Heinrich Fried jung, Der Krimkrieg und die österreichische 
Politik, 2nd edition. Cotta, Stuttgart. 
Eduard von Wertheimer, Graf Julius Andrassy, Sein Leben 
und seine Zeit, 3 vols. Stuttgart, 1913. (Also of 
importance for Hungarian home policy.) 
Theodor von Sosnosky, Die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns 
seit 1866, 2 vols. Stuttgart, 1913 and 1914. 
For an understanding of the political tendencies and 
national theories the following books are useful: 
Rudolf Springer, Grundlagen und Entwicklungziele der 
österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie. Vienna, 1906. 
(An excellent book.) 
Rudolf Springer, Der Kampf der österreichischen Nationen 
um den Staat, Part I. Vienna, 1902. 
OttojjBauer, Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemocratie. 
Vienna, 1907. (Later a popular edition also. Much 
historical material.) 
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Aurel C. Popovici, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Grosz-
Österreich. Leipzig, 1906. 
Paul Samassa, Die Völkerstreit im Habsburger Staat. Leipzig, 
1910. 
In addition these older books : 
Paul Dehn, Deutschland, nach Osten, vols. 2 and 3 ; Österreich-
Ungarn in reichsdeutschem Lieht, 2 parts. Munich, 1888 
and 1890. 
Adolf Fischhof, Österreich und die Bürgschaften seines 
Bestandes. Vienna, 1869. 
Joseph Freiherr von Cötvös, Die Nationalitätenfrage. Buda-
pest, 1865. 
Finally : 
Richard Charmatz, Deutsch-österreichische Politik. Studien 
über den Liberalismus und über die auswärtige Politik. 
Leipzig, 1907. 
On the constitution and constitutional history : 
Alfons Huber, Österreichische Reichsgeschichte. Vienna, 1895. 
Ludwig Gumplowicz, Das österreichische Staatsrecht, 3rd 
edition. Vienna, 1907. 
Heinrich Rauchberg, Österreichische Bürgerkunde. Vienna, 
published by Tempsky. 
Statistical: 
A. L. Hickmann, Geographisch-statistischer Taschenatlas von 
Österreich-Ungarn. Vienna, pubhsher, Freytag. 
Österreichisches statistisches Handbuch. Issued by the 
Central Imperial Statistical Commission (1 vol. 
annually). Vienna, published by Gerold. 
% t^ ajc 5}« jc je 
Some works are now mentioned which treat of longer 
periods of time or of individual persons, and which will 
serve to deepen preliminary knowledge. Among general 
accounts of Austrian history the following may be 
noticed: 
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Franz Martin Mayer, Geschichte Österreichs mit besonderer 
Rücksicht auf das Kulturleben, 2 vols., 3rd edition. 
Vienna, 1909. (Good comprehensive account.) 
Richard Kralik, Österreichische Geschichte, 3rd edition. 
Vienna, 1914. (Clerical conservative view of events.) 
In addition : 
Franz Krones, Geschichte der Neuzeit Österreichs vom 18. 
Jahrhundert bis auf die Gegenwart. Berlin 1879. (Also 
vol. iv. of the same author's Handbuch der Geschichte 
Österreichs.) 
H. von Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, Deutsche Geschichte von der 
Auflösung des alten bis zur Errichtung des neuen Kaiser-
reiches (1806-1871), 3 vols. Cotta, Stuttgart, 1897, 
1903, 1905. 
For Hungary : 
Michael Horvath, Kurzgefaszte Geschichte Ungarns, 2 vols. 
Budapest, 1863. (Goes down to 1848.) 
Eugen Csuday, Die Geschichte der Ungarn, 2 vols. Vienna, 
1898. 
Further : 
Michael Horvath, Geschichte des Unabhängigkeitskrieges im 
Ungarn, 1848-1849, 3 vols., 2nd edition. Budapest, 1872. 
Michael Horvath, 25 Jahre aus der Geschichte Ungarns, 
1825-1848, 2 vols. Leipzig, 1867. 
Heinrich Marczali, Ungarische Verfassungsgeschichte. Tübin-
gen, 1910. 
Joseph von Jekelfalussy, Der tausendjährige ungarische Staat 
und sein Volk. Issued by order of the Hungarian 
Ministry of Commerce. Budapest, 1896. 
Detached periods of time : 
Adam Wolf and Hans von Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, Öster-
reich unter Maria Theresa, JoseJ II. und Leopold II. 
(From Oucken, Augemeine Geschichte in Einzeldarstel-
lungen. Berlin, 1884.) 
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H. von Zwiedineck-Südenhorst, Maria Theresa (Mono-
graphien zur Weltgeschichte). Velhagen and Klasing. 
Johann Wendrinsky, Kaiser Josef II. Vienna, 1880. 
A. Dove, Ausgewählte Schriften. Leipzig, 1898. (Contains 
memoirs on Maria Theresa and Kaunitz.) 
August Fournier, Historische Studien und Skizzen, 3 vols. 
Prague, 1885 ; Vienna, 1908 and 1912. (Many con-
tributions relating to the times of Maria Theresa, 
Josef II., Napoleon and Metternich.) 
Eduard Wertheimer, Geschichte Österreichs und Ungarns im 
ersten Jahrzehnt des 19. Jahrhunderts, 2 vols. Leipzig, 
1884 and 1890. 
Ernst Viktor Zenker, Die Wiener Revolution 1848 im ihren 
sozialen Voraussetzungen und Beziehungen. Vienna, 
1897. 
Maximilian Bach, Geschickte der Wiener Revolution im Jahre 
1848. Vienna, 1898. (Social Democratic point of 
view.) 
Joseph Alexander Freiherr von Helfert, Geschichte der 
österreichischen Revolution im Zusammenhange mit 
der mitteleuropäischen Bewegung, 2 vols. Freiburg in 
Breisgau, 1907 and 1908. (Goes down to June 1848. 
Conservative point of view.) 
Friedrich Schütz, Werden und Wirken des Bürgerministeriums. 
Leipzig, 1909. (Feuilletons.) 
Walter Rogge, Österreich von Vilagos bis zur Gegenwart, 
3 vols. Leipzig, 1872, 1873. 
Walter Rogge, Österreich seit der Katastrophe Hohenwart-
Beust, 2 vols. Leipzig, 1879. (Rogge's books are 
badly arranged and full of prejudice.) 
Gustav Kolmer, Parlament und Verfassung in Österreich, 
8 vols. Vienna, 1902-14. (Covers the years 1861-
1904.) 
The following give information about civilisation and 
social life : 
Gustav Strakosch-Grassmann, Geschichte des österreichischen 
Unterrichtswesens. Vienna, 1905. 
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Ludwig Hevesi, Österreichische Kunst im 19. Jahrhundert, 
2 parts. Leipzig, 1903. (From Geschichte der modernen 
Kunst.) 
J. W. Nagl and J. Zeidler, Deutsch-österreichische Literaturge-
schichte, 2 vols. Vienna, 1896-1915. 
K. Grünberg, Die Bauernbefreiung und die Auflösung des 
Gutsherrlich-bäuerlichen Verhältnisses in Böhmen, Mähren 
und Schlesien, 2 parts. Leipzig, 1894. 
Heinrich Waentig, Gewerbliche Mittelstandspolitik. Leipzig, 
1898. (Based on Austrian sources.) 
Julius Deutsch, Geschichte der österreichischen Gewerkschajts-
bewegung. Vienna, 1908. 
Georg Loesche, Geschichte des Protestantismus in Österreich. 
Tubingen, 1902. (This excellent little booklet gives a 
bibliography at the end for the important period of the 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation.) 
Georg Loesche, Von der Toleranz zur Parität in Österreich, 
1781-1861. Leipzig, 1911. 
For commercial policy the following must be mentioned : 
Adolf Beer, Die österreichische Handelspolitik im 19. Jahr-
hundert. Vienna, 1891. 
Ludwig Lang, Hundert Jahre Zollpolitik 1805-1905. Trans-
lated from the Magyar. Vienna, 1906. 
Biographies or memoirs of the most important personalities 
are given in alphabetic order; some knowledge of the 
history will make it possible to understand the volumes 
which come under consideration for special departments of 
interest. 
Friedrich Ferdinand Graf von Beust, Aus drei Viertel-J ahr-
hunterten. 1866 bis 1885, vol. ii. Stuttgart, 1887. 
Oskar Criste, Das Buch vom Erzherzog Carl Vienna, 1914 
(Popular abridgment of the big three-volume bio 
graphy.) 
Gustav Steinbach, Franz Deak, Eine Biographie. Published 
by Manz, Vienna, 1888. 
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Karl Ritter von Landmann, Prinz Eugen von Savoyen. 
(From Weltgeschichte in Characterbildem). Munich, 1905. 
Heinrich von Sybel, Prince Eugen. Munich, 1861. 
Richard Charmatz, Adolf Fischof. Cotta, Stuttgart, 1910. 
Arthur Görgei, Mein Leben und Wirken in Ungarn in dem 
fahren 1848 und 1849, 2 vols. Leipzig, 1852. 
F. von Krones, Moritz von Kaiserfeld. Leipzig, 1888. 
Ludwig Kossuth, Meine Schriften aus der Emigration, 3 vols. 
Pressburg, 1880 and 1882. 
K. Th. Heigel, Essays aus neuerer Geschichte. Bamberg, 1892. 
(Essays about Metternich.) 
Aus Metternichs nachgelassenen Papieren. Edited by Prince 
Richard Metternich-Winneburg. Vienna, 1880. (Vol i. 
of this four-volumed work contains the autobiographical 
notes of the Chancellor of State.) 
Feldmarschall Graf Radetzky, Eine biographische Skizze nach 
den eigenen Diktaten. B y an Austrian Veteran. Cotta 
Stuttgart, 1858. 
C. Wolfsgruber, Joseph Othmar Kardinal Rauscher. Freiburg 
in Breisgau, 1888. 
Albert Eberhard Friedrich Schäffle, Aus meinem Leben, 
2 vols. Berlin, 1905. 
Hugo Kerchnawe and Alois Veltze, Feldmarschall Karl Fürst 
zu Schwarzenberg. Vienna, 19x3. 
A. F. Berger, Felix Fürst zu Schwarzenberg, k.k. Minister-
präsident. Leipzig, 1853. 
Adolf Beer, Aus Wilhelm von Tegetthoffs Nachlasz. Vienna 
1882. 
L. von Ranke, Geschichte Wallensteins. Leipzig, several 
editions. 
* * * * * * 
The relations of individual nations to each other and to 
the State are of the greatest importance. Although the 
pamphlet literature is so extensive there is yet a lack of 
comprehensive single presentations giving full informa-
tion. 
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First of all we may perhaps refer to the compilation : 
Die Völker Österreich-Ungarns, Ethnographische und kultur-
historische Schilderungen, 12 vols. Vienna, 1881, etc. 
(Special portions of it are quite applicable even to-day.) 
Further may be mentioned : 
Ludwig Schlesinger, Geschichte Böhmens, 2nd edition. 
Prague, 1870. (A detailed account only up to the end 
of the eighteenth century.) 
Teutsch, G. D., Geschichte der Siebenbürger Sachsen, 2 vols., 
3rd edition. Kronstadt, 1899. (The third volume is a 
continuation by Fr. Teutsch up to 1815. Kronstadt, 
igio.) 
Raimund Fr. Kaindl, Geschichte der Deutschen in Ungarn. 
Gotha, ig i2 . 
Alfred von Skene, Entstehen und Entwickelung der slawisch-
nationalen Bewegung in Böhmen und Mähren in 19. 
Jahrhundert. Vienna, i8g3-
Wilhelm Kosch, Die Deutschen in Österreich und ihr Ausgleich 
mit den Tschechen. Leipzig, 190g. 
Max Menger, Der böhmische Ausgleich. Stuttgart, 1891. 
Karl Türk, Böhmen, Mähren und Schlesien. (From the col-
lection : Der Kamf um das Deutschtum.) Munich, 1898. 
Heinrich Rauchberg, Die Bedeutung der Deutschen in 
Österreich. (From Neue Zeit-und Streitfragen.) Dresden, 
1908. 
R. W. Seton-Watson (Scotus Viator), Die südslavische Frage 
im Habsburger Reiche. Berlin, igi3-
Herrn. Jg. Bidermann, Die Italiener im Tiroler Provinzial-
verbande. Innsbruck, 1874. 
Gregor Kupzanko, Das Schicksal der Ruthenen. Leipzig, 
1887. 
Roman Sembratowycz, Polonia inedenta. Frankfurt-on-
Main, igo7. 
In addition the collection of material: 
Alfred Fischer, Das österreichische Sprachenrecht, 2nd edition. 
Brünn. Published by Irrgang. 
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We leave aside intentionally the older German histories 
and hence pass over the great works of Ranke, Raumer 
Giesebrecht, Ritsch, Häusser, Schlosser, Lamprecht and 
others Similarly we pass over also the political dictionaries 
and almost all properly specialist literature. 
The previous history and the history of the German 
Empire is not to be found complete in any single book, since 
the greatest historical works of modern times are those that 
deal only with sections of the subject. We may consider 
the following as complete accounts : 
Heinrich v. Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte im ig Jahr-
hundert, 5 vols. Leipzig, 1908-13, S. Hirzel. (The 
chief work on the preparatory period; goes down to 
1848.) 
Br. Gebhardt, Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, 2 vols 
5th edition. Stuttgart, 1913, Union, Deutsche Verlafis-
gesellschaft. 
D. Schäfer, Deutsche Geschichte, 2 vols., 4 th edition. Jena, 
1914, S. Fischer. (International politics.) 
G. Egelhaaf, Geschichte der neuesten Zeit vom Frankfurter 
Frieden bis zur Gegenwart, 5th edition. Stuttgart, 1915 
C. Krabbe. (Much intelligible detailed material.)' 
G. Kaufmann, Politische Geschichte Deutschlands im 19 
Jahrhundert. Berlin, 1912, G. Bondi. (National and 
liberal.) 
R. Schwemer, Vom Bund zum Reich, 2nd edition. Leipzig, 
1912, B. G. Teubner. (Aus Natur und Geisteswelt, 
vol. 102.) 
Schulthess, Europäischer Geschichtskalender. Munich, C. H. 
Beck. 
Wippermann, Deutscher Geschichtskalender. Leipzig, Felix 
Meiner. 
Dahlmann-Waitz, Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte, 
8th edition. Leipzig, 1912, F. K. Koehler. 
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Statistisches Jahrbuch Jür das Deutsche Reich. Issued b y the 
Imperial Department of Statistics. Berlin P u t t k a m -
mer and Mühlbrecht. (The most interesting book 
about Germany.) 
The following relate to the previous history of the founda-
tion of the Empire : 
Die Befreiung 1813, 1814. 1815. Urkunden, Berichte und 
Briefe. Dusseldorf-Ebenhausen, W . Langewiesche. 
(Clear, popular.) 
1848, Der Vorkampf deutscher Einheit und Freiheit. Urkun-
den, Berichte und Briefe. Düsseldorf-Ebenhausen W 
Langewiesche. (The same.) 
G. Mollat, Reden und Redner des ersten Deutschen Parla-
ments. Osterwieck, 1895, A . W . Zickfeld. (Good 
introduction into the spirit of 1848.) 
Fr. Meinecke, Weltbürgertum mid Nationalstaat, 2nd edition 
Munich, 1911 . R . Oldenbourg. (Very valuable for 
the distinction between the " G r e a t e r G e r m a n y " and 
the " Lesser Germany " parties.) 
W . Maurenbrecher, Gründung des Deutschen Reiches 1859-
1871, 4 t h edition. Leipzig, 1910, C. C. M. Pfeffer 
H" X'Sybel, Begründing des Deutschen Reiches durch 
Wilhelm I. Popular edition, 7 vols., 3rd edition 
Mumch, 1913. R. Oldenbourg. (The chief book for 
the Bismarckian period. R a t h e r lengthy.) 
The literature relating to Bismarck is v e r y extensive W e 
mention only the principal works : 
Gedanken und Erinnerungen, edited b y H. K o h l popular 
edition, 2 vols. Stuttgart , 1915, Cotta Nachf. N e w 
terge octavo edition, 2 vols. (The vital book for 
German politics.) 
Bismarck's Gesammelte Reden mit verbindlich Geschichtlichen 
P R S R e c l a m M ' b y ^ ^ 1 3 ^ L d p Z i g ' l 8 9 5 ~ 9 9 ' 
Heinr. v . Poschinger, Preussen im Bundestag 1851-1850 
Documents of the R o y a l Prussian Bundestag-Gesand-
338 CENTRAL EUROPE 
schaft, edited by H. Poschinger, 4 parts, 2nd edition. 
Leipzig, 1882-84, S. Hirzel. (Poschinger's other collec-
tions also come under consideration.) 
Heinr. Friedjung, Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in 
Deutschland, 1859-1866, 2 vols, 9th edition. Stuttgart, 
1912 and 1913, Cotta Nachf. (This brilliant Austrian 
work relates also to the history of the German Empire.) 
For the post-Bismarckian period the following may be 
mentioned : 
Karl Lamprecht, Deutsche Geschichte der jüngsten Vergangen-
heit und Gegenwart, vols. i. and ii. Geschichte der 
wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entwicklung in den 70er-
90er fahren des 19. Jahrhunderts, Geschichte der inneren 
und äusseren Politik in den 70-90 fahren des 19. fahr-
hunderts, 5th edition. Berlin, 1912 and 1915, Weid-
mann. 
Fürst Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Denkwürdigkeiten, edited 
by Fr. Curtius under the direction of Prince AI. zu 
Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, 2 vols. Stuttgart, 1906. 
Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 2 vols, cheap edition, 1914. 
(Recollections of the third Imperial Chancellor.) 
Fürst Bülow, Reden, 4 vols. Leipzig, 1914, Ph. Reclam. 
(Quite interesting as supplementary reading.) 
Deutschland unter Kaiser Wilhelm II., 3 vols. Berlin, 1914, 
Reimar Hobbing. (A many-sided compilation.) 
Imperial constitution and administration, statistical: 
Graf Hue de Grais, Handbuch der Verfassung und Verwaltung 
in Preussen und des Deutschen Reiches, 22nd edition. 
Berlin, 1914, Springer. (Practical, a much used hand-
book.) 
P. Laband, Deutsches Reichstaatsrecht, 6th edition. (Collec-
tion : Das öjfentt. Recht der Gegenwart.) Tübingen, 1912, 
J. C. B. Mohr. 
C. Loening, Reichsverfassung, 4th edition. (Collection : Aus 
Natur und Geisteswelt, vol. 34.) Leipzig, 1913, B. G. 
Teubner. 
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Der deutsche Staatsbürger, 2nd edition. Leipzig, 1912, 
C. E. Poeschel. (Easily understood civic information.) 
* * * * * * 
Only a scanty selection can be offered in regard to the 
federated States of the German Empire. For Prussia : 
W. Pierson, Preussische Geschichte, 2 vols., 10th edition. 
Berlin, 1910, Gebr. Paetel. 
O. Hintze, Die Hohenzollern und ihr Werk, 500 Jahre vater-
ländischer Geschichte. Berlin, 1915, P. Parey. 
Gerh. Anschütz, Die VerJassungsurkünde für den Preuss. 
Staat, 2 vols. Berlin, 1912, 0. Häring. (Detailed 
commentary.) 
A. Arndt, Die Verfassungs-Urkunde für den Preussischen 
Staat, 7th edition. Berlin, 1911, J. Guttentag. (With 
short explanations.) 
C. Bornhak, Grundriss des Verwaltungsrechts in Preussen, 
4th edition. Leipzig, 1912, Deichert Nachf. 
Statistisches Jahrbuch des Preussischen Staates, issued by the 
Prussian Royal Statistical Department, Berlin. 
To the Prussian books we add some German Imperial 
Polish literature : 
Ludwig Bernhard, Die Polenfrage, Das polnische Gemein-
wesen im Preuss. Staat. 2nd edition. Munich, Leipzig, 
1910. Duncker and Humblot. (Impressive essays.) 
Gg. Cleinow, Die Zukunft Polens, vol. i. Wirtschaft, vol. ii. 
Politik. Leipzig, 1908 and 1914, Fr. W7 Grunow. 
(Much material, poorly arranged.) 
Die Deutsche Ostmark, issued by the Deutschen Ostmarken-
verein. Lissa, 1913, 0. Eulitz. (Polemical writing 
against Poland.) 
C. Brandenburger, Polnische Geschichte. Leipzig, Göschen. 
(Göschen Collection, 338.) 
For the constitution and situation in the larger federated 
States the following are instructive ; 
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F. Stoerk and F. W. Rauchhaupt, Handbuch der deutschen 
Verfassungen, 2nd edition. Leipzig, 1913, Duncker and 
Humblot. (Gives the constitutions of all the individual 
States.) 
Karl Braun, Aus der deutschen Kleinstaaterei, Randglossen zu 
den politischen Wandlungen der letzten fahre. Aus den 
Papieren eines deutschen Abgeordneten. Bromberg, 1878. 
(Cheerful, interesting reminiscences.) 
C. Brandenburg, Der Eintritt der süddeutschen Staaten in den 
Norddeutschen Bund. Berlin, 1910, Gebr. Paetel. 
H. Ockel, Bayerische Geschichte. Leipzig, Göschen. (Göschen 
Collection, 160.) 
Th. Flathe, Geschichte des Kurstaates und Königreichs 
Sachsen, 3 vols., 2nd edition. Gotha, 1867-1873, 
Fr. A. Perthes. 
O. Kämmel, Sachsens Geschichte. Leipzig, Göschen. (Göschen 
Collection, 100.) 
K. Weller, Württembergs Geschichte. Leipzig, Göschen. 
(Göschen Collection, 462.) 
A. Dove, Grossherzog Friedrich von Baden als Landesherr und 
deutschev Fürst. Heidelberg, 1902, C. Winter. 
* * * * Hc * 
In passing to domestic politics we shall first notice the 
handbooks of the parties and political groups. 
Konservatives Handbuch. Berlin, 1911, R. Hobbing. 
Politisch-soziales A.B.C. Handbuch für die Mitglieder der 
Zentrumspartei. Stuttgart, 1900, Süddeutsche Verlags-
buchhandlung. 
Agrarisches Handbuch. Berlin, 1911, Farmers' Union. 
(Chief source of information for the agrarian movement.) 
Politisches Handbuch der Nationalliberalen Partei. Berlin, 
1914. Published by the National Liberal Party. 
(Comprehensive.) 
Eugen Richter, Politisches A.B.C. (Out of print. The 
best of the older handbooks.) 
Martin Wenck, Handbuch für liberale Politik. Berlin-
Schöneberg, 1911, Fortschritt (publishers of the Hilfe). 
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G. Gothein, Agrarpolitisches Handbuch. Berlin, 1910, Lieb-
heit and Thiessen. (Free Trade liberal, full of signifi-
cance.) 
Handbuch für sozialdem. Landtagswähler. Berlin, 1913. 
Publishers, Vorwärts. 
Handbuch des alldeutschen Verbandes, 18th edition. Munich, 
1915, Lehmann. 
For the history of parties : 
Friedrich Naumann, Die politischen Parteien in Deutschland. 
Berlin, 1911, Georg Reimer. (Figures out of date.) 
F. Salomon, Deutsche Parteiprogramme, 2nd edition, vol. i. 
from 1844-1871, vol. ii. from 1871-1890. Leipzig, 
B. G. Teubner. 
Oskar Klein-Hattingen, Geschichte des deutschen Liberalismus, 
cheap edition, 2 vols. Berlin-Schöneberg, 1912. Pub-
lishers of the Hilfe. (Abundant historical material.) 
Oskar Stillich, Die politischen Parteien in Deutschland, 2 vols. 
Vol i., Die Konservativen ; vol. ii., Der Liberalismus. 
Leipzig, 1908 and 1911, Klinkhardt. 
F. Mehring, Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, 4 vols., 
4th edition. Stuttgart, 1909, Dietz Nachf. (Partisan, 
but clever.) 
Werner Sombart, Sozialismus und soziale Bewegung in 19. 
Jahrhundert. Jena, 1908, G. Fischer. (Excellent in-
troduction.) 
Hugo Preusz, Das deutsche Volk und die Politik. Jena, 1915, 
C. Diederichs. (Polit. Bibl.) (Valuable contemporary 
book of liberal politics.) 
For special departments : 
August Pfannkuche, Staat und Kirche. Leipzig, 1915, 
B. G. Teubner. 
W. v. Lexis, Das TJnterrichtswesen im Deutschen Reich 
4 vols. Berlin, 1904, Behrend and Co. 
Gertrud Bäumer, Die Frau im Volkswirtschaft und 
Staatsleben der Gegenwart. Stuttgart, 1914, Deutsche 
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Verlagsanstalt. (Complete summary of the German 
femininist movement.) 
.^Important books giving summaries on foreign politics, 
the army and the navy : 
Count von Reventlow, Deutschlands auswärtige Politik 
1888-1913, 2nd edition. Berlin, 1914, C. S. Mittler 
and Son. (An important book of the chronicle type.) 
Paul Rohrbach, Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern, 
4th edition. Stuttgart, 1912, J. Engelhorns Nachf. 
(Thoughtful introduction to foreign politics.) 
E. Zimmermann, Unsere Kolonien. Berlin, 1914, Ullstein 
and Co. 
A. v. Löbell, Das deutsche Heer. Stuttgart, Greiner and 
Pfeiffer. (Bücher des Wissens, vol. 92.) 
Nauticus, Jahrbuch für Deutschlands Seeinteressen. Berlin, 
E. S. Mittler and Son. 
General economic policy is dealt with to suit the needs of 
political readers in : 
Friedrich Naumann, Neudeutsche Wirtschaftspolitik, 3rd 
edition. Berlin, 1911, Georg Reimer. 
Werner Sombart, Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft des 19. 
f ahrhunderts, 2nd edition. Berlin, 1909, Georg Bondi. 
Popular edition, 1913. 
Commercial policy : 
W. Lötz, Ideen der deutschen Handelspolitik 1860-1891. 
Leipzig, 1892, Verein für Sozialpolitik. 
Richard Calwer, Jahrbuch der Weltwirtschaft. Jena, G. 
Fischer. 
Lusensky, Einführung in die deutsche Zoll-und Handels-
politik. Hanover, 1913, Helwing. (Important for the 
preliminary work for commercial treaties.) 
Agrarian policy : 
A. Buchenberger, Grundzüge der deutschen Agrarpolitik, 
2nd edition. Berlin, 1899, P. Parey. 
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Th. von der Goltz, Geschichte der deutschen Landwirthschajt, 
vol. ii., Das 19. Jahrhundert. Stuttgart, 1903, Cotta 
Nachf. 
Die Deutsche Landwirtschaft, bearbeite v. Kaiserl. Statis-
tischen Amt. Berlin, 1913, Pultkammer and Mühl-
brecht. (The best contemporary summary.) 
Industrial policy : 
Hiibener, Die deutsche Eisenindustrie. Leipzig, 1913, G. A. 
Glöckner. (Handelshochschulbibl., vol. 14.) 
Die Schwereisenindustrie im deutschen Zollgebiet, ihre Entwick-
lung und ihre Arbeiten. Stuttgart, 1912, A. Schlicke 
and Co. 
A. Oppel, Die deutsche Textilindustrie. Leipzig, 1912, 
Duncker and Humblot. 
F. Baumgarten and A. Meszleny, Kartelle und Trusts. 
Berlin, 1906, O. Liebmann. 
Tschierschky, Kartell und Trust. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner. 
(Aus Natur und Geisteswelt, 522.) 
P. Krusch, Die Versorgung Deutschlands mit metallischen 
Rohstoffen. Leipzig, 1913, Beit and Co. 
C. Christiansen, Chemische und Farbenindustrie. Tübingen, 
1914, J. C. B. Mohr. 
M. Levy, Die Organisation und Bedeutung der deutschen 
Elektrizitätsindustrie. (Contained in special industrial 
reports, series 8.) Berlin, 1914, Georg Reimer. 
Financial policy : 
R. Helfferich, Studien über Geld-und Bankwesen. Berlin, 
1900, J. Guttentag. (Out of print.) 
R. Helfferich, Deutschlands Volkswohlstand, 1888-1913, 4th 
edition. Berlin, 1914, G. Stilke. 
J. Riesser, Von 1848 bis heute, Bank-und Wirthsch-Studie. 
Populär edition of Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre 
Konzentration. Jena, 1912, G. Fischer. 
Social policy : 
Leopold von Wiese, Einführung in die Sozialpolitik. Leipzig, 
1910, G. Glöckner. (Handelshochschulbibl., vol. 8.) 
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H. Jastrow, Sozialpolitik unci Verwaltungs-Wissenschaft. 
Berlin, 1902, Georg Reimer. (Fundamental.) 
Heinr. Herkner, Die Arbeiterfrage, 5th edition. Berlin, 1908, 
J. Guttentag. (Gives the history.) 
A. Manes, Sozialversicherung. Berlin, G. J. Göschen. 
(Göschen Collection, 267.) 
Of course this is only a very small selection from the 
abundance of national economic and socio-political literature. 
* * * * * * 
We shall conclude, like our Austrian colleague, with a 
brief enumeration of biographies and memoirs, which are 
of importance for the political history : 
R. Koser, Geschichte Friedrichs des Grossen, 3 vols., 4th and 
5th edition. Stuttgart, 1912-13, Cotta Nachf. ' Popular 
edition, 6th and 8th edition, 1913. (Reputable standard 
work.) 
M. Lehmann, Freiherr von Stein, 3 vols. Leipzig, 1902-5, 
S. Hirzel (vol i. out of print.) (Inner history of thé 
wars of liberation.) 
H. Delbrück, Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen R. 
Gneisenau, 2 vols, in one book. Berlin, 1908, G. Stilke. 
(Military and contemporary history.) 
J. R. Sepp, Görres. Berlin, 1896, E. Hofmann and Co. 
(Geisteshelden, vol. 23.) (Catholic romanticist.) 
Friedrich Meineike, Radowitz und die deutsche Revolution. 
Berlin, 1913, Mittler and Son. (Important for 1848.) 
L. Parisius, Freiherr Leopold von Hoverbeck, 2 vols. Berlin, 
1900, J. Guttentag. (About the older Prussian 
liberalism.) 
Leopold von Gerlach, Denkwürdigkeiten aus dem Leben, 
2 vols. Berlin, 1892. (The older Conservative Berlin.) 
Karl Jentsch, Friedrich List. Berlin, 1901, E. Hofmann 
and Co. (The prophet of the eastward extension.) 
A. Bergengrün, David Hausemann. Berlin, 1901. (The 
rise of modern capitalism.) 
H. Oncken, Lassalle. Stuttgart, 1904, Fr. Frommann. 
(Beginnings of Social Democracy.) 
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R. Haym, Das Leben Max Dunckers. Berlin, 1891, R. 
Gaertner. (Liberal developments.) 
Briefe von und an Freiherr W. E. Ketteler, edited by J. M. 
Reich. Mainz, 1879, Kirchheim. (Beginnings of the 
Centre.) 
E. Mareks, Kaiser Wilhelm I., Eine Biographie 6-7 
editions. Munich, 1910, Duncker and Humblot. (Poli-
tical history.) 
Oskar Klein-Hattingen, Bismarck und seine Welt, 3 vols. 
Berlin, Dümmler. (Critical liberal history of Bismarck.) 
M. Lenz, Geschichte Bismarcks, 4th edition. Munich, 1914, 
Duncker and Humblot. 
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* * * * * * 
With these memorials of notable men we conclude our 
work. They have done what they could. Let us do what 
we can and ought ! 
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so learned that for him its pages h a v e nothing n e w . " 
[Continued on next page 
P. S. KING & SON, LTD. , WESTMINSTER 
Kings Latest Publications 
{Continued^ 
Demy 8vo. Cloth. fc. net. Inland Postage U 
R U S S I A T O - D A Y 
Issued by the authority of the Russian Imperial Ministry of Finance 
Edited by ARTHUR RAFFALOVICH 
CONTENTS : Brief Geographical Sketch—National Education—Agriculture 
—Cotton and Cotton-growing—Factories and Workshops—Mining and 
Metallurgy—Machine Industry—Forestry—Fisheries—Internal Transport 
—Posts, Telegraphs, and Telephones—Internal Trade of Russia—Foreign 
Trade m Russia—Public Finances—Money and Credit—The Drink 
Question in Russia—Formation of Joint-Stock Companies—Appendices. 
Royal 8vo. Cloth. 4 5 o pages. 12s. net. Inland Postage, 7d. 
Postage Abroad, Is. 
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR 
Russian Consular Officers 
and all persons having relations with Russia 
SECOND EDITION—REVISED AND AMPLIFIED 
By BARON A. HEYKING, D.C.L. 
IMPERIAL RUSSIAN CONSUL-GENERAL IN LONDON 
The Times.—" I t covers so much ground and is supplemented by so much 
other legal information, including a chapter on the legal position of 
foreigners m Russia, that every one who has dealings with Russia will 
undoubtedly find in it something which will afford him Help and guidance." 
CHEAP EDITION 
Demy 8vo. Cloth. 816 pp., with very full Index and Glossary, ^s. 6d. net. 
Inland Postage, 6d. 
A T E X T - B O O K F O R U S E I N C O L L E G E S A N D B Y A L L 
S T U D E N T S O F H I S T O R Y 
Select Documents Illustrating 
Mediaeval & Modern History 
By E M I L R E I C H 
D O C T O R J U R I S 
AUTHOR OF " FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN EUROPE " ; " SUCCESS AMONG NATIONS " ; 
" ATLAS OF ENGLISH HISTORY," ETC. ETC. 
Quarterly Review.—" The book will prove of great value to all who are 
desirous of obtaining a sound foundation for their knowledge of history." 
P. S. KING & SON, LTD., WESTMINSTER 




